当前热点案例分析

,

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3GXQKZYHenry

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3

OTYZX[IZUX

-URJKT

,[Z[XK'[

ZNUXKJ

VXUULXKGJ

GTJ

RKIZ[XKYForgingBest

Prac

icesinRi

kManagement)UTZKTZYForging

Best

Practices

in

Risk

ManagementCase

Studies

on

Disruptions

During

the

CrisisWhy

do

we

need

both

liquidity

regulations

and

a

lender

of

lastresort?Global

Financial

Markets

Liquidity

StudyReforming

LIBOR

and

Other

Financial

Market

Ben

arksCentral

Counterparties:

Addressing

their

Too

Important

to

FailNatureStress

Testing

ConvergenceCybersecurity

101:

A

Resource

Guide

for

Bank

Executives2-206,OXS

2K\KR

/YY[KY

OT8OYQ

3KGY[XKSKTZChannels

linking

risk:Risk

can

spread

from

one

firm

to

another

through

directinterconnections

between

firms.Risks

may

be

correlated,

and

losses

can

spread

from

one

to

anotherthrough

market

prices.A

risk-mitigating

action

may

amplify

risk

when

employed

by

manyfirms

simultaneously.3-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义=NGZ

.

G

Y

)NGTMKJ

H_

ZNK

)XOYOYAreas

of

risk

management

that

have

been

most

affected

by

thefinancial

crisisTaking

a

longer-term on

risk:A

crucial

feature

of

the

historical

record

that

may

not

be

evidentfrom

just

2-3

years

of

history

is

a

pattern

of

volatility

regimeswith

a

profound

impact

on

risk

measurement.4-206=NGZ

.

G

Y

)NGTMKJ

H_

ZNK

)XOYOYRadically

heightened

attention

to

counterparty

risk:The

collapse

of

AIG

and

several

insurers

were

reminders

thathigh

credit

ratings

cannot

substitute

for

due

diligence

and

carefulmonitoring

of

counterparties;The

Libor-OIS

spread

climbed

dramatically

in

August

2007

andagain

in

September

2008

and

it

shows

no

sign

of

fully

returningto

its

small

and

stable

pre-crisis

level.The

use

of

collateral

in

derivatives

transactions

has

climbedsteadily.Portfolio

compression

services

continue

o y

large

scale.The

Dodd-Frank

Act

mandates

moving

most

derivatives

fromOTC

trading

to

central

clearing.5-206=NGZ

.

G

Y

)NGTMKJ

H_

ZNK

)XOYOYA

new

focus

on

funding

liquidity:The

flight

of

short-term

funding

was

a

major

factor

in

thefailures

of

2008.

The

aftermath

of

the

crisis

has

brought

tightercontrols

to

the

repo

market,

new

rules

for

money

market

fundsthat

constrain

their

role

as

a

source

of

short-term

funding.The

integration

of

market

and

credit

riskReduced

reliance

on

credit

ratings:The

crisis

has

left

skepticism

about

reliance

on

credit

ratingsDodd-Frank

Act

bars

the

use

of

credit

ratings

from

regulatoryrequirements.Shift

mu ore

responsibility

to

a

wide

range

of

marketparticipants

to

undertake

greater

due

diligence.6-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

=NGZ

.

G

Y

)NGTMKJ

H_

ZNK

)XOYOYNew

levels

of

sovereign

risk:Until

recently,

sovereign

risk

was

almost

entirely

limited

toemerging

markets.

A

U.S.

downgrade

and

a

crisis

in

Europe

thatintertwines

bank

and ernment

debts

across

borders

havechanged

that.A

shift

from

probability

to

uncertainty:The

financial

crisis

has

brought

a

renewed

appreciation

for

theimportance

of

imagining

the

unthinkable

and

develo

stressscenarios,

thus

bringing

a

greater

role

for

uncertainty

that

cannotbe fied

probabilistically

into

risk

management.7-206=NGZ

.

