英文论文2000字经济

英文论文2000字经济篇一：英语论文-中国在世界经济中的优势与劣势

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专业商务英语论文成果

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中国在世界经济中的优势与劣势

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Index

Abstract……………….6

Chapter1IntroductionandOverview………………...7Chapter2China’sStrengthsintheWorldEconomy…………………8

2.1Economy-orientedPolicy……………………8

2.2HugeMarket………………...10

2.3LowCostandHighQualityofHumanResource…………...11

Chapter3China’sWeaknessesintheWorldEconomy……………13

3.1AbsenceofCreditLegalandJudicialSystem………………13

3.2InefficiencyinStateOwnedEnterprisesandFinancialSystem…………….13

3.3InadequateInfrastructure…………………...15

3.4UnemploymentandIncomeDisparity……..16

3.5Pollution……………………17Conclusion……………18

Reference……………..19

篇二：EconomicEssay经济英文论文

TheLikonomics

--TheLikonomics--

“Likonomics”,thetermtodescribeChinesePremierLiKeqiang`seconomicpolicy.WascoinedonJune27bythreeeconomistsatBarclaysCapital.LikeThatcherism,Reaganomics,andmorerecently“Abenomics”,LikonomicshasbecomethebuzzwordtodescribetheimplicationsofChinasneweconomicprogram.Andwhatis“Likonomics”?TheBarclaysCapital`seconomistsalsogiveouraexplain,“Likonomics”wasaseriesofmeasuresadoptedbytheStateCouncil.ThemeasureswerepassedtoensurethesustainabilityofChina`seconomy.“whichcouldbesummarizedasLikonomics,consistsofthreekeypillars:nostimulus,Deleveragingandstructuralreform.ItismeantheChinaneedtofreethemarket,andstopthegovernmentcontrolthemarket.Andthisnewpoliceisalong-termobjectives,sothenextthreeyearsthegrewrateofChinesequarterofEconomicwillbereducedatleast4%.

“Sinceassumingofficeinmid-March,PremierLiKeqianghastakenadifferentpolicypath.Itskeyeconomicpolicyframework,whichcouldbesummarizedasLikonomics,consistsofthreekeypillars:nostimulus,deleveragingandstructuralreform.”(ChinaDaily07/05/2023page9byHuangYiping).Inthenews,weknowthethreesolutions,“nostimulus”,“Deleveraging”and“structuralreform”.The“stimulus”meanthegovernmentintheshorttime,

followingtheliabilitiesorexpandthemoneysupplytostimulatetheeconomy,butatthesametimetheinflationalsocoming,SothefirstwayistodecreasetheChineseinflation.Andthesecondsolutionis“Deleveraging”,thissolution`smeaningis“repay”,repaythemoneythatborrowbeforetheeconomiccrisis,atthesametimethemostassets,suchasstocks,bonds,realestatethepricesofthoseassetswillbedecrease,andthecountry`seconomyalsowillbereduced.Thelastsolutionisthe“structuralreform”,everyoneknowthegovernmenthasnoabletocontrolthemarket,becausethegovernmentcannotgetallinformationforthegovernment,butitjustisthehalfreasonforthissolution,theotherpartisthe“corruption”intheChinesegovernmentsystem,thepowerofficialhaveabletocontroltheeconomy.SothePremierLiKeqiangbuildthe“freetradezone”inShanghai,inthisareanoonecancontroltheeconomy,thatmeaneverythinghappeninthisareaareallformthemarket`sselfadjusting.

Infactthewords“nostimulus”,“Deleveraging”and“structuralreform”areprofessional,soIusemyownwordtoexplainthe“Likonomics”.Ihavefoursteps.Firststep,only“fight”theinflationanddonotcaretheChineseEconomygrowrate,rightnowinChinatheRIBORbetweenbanksisfrom2%increaseto30%,itiseffectivetostopthebanks`sventureinvestment,because

whentheRIBORincreasethebankhavetokeepthe“workingcapital”intheirownhand,theyhavenoenoughabletopaytheextremelyhighinterestrate,sothatthetotalmoneyinthemarketgoingtodecrease.ButatthesametimetheChina“TotalSocialFinancing”itreduced43%.Secondlystep,isdecreasetheTAX,assameasthepictureshowas,rightnowtheChinesetaspriceisstandonthepointA,andifthegovernmentreducedthetaxpricethetotaltaxrevenuewill

be

increase.Thirdlystep,isfreethecoal`sprice,becauseinChinathecoalisthemostimportantresource,peopleusethecoaltogenerateelectricity,warmandothers,butonthecoalhave88kindsoftax,andthegovernmentdisagreetotradethecoalwithothercountries,sothatifthegovernmentstoptocontrolthecoal`sprice,thepricewillbedecrease,thentheburdenofenterpriseswillaccordinglydrop.Fourthstep,andalsothelaststepistalkabout

thegovernmentcontrol.Weallknow,thatifthegovernmentcontrolthemarkettheefficiencyofmarketwillgoesdown,becausethegovernmentcannotgetalltheinformationinthemarket.Sothe“Freetradezone”wasborninShanghai,inthiszonethegovernmentcannotcontrol,andtheotherlargeenterprisealsocannotintervene,itisa100%freemarket.ThePremierLiisusethiswaytobreakthebureaucracyinChina.

