比较商事组织法讲义

LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)ding0118@1比较商事组织法

法律硕士课程(法学)2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基础(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林华伟等译],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation4WhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…5<国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要>(2010-2020)[公开征求意见稿]丰田汽车召回香港华懋集团前董事局主席龚如心遗产案AVATAR6TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)为什么有企业/厂商?[交易\市场和企业/厂商]它们在资本市场的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(为什么代理成本在现代企业不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的调查表明,当时美国200个最大的公司中,88个是由管理人员控制的.Berle和Means认为,股东对于代理成本的监督是无能为力的,你是否同意这一看法?授权机制的优势和弊端7TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)为什么股东被称为“剩余财产的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股东表决权----→集体行为----→监督成本----→信息取得的代价(在股权分散的情况下,为什么股东都愿意做消极股东,搭便车-FreeRiders会很普遍?)如何约束代理人的机会主义行为?(代理成本是所有和控制分离的代价,第7页)8TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股价能否反映公司管理人员的懈怠或其他机会主义行为?监督机制包括哪些方面?9TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)经理和股东存在利益冲突,代理成本不可能为零;所有者是代理成本的最终承担者,增加代理成本则可以使经理单方面受益,这里就出现了需要法律敢于的现象----成本转嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干预的目标----减少代理成本.因此,检验公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否减少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3页.[Jensen&Meckling]

！结合我国<公司法>,你如何理解我国法律是否减少了代理成本,请举例说明.10TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企业业正正是是针针对对机机会会主主义义\交交易易成成本本和和合合同同不不完完备备的的回回应应(p.10).当当合合同同一一方方是是““交交易易专专用用财财产产””(trade-specificassets)的的所所有有者者时时,交交易易双双方方组组建建企企业业比比签签定定合合同同更更有有效效率率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson11TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----权权衡衡缔缔约约成成本本和和所所有有权权成成本本企业业所所有有权权类类型型和和所所有有权权成成本本存存在在相相关关性性.→投资资者所所有→雇员员所有有→所有有者缺缺位当所有有权成成本过过高的的时候候,没没有所所有者者比““产产权清清晰””更重重要.12TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保险险公司司与投投保人人的关关系为为例,说明明公司司股东东与管管理者者的关关系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits13TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解解代理理成本本的存存在之之后,你的的投资资选择择是什什么?在放弃弃全部部所有有权归归自己己所有有的企企业形形式后后,投投资者者会面面临哪哪些合合同关关系?[NexusofContracts]作为投资资者,你你希望公公司法或或者公司司章程加加入企业业社会责责任的内内容吗?14TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文文译本???]15InstitutionalArrangements在交易成成本为零零的条件件下,制制度的选选择不会会影响经经济活动动的最终终效益.在交易易成本不不为零的的现实世世界里,制度的的安排会会在不同同程度上上影响交交易的效效益.郁光华:<公司司法的本本质>,法律出出版社2006年版,第38页.RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.16FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.17LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.18ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts19FourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]20CloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?LimitedliabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor21有限责任的形形成代表性论文如如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).22对于公司法法人人格与与股东有限限责任合并并意义的思思考公司法人人人格----积极的的资产区分分/公司财财产成为公公司债权人人的担保财财产，为公公司债权人人设定优先先于股东或或者公司经经营者的债债权人受偿偿的浮动担担保（floatingcharge），公公司债权人人在评估公公司财产时时具有比较较优势股东东有有限限责责任任----消消极极的的资资产产区区分分/股股东东的的个个人人财财产产成成为为股股东东的的债债权权人人的的担担保保财财产产，，降降低低了了公公司司破破产产时时的的债债权权追追讨讨成成本本，，简简化化并并实实质质性性地地稳稳定定了了股股票票的的定定价价过过程程总体体意意义义----便便利利交交易易另另一一方方明明确确交交易易对对象象，，区区分分公公司司与与其其股股东东，，公公司司及及其其股股东东的的总总体体融融资资成成本本得得以以降降低低23对交易另另一方的的提示----来自公公司法人人人格与与股东有有限责任任原则的的适用共担和转转嫁交易易风险----债权人人参与监监督公司司经营者者隔离公司司的不同同经营活活动与监监督成本本的增加加——信信息不对对称（InformationAsymmetry））参见：：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).24LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作为为有限限责任任的对对价,应当当要求求公司司服从从政府府管制制\为为顾客客,雇雇员和和相邻邻社区区的利利益考考虑而而决策策和行行事.Whatdoes““externalizationofrisk””meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?25WhyLimitedLiability:SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute26LimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.27LimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美国国第七巡回回上诉法院院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥哥大学法学学院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的的经济结构构-张建伟伟&罗罗培新译译),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.28LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院为了平平衡有限责责任的成本本和收益的的尝试29LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)请用法经济济学的方法法分析上述述各种方法法的效率.30PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment31Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]32TheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLawJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:AnEssayontheJudicialRole33WhatConcerned:USAFederalism?Mandatory?+Enabling?+DefaultRules?34StateCompetitionAllparticipantsinthedebatebelievethattheincomeproducedbythecharteringbusinessspursstatestoenactlawsthatfirmsdesire.Howdoprinciples----theshareholders----ensurethattheiragents----themanagers----behavefaithfully?35Whynotfederaldomain?Cary’sArguments…Winter’sresponse…Romano’sfurtherobservation…36ATransactionalCostExplanationFranchisetaxrevenueConstitutionalsupermajorityrequirementInvestmentsinlegalcapital37TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawTaxpayersDelawarebar38EnablingLaws…TheCorporateCodeinalmosteverystateisan“enabling”statute…….Thehandiworkofmanagersisfinalinallbutexceptionalortrivialinstances……EasterbrookandFischel,pp.96-97.Doyouthinkitistheinvestorswhochoosewhethertoorganizeasacorporation,trust,partnership,mutualorcooperative?39AnInvisibleHandHowdoestheinvisiblehandtakeaneffectontheself-interestedmanagers?40Whyisitamandatorystructureofcorporatelaw?InvestorProtectionHypothesisUncertaintyHypothesisPublicGoodHypothesisInnovationHypothesisOpportunisticAmendmentHypothesis41Mandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLawJudicialRole42WhatConcerned:China??????43WhattoCompromise?EUShouldweexpecttheemergenceofaEuropean““Delaware”withtheEuropeanCommunity’seconomicintegration?Romano,p.96.44WhatLearned:Japan公司形式的调调整派生诉讼45WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingtheCorporateVeilDerivateSuits46FutureTrends:ConvergenceandCompromise???47FinancingtheCorporationCliffordW.Smith,Jr.&JeroldB.Warner,OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBondCovenants,pp.121-128KennethLehn&AnnettePoulsen,ContractualResolutionofBondholder-StockholderConflictsinLeveragedBuyouts,pp.128-130MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOsandthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.130-13248Cont’’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapitalOrganization,pp.132-138FrankH.Easterbrook,TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,pp.138-13949TwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalIssuingEquityIssuingDebt50AgencyCostsAgencycostofoutsideequityAgencycostofdebt51AStudyonCorporateBondMaturity:PerspectivefromTransactionCostsandAgencyCosts发行长期期债券可可以降低低交易成成本，但但债券期期限越长长，代理理成本就就越高。。企业在在发行新新债券时时必须对对交易成成本和代代理成本本进行权权衡，寻寻求最优优债券期期限结构构。模型型证明，，发行企企业债券券时运用用提前赎赎回条款款、卖回回条款、、偿债基基金条款款和转换换权等债债券契约约条款可可以同时时达到降降低发债债总成本本和延长长企业债债券融资资期限的的目的。。Transactioncostsassociatedwithbondissuescanbereducedbyissuingbondswithlongertermstomaturity.However,thelongerthetermtomaturity,thehighertheagencycostsassociatedwiththeissue.Firmsthatpursuingoptimalbondmaturitystructuremustweightransactionandagencycostsofanewcorporatebondissue.Modelsinthepaperindicatethatfirmscanmakeuseofbondcovenantssuchasthecallprovision,theputprovision,thesinkingfundprovisionandconvertibilitytoincreasethetermtomaturityofabondissueandatthesametimereducetheaggregateoftheagencycostsandtransactioncostsassociatedwithit.Xiao-kunZHOU(周孝坤坤),““企业债券券期