G

Y

)NGTMKJ

H_

ZNK

)XOYOYManaging

through

regulatory

uncertainty:Regulatory

changes

are

always possible,

but

the

near-termenvironment

will

be

characterized

by

a

higher

than

usual

level

ofregulatory

uncertainty.8-206'

.OYZUXOIGR

6KXYVKIZO\K

<URGZOROZ_

8KMOSKYVaR

requires

tracking

the

market

risk

factors

to

which

a

portfolio

isexposed

and

maintaining

historical

data

on

these

market

riskfactors.Market

returns

exhibit

high

kurtosis:The

distribution

of

returns

of

virtually

every

market

variableshows

a

higher

peak

and

heavier

tails

than

would

be

predicted

bya

normal

(Gaussian)

distribution.9-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义'

.OYZUXOIGR

6KXYVKIZO\K

<URGZOROZ_

8KMOSKYA

regime-switching

model

formalizes

this

idea

by

positingunderlying

states

or

regimes.

Within

each

regime,

model

parametersare

fixed,

but

the

parameters

in

different

regimes

can

be

verydifferent.A

limitation

of

this

approach

is

that

a

very

long

historical

record

isneeded

for

precise

estimation

it

is

difficult

to

glean

informationabout

transitions

if

the

record

includes

only

4-5

regime

switches.10-2069_YZKSOI

/SVROIGZOUTY

3OIXU

3KKZY

3GIXURisk

can

be

amplified

when

multiple

firms

attempt

to

take

the

samerisk-mitigating

steps.Regulations

that

are

“procyclical”

are

one

source

of

amplification.A

procyclical

regulation

is

one

that

tightens

constraints

on

creditprovision

during

an

economic

downturn

thus

contributing

to

aworsening

downturn.Sources

of

procyclicality:

Loan

loss

reserve

accounting

rules

>declining

loss

reserves

in

good

times

and

growing

loss

reservesas

the

economy

soursCapital

requirements >

lead

banks

to

hold

more

capital

as

creditquality

deteriorates11-2069_YZKSOI

/SVROIGZOUTY

3OIXU

3KKZY

3GIXURisk-mitigation

strategies

can

have

amplification

effects:Bank

run:

a

single

depositor

withdraws

funds

from

a

dicey

bank>

push

an

uninsured

bank

into

failure

if

followedsimultaneously

by

enough

depositors.A

widenin

S

spread

signals

increased

risk

>

trigger

moreprotection

buying

>

leads

to

further

spread

widening.Investment

banks

vary

the

size

of

their

balance

sheets

as

if

toa

level

of

VaR

>

selling

assets

as

volatility

increases

>during

an

extended

period

of

low

and

declining

volatility

>ballooning

balance

sheets.

e

in

volatility

in

2007

>

a

rushto

the

exit

as

firms

try

to

lower

their

risk

>

the

sell-off

leads

toa

further

increase

in

volatility.12-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

9_YZKSOI

/SVROIGZOUTY

3OIXU

3KKZY

3GIXUStock

market

crash

of

1987:

the

use

of

portfolio

insurancestrategies

>

trigger

selling

in

a

declining

market

>

lead

to

adownward

cascade

if

applied

widely.“Quant

crisis”

of

August

2007:

each

fund

might

have

counted

onthe

ability

to

sell

off

assets

as

a

way

to

manage

risk

withoutanticipating

the

effect

of

multiple

funds

ng

so

simultaneously.AIG:

each

counterparty

may

have

taken

comfort

in

knowing

thatit

could

demand

collateral

from

AIG

in

the

event

of

adowngrade.

But

draining

cash

through

collateral

calls

led

tofurther

downgrades

and

yet

more

collateral

calls

in

a

cycle.13-2068OYQ

3GTGMKSKTZ

(KYZ

6XGIZOIKYTakea

longer

look

back:Looking

at

2-3

years

of

past

data

gives

an plete

picture

offinancial

risk.

Some

important

features

emerge

only

over

a

timescale

of

20

or

more

years.Takea

longer

look

forward:Incremental

Risk

Charge:

requires

a

VaR

calculation

over

a

1-year

horizon;

and

rather

than

hold

a

portfolio

fixed,

it

assumesrebalancing

to

a level

of

risk,

with

the

rebalancingfrequency

tied

to

asset

liquidity.Attempt

to fy

portfolio

risk

over

a

relatively

long

horizon.14-2068OYQ

3GTGMKSKTZ

(KYZ

6XGIZOIKYStress

test

through

regime

changes:Greater

use

of

stress

scenarios

and

less

reliance

on

fiableprobabilities.Remember

the

categorical

imperative:Risk

managers

need

to

consider

the

effectiveness

of

a

risk-mitigating

action

when

the

same

action

is

undertakensimultaneously

by

many

other

firms.15-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义8OYQ

3GTGMKSKTZ

(KYZ

6XGIZOIKYIn

addressing

procyclicality, “best

practices”

