ERIA-New Normal,New Technologies,New Financing-report (2022-06-23)（英文）行业资料

NewNormal,

NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

EditedbyLiliYanIngandDaniRodrik

NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

NationalLibraryofIndonesiaCataloguing-in-PublicationData

ISBN:978-602-5460-41-8

Publishedby

EconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)

SentralSenayanII,6thfloor,JalanAsiaAfrikaNo.8

Jakarta10270,Indonesia

InternationalEconomicAssociation(IEA)

London

©EconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia

PublishedinJune2022

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem,ortransmittedinanyformbyanymeanselectronicormechanicalwithoutpriorwrittennoticetoandpermissionfromERIA.

Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedhereindonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsandpoliciesoftheEconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia,itsGoverningBoard,AcademicAdvisoryCouncil,ortheinstitutionsandgovernmentstheyrepresent.

TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationarepersonalanddonotrepresentanycommitmentorofficialstatementoftheG20MemberCountriesortheGovernmentofIndonesiaasthePresidentoftheG20in2022.

Materialinthispublicationmaybefreelyquotedorreprintedwithproperacknowledgement.

CoverArtandBookDesignbyLiliYanIngandM.RaihanRamadhan

LayoutbyFadrianiTrianingsih

FrontMatter

iii

Foreword

Theongoingcoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)pandemicandeconomicrecoveryeffortshaveforcedtheworldtofacetheneedforanewframeworkforachievingbettereconomicconditions.EconomicrecoveryamidstglobaluncertaintyandlimitedliquidityraisestheneedforG20collaborationtocreateanewnormalsituation.

TheEconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)andtheInternationalEconomicAssociation(IEA)havethehonourtorespondtotherequestoftheGovernmentofIndonesiatosupportitsG20Presidencyin2022.TogetherwiththeGovernmentofIndonesiaandrespectedacademicsfromtheG20countries,G20expertteamexaminestheglobaleconomicsituationandthepriorityissuesoftheG20PresidencyofIndonesia.ThereportfocusesonthreemainareasfortheG20sherpaandfinancetracks:(i)economicrecovery,(ii)digitaltransformation,and(iii)inclusivegrowthandsustainabledevelopment.

WebelievethisreportwillprovideinsightsintothesuccessofIndonesia’sG20andimprovementoftheworldeconomic.ERIAandIEAhavethecommitmentstosupportthesuccessoftheIndonesia’sG20PresidencyandwillcontinueoursupporttotheupcomingG20inthefuture.

HidetoshiNishimura

President

EconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)

DaniRodrik

PresidentInternationalEconomicAssociation(IEA)

G20Indonesia2022:NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

iv

Acknowledgements

ThisreportwaspreparedinclosecollaborationbetweentheEconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)andtheInternationalEconomicAssociation(IEA)withG20WorkingGroups,Think20(T20),andBusiness20(B20).ThereportconsistsofthreemainsectionsbasedonIndonesia’sthreepriorityareas:economicrecovery,digitaltransformation,andsustainabledevelopment.

WewouldliketospeciallythankJosephStiglitzandJeffreySachsforourdiscussionontherootofinequalityandworldorder.WearegratefultoDaronAcemoglu,ShiroArmstrong,BambangBrodjonegoro,PeterDrysdale,JayatiGhosh,FukunariKimura,MurrayLeibbrandt,AlbertPark,HanPhoumin,AlloysiusJokoPurwanto,VeraSongwe,ShujiroUrata,FauziahZen,andERIA,IEA,OECD,WorldBank,WTO,UNCTAD,UNESCAP,andUNIDOcolleaguesforsharingtheirinsightsonthethreekeyissues.

ThereportcouldnothavebeenpublishedwithoutvaluableinputsfromourdiscussionswithG20officials,T20,andB20,andparticularlysignificantsupportfromIndonesianG20officials–SuahasilNazara,Riyatno,IndraDarmawan,DjatmikoBrisWitjaksono,WempiSaputra,KasanMuhri,EdiPambudi,RizalLukman,RezaPahlevi,Megawati,andYessiVadilla–aswellasERIAandIEAmanagementteams–KojiHachiyama,TaizoHara,andAndreaCavallo.WealsothankIvanaMarkus,EdoSetyadi,MichelleChandraKasih,RiaFortunaWijaya,CatherinNurSafitri,andMuhammadRaihanRamadhanforprovidingoutstandingresearchassistance,andeditorialteam–StefanWesiak,OonaghDuffy,andFadrianiTrianingsih–fortheirexcellentwork.

