兰德-体系竞争：新兴战略对手的本质（英）-2022.11

PerspectiveMICHAELJ.MAZARR,TIMMCDONALDContentsCompetinginSystemicTerms 1CompetingfortheShapeoftheInternationalSystem 3CompetingwithaSystemsMindset 10ConceptualizingSystemicCompetition 14PrinciplestoGuideaStrategyofCompetingfortheSystem 24ConclusionsandRecommendations 33 AboutRANDchallengestohelpmakecommunitiesthroughouttheworldsaferandmoresecure,healthierandmoreprosperous.RANDisnonprofit,nonpartisan,andcommittedtothepublicinterest.ResearchIntegrityOurmissiontohelpimprovepolicyanddecisionmakingthroughresearchandanalysisisenabledthroughourcorevaluesofqualityandobjectivityandourunwaveringcommitmenttothehighestlevelofintegrityandethicalbehavior.Tohelpensureourresearchandanalysisarerigorous,objective,andnonpartisan,wesubjectourresearchpublicationstoarobustandexactingquality-assuranceprocess;avoidboththeappearanceandrealityoffinancialandotherconflictsofinterestthroughstafftraining,projectscreening,andapolicyofmandatorydisclosure;andpursuetransparencyinourresearchengagementsthroughourcommitmenttotheopenpublicationofourresearchfindingsandrecommendations,disclosureofthesourceoffundingofpublishedresearch,andpoliciestoensureintellectualindependence.Formoreinformation,visit/about/research-integrity.RAND’spublicationsdonotnecessarilyreflecttheopinionsofitsresearchclientsandsponsors.isaregisteredtrademark.LimitedPrintandElectronicDistributionRightsblicationandtrademarkscontainedhereinareprotectedbylawThisrepresentationofRANDintellectualpropertyisprovidedfornoncommercialRANDtoreproduce,orreuseinanotherform,anyofitsresearchproductsforcommercialpurposes.Forinformationonreprintandreusepermissions,pleasevisit/pubs/permissions.Formoreinformationonthispublication,visit/t/PEA1404-2.©2022RANDCorporation1TheUnitedStateshasnowestablishedstrategiccompetitionwithtwoleadingrivals—ChinaandRussia—asthecenterpieceofitsnationalsecuritystrategy.1Russia’sinvasionofUkraineinFebru-ary2022dramaticallyraisedtheintensityofthatbilateralrivalryandthegeneraltenorofglobalcompetition.ManyrecentanalyseshaveconcludedthattheUnitedStatesisengagedinclassicstrategicrivalrieswithbothcountries,likelytopersistfordecadesandinvolveallinstrumentsofnationalpower.2Yetcompetitionisanactivity,notastrategy;ameans,notanend.3AssertingthattheUnitedStatesisengagedinacompetitionorrivalrybegsanobviousfollow-upquestion:WhatistheUnitedStatescompetingfor?TowardwhatendisU.S.strategydirected,andwhatthendoesthismaketherivalriesfundamentallyabout?CompetinginSystemicTermsiveoftheserivalriesprimarilyinsystemicrdtomaintainpredominantsystemitsinstitutionsrules,norms,processes,networks,andvalues.Inthelead-ingrivalryinworldpoliticstoday,forexample,theUnitedStatesandChinaarecompetingtoestablishthefounda-tionalglobalparadigm—theessentialideas,habits,andexpectationsthatgoverninternationalpolitics—andthebroadersystemthatproducesthatparadigm.4Thatsystemincludesactorsornodesrangingfromstatestoindustries,institutions,andnongovernmentalorganizations,aswellastherelationshipsamongthem,suchasagreements,rules,andformsofmutualexchange.Eachofthemainrivalsisseekingtoshapethesecomponentsoftheinternationalsystemtoproduceanorderorientedtoitsinterests,goals,andvalues.Butcompetinginsystemictermsalsoimpliesasecondrequirement,onemoreabstractandfarmorechallengingtofulfill:tothinkandactinsystemicterms—todevelopstrategiesthatareinherentlydesignedtoshapeholistic,indirect,andnetworkedsystemiceffectsasmuchas,andevenmorethan,successesonindividualdisputes.Thatmeansmovingawayfromlinear,problem-andissue-specificstrategiesandworkingtogeneratebroaderandmoreindirecteffects