face

ingobjectives.On

one

hand,

they

should

encourage

firms to

invest

indevelo precise

measures

of

risk;On

the

other

hand,

it

is

this

very

sensitivity

that

amplifies

risk

ifit

triggers

widespread

similar

responses.16-2068OYQ

3GTGMKSKTZ

(KYZ

6XGIZOIKYCountermeasures:Using

through-the-cycle

default

probabilities,

rather

than

point-in-time

estimates

reduces

the

procyclicality

of

capital;

it

does

soby

reducing

risk

sensitivity.Combining

a

current

VaR

(which

should

respond

quickly)

with

astressed

VaR

(which

serves

as

a

buffer

against

swings

involatility),

as

required

under

Basel

III,

entangles

the

twoobjectives

both

precise

risk

measurement

and

effectivebuffering

against

the

amplifying

effects

of

responses

to

risk.17-2062.CaseStudieson

DisruptionsDuringtheCrisis)UTZKTZY1.

Forging

Best

Practices

in

Risk

Management2

Case

Studies Disruptions

During

the

CrisisWhy

do

we

need

both

liquidity

regulations

and

a

lender

of

lastresort?Global

Financial

Markets

Liquidity

StudyReforming

LIBOR

and

Other

Financial

Market

Ben

arksCentral

Counterparties:

Addressing

their

Too

Important

to

FailNatureStress

Testing

ConvergenceCybersecurity

101:

A

Resource

Guide

for

Bank

Executives18-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

'[IZOUT

8GZK

9KI[XOZOKYAn

auction-rate

security

(ARS)

is

a

long-term

debt

security

whoseinterest

rate

is

reset

regularly

via

an

auction

process.This

interest

rate

is

then

paid

by

the

issuer

on

all

shares

until

thenext

auction

date.An

auction

fails

if

there

are

fewer

bids

than

investors

seeking

toredeem

shares.

The

interest

rate

on

the

securities

is

reset

to

aum

“penalty”

rate

to

compensate

investors

for

the

inability

toredeem

their

shares

and

to

provide

the

issuer

with

an

incentive

torestructure

the

obligation.19-206'[IZOUT

8GZK

9KI[XOZOKYSource

of

Fragility:The

underlying

asset

was

a

long-term

debt

security,

but

holders

ofthe

security-in

normal

times-could

withdraw

their

funds

byredeeming

shares

in

the

next

auction.A

holder

of

the

security

who

expects

future

auctions

to

fail

maywant

to

sell

in

the

current

auction

to

avoid

being

locked

into

thesecurity.

Similarly,

new

investors

may

be

unwilling

to

bid

in

thecurrent

auction

if

they

expect

that

future

auctions

may

fail.To

limit

the

fragility:

penalty

rate

imposed

after

a

failed

auction;

thepossibility

that

a

market

maker

would

step

in

and

submit

sufficientbids

to

prevent

an

auction

from

failing.20-206'[IZOUT

8GZK

9KI[XOZOKYCrisis:In

2008,

for

those

securities

with

a

relatively

low

penalty

rate,

theauctions

largely

continued

to

fail

and

investors

were

unable

toredeem

shares.For

those

securities

with

a

relatively

high

penalty

rate,

manyauctions

remained

successful

although

the

clearing

rates

increasedsubstantially.

Investors

were

able

to

exit

the

market

withoutexperiencing

losses,

but

issuers

paid

substantially

higher

rates.Policy

Response:In

subsequent

months

and

years,

many

investors

in

ARS

sued

theirbrokers,

claiming

they

were

misled

about

the

liquidity

risksinvolved.21-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义)USSKXIOGR

6GVKXCommercial

paper

is

a

key

source

of

short-term

financing

for

U.S.corporations

and

financial

institutions.

