德国双层结构上市企业监事个体独立性分析,比较法论文

德国双层结构上市企业监事个体独立性分析,比较法论文本篇论文目录导航：【题目】德国双层构造上市企业监事个体独立性分析【引言】【第一章】【第二章】【第三章】【4.1】【4.2】【结论/以下为参考文献】摘要在公司内部治理中行使监督职能的人员的个人独立性问题，最初是在盎格鲁撒克逊公司治理单一构造法律传统中，以克制监督与管理在统一机构〔Board〕下自个监督自个的窘境为目的而进行讨论与研究的。但随着时代发展，德国公司法长久以来确立的监督与管理机关人事、职能相分离的双层形式中主要以监督董事会对公司的管理为任务的监事会的成员独立性问题也越来越遭到立法、理论界和实践的重视。本文主要研究德国上市股份公司内部治理双层构造中监事个人独立性保障的必要性和相关法律规范。全文共分为四章：第一章，德国公司内部治理双层构造要义。首先，对监事个人独立性法律规范产生作用所依靠的基本法律框架加以分析和总结。华而不实第一节研究监事会与董事会在人事上、职能上相分离的原则确立的主要法律规范，接下来简述德国双层构造中重要特征员工共同决定制度，作为法律上容忍的监事个人利益冲突存在的制度，为本文研究设定了一定的限制。由于共同决定制度最初设计理念是实现社会的满意度，其相关法律规范分散于各个共同决定法案中，并牵涉宪法、劳动法的特殊规则，而本文主要从公司法视角出发，因此在下文将不对员工代表在监事会中的独立性问题作特殊讨论，而只关注于股东一方代表监事的独立性。接下来简述双层构造主要缺陷监事会与董事会沟通不畅、对监督对象的信息把握缺乏。为克制此缺陷，德国立法者通过(股份法〕改革实现了监事会的职能扩张。本章最后概括了德国学者对当前双层构造的看法：固然监事会的职能行使不完善被人长期诟病，但研究证明并不是双层构造本身的问题，任何一种形式都有其利弊，且两种主要形式正在相互趋同化发展。因而，学界普遍以为，放弃双层形式是没有必要的。第二章，监事会职能与监事独立性问题。为应对双层构造监督缺陷而进行的监事会职能扩张，对监事会成员个人独立性提出了新挑战。首先是历史考察。从1884年之前的(德意志普通商法典〕到今日受欧盟法影响并被(德国公司治理准则〕所补充的(股份法〕中确定的双层构造及监事会职能，监事会与董事会的职能划分经历了由模糊到清楚明晰再到相互融合的一个否认之否认的经过。接下来重点考察现行法中监事会的基本职能能监督与咨询。作为职能扩大的表现，本文以监事会特定事项保存权为例讨论德国现行法中双层构造的界线能否已被突破。最后分析监事会职能扩大，十分是咨询职能的发展给监事个人独立性带来的挑战。得出结论：正是由于监事会职能的扩大，监事个人独立性保障问题在公司治理讨论中尤为重要。第三章，利益冲突与独立性。由于个案中与制度性的利益冲突的存在，十分是德国监事会成员兼职的角色设定，使得监事不能以公司利益为唯一利益导向而进行独立公正的判定。利益冲突与监事的不独立性认定有直接关联。对利益冲突进行规范，是保障监事的个人独立性的重要方式。第四章，监事独立性保障制度的规范分析。对公司治理实践产生作用的规范主要是立法和作为软法的(公司治理准则〕。本文对(公司治理准则〕作用机制和法律意义作了分析，以为这种方式可有效解决公司治理中公司自治与法律强迫之间的矛盾。而其产生作用的详细表现，则结合接下来的(股份法〕规范进行分析。在这一章中，本文着重对第100条第5款中概念的不确定性，和法律后果确定困难的问题进行研究。并得出结论：法律后果确定困难的问题产生于事物本身的矛盾。对这一问题的解决，当前最有效的方式是通过法院个案认定构成案例群以抽象出规则，弥补法律空白带来的法的不安宁性。(股份法〕第161条确立的遵守或者解释的机制，结合(公司治理准则〕详细条款，通过市场而不是法律强迫的方式对公司治理的完善产生作用。本文关键词语：德国上市公司双层构造监事会监事个人独立性公司治理ABSTRACTDiscussiononthethemetheindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardincorporategovernance,washoldoriginallyonlyintheregionfollowingthetraditionofAnglo-Saxonlaw.Toremedythedefectonecan?tcontrolitselfinauniformboard,theAnglo-SaxonlawhasdevelopedOutsideDirectorsSystem.Withthedevelopment,however,inGermanycorporationlaw,thatoveralongtimethetwo-tierboardsystemseparationbetweenamanagementboard(Vorstand)andasupervisoryboard(Aufsichtsrat)-rules,theproblemindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardisattractingmoreandmoreattention.Thismaster?sdissertationfocusonthetheme,thenecessityoftheindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardincorporategovernanceinGermanystockexchange-listedcompaniesandrelativeregulations.Thisdissertationisdividedinto4chaptersasfollows:ChapterOnestudiesthecrucialfactorsofthetwo-tiersystem.Firstly,itanalyzesandsummarizetheframework,onwhichtheindependenceofthemembersofthesupervisoryboardincorporategovernancerelies.Thefirstsectiondiscussesontheprincipleofbothpersonnelandfunctionalseparationbetweenamanagementboardandasupervisoryboard.Andthendescribebrieflythefeaturesofco-determinationregime.Asaregime,thatreflectsthetoleranceofconflictsofinterestsbylaw,itdefinedthelimitofmydissertation.Sincetheconceptofco-determinationregimeistorealizethesocialsatisfaction,furthermore,itreferstomanyotherlawdomainsincludingconstructionlaw,laborlaw,etc.,whilemeinedissertationcomposesjustinacorporategovernance?perspective.Thereforeinfollowingparagraphsthespecificproblemsrelatedtotherepresentativesoftheworkforceareignoredandonlytheindependenceoftherepresentativesofshareholdersisdiscussed.Theninthenextsectionisrevealedthemainflawsofthetwo-tierstructure-lackofcommunicationbetweenmanagementboardandsupervisoryboard,andthesupervisoryboardisnotenoughinformed.Inordertoremedythisdefect,GermanylawmakersexpandthefunctionofsupervisoryboardbymeansofthereformoftheAktG.AttheendofthisChapterissummarizedtheopinionsofGermanyscholars:althoughthefunctionofsupervisoryboardworksinadequatelyinthepractice,thedefectsyetdoesntresultfromthetwo-tiersystemitself.Everystructureinthecorporategovernancehasitsadvantagesanddisadvantages.Inadditiontothis,boththemainstructuresareconvergingwitheachother.Therefore,currentlyprevailingviewinjurisdictionandexpertsliteraturebelieveitnotnecessarytoabandontwo-tiersystem.ChapterTwodealswiththefunctionofboardofsupervisorsandtheindependenceofindividualsupervisors.Theexpansionofthefunctionofboardofsupervisorsinmoderntimeschallengestheindependenceofindividualsupervisors.Thedivisionofthefunctionsofboardofdirectorsandboardofsupervisorshasgonethroughthreestagesblurred,distinct,blendedfrombefore1884tothetwo-tierstructureandthefunctionsofboardofsupervisorswhichareinfluencedbytodayseuropeanlawsanddeterminbyAktGsupplementedbyGermanCorporateGovernanceCode.Thechapterthenexploresthebasicfunctionofboardofsupervisorsundercurrentlawssupervisionandconsultancy.Mydissertationdiscussesthatiftheboarderofthedouble-tierstructurehasbeenbrokenthroughundercurrentGermanlaw,basedonagreementreservationforthesupervisoryboardanexampleofthefunctionexpansionofboardofsupervisors.Thenthechapteranalyzesthechallenges,facedbyindividualsupervisors,arisingfromtheexpansionofboardofsupervisorsfunction,especiallythefunctionofconsultancy,anddrawstheconclusion:itistheexpansionoffunctionoftheboardthatmakestheindependenceofindividualsupervisorsanimportantissueforthediscussionofcorporategovernance.ChapterThreeisconcernedwithconflictsofinterestandindependence.Duetotheconflictsofinterestbetweenindividualsupervisorsandthecorporation,inparticularthedoubleroleofthesupervisorsinGermany,theindividualsupervisorcannotmakeindependentandfairjudgmentssolelyintheinterestofthecompany.Theconflictsofinterestisdirectlyrelatedtothedependenceofamember?saffirmation.Toregulatetheinterestconflictsisanimportantwaytosecuretheindependenceofindividualsupervisors.ChapterFouranalyzestheregulationsprovidedforasystemthatsecurestheindependenceofsupervisors.LegislationandGermanCorporateGovernanceCode(assoftlaw)arethemajorregulationsthathaveeffectonthepracticeofcorporategovernance.ThedissertationmakesanalysisonthemechanismandlegalsignificanceofGermanCorporateGovernanceCode,andfindsthatGermanCorporateGovernanceCodecaneffectivelyresolvethecontradictionbetweencorporateself-governanceandmandatorylaw.DetailsoftheeffectivenessofGermanCorporateGovernanceCodeisanalyzedtogetherwiththestipulationsofAktG.ThisChapterfocusesontheambiguityofthedefinitioninItem5ofArticle100,andthedifficultyindecidingthelegalresult,anddrawstheconclusionthattheproblemindecidingthelegalresultderivesfromthenatureofthings.Toresolvethisproblem,themosteffectivemethodcurrentlyistoabstractrulesfromagroupofcasesruledbycourt.ThecomplyorexplainsystemsetforthinArticle161ofAktG,combinedwiththestipulationsofGermanCorporateGovernanceCode,improvescorporategovernancethroughmarketmechanism,ratherthanmandatoryprovisionsoflaw.Attheendofthischapter,adviceisprovidedforthecorpor