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INTHISCHAPTER,YOUWILLLEARN:thefunctionsahealthyfinancialsystemperformsthecommonfeaturesoffinancialcrisesgovernmentpoliciestoalleviateorpreventcrises1BRAINSTORM
WhatthefinancialsystemdoesWhatfunctionsdoesthefinancialsystemperform?Taketwominutesandtrytothinkoftwoorthree,andwritethemdown.Then,we’llcompareanswers.2WHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
1.FinancingInvestmentThefinancialsystemhelpschannelfundsfromsavers—householdswithetheydonotneedtospendimmediately…toinvestors—firmsthatneedfundstofinanceinvestmentprojectsWHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
1.FinancingInvestmentFinancialsystem:theinstitutionsintheeconomythatfacilitatetheflowoffundsbetweensaversandinvestorsThefinancialsystemincludesfinancialmarkets,likethestockmarket,throughwhichhouseholdsdirectlyprovidefundsforinvestmentfinancialintermediaries,likebanksormutualfunds,throughwhichhouseholdsindirectlyprovidefundsforinvestmentWHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
1.FinancingInvestmentDebtfinance:sellingbondstoraisefundsforinvestmentAbondrepresentsaloanfromthebondholdertothefirm.Equityfinance:sellingstocktoraisefundsforinvestmentAshareofstockrepresentsanownershipclaimbytheshareholderinthefirm.WHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
1.FinancingInvestmentFinancialintermediariesacceptfundsfromsaversanddirectthemtoinvestors.Forexample,banksacceptdepositsfromhouseholdsandmakeloanstofirms.Otherexamples:mutualfunds,pensionfunds,andinsurancecompaniesWHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
2.SharingRiskManypeopleareriskaverse:
otherthingsequal,theydislikeuncertainty.Thefinancialsystemallowspeopletosharerisks:Investorscansharetheriskthattheirprojectswillfailwiththesaverswhoprovidethefunds.Saversmaybewillingtoaccepttheserisksfortheprospectofahigherreturnthantheycouldearnotherwise.WHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
2.SharingRiskManypeopleareriskaverse:
otherthingsequal,theydislikeuncertainty.Thefinancialsystemallowspeopletosharerisks:Saverscanreduceriskthroughdiversification:providingfundstomanydifferentinvestorswithuncorrelatedassets.Diversificationcanreduceidiosyncraticrisks,risksthatdifferacrossindividualbusinesses.Diversificationcannotreducesystematicrisks,whichaffectmost/allbusinesses.WHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
3.DealingwithAsymmetricInformationAsymmetricinformation:
whenonepartytoatransactionhasmoreinformationaboutitthantheotherpartyAdverseselection:
whenpeoplewithhiddenknowledgeaboutattributessortthemselvesinawaythatdisadvantagespeoplewithlessinformationExample:investorswhoknowtheirprojectsarelesslikelytosucceedaremoreeagertofinancetheprojectswithotherpeople’sfundsWHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
3.DealingwithAsymmetricInformationAsymmetricinformation:
whenonepartytoatransactionhasmoreinformationaboutitthantheotherpartyMoralhazard:arisesfromhiddenknowledgeaboutactions,occurswhenimperfectlymonitoredagentsactindishonestorinappropriateways.Example:entrepreneursinvestingotherpeople’smoneyarenotascarefulasiftheywereinvestingtheirownfundsWHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
3.DealingwithAsymmetricInformationThefinancialsystemhelpsmitigatetheeffectsofasymmetricinformation.Example:banksBanksaddressadverseselectionbyscreeningborrowersforadversehiddenattributesthatsaversmightnotdetect.Banksaddressmoralhazardbyrestrictinghowloanproceedsarespentorbymonitoringtheborrowers.WHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
4.FosteringEconomicGrowthIntheSolowmodel,thereisonetypeofcapital;intherealworld,therearemany.Firmswithlucrativeinvestmentprojectsarewillingtopayhigherinterestratestoattractfundsthanfirmswithlessdesirableprojects.Thefinancialsystemhelpschannelfundstoprojectswiththehighestexpectedreturnsrelativetotheirrisk.WHATTHEFINANCIALSYSTEMDOES
4.FosteringEconomicGrowthGovthelpsfacilitatethisfunctionbyprovidingqualitylegalinstitutions,e.g.