Disruptions

to

the

CP

marketmay

result

in

higher

funding

costs,

forced

asset

sales

to

raise

cash,and

pressure

on

credit

lines

extended

by

commercial

banks.Corporate

CP

is

typically

issued

by

large,

highly

rated,

publiclytraded

nonfinancial

corporates.CP

is

attractive

to

investors

given

its

short

duration;

the

maturity

ofCP

is

limited

to

270

days.22-206)USSKXIOGR

6GVKXCrisis:The

vulnerability

of

CP

markets

is

attributable

to

the

type

ofinvestors

who

purchase

CP,

the

short-term

nature

of

the

market,

andthe

rollover

risk

faced

by

institutions

reliant

on

it.Lehman

Brothers’

bankruptcy

triggered

massive

redemptions

fromprime

money

market

funds,

which

subsequently

reduced

theirholdings

of

CP

as

investors

became

increasingly

skeptical.Total

outstanding

CP

fell

15

percent

between

August

and

October2008,

and

financial

CP

outstanding

fell

32

percent.23-206)USSKXIOGR

6GVKXPolicy

Response:The

Commercial

Paper

Funding

Facility

(CPFF)

was

designed

toprovide

temporary

support

to

all

CP

issuer

types

through

theprovision

of

a

liquidity

backstop.Through

the

CPFF,

the

Fed

would

purchase

three-monthcommercial

paper

directly

from

eligible

issuers

to

provideassurance

to

both

issuers

and

investors

that

firms

would

be

able

toroll

over

their

maturing

CP.24-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

'YYKZ

(

GIQ

KJ

)USSKXIOGR

6GVKXIn

order

to

enhance

their

attractiveness

to

prospective

investors,their

rating

status

was

boosted

with

guarantees.Since

most

sponsors

were

large

banks

with the

highest

creditratings,

the

provision

of

such

guarantees

effectively

transferred

therating

status

of

the

sponsor

to

the

conduit.The

U.S.

bank

regulatory

agencies

issued

a

ruling

that

allowedbanks

to

exclude

sponsored

conduits

from

consolidationrequirements.25-206'YYKZ

(

GIQ

KJ

)USSKXIOGR

6GVKXCrisisThe

ABCP

market

collapse

in

August

2007

enhanced

uncertainty,coupled

with

the

pronounced

maturity

mismatch of

conduits’balance

sheets,

triggered

a

run

on

their

liabilities.The

market

was

further

hit in

the

aftermath of

Lehman’sbankruptcy,

as

a

result

of

the

run

on

one

of

the

largest

moneymarket

funds,

the

Reserve

Primary

Fund.26-206'YYKZ

(

GIQ

KJ

)USSKXIOGR

6GVKXPolicy

ResponseFollowing

August

2007

and

prior

to

Lehman’s

default,

policy

actionmainly

focused

on

providing

liquidity

to

banks

by

reducing

the

discountwindow

rates

and

extending

the

loan

terms.After

Lehman’s

failure

that

policy

actions

were

specifically

aimed

at

thecommercial

paper

market.Asset-Backed

Commercial

Paper

Money

Market

Mutual

Fund

LiquidityFacility

(AMLF)

provided

nonrecourse

loans

to

commercial

banks

topurchase

eligible

ABCP

from

money

market

mutual

funds.In

2010,

new

accounting

rules

were

introduced,

requiring

consolidationfor

accounting

purposes

of

most

ABCP

conduits

on

the

balance

sheet

ofthe

sponsoring

institution,

thus

reducing

the

scope

for

ABCP

marketgrowth.27-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义3

UTK_

3GXQKZ

3[Z[GR

,

[

T

J

YMMFs

are

key

intermediators

of

short-term

debt.The

historical

success

of

the

funds

in

maintaining

principal

stabilityattracted

a

large,

highly

risk-averse

shareholder

base

that

includedinstitutional

investors.28-2063

UTK_

3GXQKZ

3[Z[GR

,

[

T

J

YSource

ofFragility:Investors

have

a

strong

incentive

to

run

from

a

distressed

MMFbecause

redemptions

can

shift

risks

and

costs

to

remainingshareholders.MMFs

round

their

share

price

to

the

nearest

cent,

an

investor

whoredeems

shares

from

a

fund

that

has

incurred

a

loss

of

less

than

0.5percent

may

still

beable

to

obtain

$1

per

share.MMFs

meet

redemptions

by

disposing

of

their

highly

liquid

assets.This,

in

turn,

can

help

the

funds

avoid

losses

from

sale

of

less

liquidsecurities.

However,

during

periods

of

market

strain,

the

investorsthat

redeem

pose

a

negative

externality

on

nonredeeming

investorsby

leaving

them

with

a

less

liquid

pool

of

assets.29-2063

UTK_

3GXQKZ

3[Z[GR

,

[

T

J

YPolicy

ResponseEmergency

measures:

temporarily

provided

a

guarantee

against

lossfor

shareholders

in

participating

MMFs.Also,

the

Federal

Reserve’s

AMLF

supported

MMF

liquidity

byproviding

nonrecourse

financing

for

bank

purchases

of

ABCP

fromMMFs.30-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

8KVU

3GXQKZYThe

market

value

of

the

securities

purchased

typically

exceeds

thevalue

of

the

cash

the

borrower

receives.This

difference,

which

is

normally

expressed

as

a

percentage,

iscalled

the

“margin”

and

measures

the

extent

to

which

the

implicitcashloan

is

overcollateralized.In

the

bilateral

market,

the

settlement

of

the

repo

is

handled

by

thetwo

counterparties,

while

in

the

tri-party

repo

market

a

third-partyclearing

bank

provides

settlement

and

collateral

managementservices.31-2068KVU

3GXQKZYSource

of

Fragility

and

the

CrisisShort

maturities

and

the

risk

of

fire

sales

are

two

factors

thatexacerbate

fragility

for

repo

financing.Short

maturities

can

create

rollover

risk

when

the

buyers

getconcerned

and

pull

out.If

the

market

for

the

securities

is

not

very

liquid,

or

if

the

amount

ofsecurities

being

sold

is

very

large,

the

lender

may

be

forced

to

sellits

assets

at

fire-sale

prices

and

could

suffer

losses.The

repo

haircuts

on

a

variety

of

assets

rose

o

age

from

zeroin

early

2007

to

nearly

50

percent

in

late

2008.32-2068KVU

3GXQKZYPolicy

ResponseThe

Federal

Reserve

established

several

funding

programs

tobackstop

the

tri-party

repo

market,

provide

emergency

liquidity

todealers,

and

strengthen

investor

confidence

in

dealers’

ability

torepay

funds

borrowed

under

repo

agreements.Auctioned

loans

of

Treasury

securities

to

primary

dealersProvided

funding

to

primary

dealersAccepted

a

broader

range

of

collateral33-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义)XKJOZ

)USSOZSKTZYHistorically,

banks

have

been

the

main

source

of

credit

tocorporations,

but

they

have

also

provided

corporations

liquidityinsurance

by

extending

them

lines

of

credit

and

loan

commitments.Firms

value

credit

lines

because

they

protect

them

against

changesin

interest

rates,

help

them

signal

their

true

quality,

or

reduceinstances

of

credit

rationing.With

the

advent

of

the

originate-to-distribute

model,

where

lendersorigina

oans

with

the

intention

of

selling

them

to

other

investorsas

opposed

to

holding

until

maturity.To

make

these

vehicles

more

attractive

to

investors,

banks

offeredcredit

enhancements

to

reduce

the

risk

to

investors

in

the

event

ofunexpected

losses

and

provided

liquidity

backstops34-206)XKJOZ

)USSOZSKTZYSource

of

FragilityDeposit

withdrawals and

firms’

drawdowns

will

likely

cometogether

in

instances

when

there

is

uncertainty

about

the

financialcondition

of

the

bank.

Putting

liquidity

pressure

on

banks.When

banks

provide

credit

commitments

to

ABCP

programs

or

toback

up

CP

programs,

they

create

a

liquidity

exposure

to

a

newfactor the

CP

market.35-206)XKJOZ

)USSOZSKTZYCrisisBanks

that

had

larger

losses

experienced

both

an

increase

in

thedrawdown

rates

on

their

credit

lines

and

a

runoff

in

uninsureddeposits.This

combination

is

bound

to

have

put

liquidity

pressure

on

thesebanks.As

structured

investment

vehicles

accumulated

losses

and

investorslost

confidence

in

them,

these

vehicles

increasingly

became

unableto

fund

themselves

in

the

CP

market.The

run

on

the

money

market

fund

industry

that

followed

the

eventsat

the

Reserve

Primary

Fund

raised

concerns

about

the

ability

ofcommercial

paper

issuers

to

renew

their

debt.36-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

)XKJOZ

)USSOZSKTZYPolicy

ResponseThe

increase

in

the

deposit

limit

covered

by

deposit

insurance

from$100,000

to

$250,000

and

the

guarantee

in

full

of

noninterest-bearing

transaction

accounts

appear

to

have

helped

stabilize

theexodus

of

deposits

from

the

banking

industry.37-206*URRGX

,[TJOTM

UL

4

U

T

;

