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1、课程供应链管理DeterminingOptimalLevelofProductAvailability(5)课件课程供应链管理DeterminingOptimalLevRevenue Sharing ContractsManufacture charges the retailer a low wholesale price and shares a fraction of the revenue generated by the retailer.The retailer cost will be decreased due to lower overstock cost, thus, re

2、tailer will increase the level of product availability resulting higher profits for both manufacturer and retailer.Basher Eyre _Geograph2Revenue Sharing ContractsManufRevenue Sharing ContractsManufacturers production cost = vWholesale price charged by manufacturer = cManufacturer shares a fraction f

3、 of the retailers revenueRetailer charges a retail price p and has a salvage value sR for unsold items. The understocking cost = Cu = (1-f)p cThe overstocking cost = Co = c sR 3Revenue Sharing ContractsManufRevenue Sharing Contracts4Revenue Sharing Contracts6Revenue Sharing ContractsExample: TF char

4、ges only c = $10 for each jacket, SA sells the jacket for p = $200 and shares f of the revenue to TF. Demand at this price is normal distributed with a mean 1000 and a standard deviation 300. Assume that no salvage value for any leftover jackets.5Revenue Sharing ContractsExampRevenue Sharing Contrac

5、tsWholesale Price cRevenue-SharingFraction fOptimal Order Size for SAExpected OverstockAt SAExpected Profit for SAExpected Profit for TFExpectedSupply Chain Profit$100.3144044912427359429183702100.513843998473598580183315100.7129031745503136278181781100.910001207606158457166063200.313203421105237188

6、6182409200.5125228671601109176180777200.71129195334551420511755066Revenue Sharing ContractsWholeRevenue Sharing ContractsObservations: revenue sharing with a lower wholesale price allows both retailers and manufactures to increase their profit. The revenue sharing encourages retailers to increase th

7、e level of product availabilityApplications: video rental industry, such as Blockbuster.7Revenue Sharing ContractsObserContracts for Product Availability and Supply Chain Profits: Revenue Sharing ContractsThe buyer pays a minimal amount for each unit purchased from the supplier but shares a fraction

8、 of the revenue for each unit soldDecreases the cost per unit charged to the retailer, which effectively decreases the cost of overstockingHave a similar effect as buyback contracts but eliminate the cost of returnsEnabler: require an information infrastructure to monitor sales at retailerLower reta

9、iler effortSuited for products with low variable cost and a high cost of returnResult in supply chain information distortion8Contracts for Product AvailabiQuantity Flexibility ContractsIf a retailer order O units the manufacturer commits to supplying up to Q = (1+)O and the retailer commits to buyin

10、g q = (1-)OHow can quantity flexibility contracts help increase profitability?Wikipedia9Quantity Flexibility ContractsQuantity Flexibility ContractsManufacturing cost per unit: vWholesale price: cRetailing price: pRetailer salvage value: SRManufacture salvage value: SMDemand (2)10Quantity Flexibilit

11、y ContractsQuantity Flexibility ContractsScenario:Retailer orders O units, manufacture commits to supply Q unitsManufacturer produces Q unitsRetailer purchases q units if demand R is less than q; R units of demand R is between q and Q; Q units if demand is higher than Q11Quantity Flexibility Contrac

12、tsQuantity Flexibility ContractsExpected quantity sold by retailerExpected quantity purchased by retailerq = (1-)OQ = (1+)O12Quantity Flexibility ContractsQuantity Flexibility ContractsExpected overstock at retailerExpected retailer profitExpected manufacture profit13Quantity Flexibility ContractsQu

13、antity Flexibility Contracts Wholesale price c Order size O Expected purchase by SA Expected sale by SA Expected profits for SA Expected profits for TF Expected supply chain profit 0.000.00$1001,0001,000 880$76,063$90,000$166,0630.200.20$1001,050 1,024968$91,167$89,830$180,9970.400.40$1001,070 1,011

14、 994$97,689$86,122$183,8110.000.00$110962962860$66,252$96,200$162,4520.150.15$1101,014 1,009 945$78,153$99,282$177,4350.420.42$1101,048 1,007993$87,932$95,879$183,8110.000.00$120924924838$56,819$101,640$158,4590.20.2$1201,0001,000 955$70,933$108,000$178,9330.50.5$1201,040 1,003 996$78,874$104,803$18

15、3,67714Quantity Flexibility ContractsQuantity Flexibility ContractCommon for components in the electronic and computer industryExample: Benetton: retailer required to place order 7 months before delivery, but allow retailer to alter up to 30% quantity ordered in any color and assign to another color