prosecutingfraudtoreducemoralhazardenforcingdisclosurerequirementstoreduceadverseselectionBRAINSTORM
FinancialsystemfailureSupposethefinancialsystemesunabletoperformthefunctionofchannelingfundsfromsaverstoborrowers.Taketwominutes,thinkoftwoorthreespecificconsequences,andwritethemdown.Then,we’llcompareanswers.14COMMONFEATURESOFFINANCIALCRISES
1.Asset-PriceBoomsandBustsFinancialcrisesoftenfollowaperiodofoptimismandaspeculativeasset-pricebubble.Eventually,optimismturnstopessimismandthebubblebursts,causingassetpricestodrop.Inthe2008–2009crisis,thecrucialassetwashousing:housepricessoareduntil2006,thendropped30%by2009.COMMONFEATURESOFFINANCIALCRISES
2.InsolvenciesatfinancialinstitutionsFallingassetpricescausedefaultsonbankloans.Sincebanksarehighlyleveraged,
defaultsgreatlyreducetheircapital,
increasingtheriskofinsolvencies.In2008–2009,manybanksheldmortgagesandassetsbackedbymortgages.Fallinghousepricessharplyincreasedmortgagedefaults,pushingmanyfinancialinstitutionstowardbankruptcy.COMMONFEATURESOFFINANCIALCRISES
3.FallingconfidenceInsolvenciesatsomebanksreduceconfidenceinothers,andindividualswithuninsureddepositswithdrawtheirfunds.Toreplacetheirshrinkingreserves,banksmustsellassets.Sellingbymanybankscausessteeppricedeclines—calledafiresale.In2008–2009,thecollapseofBearStearnsandLehmanBrothersreducedconfidenceinotherlargeinstitutions,manyofwhichwereinterdependent.FYI:TheTEDspreadTheTEDspreadmeasurestheperceivedcreditriskofbanks.Definition:TEDspread=
rateonthree-monthinterbankloans
–rateonthree-monthT-bills
(expressedinbasispoints)
TheTEDspreadisusuallybetween10and50basispoints.Inafinancialcrisis,fallingconfidenceinbankscausestheTEDspreadtorise…TheTEDspread,2003–2015basispointsCOMMONFEATURESOFFINANCIALCRISES
4.CreditcrunchFrequentdefaultsandinsolvenciesmakeithardforinvestorstogetloans—eventhosewithgoodcreditandlucrativeprojects.In2008–2009,bankssharplyreducedlendingtoconsumersforbuyinghomesandtobusinessesforexpandingoperationsorbuyinginventories.COMMONFEATURESOFFINANCIALCRISES
5.RecessionWithlesscreditavailable,consumerandbusinessspendingdeclines,reducingaggregatedemand.Result:outputfalls,unemploymentrises.In2008–2009,unemploymentroseabove10%andremainedveryhighformanymonthsafterthefinancialcrisis.COMMONFEATURESOFFINANCIALCRISES
6.AviciouscircleTherecessionreducesprofits,assetvalues,andhouseholdes,whichincreasesdefaults,bankruptcies,andstressonfinancialinstitutions.Thefinancialsystem’sproblemsandtheeconomy’sdownturnreinforceeachother.In2008–2009,theviciouscirclewasapparent,creatingfearstheeconomywouldspiraloutofcontrol.TheAnatomyofaFinancialCrisisFallingconfidenceinmanyfinancialinstitutionsAsset-pricebustInsol-vencies
atsomefinancialinstitutionsCreditcrunch(banksreducelending)Recession(fromfallingaggregatedemand)Viciouscircle
(recessionputsmorepressureonassetpricesandfinancialinstitutions)Whoshouldbeblamedforthe
financialcrisisof2008–2009?Possibleculpritsinclude:TheFederalReserveHomebuyersMortgagebrokersInvestmentbanksRatingagenciesRegulatorsGovernmentpolicymakersAllofthemlikelydeserveashareoftheblame.BRAINSTORM
GovernmentpoliciesWhatshouldthegovernmentdoifafinancialcrisisoccurs?Canthegovernmentpreventfinancialcrises?Taketwominutes.Trytothinkofaspecificpolicytoalleviateafinancialcrisisandanotherpolicytopreventfuturecrises.25POLICYRESPONSESTOACRISIS
1.ConventionalmonetarypolicyThecentralbankcanexpandthemoneysupplytolowerinterestratesandencouragespending.TheFedreducedthefederalfundsratetonearlyzeroby12/2008,yetthiswasinsufficient.