Rightnow,theChinaisthefastestdevelopcountryintheworld,andatthesametimethestagflationalsoiscoming.SothePremierLiusetheextremelyhardcosttostoptheChineseinflationincrease.Wedon`tknowwhatwillbehappenintheaftertenyears,eventwentyyears,theChina,standonthetopofworld,everyactionofChinacanhaveabletoeffecttheinternationaleconomic.

Alltheinformationsarefromthosewebsite:

篇三：一篇经济类英文论文(含中文翻译)

TheProblemofSocialCost

社会成本问题

RONALDCOASE

罗纳德·科斯

RonaldCoaseisProfessorEmeritusatUniversityofChicagoLawSchoolandaNobelLaureateinEconomics.ThisarticleisfromTheJournalofLawandEconomics(October1960).Severalpassagesdevotedtoextendeddiscussionsoflegaldecisions

havebeenomitted.

罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥高校法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。本文是其外法学与经济学杂志（1960年10月）。特地的法律问题的打算的延长争论的几个

段落已被省略。

I.THEPROBLEMTOBEEXAMINED

Thispaperisconcernedwiththoseactionsofbusinessfirmswhichhaveharm-fuleffectsonothers.Thestandardexampleisthatofafactorythesmokefromwhichhasharmfuleffectsonthoseoccupyingneighbouringproperties.Theeconomicanalysisofsuchasituationhasusuallyproceededintermsofadivergencebetweentheprivateandsocialproductofthefactory,inwhicheconomistshavelargelyfollowedthetreatmentofPigouinTheEconomiesofWelfare.Theconclusiontowhichthiskindofanalysisseemstohaveledmosteconomistsisthatitwouldbedesirabletomaketheownerofthefactoryli-ableforthedamagecausedtothoseinjuredbythesmoke,oralternatively,toplaceataxonthefactoryownervaryingwiththeamountofsmokeproducedandequivalentinmoneytermstothedamageitwouldcause,orfinally,toexcludethefactoryfromresidentialdistricts(andpresumablyfromotherareasinwhichtheemissionofsmokewouldhaveharmfuleffectsonothers).Itismycontentionthatthesuggestedcoursesofactionareinappropriate,inthattheyleadtoresultswhicharenotnecessarily,orevenusually,desirable.

一、要检查的问题

本文关注的是这些行动的企业有损害他人有用的影响。标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占据邻近物业的有害影响。在这种状况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。这种分析的结论，好像使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最终，它会导致排解住宅区（也许是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响）工厂厂主不同的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。行动的建议的课程是不合适的，由于它们导致的结果是不肯定，甚至是通常状况下，可取的，它是我的论点。

II.THERECIPROCALNATUREOFTHEPROBLEM

Thetraditionalapproachhastendedtoobscurethenatureofthechoicethathastobe

made.ThequestioniscommonlythoughtofasoneinwhichAinflictsharmonBandwhathastobedecidedis:howshouldwerestrainA?Butthisiswrong.Wearedealingwithaproblemofareciprocalnature.Toavoidtheharmto,BwouldinflictharmonA.Therealquestionthathastobedecidedis:shouldAbeallowedtoharmBorshouldBbeallowedtoharmA?Theproblemistoavoidthemoreseriousharm.Iinstancedinmypreviousarticlethecaseofaconfectionerthenoiseandvibrationsfromwhosemachinerydisturbedadoctorinhiswork.Toavoidharmingthedoctorwouldinflictharmontheconfectioner.Theproblemposedbythiscasewasessentiallywhetheritwasworthwhile,asaresultofrestrictingthemethodsofproductionwhichcouldbeusedbytheconfectioner,tosecuremoredoctoringatthecostofareducedsupplyofconfectioneryproducts.Anotherexampleisaffordedbytheproblemofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsonneighbouringland.Ifitisinevitablethatsomecattlewillstray,allincreaseinthesupplyofmeatcanonlybeobtainedattheexpenseofadecreaseinthesupplyofcrops.Thenatureofthechoiceisclear:meatorcrops.Whatanswershouldbegivenis,ofcourse,notclearunlessweknowthevalueofwhatisobtainedaswellasthevalueofwhatissacrificedtoobtainit.Togiveanotherexample,ProfessorGeorgeJ.Stiglerinstancesthecontaminationofastream.Ifweassumethattheharmfuleffectofthepollutionisthatitkillsthefish,thequestiontobedecidedis:isthevalueofthefishlostgreaterorlessthanthevalueoftheproductwhichthecontaminationofthestreammakespossible.Itgoesalmostwithoutsayingthatthisproblemhastobelookedatintotalandatthemargin.