WehopethispublicationcanprovideasolidbasisforLeadersandMinisterstoestablishanddeliverG20commitmentsforabetterworldeconomy.ThesupportfromtheGovernmentofIndonesiaandstrongengagementwithG20officialsaregreatlyacknowledged.

ThesupportfromtheGovernmentofIndonesiaisgreatlyacknowledged:

FrontMatter

v

TableofContents

ListofFiguresvii

ListofTablesix

ListofBoxesix

ListofEditorsandContributorsx

Chapter1Introduction1

LiliYanIngandDaniRodrik

Chapter2EconomicRecoveryRequiresGlobalEfforts8

M.ChatibBasri,LiliYanIng,andGüntherG.Schulze

Chapter3GlobalEconomicRecoveryintheFaceofCOVID-1922

MauriceObstfeld

Chapter4EnsuringGlobalFinancialStability38

JoséAntonioOcampo

Chapter5TheG20’sRolesinImprovingResilientSupplyChain51

TaijiFurusawaandLiliYanIng

Chapter6TheG20’sRoleinFosteringTradeandInvestment64

GordonHanson

Chapter7DigitalTransformation:‘DevelopmentforAll’?76

LiliYanIng,GeneGrossman,andDavidChristian

Chapter8TheTechnologyGapintheDevelopingWorldandtheG20:89

AnEmpiricalProfile

HaroonBhorat,CaitlinAllenWhitehead,andDaviddeVilliers

Chapter9InclusiveGrowth:WhatKeySpecificActionsthatareFeasibleforthe101

G20ActinginConcertWouldHelpthePoorestCountriesEscapefromMassPoverty?

PaulCollier

Chapter10FinancingInfrastructure115

JustinYifuLinandYanWang

G20Indonesia2022:NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

vi

Chapter11

Chapter12

GreenFinance–TheRoadfromBillionstoTrillions130

IshacDiwanandHomiKharas

StrengtheningtheMultilateralTradingSystem:The‘WTORising’141

Imperative

RichardBaldwinandDmitryGrozoubinski

FrontMatter

vii

ListofFigures

Figure2.1

TotalDebtasShareoftheGDPofG20Countries(%)

11

Figure2.2

CentralBankPolicyRates,2019-2021

13

Figure3.1

RealGDPofMajorCountriesandRegionsComparedwithPre-COVID-19Trends

30

Figure3.2

DownwardTrendinPre-PandemicEMDEGrowthRates,EvenExcludingChina

32

Figure3.3

PublicDebtRatiostoGDPRoseSharplyin2020

33

Figure3.4

ShareofBusinessEstablishmentsinArrearsorAnticipatingArrearswithin6Months,May–September2020

33

Figure3.5

CPIInflationLevelssince2005

34

Figure4.1

USInterestRates(%)

39

Figure4.2

StockMarketPrices

40

Figure4.3

CentralGovernmentGrossDebt

41

Figure4.4

CapitalFlowsTowardsEmergingEconomies,2018–2022

43

Figure4.5

YieldsofEmergingBankingBonds(JPMorganEMBI)

44

Figure4.6

DebtRatiosofEmergingandDevelopingCountries

46

Figure5.1

ValueofExportsbyMajorTradingCountries,2000–2021(%)

53

Figure5.2

GDPGrowthofFiveCountries,2000–2020(%)

53

Figure6.1

RevealedComparativeAdvantageinManufacturingandNon-Manufacturing,ChinaRelativetotheUnitedStates