限结构构研究―基基于交易成成本和代理理成本视角角”,<生态经济济>,2007/01,pp.75-77.52公司的债权权人交易债权人人机构贷款人人持有公司发发出的付款款证明的人人53Examplesinpp.119-120Example1----ChoiceofShareholder----ProjectLExample2----ChoiceofBondholder----ProjectLExample3----withLeveragedEffect+LimitedLiabilityConcernedforShareholder----ProjectH54Whynot100percentdebt-financedfirms?P.120,Textbook.55MajorSourcesofConflictbetweenBondholdersandStockholdersDividendPaymentClaimDilutionAssetSubstitutionUnderinvestment56BondCovenantsRestrictionsontheFirm’’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyCovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrustee57RestrictionsontheFirm’’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictionsonInvestmentsSecuredDebtsRestrictionsonMergers58RestrictingthePaymentofDividendsPp.124-12559RestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyLimitationsonDebtandPrioritySinkingFundsConvertibilityProvisions60SinkingFunds偿债基金为为确保债债券能干到到期日有足足够的资金金以偿还债债权人的本本金，发行行公司于债债券未到期期前预先按按期提存的的基金。偿偿债基金通通常是存入入选定的一一家银行作作为信托管管理人，由由信托管理理人利用这这笔基金进进行各种投投资，投资资收益则增增加偿债基基金。由此此可见，偿偿债基金相相当于一笔笔专用基金金存款。由由于偿债基基金不在债债券发行公公司掌握中中，其性质质是由受托托人管理的的公司债券券持有人的的资金，但但在实际偿偿还本金之之前，并不不抵消债券券发行公司司的债务。。债券发行公公司应按券券契约的规规定提存偿偿债，每年年提存偿债债基金的终终值应等于于债券的本本金。每年年年终应根根据信托管管理人关于于偿债基金金的收支报报告，确认认应有投资资收益或投投资损失。。如果偿债债基金不足足以清偿券券本金，则则就首先从从一般存款款户补足，，然后作清清偿全部公公司债的会会计处理。。公司偿债债基金应作作为一项长长期投资反反映在年末末资产负债债表上，偿偿债基金投投资收益或或损失则应应作为其他他项目列入入当年的损损益表。61CovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRequiredPurchaseofInsurance62TheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrusteePp.127-128信托担保协协议Awrittenagreementbetweentheuserofabondandhis/herbondholders,usuallydecifyinginterestrate,maturitydate,convertibility,andotherterms.Alsocalledindenture.指一张张明确记载载债券持有有人与发行行公司双方方所拥有的的权利和义义务的法律律文件。由由发行人和和债券所有有人达成的的，通常标标明利率、、期日、兑兑换性和其其他项目的的书面协议议，也叫契契约63债权人的考考量期限回报风险----违约风风险控制利益冲突谈判64InternalGovernanceStructureBoardofDirectorsShareholdersVotingRightsFiduciaryDutiesExecutiveCompensationBlock-holders(OutsideShareholders)65Readings(A)OliverE.Williamson,CorporateGovernance,pp.148-155.CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&BossL.Watts,IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensationPlans,pp.155-162.RobertaRomano,TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithoutFoundation?JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,Does“Unlawful”Mean“Criminal”?:ReflectionsontheDisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmericanLaw,pp.172-179.66Reading…MainPointsinEachArticles……67OliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCorporateGovernancefor?WhoaretheBODresponsiblefor?ShareholdersandotherConstituencies?OutsideShareholders’’Role?Managersthemselves?68CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&

BossL.WattsManagementIncentivesandCorporateGovernance:proorcon?69RobertaRomanoDerivativeSuits:SomeObservationswithEmpiricalStudiesPlaintiffs’counselsasshareholders’’agents?70JohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCriminalLaws:Convergence?Benefits/Advantagesv.DisadvantagesWhy?71FiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryDutiesinCorporateLaw?HowaboutnormalContracts?ResidualOwnersandMarginalRisks订立内容详详细的合同同意味着极极高的成本本,信义义义务成为不不完备合同同的补充规规则.72BJRDeferentialApproach(顺从路路径)Incentive-compatibleContracts73DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRole……74Readings(B)FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.JeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.JohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.MarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.BernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.213-214.75FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.FischelFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.DoyouthinkVotingisakeyroleincorporategovernance?76JeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.WhydoAmericanCorporationsintroduceDualClassCommonStock?Howdoyoucommentonitsrelationshipwithcorporategovernance?77JohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.WhatisProxyMechanism?Didtheauthorconcludethatproxycontextfacilitatedtheefficiencyofcorporategovernance?78MarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.HowwouldyouunderstandtheagencyprobleminAmericancorporategovernance?79BernardS.BlackBernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.WhowatchesWhom?80VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl81CasesParamountCommunications,Inc.v.TimeInc.,571A.2d1140(Del.1990).Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrews&ForbesHoldings,Inc.,506A.2d173(Del.1986).Moranv.HouseholdInternational.Inc.,500A.2d1346(Del.Ch.1988).UnocalCorp.v.MesaPetroleumCo.,493A.2d1049(Del.1988).CityCapitalAssociatesv.IntercoInc.,551A.2d787(Del.Ch.1988).82AdditionalReadingMaterials…RonaldJ.GilsonandReinierKraakman,Delaware’sIntermediateStandardforDefensiveTactics:IsThereSubstancetoProportionalityReview,44BusinessLawyer247(1989).83VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(A)TheoriesandEvidence反接管条例:向底竞争争还是力争上上游的竞争?接管是最大化化了个人(目目标公司股东东)的权益,它是否同时时可以最大化化社会效益?84代理成本和要要约收购并购是降低代代理成本的有有效方式?当当公司的代理理成本过高时时,要约收购购行为给股东东开除管理层层的机会.兼并与敌意要要约收购:哪哪个成本更大大?公司管理层应应当听任股东东和相互竞争争的要约收购购者对投标行行为自由博弈弈?85WilliamsAct任何人持有公公众公司5%以上的股份份时,必须提提交报告,披披露其持股比比例和意图;而且,要约约收购者必须须就其财务状状况和计划，，提交更为详详细的报告,同时,必须须向公众开放放其收购要约约一个月.要约收购者在在要约期内不不得向市场另另行购买股票票,另外,必须以最高高的交割按比比例买超额售售出的股份.86A.TheoriesandEvidenceHenryG.Manne,MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,pp.223-224.WhydoesaCorporate-controlmarketneeded?87A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.Jensen,Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,pp.225-228.FreeCashFlowTheoryTheRoleofDebtinMotivatingOrganizationalEfficiencyLeveragedBuyoutsandFreeCashFlowTheory88A.TheoriesandEvidenceAndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers,BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,pp.228-232.Whatdidtheauthorsdemonstrateinthearticleviathreeexamples?Anexusoflong-termcontractsbetweenshareholdersandstakeholders89A.TheoriesandEvidenceYakovAmihudandBaruchLev,RiskReductionasaManagerialMotiveforConglomerateMergers,pp.232-233.Whatdrivesasubstantialnumberoffirmstoengageinconglomeratemergers?90A.TheoriesandEvidenceRichardRoll,TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,pp.233-235.91A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientificEvidence,pp.235-242.92A.TheoriesandEvidenceGreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.BrickleyandJeffryM.Netter,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpiricalEvidenceSince1980,pp.242-245.93A.TheoriesandEvidenceSanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleiferandRobertW.Vishny,HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturntoCorporateSpecialization,pp.245-248.94州法:反接接管条例第一代反接管管条例:对对本州公司,州官员有出出价否决权第二代反接管管条例:只适适用于本州公公司,“控控股条例”或或者“公平平价格条例””第三代接管条条例:“企企业联合条例例”大约有40个个州制定有不不同的接管条条例95VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(B)TheProperRoleofaTarget’’sManagementinRespondingtoaTenderOffer,pp.258-261.969798GoodLuck!!!ding0118@999、静静夜夜四四无无邻邻，，荒荒居居旧旧业业贫贫。。。。12月月-2212月月-22Sunday,December25,202210、雨雨中中黄黄叶叶树树，，灯灯下下白白头头人人。。。。01:36:5801:36:5801:3612/25/20221:36:58AM11、以我我独沈沈久，，愧君君相见见频。。。12月月-2201:36:5801:36Dec-2225-Dec-2212、故人人江海海别，，几度度隔山山川。。。01:36:5801:36:5801:36Sunday,December25,202213、乍见翻翻疑梦，，相悲各各问年。。。12月-2212月-2201:36:5801:36:58December25,202214、他乡生生白发，，旧国见见青山。。。25十十二月20221:36:58上午午01:36:5812月-2215、比不了了得就不不比，得得不到的的就不要要。。。。十二月221:36上午午12月-2201:36December25,202216、行动出出成果，，工作出出财富。。。2022/12/251:36:5801:36:5825December202217、做