二、互惠性的问题

传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B上一个敌人造成的损害和什么要打算的是：我们应当如何抑制一个？但这是错误的。我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。为了避开损害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必需打算是：应当允许A损害B或应允许B损害吗？问题是要避开更严峻的损害。我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械担心医生在他的工作状况。为了避开伤及医生会造成损害的糕点。基本上这种状况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供应削减，成本篡改。另一个例子是赐予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。假如这是不行避开的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得全部的肉类供应增加作物供应削减开支。选择的性质是明确的：肉类或农作物。应赐予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。给另一个例如，教授乔治·J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。假如我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的鱼，将要打算的问题是：是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。

III.THEPRICINGSYSTEMWITHLIABILITYFORDAMAGE

Iproposetostartmyanalysisbyexaminingacaseinwhichmosteconomistswouldpresumablyagreethattheproblemwouldbesolvedinacompeletelysatisfactorymanner:whenthedamagingbusinesshastopayforalldamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly(strictlythismeansthattheoperationofapricingsystemis

withoutcost).

Agoodexampleoftheproblemunderdiscussionisaffordedbythecaseofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsgrowingonneighbouringland.Letussup-posethatafarmerandcattle-raiserareoperatingonneighbouringproperties.Letusfurthersupposethat,withoutanyfencingbetweentheproperties,anincreaseinthesizeofthecattle-raiser’sherdincreasesthetotaldamagetothefarmer’scrops.Whathappenstothemarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreasesisanothermatter.Thisdependsonwhetherthecattletendtofollowoneanotherortoroamsidebyside,onwhethertheytendtobemoreorlessrestlessasthesizeoftheherdincreasesandonothersimilarfactors.Formyimmediatepurpose,itisimmaterialwhatassumptionismadeaboutmarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreases.

Giventhatthecattle-raiserisliableforthedamagecaused,theadditionalannualcostimposedonthecattle-raiserifheincreasedhisherdfrom,say,2to3steersis$3andindecidingonthesizeoftheherd,hewilltakethisintoaccountalongwithhisothercosts.Thatis,hewillnotincreasethesizeoftheherdunlessthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproduced(assumingthatthecattle-raiserslaughtersthecattle)isgreaterthantheadditionalcoststhatthiswillentail,includingthevalueoftheadditionalcropsdestroyed.Ofcourse,if,bytheemploymentofdogs,herdsmen,aeroplanes,mobileradioandothermeans,theamountofdamagecanbereduced,thesemeanswillbeadoptedwhentheircostislessthanthevalueofthecropwhichtheypreventbeinglost.Giventhattheannualcostoffencingis$9,thecattle-raiserwhowishedtohaveaherdwith4steersormorewouldpayforfencingtobeerectedandmaintained,assumingthatothermeansofattainingthesameendwouldnotdosomorecheaply.Whenthefenceiserected,themarginalcostduetotheliabilityfordamagebecomeszero,excepttotheextentthatanincreaseinthesizeoftheherdnecessitatesastrongerandthereforemoreexpensivefencebecausemoresteersareliabletoleanagainstitatthesametime.But,ofcourse,itmaybecheaperforthecattle-raisernottofenceandtopayforthedamagedcrops,asinmyarithmeticalexample,with3orfewersteers.

Itmightbethoughtthatthefactthatthecattle-raiserwouldpayforallcropsdamagedwouldleadthefarmertoincreasehisplantingifacattle-raisercametooccupytheneighbouringproperty.Butthisisnotso.Ifthecropwaspreviouslysoldinconditionsofperfectcompetition,marginalcostwasequaltopricefortheamountofplantingundertakenandanyexpansionwouldhavereducedtheprofitsofthefarmer.Inthenewsituation,theexistenceofcropdamagewouldmeanthatthefarmerwouldselllessontheopenmarketbuthisreceiptsforagivenproductionwouldremainthesame,sincethecattle-raiserwouldpaythemarketpriceforanycropdamaged.Ofcourse,ifcattle-raisingcommonlyinvolvedthedestructionofcrops,thecomingintoexistenceofacattle-raisingindustrymightraisethepriceofthecropsinvolvedandfarmerswouldthenextendtheirplanting.ButIwishtoconfinemyattentiontotheindividualfarmer.