66

Figure6.2

RealWagesbyMunicipalityinMexico,1990and2015

67

Figure6.3

ChangeintheUSEmployment–PopulationRatio,2000-2019

69

Figure7.1

GlobalRetailE-CommerceSales,2014–2025

78

Figure8.1AverageTertiaryEducationGrossEnrolmentRatiosbyCountry93

IncomeClassification,2000–2020

Figure8.2AverageContributionbyIndicatortotheTechnologyGapIndex,97

2000–2020

Figure9.1

Figure10.1

Figure10.2

FinanceandUncertainty

GlobalInfrastructureNeeds,2007–2040

ExpandingtheDefinitionofDevelopmentFinance

105

117

120

Figure10.3TaxonomyoftheFinancialInstrumentsRequiredforInfrastructure122

FinanceandPatientCapital

G20Indonesia2022:NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

viii

Figure10.A1InfrastructureBottlenecks–TheG20andAsianDeveloping126

Countries,ExcludingChina,2000–2017

Figure12.1ExportGrowthinGoodsandServicesTrade,2011–2019,and2019145

ExportShares

FrontMatter

ix

ListofTables

Table2.1CurrentAccount/GDP(%),GFCF/GDP(%),andPrivate15

Savings/GDP(%)

Table8.1AverageTechnologyAdoptionRatesbyCountryIncome90

ClassificationandintheG20,2000–2020

Table8.2AverageTechnologyProductionRatesbyCountryIncome91

ClassificationandintheG20,2000–2020

Table8.3GiniCoefficientofTechnologyAdoptionandProductionRates,92

WorldandG20

Table8.4

Top500EducationalInstitutionsbySubjectandCountryIncomeClassification,2021

94

Table8.5

GiniCoefficientofHumanCapitalAccumulation,TertiaryGERs,andSTEMFieldRankings:TheWorldandtheG20

95

Table8.6

AnAlkire-FosterGlobalTechnologyGapIndex,2000–2020

96

Table9.1

AverageGDPperCapitaAnnualGrowth,byGroupandPeriod(%)

103

Table9.2

AverageAnnualGrowthinTotalWealthperCapita,byGroupandPeriod(%)

103

Table9.3

AnnualPercentageChangeinRenewableNaturalCapitalperCapitaDuringEachPeriod

104

Table10.1

InfrastructureInvestmentGap,2016–2040

117

Table10.2

G20OutflowstoEMDCforSustainableInfrastructure,2011–2017

121

Table10.A1

SectorsandIndicatorsforBottleneckIdentification

125

Table10.A2

G20andAsianDevelopingCountries,ByIncomeGroup

127

Table12.1ImportanceofBusinessServiceExportsinOverallJobCreation,146

2011–2018

ListofBoxes

Box2.1

Box2.2

WorldwideAccesstoVaccines

EconomicConsequencesoftheWarinUkraine

9

12

G20Indonesia2022:NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

x

Editors

LiliYanIng,LeadAdvisorforSoutheastAsiaRegionatEconomicsResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)

DaniRodrik,ProfessorofPoliticalEconomyatHarvardUniversityandPresidentofInternationalEconomicAssociation(IEA)

ListofContributors

RichardBaldwin,ProfessorofInternationalEconomicsatGraduateInstituteGenevaM.ChatibBasri,ProfessorofEconomicsatUniversityofIndonesia

HaroonBhorat,ProfessorofEconomicsatUniversityofCapeTown

DavidChristian,ResearchAssociateatEconomicResearchInstituteforASEANandEastAsia(ERIA)

PaulCollier,ProfessorofEconomicsandPublicPolicyatBlavatnikSchoolofGovernmentUniversityofOxford

IshacDiwan,ProfessorofEconomicsatParisSchoolofEconomics

TaijiFurusawa,ProfessorofEconomicsatUniversityofTokyo

GeneGrossman,ProfessorofEconomicsatPrincetonUniversity

DmitryGrozoubinski,ExecutiveDirectoratGenevaTradePlatform

GordonHanson,ProfessorofEconomicsatHarvardKennedySchool,HarvardUniversity

HomiKharas,SeniorFellowatGlobalEconomyandDevelopmentCenterforSustainableDevelopmentBrookings

JustinYifuLin,ProfessorofEconomicsatPekingUniversity

MauriceObstfeld,ProfessorofEconomicsatUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley

JoséAntonioOcampo,ProfessorofProfessionalPracticeinInternationalandPublicAffairsatColumbiaUniversity

GüntherG.Schulze,ProfessorofEconomicsatUniversityofFreiburg

DaviddeVilliers,JuniorResearchFellowatDevelopmentPolicyResearchUnit,UniversityofCapeTown

YanWang,SeniorAcademicResearcheratGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter,BostonUniversity