.TheUnitedStatescannotignoreindividualchallengesandwillnotalwayshavethetimeorinstitutionalcapacitytolookbeyondtheirnarrowfocus2whenitchoosespolicies.Butasmuchaspossible,compet-rentstressesontheliberalworldorder,nowisoneofthoseinginsystemictermsmeansfocusingonthewholerathertimes.Wearguethatasystemicperspectiveisessentialforthanitsparts,thinkingintermsofindirectandsecondarydevelopingastrategytoshapetheoutcomeofthissystemicoutcomes,andshapingsystemiceffectstoitsadvantage.Itreset.means“understandingthesystemasasystemandgivingSecond,intheprocessofpursuingthisoverarchingprimaryvaluetotherelationshipsthatexistamongseem-strategicimperativeofshapingthesystem,theUnitedinglydiscreteparts.”5StatesmustmakestrategyandundertakespecificpolicyInthisPerspective,wemaketwoarguments.First,ininitiativesthroughalensofsystemdynamics.Thatmeansthesegrowingrivalries,theUnitedStatesisprincipallyaconstantefforttoplaceindividualactionsinthecon-competingforpredominantinfluenceoverthestructureoftextofsystemicrealities,andtoappreciatethenatureoftheglobalsystem,includinginstitutions,rules,andnorms.systemsasopposedtodiscrete,issue-specificaction.TheInthisconcept,theworkofbilateralcompetition,ornego-UnitedStatesmustnotonlycompeteforthesystem.Itmusttiationoverspecificissues,isinstrumentaltowardestab-competeusingsystemicstrategies.lishingthesystemstructureandultimatelytotheemer-ThisanalysisbuildsonseveralpriorRANDCorpora-genceofaglobalparadigm.Whenthesystemstructureandtionreportsthathaveassessedboththenatureofinter-relatednormsarealignedwithU.S.nationalinterestsandnationalordersandthenatureoftheemergingrivalries.6values,competitionoccursinacontextofincentivesthatInthefollowingsections,weexploreareasofdisputeinworksintheUnitedStates’favor.thecurrentshapeoftheinternationalsystem;introduceButtrendsinanyinternationalsystemarefluidandsystemiccompetitionasaconceptualframetothinkaboutemergent.Becausetheworldiscontinuallyevolving,thesecompetitionfortheinternationalorder;illustratehistori-systemsmustactivelybemaintained,andsometimesrede-calandcontemporaryexamplesofsystemicorders;assesssigned,iftheyaretocontinuereflectingU.S.interestsandthecurrentU.S.capabilitiesfordevelopingsystem-shapingpreferences.Atsomemoments,theinternationalsystemstrategy;andidentifyprinciplestoguidedevelopmentofarrivesatinflectionpointswhereamuchgreaternumbernationalstrategyforcompetingforthesystem.ofitsessentialrulesandvaluesareatstake.Giventhecur-3CompetingfortheShapeoftheInternationalSystemScholarsandanalystshaveofferedmultipletheoriesaboutthefundamentalcharacteroftheU.S.rivalrieswithRussiaand,especially,China.7InthecaseofChina,someviewthecompetitionasprimarilymilitary,involvingacon-testforsupremacyintheIndo-Pacific.Othersseeitasaneconomic-technologicalcontestfordominanceofahand-fulofcutting-edgeindustries.Afewfocusontheideologi-calaspectsoftherivalry.Ourcaseforthecentralityofsystemicfactorsreliesontwoprimarysourcesofsupport.Oneishistorical—inthefollowingsection,webrieflymakethecasethatthehistoryofvariouserasoforder-buildingdemonstratestheimportanceofsystemicfactorsindeter-mininggeopoliticaloutcomes.Thesecondsourceofsup-portistheevidenceofclearChinesestrategicobjectivesandtoolsorientedtowardasystemiccompetition.Wesum-marizethesebelow.WedonotarguethattheU.S.rivalrieswithChinaareRussiaareonlycompetitionsforthesystem.Theyclearlyhavemilitary,economic,andtechnologicalcomponents.Someofthosediscretecontestscanhaveimportantechoesthroughthesystem:Forexample,wereU.S.militarypowerintheIndo-PacifictodecaytothepointofbeingclearlyoutmatchedbyChina,thatdevelopmentwouldhavepro-foundsystemicimplications.Ourargumentismerelythat,bothintermsoftheleadingobjectivesofthecompetitorsandthemostimportantmindsetsforcompetition,asys-temicapproachshouldprovidetheessentialframeworkforhowtheUnitedStatesapproachestheserivalries.TheHistoricalImportanceofCompetingfortheSystemThehistoryofaseriesofsystemicrivalriesfromancienttimestothepost–ColdWarorderhighlightsthecompeti-tiveadvantagethatnationscangainfromdefiningthepre-vailingregionalorglobalsystemandparadigm.InancientGreece,AthensreachedtheapogeeofitspowerinpartbydominatingtradeintheAegeanandMediterraneanSeasthroughvariousmeans,includingitsalliancenetwork,theDelianLeague.RomegainedadvantagesfromasimilarcontrolofregionalseabornetradeafteritsdefeatofCar-thage,butevenbeforethatRomehadworkedtogenerateanorderofsupportive(indeedquasi-vassal)city-statesthroughoutItaly.Evenintheseancientcases,thesystemsthatgrewuparoundthesecity-stateswerefarmorethantheproductofempire:Theyincludedflowsoftrade,net-worksofideasandscientificexploration,andanincreas-inglyinterconnectedeliteclass.Leadingpowersbecamemagnetsforthesystemicdynamicsoftheirera.8InEuropebeginninginthe17thcentury,anewsystembasedonmoreformalizednationalsovereigntyemergedattheendoftheThirtyYearsWar,typicallycalledtheWest-phalianSystem.9ItrepresentedanefforttostabilizeEuro-peanpoliticsandreducetheincidenceofwarbybuildinggreaterrespectforthenormofstatesovereignty.Theresultingcontextcreatedthebasisfornationalcompetitiveadvantage:Politicalentitiesthatmanagedtodevelopintomorecoherent,stable,competitivestatesaccumulatedmorepowerandinfluencethanthosethatremainedmorefrag-mentedandill-governed.Morerecenthistoricalexamplesalsohighlighttheimportanceofsystemiceffectsinglobalrivalries.TheBrit-4ishEmpire,spanningfromthemid-1600suntiltheendofWorldWarII,wasanetworkofcoloniesanddependenciesmanagedthroughaseriesofeconomic,social,andlegalrelationshipsthateffectivelyamountedtoacomprehen-sivesystemicarchitecturetopromoteBritishinterests.10Itseconomicrelationshipsincludedflowsofgoodsandresourceswithcolonies,dominions,andtradingpartners,maintainedthroughapreeminentmaritimenetwork.Anaccompanyingsetofsocialandculturalrelationshipsincludedmigration,language,andrule-of-lawstandardsprevalentthroughouttheCommonwealthascoloniza-tionspreadmilitary,economic,andreligiousinfluence.Theempirealsoreflectedlegalrelationships,maintainedthroughwidespreaduseoftheEnglishcommonlawandstatutorylawsystems,whichwerediffusedbysettlersandtradersandadaptedtolocalenvironments.Throughthesearrangements,theBritishEmpiregen-eratedsubstantialpolitical,economic,andsocialinfluenceforarelativelysmallislandnation.Atitspeakintheearly20thcentury,theempirecoverednearlyaquarterofboththeworldpopulationandtotallandarea.Itisimportanttostress,however,thatalloftheseeffectsdependedonlargersystemicprocesseswellbeyonddirectBritishimpe-rialactivities.Britain,inaverydifferentwaybutsomewhatakintoAthensandRomebeforeit,becamethehubofthedominantnetworksofexchange—economic,intellectual,andcultural—ofthetime.Itcametohavedecisiveinflu-enceoverthetrendsinthelargersystem.WhiletheBritishEmpirewasmaintainingaglobalsystemofcolonies,dominions,andtrade,themajorpowersofcontinentalEuropegatheredinViennainthewakeofNapoleon’s1815defeatatWaterloo.Theydevelopedaseriesofalliancesandmechanismsfordisputeresolutionintendedtostrengthencohesionamongthecontinentalpowers,suppressrevolutionaryandliberalmovements,andmaintainthebalanceofpowerforestablishedgovernmentsandmonarchies.ThearrangementscametobeknownastheConcertofEuropeorViennaSystemandpersisted,withsomeadaptations,fornearly100