16、 3 months before delivery and allow retailer to alter up to 10% after the start of the season15Quantity Flexibility ContractCContracts for Product Availability and Supply Chain Profits: Quantity Flexibility ContractsAllows the buyer to modify the order (within limits) as demand visibility increases

17、closer to the point of saleBetter matching of supply and demandIncreased overall supply chain profits if the supplier has flexible capacityCan be effective if a supplier sells to multiple retailers with independent demand16Contracts for Product AvailabiContracts for Product Availability and Supply C

18、hain Profits: Quantity Flexibility ContractsDownsize:Supplier needs to have inventory or excess flexible capacityLower levels of information distortion than either buyback contracts or revenue sharing contracts due to aggregation of uncertainty from supplierLower retailer effort17Contracts for Produ

19、ct AvailabiVendor-Managed Inventory(VMI)VMI: manufacturer or supplier is responsible for all decisions regarding product inventories at the retailerRequirements: share info from retailersBenefits:Increase profit of manufacturerImprove manufacturer forecast accuracyAvoid double marginalizationDrawbac

20、ks:Impact of product substitution to bring higher inventory in retailer本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 20

21、07多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。18Vendor-Managed Inventory(VMI)VCRCPCFCPFR Model協同合作協議協同商業計劃共同的銷售預測例外狀況的判定與處理共同的訂單預測例外狀況的判定與處理訂單產生Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment本作品轉載自 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment,瀏覽日期2012/03/23。依據著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。19CRCPCF

22、CPFR Model協同合作協議CollaborCPFR避免不必要庫存庫存成本報廢外部庫存提升流程效率增加收益提高物流利用率避免缺貨提高促銷效率提升業績訂單管理採購人力管理提高配送效率整合運輸管理導入CPFR的好處20CPFR避免不必要庫存庫存成本提升流程效率增加收益提高物流利協同規劃,預測與補貨(Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment, CPFR)目標:對共同作業過程,格式與績效指標的協調一致透過POS資料,分享一個共同預測與需求規劃在一個協調機制下,對需求滿足,滿足的優先次序與供應分配的管理之相互溝通對未來促銷的預先通知

23、以減少長鞭效應透過共同技術的分享,使需求,存貨與運送的資料更透明化21協同規劃,預測與補貨(Collaborative Plann協同規劃,預測與補貨(CPFR)指導原則:共同交易架構的建立:語言,作業模式,與資料標準企業的流程必須清楚定義作業的流程與共同的術語必須轉換成特定與共同的標準22協同規劃,預測與補貨(CPFR)指導原則:24CPFR RoadmapPublished by VICS (Interindustry Commerce Standard Association)Nine steps:Develop guidelines for the relationshipsDevel

24、op a joint business planCreate a sales forecastIdentify exceptions for the sales forecastCollaborate on exception itemsCreate an order forecastIdentify exceptions for the order forecastResolve/collaborate on exception itemsGenerate orders23CPFR RoadmapPublished by VICS 協同規劃,預測與補貨(CPFR)績效指標:預測準確度的提升顧

25、客服務水準的提高缺貨率的降低存貨水準的降低較佳的財務資金結構24協同規劃,預測與補貨(CPFR)績效指標:26Contracts to Coordinate Supply Chain CostsDifferences in costs at the buyer and supplier can lead to decisions that increase total supply chain costsA quantity discount contract may encourage the buyer to purchase a larger quantity (which would

26、be lower costs for the supplier), which would result in lower total supply chain costs but higher inventory levels and lot sizesQuantity discounts lead to information distortion because of order batchingExample: Replenishment order size placed by the buyer. The buyers EOQ does not take into account

27、the suppliers costs.25Contracts to Coordinate SupplyContracts to Increase Agent EffortThere are many instances in a supply chain where an agent acts on the behalf of a principal and the agents actions affect the reward for the principalThreshold contracts increase information distortion, however. On

28、e way to offer threshold incentives over a rolling horizon.Example: A car dealer who sells the cars of a manufacturer, as well as those of other manufacturersExamples of contracts to increase agent effort include two-part tariffs (a franchise fee and sell product at cost) and threshold contracts (in

29、creasing margin to dealer for higher threshold)本作品轉載自Microsoft Office 2007多媒體藝廊,依據Microsoft服務合約及著作權法第46、52、65條合理使用。26Contracts to Increase Agent EfContracts to Induce Performance ImprovementA buyer may want performance improvement from a supplier who otherwise would have little incentive to do soA shared savings contract provides the supplier with a fraction of the sa

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