CaitlinAllenWhitehead,JuniorResearcheratDevelopmentPolicyResearch,UnitUniversityofCapeTown

Chapter1

Introduction

LiliYanIngandDaniRodrik

Whilethecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)seemstobebehindusnow,thescarringeffectsonemployment,poverty,andeducationwilllastforever.Theunemploymentratereached6.3%in2021,with33millionmorepeopleunemployedworldwidethanbeforethepandemic.Women,youth,andlesseducatedgroupsofthepopulationhavebeendisproportionatelyaffected.Povertyincidencehasalsoincreased,withextremepovertyrisingby0.9%in34mostlylow-incomeandlowermiddle-incomecountries.Bytheendof2022,860millionpeoplecouldbelivinginextremepoverty,whilesimultaneouslytheworld’spoorestcountriesmustrepayUS$43billionindebtthisyear.

Moreover,thecurrentwarinUkraineandrisingglobaltensionshaveplacedadditionalpressuresontheworldeconomy.Thesupplyshortagewillmagnifyinflationarypressuresthroughincreasesinthepriceofenergy,food,andmetals.Inflationisexpectedtoremainelevatedformuchlonger,bothinadvancedandemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs).Thefactthatnow,countries,particularlylow-andmiddle-incomecountries,havelimitedfiscalspace,hasworsenedtheinequalityandtherecoveryprocess.

WebelievetheG20couldbeaneffectiveinternationalforumtofosteracoordinatedglobalresponsetoestablishanddelivercommitmentsforresilient,sustainable,andinclusivegrowth.Thisreportconsistsofthreemainsections:economicrecovery,digitaltransformation,andsustainabledevelopment.

Chapter2,writtenbyChatibBasri,LiliYanIng,andGüntherSchulze,discussestheurgencyofglobaleffortsinmitigatingthescarringeffectsofthepandemic.ItstartswithanexplanationofhowtheprolongedCOVID-19pandemichasincreaseduncertaintiesinvariousdomains,includinghealth,economy,andsocialaspects.Governmentsaroundtheworldhavestrivedtooptimisetheuseoffiscalandmonetarymeasurestomitigatetheeffectsofthepandemic.Thefiscalinterventionshavehelpedcountriestosurviveduringthepandemicbuthaveincreaseddebtburdenssignificantly.Monetaryinterventionshavealsobeenimplementedsince2020byloweringinterestratesandprovidingadditionalliquidity.Whilethepandemicisnotoveryet,thewarinUkrainehasescalatedmajoreconomicshocksandaffectedtheworld’srecoverypath.Itisevenmorechallengingbecauseofthefactthattheeconomicrecoveryisuneven.

Theauthorsproposethreemainpolicyrecommendations.First,itiscrucialfortheG20toreinforceitscommitmenttoprovidevaccinesandmedicalsuppliestolow-incomecountries.Second,theG20needstotakestepstomitigatetheriskofdebtdistressbyimplementingthe

G20Indonesia2022:NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

2

DebtServiceSuspensionInitiative(DSSI)aswellasensuringthattheCommonFrameworkforDebtTreatments(CFDT)workseffectively.Formostdevelopingcountrieswithlimitedfiscalcapacity,effortsareneededtoimprovetaxrevenuethroughreformstotaxadministrationaswellasimprovingthequalityofspending.Third,whiledevelopedcountrieshavestartedtotightentheirliquidity,low-andmiddle-incomecountriesstillneedstimulustogrow.Itisimportantthattheexitstrategychosenindevelopedcountriesdoesnotcauseinstabilityforemerginganddevelopingeconomies.TheG20forumisanavenuefordevelopinganddevelopednationstoexchangeinformationonpolicyinanhonestandtransparentmannerthatwillcreategreatercertaintyinthemarket.

Chapter3,byMauriceObstfeld,highlightsspecificallytheroleofmonetarypolicyinthepost-pandemicstrategy.Obstfeldprovidesevidencethattheworldeconomyhasyettoreturntopre-pandemicgrowthpaths,andthattherepercussionsduetothewarinUkraineareanadditionaldragontheglobalrecovery.Emerginganddevelopingeconomiesaregenerallyprojectedtostayfartherfrompre-pandemicgrowthpathsforlongerthantheadvancedeconomies.Atthesametime,inflationarypressuresareworryinglystrongthroughouttheworld.Withoutappropriateeconomicpoliciesandmoreeffectivemultilateralcooperationonglobalpublichealthinparticular,thescarringeffectsofCOVID-19mayresultinpermanentlylowerlevelsandlong-rungrowthratesofrealgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)thanthoseexpectedinJanuary2020,especiallyforEMDEs.

Fiscalpolicymustensurepublicsolvencyovertimewithoutaprematurewithdrawalofmacroeconomicsupportorharmtothemostvulnerable,alreadybatteredbythepandemic.Monetarypolicymustkeepinflationexpectationswellanchoredwhilestoppingshortofinducingdeeprecessions.Withallcountriesfacingpressuresoffiscalandmonetarycredibility,theymustcoordinatepolicyresponsestoavoidajointlyexcessiveresponsetotheirsharedchallenges,withdueregardtonationalconditions.Thateffortmustincluderejectingfoodexportrestrictionsdespitehighfoodprices.SpilloversfromtightermonetarypolicycouldimpactEMDEsmostpowerfully,especiallyfrontiermarketswithhighdebts.Tohelp,theG20shouldendorseenhancementstotheglobalfinancialsafetynet,EMDEpolicyapproachesthatreducetheimpactoftheglobalfinancialcycle,and,incasesoflikelyinsolvency,enhancementstothecurrenthaphazardlandscapeofsovereigndebtrestructuring.DirectedevolutionoftheG20CommonFrameworkforDebtTreatmentsbeyondtheDebtServiceSuspensionInitiativecouldproducelesscostlywaysofhandlingfuturesovereigndebtproblems.

Chapter4,byJoséAntonioOcampo,pointsouttheimportanceofensuringglobalfinancialstability.ThecurrentfinancialstabilityissuesfacingtheglobaleconomyaretheresultofthehighpublicsectordebtlevelsinheritedfromtheCOVID-19crisis,andoftherisinginflationandslowereconomicgrowththathasbeenevidentsincelate2021butaggravatedbytheeconomiceffectsoftheRussianinvasionofUkraine.Themajorchallengesareassociatedwiththeincreaseininterestrates,whichisalreadyunderway.Despitehighdebtratios,therisksarenotsevereforadvancedeconomies,wherepublicsectordebtratiosareexpectedtodecreasemoderatelyinthenextfewyearsbutareimportantforemerginganddevelopingcountries,whichwillhavetoconfrontnotonlytherisingcostsoffinancingbutalsoapossiblereductionininternationalprivatecapitalflows.

Introduction

3

Capitalisingandincreasingfinancingfrommultilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs)andofficialdevelopmentassistance,aswellasanewallocationofspecialdrawingrights(SDRs),couldmitigatetheseproblems.Debtreliefandbetterdebtworkoutmechanismsshouldalsoplayaroleforcountriesfacinghighdebtratios.Existingmechanismsforlow-incomecountriesshouldbemaintainedandstrengthened,andnewonesshouldbeputinplaceformiddle-incomecountriesfacingseveredebtproblems.Stockmarketcorrectionsmayalsogeneratefinancialstabilityissuesinadvancedeconomies,buttheyarelessimportantthanthosefacedbyemerginganddevelopingcountries.TheliabilitiesofprivatesectorfirmsthatwerestronglyaffectedbytheCOVID-19crisisalsogenerateproblemsandmayrequireimprovementsinrestructuringandsolvencysystemsinsomecountries,butthereisnoevidenceofrisksofsignificantbankingcrises.Finally,actionisneededtomanagetherisksassociatedwiththegrowthandhighvolatilityofcryptoassets,andthefinancialriskthatclimatechangeisgenerating.

Chapter5,byTaijiFurusawaandLiliYanIng,highlightstheimportanceofmaintainingresilientglobalsupplychains.Thepandemicandcurrentgeopoliticaltensionshaveputsupplychainsunderpressure,resultinginincreasedonshoring.Morethantwo-thirdsofallinternationaltradeflowsinvolvetradeinglobalvaluechains(GVCs),andthevalueofworldwideintermediategoodstradehasrisentomorethanUS$10trillionannuallyinthepast2decades.However,thepandemicanditsmeasures,suchaslockdownsandlimitedeconomicactivities,causedglobaldemandandsupplyshocksandhaltedproductionandtrade.Thepandemicdidnotonlydisruptfirms’directintermediatesupplies,butalsoabout40%oftheirtier2suppliersandbeyond.