yearsuntilthedissolutionoftheallianceinadvanceoftheoutbreakofWorldWarI.11Theseagreementsprovidedbenefitstomembersandcre-atedcoststoleavingthesystemortransgressingit.Eventu-ally,cracksbegantoemergewithshiftingalliances,butindominanttermsforacenturythroughoutEurope,throughtheCrimeanWar,andbeyond,theViennaSystemachievedimportantgeopoliticaleffectsbyshapingsystemicrealitiesandincentives.Perhapsthemostimportantandsuccessfulsystem-levelstrategyinthemoderneraemergedinEuropeafterWorldWarII,withtheMarshallandSchumanPlansandtheefforttobegintheintegrationofEurope.12TheSchumanPlan,forexample,soughttoaligntheinterestsofindustry,unions,andpoliticalleadersontheprincipleofinterdependence,facilitatedthrougheconomicandsecuritycooperation.13CooperativeagreementsovertheminingandprocessingofcoalandsteelledtotheEuro-peanCoalandSteelCommunity(ECSC),enablingFrance,WestGermany,andtheBeneluxcountriestorebuildeconomicallywhilemakingwaramongthemmateriallydifficult,orevenimpossible.Withtheprincipleofinterde-pendenceestablished,othernationsjoinedadditionaltradeandpoliticalunions,leadingtotheEuropeanEconomicCommunity(CommonMarket)andeventuallytheEuro-peanUnion.Asithascontinuedtoevolve,thispostwarorderrepre-sentsoneofthemostelaborateeffortstoachievegeopoliti-5caleffectsbyshapingsystemsdynamics.14Ithasinvolvedmultilateralcollaborationamongstatesintheireconomies,defenseactivity,andcoordinationoncollectiveactionchallenges,suchastradeandhumanrights.Thecurrentrules-basedorderincludesinstitutionssuchastheUnitedNations,WorldTradeOrganization,WorldBankGroup,andInternationalMonetaryFundandsystemsofcoordina-tionsuchastheGroupof7(G-7)andGroupof20(G-20).Thedrawoftheseinstitutionscreatedagravitationaleffectinwhichacriticalmassofleadingstatesconditionedaccesstotheirmarketsandinstitutionsonkeynormsandvalues.Theresultwasapowerfulechoeffectthroughoutworldpoliticsthathadimportantsystemicinfluence.15Since1945andespecially1989,then,theUnitedStateshasthrivedinthecontextofafavorableinternationalorderithelpedtoestablishthroughformationofalliancesandinstitutions.ThesystemsthatwereestablishedafterWorldWarIIandduringandfollowingtheColdWar—suchastheUnitedNations,NATO,theEuropeanCommunity,WorldTradeOrganization,WorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFund—andnetworksofeconomicandpoliticalalliances,havedonewellforensuringpeaceandprosper-ity.PolicymakersintheUnitedStateshaveviewedtherelationships,rules,andresultingstabilitythatarisefromtheinternationalorderasessentialmeanstoachievingU.S.nationalinterestsbothdomesticallyandthroughouttheworld.Asoneofusarguedina2018RANDstudythatreviewedmanycategoriesofinternationaltrendsandU.S.interests,“thepostwarorderhashadimportantvalueinlegitimizingandstrengtheningU.S.influenceandinstitu-tionalizingandacceleratingpositivetrends.”16Historysug-geststhatsucceedingorwinningatthesystemiclevelcanbeacriticalcomponentofsuccessinlong-termrivalries.17ManytreatmentsoftheU.S.nationalsecurityrequire-mentsoftheseemergingrivalriesfocusonspecificrequiredinvestmentsindefenseandnationalsecurity,fromweaponsystemstoemergingtechnologyareas.Butbeyondtheseissue-specificpoliciesdesignedtosecureadvantage,thereisamoreholisticandsystemiclevelinwhichthecompeti-tionwillplayout.IftheUnitedStatescansustainthesup-portivealignmentoftheoverridingproportionofleadingpowers;maintainpredominantinfluenceininternationalinstitutions,processes,andstandard-settingbodies;andwinthebattleforinfluenceamongnongovernmentalnet-works,itwillgaindecisivecompetitiveadvantage.This,alongwiththedomesticdynamismoftheUnitedStatesanditsdemocraticallies,washowtheUnitedStatespre-vailedintheColdWar.ItwillbeessentialfortheUnitedStatestoattendtothissystemiccompetitioninthesenewrivalries.18Astheseexamplessuggest,shapingtheinternationalsystemcanbeviewedasoneapproachtograndstrategy.6countrystheorybehighlyselfdirectedandorientedtowardmilitarypowerproducingsecurityhmilitaryovermatchButanotherapproachandoduceesandsovertheountriesofthetatepursuitofthosegoalswhichalignedwithUSessioneconomicstatradepromotionofhumanrightsChineseandRussianEmphasisonSystemicCompetitionToday,RussiaandChinaareactivelyengagedinstrategiesthat,intentionallyornot,appeartobeaimedpreciselyatinfluencingtheoperationofthesystem.21Russianrevision-ismseekstounderminethestrengthofthecurrentorderandreestablishRussianspheresofinfluence.Russiaisinte-gratingmilitary,informational,anddiplomatictoolswithenergydiplomacytotrytofracturetheU.S.-ledorderandbuildtentaclesofitsowninfluence.Russia’sapproachinsomewaysrepresentsnothingmorethanclassicstatecraftacrossarangeofinstrumentsofpower,butonesthatadduptoanimportantlysystemicfocus.China’sstrategyismuchmorecomprehensivelysys-temicingoalsandapproach.Itisgroundedineconomicandtechnologicalinvestmentsandnetworks,designedtocreatesystemicrelationshipsanddependenciesthattiltworldpoliticstowardaSino-centricorder.ThebestknownandmostsubstantialexampleofthisprocessistheBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI),amassiveprogramofinvestmentandeconomicandtechnologicalengagementdesignedtoshapetradingroutestoChina’sfavorthroughthedevel-opmentofrevisedtradepathwaysandrules.Indeed,theveryessenceofChina’sstrategycouldbeconsideredasasystemicapproach,designedtoshiftregionalandglobalnetworksandsystemicdynamicsinChina’sfavor.Table1summarizessomeoftheprimaryChineseinitiativeswiththischaracter.TheUnitedStates,ontheotherhand,thoughitspeaksthelanguageofsystemicapproachesintheformofsupportforarule-basedinternationalorder,doespreciouslittletoorganizecompetitivestrategiesinsystemicterms.Many7TABLE1China’sSystemicInitiativesPolicyInitiativeSystemicImplicationsInfrastructureinvestmentsChinaisconsciouslyseekingtoreshapeEurasianeconomicnetworksintoaSino-centricfuture,andmajorinfrastructureinvestmentsarealeadingtoolofengagementwithmanydevelopingcountrieswhohaveadifficulttimefinancingsuchventureselsewhere.Non-infrastructureforeigndirectinvestmentChinesebanksandfirmshavemadeimmenseinvestments,mostlyprofit-seeking,incompaniesaroundtheglobe,including(untilrecently)theUnitedStatesandEurope.TheseprovidesystemicpowerbyintegratingChinaintoglobalsupplychains.useasreservecurrency,digitalRMBprogramDigitalSilkRoadChinaisseekingtoredirectglobalcurrencymarketstowardtheRMBasawayofdilutingU.S.financialpower.ChinaisseekingtoencouragecountriestobuildtheirdigitalinfrastructureonafoundationofChinesetechnology,whichwouldgrantChinaaccesstodataandgeneratehugedependencies.TradenetworksThroughnationalstrategybutlargelybecauseofobjectivemacroeconomicrealities,ChinahasbecometheleadingtradepartnerofmostnationsinAsia,aswellasadominantpartnerinspecificindustries(suchasautomobiles)ofothercountries.ThesetradenetworksprovideChinawithleverageovereconomicstandardsandcreatedependenciesthatcanbemanipulatedtoshapebehavior.MilitarycooperationChina’ssecuritycooperationactivitiesremainrelativelymodestcomparedwithU.S.andevenEuropeanUnionprograms,buttheyaregrowinganddesignedtocomplementChina’seconomicandtechnologicalinitiativeswithanofferofarmssalesandtransfers,militarytraining,combinedexercises,andotherformsofcollaboration.EffortstoundermineU.S.Indo-PacificallianceandpostureChinaaimstoreshapethesecurityarchitectureintheAsia-Pacific,pushingtheUnitedStatesoutoftheregionasaprimarysecurityproviderformanynations.ThishasinvolvedacombinationofstepstoweakenU.S.alliancesandsecuritypartnerships,rangingfromthreatstoefforts(asinThailand)tocultivatecompetinginfluence.CulturalprogramsTheUnitedFrontWorkGroupinChinahasthemissiontoshapeinternationalperceptionsandpromotesympathyforChinesevaluesandculture.ThroughsuchtoolsasConfuciusInstitutes,scholarshipsandfellowships,andChineselanguagetraining,ChinaisseekingtoestablishChineseculturalpredominanceamongkeyactorsintheAsia-Pacific.8nationalsecurityinitiativesareundertakenfordiscreteandissue-specificpurposes:togainanadvantageinaspecificmilitarytechnology,imposediplomaticcostsonacountrybehavingagainstinternationalnorms,buildlong-termrelationshipsinakeypartnernation,andsoon.U.S.com-petitivepoliciesareseldomconceptualizedorimplementedwithsystemiceffectsinmind.22Takingseriouslythesystemicessenceofthecom-petitionamongthesepowersneednotmakezero-sumassumptions.EvenChinaandRussiatodaydonotdifferwiththeUnitedStatesonallaspectsofthedesiredsystem.Allthreecountriesagreeontheneedtocombatterrorism,forexample.Allhavecalledforresponsestoglobalwarm-ing,andattimeshaveappreciatedthepotentialvalueofcooperationonthatissue.Allwantastableinternationalfinancialorder.AllhavedemonstratedadesiretomitigaterunawayproliferationbycountriessuchasIranandNorthKorea(thoughtheyhavedifferedontacticsandthedegreeofabsolutismintheirgoals).However,thethreeprimaryrivalsinworldpoliticsdohavesignificantdisagreementsaboutthenatureoftheinternationalsystemtheyprefer.RecentRANDreportscesin1.Inthebroadestgeopoliticalandgeoeconomicsense,theUnitedStatesprefersaU.S.-andally-centricinternationalsystem,oneinwhichtheUnitedStatesisthedefaultsecurityproviderformanycountriesandtheinternationalorderrevolvesaroundU.S.,ally,andpartnerpowerandcapacities.ThismeansaninternationalsystemwithstrongU.S.alliancenetworks,anddeepeningwebsofsecuritycol-laborationamongdemocraciesandselectedotherpartnercountries.Itmeansasystemthatemploysthedollarandselectalliedcurrenciesastheglobalreservecurrencies,andoneinwhichmosttechni-calstandardsaresetbytheUnitedStatesandotherdemocracies.RussiaseekstofragmentthatsystemandestablishitselfasanequaltotheUnitedStatesingeopoliticalterms—byweakeningNATO,forexample.Chinahasmuchmoreelaborategoalsinthisarea,seekingtofullytradeouttheU.S.-ledorderwithaSino-centricone,atleastwithintheAsia-Pacificandpotentiallygloballyaswell.2.TheUnitedStatesdesiressystemictrendsinthedirectionofdemocracyandrespectforhumanrights;ChinaandRussiaareeitheragnosticaboutsuchprogressoractivelyhostiletoit.Indeed,bothviewthegeneralpushfordemocratization,reflectedinsuchdevelopmentsas“colorrevolutions,”asactivethreatstotheirrule.Thisdistinctionalsoextendstoexternalbehavior,withChinaandRussiasome-timestryingtoconstraintheexpressionoffreeideas,orquashdissentaimedattheirregimes,eveninothercountries.93.TheUnitedStatesprefersasystembasedonbroadlyliberalprinciplesofeconomicexchange,specificallyfreetrade(withsomeexceptions),respectforintel-lectualpropertyrights,andthelargelyfreeflowofcapital.Thisishardlyabinarystandard;tradeisneverentirelyfree,andmarketsareconstructedthroughrules,institutions,andnorms.Further,theUnitedStateshasadoptedaseriesoftraderestrictionsoverthepastfiveyears,whileChina’sapproachtointernationaltradeagreementsisnotwhollycynicalordishonest.Butitistruethat,assignificantly(andincreasingly)state-runecono-mies,ChinaandRussiaseekamorecontrolledandlessliberalizedeconomicsystem.4.TheUnitedStatesprefersaninternationalsystemthatmaximizesth