(RecalltheliquiditytrapfromChap.12.)POLICYRESPONSESTOACRISIS
2.ConventionalfiscalpolicyThegovernmentcanincreasespendingandcuttaxes.Fiscalpolicymakersenactedstimulusof$168billionin2008and$787billionin2009.Butthelargeandgrowinggovernmentdebtsharplylimitedfurtherstimulusmeasures.POLICYRESPONSESTOACRISIS
3.LenderoflastresortRunsonbankscancreatealiquiditycrisis,
inwhichsolventbankshaveinsufficientfunds
tosatisfydepositors’withdrawals.Thecentralbankcanmakedirectloanstothesebanks,actingasalenderoflastresort.In2008–2009,theFedactedaslenderoflastresorttomanybanksandtoshadowbanks,whichperformmanyofthesamefunctionsasbanksandwereexperiencingsimilarproblems.POLICYRESPONSESTOACRISIS
4.InjectionsofgovtfundsThegovtcanusepublicfundstopropupthefinancialsystem:Givefundstothosewhohaveexperiencedlosses(e.g.,FederalDepositInsurance)Makeriskyloans(e.g.,loanstoAIGin2008)Injectcapitalintoailinginstitutions,takinganownershipstake(e.g.,TARP)Usingpublicfundstopropupailinginstitutionsiscontroversialandmayincreasemoralhazard.POLICIESTOPREVENTCRISES
1.FocusingonshadowbanksShadowbanksengageinfinancialintermediationandincludeinvestmentbanks,hedgefunds,privateequityfirms,andinsurancecompanies.Theirdepositsarenotfederallyinsured,sotheyarenotheavilyregulatedliketraditionalbanksandcantakeonmuchmorerisk.Theirfailurescanhurtthebroadereconomy,somanypolicymakerssuggestlimitingtherisktheycantake,increasingcapitalrequirementsforthem,allowingmoregovtoversight.POLICIESTOPREVENTCRISES
2.RestrictingsizeInstitutionsdeemed“toobigtofail”haveamoralhazardproblem.Someproposalswouldlimitthesizeoffinancialinstitutionstoreducetheharmtheirfailureswouldcausetotherestofthefinancialsystem.Proposalsincludelimitingmergersandincreasingcapitalrequirementsforlargerbanks.POLICIESTOPREVENTCRISES
3.ReducingexcessiverisktakingTopreventfinancialfirmsfromfailing,someproposelimitsonexcessiverisktaking.Problem:defining“excessive”TheDodd-FrankActof2010includesthe
Volckerrule,whichprohibitscommercialbanksfrommakingcertaintypesofspeculativeinvestments.POLICIESTOPREVENTCRISES
4.MakingregulationworkbetterTheregulatoryapparatusoverseeingthefinancialsystemishighlyfragmented.Dodd-Frankandothermeasuresseektocoordinatethevariousregulatoryagenciesandimprovetheeffectivenessoffinancialindustryoversight.POLICIESTOPREVENTCRISES
5.TakingamacroviewofregulationTraditionally,financialregulationhasbeenmicroprudential,aimingtoreducetheriskofdistressinindividualfinancialinstitutions.Today,financialregulationisalsomacroprudential,aimingtoreducesystem-widedistresstoprotectagainstdeclinesinproductionandemployment.TheEuropeansovereigndebtcrisisDebtproblemsinGreece:Risinggovtdebt,revelationsthatGreecemayhavemisreporteditsfinancesinearlieryearsGreekbondsdowngraded,pricesfell,interestratesshotupasmarketsworriedthatGreecemightdefaultRepercussionsthroughoutEurope:ManyEuropeanbanksheldGreekbonds,whosefallingvaluespushedthemtowardbankruptcy.Policymakersworriedthatbankswouldfail,causingacreditcrunchandeconomicdownturn.TheEuropeansovereigndebtcrisisBailingoutGreece:TheECBandhealthiercountriesinEuropemadeloanstoGreecetopreventanimmediatedefault.TheloanscamewithconditionsthatGreeceenactausteritymeasurestoimproveitsfinances.Taxpayersincountriesprovidingthefundsresentedthebailouts.Greekcitizensresentedtheausteritymeasuresandriotingensued.Othercountrieswithproblems:ManyfearedaGreekdefaultwouldleadto
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