9

(GTQYBanks

had

substantial

dollar

liabilities

on

the

other

side

of

theirbalance

sheets.Most

non-U.S.

banks

meet

their

dollar

funding

needs

by

issuingdollar-denominated

wholesale

debt,

such

as s

of

deposits(CDs)

and

commercial

paper,

out

of

U.S.

bank

branches

and

othercorporate

entities.U.S.

investors

such

as

MMFs

buy

these

debt

instruments

andconstitute

the

main

source

of

dollar

funding

of

European

banks.38-206*URRGX

,[TJOTM

UL

4

U

T

;

9

(GTQYCrisisU.S.

wholesale

investors,

in

particular

the

MMFs

that

are

sensitiveto

risk,

tend

to

pull

back

and

reduce

lending

when

investment

risksintensify.Non-U.S.

banks

can

fill

the

dollar

funding

gap

by

“deleveraging,”or

shrinking

dollar

assets

so

as

to

reduce

their

need

for

dollars.The

most

widely

used

alternative

is

to

convert

domestic

currencyliabilities

into

dollars

for

a

fixed

period

through

foreign

exchangeswaps,

or

borrow

dollars

from

central

bank

dollar

liquidityfacilities.39-206【梦轩考资

】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义*URRGX

,[TJOTM

UL

4

U

T

;

9

(GTQYPolicy

ResponseThe

Federal

Reserve

provided

dollar

loans

to

U.S.

branches

offoreign

banks

through

the

discount

window

(DW)

and

the

TermAuction

Facility.The

Federal

Reserve

provides

U.S.

dollars

in

exchange

for

anequivalent

amount

of

foreign

currency.The

dollar

loans

were

provided

at

a

rate

that

made

it

attractive

forbanks

to

borrow

in

times

of

crisis.40-206=NURKYGRK

,[TJOTM

GTJ

4UXZNKXT

8UIQIn

September

2007,

Northern

Rock

experienced

an

old-fashionedbank

run.Northern

Rock

relied

on

securitization

and

funding

from

wholesalemarkets

rather

than

“traditional”

funding

from

retail

deposits

andholding

loans

until

maturity.The

drying-up

of

liquidity

in

wholesale

markets

in

the

summer

of2007

adversely

affected

Northern

Rock.The

Bank

of

England

agreed

to

provide

emergency

assistance.

Theernment

announced

it

would

guarantee

all

existing

deposits

tocontain

the

run.41-2063.Whydowe

need

bothliquidi

yregulationsandalenderoflastresort)UTZKTZYForging

Best

Practices

in

Risk

ManagementCase

Studies

on

Disruptions

During

the

Crisis3

Why

do need

both

liquidity

regulations

and lender

of

lastresort?Global

Financial

Markets

Liquidity

StudyReforming

LIBOR

and

Other

Financial

Market

Ben

arksCentral

Counterparties:

Addressing

their

Too

Important

to

FailNatureStress

Testing

ConvergenceCybersecurity

101:

A

Resource

Guide

for

Bank

Executives42-206【梦轩考资】6454842 专业提供CFA

FRM全程+讲义

/TZXUJ[IZOUT

5\KX\OK]The

scale

of

Federal

Reserve

intervention

in

financial

marketsduring

the

crisis

generated

considerable

controversy.U.S.

lawmakers

and

regulators

took

various

steps

to

reduce

thelikelihood

that

lending

by

the

Federal

Reserve

would

be

required

inthe

future.Loans

were

bailouts

of

financial

institutions

that

protected

themfrom

the

consequences

of

their

risky

behavior.It

encourages

institutions

to

take

on

more

risk.It

threatens

the

independence

of

the

Federal

Reserve.A

contrary

v