Theauthorsdiscussfivetypesofshocksinthischapterandarguethattheheavyrelianceonsolesuppliersforavarietyofcriticalinputsandproductsmightnotbetheoptimalsolution.Thepandemicshowedfirmsthattheirjust-in-timestrategyishighlypronetodisruptionsaffectingthesuppliers.Inparallel,thepandemicandcurrentgeopoliticaltensionsincreasedtheuseofexportrestraintsasmanycountriesstruggledtosecuretheirdomesticsupply.TheworldneedstorestructureGVCsandtherearetwobroadpolicysuggestionstoincreaseGVCresilience:reshoring/nearshoringordiversificationofsuppliersandmarkets.TheG20needstoplayakeyroleintheefforttoimproveGVCresilienceaswellasensuringthestockpilingofessentialgoodsandcriticalinputstomitigateothershocksordisruptionsinthefuture.

Chapter6,preparedbyGordonHanson,emphasisestheimportanceoftheG20infosteringtradeandinvestmentintheeconomicrecoveryagenda.Theunevenglobalisationhasleftmanycountriesrivenbyregionaleconomicdisparities,especiallyinthedevelopingeconomies.Workersinlow-wageandlow-employmentrateregionsarenotleavinginsufficientnumberstoimprovethelargedifferenceinearningsandlivingstandardsacrossregions.TheongoingtradewarbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStateshasincreasedglobalgeopoliticaltensions,andtheongoingpandemichasseverelydisruptedbothglobalsupplychainsandthemovementofpeopleacrossborders.Moreover,astheabilityoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)inresolvingdisputeshaseroded,countrieshaveincreasinglyturnedtobilateralorregionalsolutions,makingitmorecomplicatedtorevivemultilateralcooperationontrade.G20membersmustfindwaystofostertradeandinvestmentasmanycountrieshavegrownincreasinglyscepticalaboutglobalisation.

G20Indonesia2022:NewNormal,NewTechnologies,NewFinancing

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Thechapterprovidesthreeprinciplesthatpolicymakersshouldkeepinmind:focusonhelpingdisplacedworkersregainemployment,policyneedsattunedtochangeandhelpingworkersmoveacrosssectors,andbettercooperationamongstgovernmentstoavoidtaxandsubsidycompetition.Restoringglobaltradewillrequireglobaleffortsandcoordinationamongstcountries,especiallywithinG20members.Chapter7,byLiliYanIng,GeneGrossman,andDavidChristian,bringstotheforeoneofthemostcrucialchangesofourtime–digitaltransformation(DX)–thatmassivelyreducesthecostofsharinginformation.ThepandemichasacceleratedthedevelopmentofDX,includingdigitaltrade.DespitethefactthatDXhelpsbusinessestoimproveproductivityanddriveeconomicgrowth,ithasconsequencesforemploymentandwages,particularlyforlessskilledworkers.DXpotentiallyraiseslabourmarketpolarisationandinequalitybetweencountries.Moreover,thekeychallengesembeddedinDXanddigitaltradeincludeprivacy,cybersecurity,competition,anddigitaldivide.TheG20mustplayaleadingroleinovercomingthesechallengesandensureDX‘developmentforall’.First,theG20needstoimplementwhatithasalreadycommittedtointhefieldsofindustrialrobots,automation,andartificialintelligence(AI).Thisincludes(i)cooperationandsupportfordigitalisationenablers,comprisingthedevelopmentofdigitalinfrastructureandconnectivity;(ii)protectionofdataprivacyandthemitigationofdigitalisationrisksfromaconsumerprotectionstandpoint;and(iii)thedevelopmentofmappingandstatisticalmeasurementofthedigitaleconomy.Second,toreducetheadoptioncostsofindustrialrobots,automation,andAIforbusinessesandmakethemcommerciallyviable,G20membersshouldcooperateandpromoteincentivesfortechnologicaladoptionbydevelopingcountries.Third,theG20shouldimprovethequalityofkeydigitalenablersfortheadoptionofindustrialrobots,automation,andAI.Thisincludesdigitalinfrastructureandthenecessarytechnologies