Ihavesaidthattheoccupationofaneighbouringpropertybyacattle-raiserwouldnotcausetheamountofproduction,orperhapsmoreexactlytheamountofplanting,bythefarmertoincrease.Infact,ifthecattle-raisinghasanyeffect,itwillbetodecreasetheamountofplanting.Thereasonforthisisthat,foranygiventractofland,ifthevalueofthecropdamagedissogreatthatthereceiptsfromthesaleoftheundamagedcroparelessthanthetotalcostsofcultivatingthattractofland,itwillbeprofitableforthefarmerandthecattle-raisertomakeabargainwherebythattractoflandisleftuncultivated.Thiscanbemadeclearbymeansofanarithmeticalexample.Assumeinitiallythatthevalueofthecropobtainedfromcultivatingagiventractoflandis$12andthatthecostincurredincultivatingthistractoflandis$10,thenetgainfromcultivatingthelandbeing$2.Iassumeforpurposesofsimplicitythatthefarmerownstheland.Nowassumethatthecattle-raiserstartsoperationsontheneighbouringpropertyandthatthevalueofthecropsdamagedis$1.Inthiscase$11isobtainedbythefarmerfromsaleonthemarketand$1isobtainedfromthecattle-raiserfordamagesufferedandthenetgainremains$2.Nowsupposethatthecattle-raiserfindsitprofitabletoincreasethesizeofhisherd,eventhoughtheamountofdamagerisesto$3;whichmeansthatthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionisgreaterthantheadditionalcosts,includingtheadditional$2paymentfordamage.Butthetotalpaymentfordamageisnow$3.Thenetgaintothefarmerfromcultivatingthelandisstill$2.Thecattle-raiserwouldbebetteroffifthefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatehislandforanypaymentlessthan$3.Thefarmerwouldbeagreeabletonotcultivatingthelandforanypaymentgreaterthan$2.Thereisclearlyroomforamutuallysatisfactorybargainwhichwouldleadtotheabandonmentofcultivation.*Butthesameargumentappliesnotonlytothewholetractcultivatedbythefannerbutalsotoanysubdivisionofit.Suppose,forexample,thatthecattlehaveawell-definedroute,say,toabrookortoashadyarea.Inthesecircumstances,theamountofdamagetothecropalongtheroutemaywellbegreatandifso,itcouldbethatthefarmerandthecattle-raiserwouldfinditprofitabletomakeabargainwherebythefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatethisstripofland.

Butthisraisesafurtherpossibility.Supposethatthereissuchawellde-finedroute.Supposefurtherthatthevalueofthecropthatwouldbeobtainedbycultivatingthisstripoflandis$10butthatthecostofcultivationis$11.Intheabsenceofthecattle-raiser,thelandwouldnotbecultivated.However,giventhepresenceofthecattle-raiser,itcouldwellbethatifthestripwascultivated,thewholecropwouldbedestroyedbythecattle.Inwhichcase,thecattle-raiserwouldbeforcedtopay$10tothefarmer.Itistruethatthefarmerwouldlose$1.Butthecattle-raiserwouldlose$10.Clearlythisisasituationwhichisnotlikelytolastindefinitelysinceneitherpartywouldwantthistohappen.Theaimofthefarmerwouldbetoinducethecattle-raisertomakeapaymentinreturnforanagreementtoleavethislanduncultivated.Thefarmerwouldnotbeabletoobtainapaymentgreaterthanthecostoffencingoffthispieceoflandnorsohighastoleadthecattle-raisertoabandontheuseoftheneighbouringproperty.Whatpaymentwouldinfactbemadewoulddepend

ontheshrewdnessofthefarmerandthecattle-raiserasbargain-ers.Butasthepaymentwouldnotbesohighastocausethecattle-raisertoabandonthislocationandasitwouldnotvarywiththesizeoftheherd,suchanagreementwouldnotaffecttheallocationofresourcesbutwouldmerelyalterthedistributionofincomeandwealthasbetweenthecattle-raiserandthefarmer.

Ithinkitisclearthatifthecattle-raiserisliablefordamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly,thereductioninthevalueofproductionelsewherewillbetakenintoaccountincomputingtheadditionalcostinvolvedinincreasingthesizeoftheherd.Thiscostwillbeweighedagainstthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionand,givenperfectcompetitioninthecattleindustry,theallocationofresourcesincattle-raisingwillbeoptimal.Whatneedstobeemphasizedisthatthefallinthevalueofproductionelsewherewhichwouldbetakenintoaccountinthecostsofthecattle-raisermaywellbelessthanthedamagewhichthecattlewouldcausetothecropsintheordinarycourseofevents.Thisisbecauseitispossible,asaresultofmarkettransactions,todiscontinuecultivationoftheland.Thisisdesirableinallcasesinwhich