高新技术产品出口翻译

1、高新技术产品出口，是发展中国家的技术突破的标志还是数据上的虚像？【资料来源】：该文章为隆德大学 DIME WP 2.3 工作室的“产业创新动态和知识的特点”而准备， 2006年4月26日至27日。【作者】：Martin Srholec，奥斯陆大学创新和文化技术中心。摘要： 高科技产品的专业化经常用于加大技术出口的力度，而发展中国家正日益成为这些产品的出口商，有的甚至成为高新技术产品出口中最为专门化的国家。这篇文章仔细研究了根据技术密集性进行出口归类的分类标准的相关性。结果表明，高新技术产品出口的专业化通常不会与发展中国家的本土技术能力同步发展。而据国内进口产品的分析表明，大比例的高新技术产品出

2、口实际上可以归因于日益国际化的电子生产系统的分散性对于贸易统计有深刻的影响。计量经济学的构架证实国内的技术能力与电子产品的出口性能相关，正是由于对电子元件的进口倾向使得迄今为止国内各地在电子产品的进口专业化方面有如此大的差异。本文将以一些关于政策和未来研究方面的启示作为总结。高新技术产品出口方面的专业化趋势：什么样的指示？在学术界，众所周知经济的发展需要结构性的变化，因此在研究中分析结构性的转变也是非常重要的一个方面。由于经济的规模和范围的扩大、出口的多样化以及与基于剥削自然资源的出口相比通常具备更高的技能和技术强度这些原因，我们可以理所当然地认为进入到制造业出口的时代将会给我们带来更大的发展

3、机遇。虽然初级资源型贸易和加工贸易之间的区别相对容易辨别，但是加工贸易的技术强度之间的区分却变得复杂得多。 如上所述，习惯上来说，通过比较各个国家的高科技产品专业化之间的比较，我们就可以捕捉到技术的出口力度。图一提供了一个关于各个国家相关的可用数据之间的比较（在2003年的108个国家的样本）。图中垂直轴绘制的是商品出口中的高科技产品比例，而水平先则表示电子产品出口中的专业化。虚线则表示样本的平均数，它把整个图表分为四个象限，即沿着两个方向分为以下/以上的平均系数，以此表明这些国家的产品在出口中的专业化程度。 图一 2003年高新技术产品与电子产品的专业化高新技术产品出口的数据是以世界发展指标

4、数据集（世界银行，2005）为基础的，它指高研发强度的产品，诸如航空航天，计算机，医药，科学仪器和电气机械等。这与经合组织的分类定义是一致的，而且与基于Pavitt的分类科学并得到普遍认可的出口行业相当接近。电子产品出口可以COMTRADE数据库（联合国2005年）中获得，它并覆盖了以下产品的相关贸易：办公、会计和计算机械（75）；电台、电视和通讯设备（76）；电气机械（77）；以及医疗、精密和光学仪器（87，881，884和885）。所有的代码都是根据SITC, rev. 3而来。 大多数国家在高科技产品出口的份额上一直保持低于平均水平，而大部分的低收入国家的高新技术产品出口报告甚至可以忽略

5、不计，即使高新技术产品出口的专业化绝不是最先进的国家的特权。然而，最引人注目的事实是专门从事高科技产品出口的国家是菲律宾。在那里，几乎有三分之二的出口都属于高科技类。其他高新技术产品出口专业化的国家还包括马耳他、新加坡、马来西亚和台湾，其中超过三分之一的出口都是高新技术产品。此外还有几个随手可得的关于发展中国家或新兴国家的典型例子，如中国、泰国、哥斯达黎加、墨西哥、匈牙利、韩国等在高科技领域也表现的相当出色。在仔细观察其结构之后就可发现，在大多数国家的高新技术产品出口中，电子产品占大部分的比重，且这种匹配关系在专业化程度高的国家表现的尤其明显。这些国家通常以有限范围内的电子产品为主要的高新技术

6、出口产品。高科技产品出口的专业化与电子产品出口的整体相关性非常高。图1显示，这些指标在全国各地的差异超过了80%，如果排除一些重要的出色者的话那么差异会更大。因此，在下面的章节中，我们将会集中分析狭义上的电子贸易，以此作为一个具有广泛代表性的高新技术产品出口分析。这些到底是什么意思呢？它告诉我们什么呢？仅就高新技术产品出口的角度看，人们会认为很多发展中国家在科技发展这个层面已经取得了很大成就。如果从高新技术产品出口的统计数字上看，甚至会有人认为这些国家在经济技术上已经超越了日本、美国、欧盟。Srholec通过举例的方式直接比较了经合组织地区的国家高科技领域的研发力度。通过比较产生的数据显示，经

7、合组织成员国中的那些收入比较低的国家例如墨西哥、波兰、斯洛伐克、匈牙利和捷克共和国等国家，他们在产品科技研究发展强度仍然比那些通过对高科技产品和其他制造业实施差异税额征收的手段来限制高新科技企业发展的发达国家的科技研究发展水平要低得多。这些都让我们很难认为这些国家都属于高科技发展的国家。尽管发展中国家在高科技产品的研究发展上的投入还很低，但是对于那些非经合组织成员国关于高科技研究发展数据也是可以进行比较的。高新技术产品出口的发展和科技发展的支出的经济力度并不是成比例的。贫富悬殊是菲律宾、马耳他和马来西亚最引人注目的地方，这些国家的另一个比较特殊的地方在于这些国家在高新科技领域的出口占到总出口的

8、45%，在那些高新科技领域出口所占比例稍微低点的国家例如哥斯达黎加、泰国和墨西哥，他们的高科技研究发展的支出费用仍地远低于GDP的1%。因此，这些实例能够证明，国家高速发展的高新技术出口或许不是因为其具有先进的技术能力。这些都证明了这样的假设：高新技术的发展已经把国际生产分散，一个科技发展落后的国家仍然可以制造出具有高科技含量的产品。随着外资企业的增多，东亚地区已经发展成为高科技制造业的集聚地，但是在这一地区，定位在“第一梯队”的新型工业化国家和其他地区的相关科技能力还存在一定的差距。亚洲的一些高收入国家例如新加坡、台湾、韩国和日本，他们的高新技术出口和研发强度都排在全球前15位，其他的亚洲国

9、家的科技能力则远远落后于他们。由于拥有庞大的市场规模和独特的发展轨迹，中国在科技研发方面则属于一个特殊情况。在高科技产品研究发展强度方面，中国已经超越了一些高收入国家例如爱尔兰和南欧的一些国家。由于经济发达地区和偏远地区的地区之间存在差异，中国的一些地区可能保持着高于全国平均水平的高科技产品研究发展强度，甚至接近发达国家的研究发展水平。正如前面提到的，日益发展的高新技术产品出口和当地的科技能力巨大差异背后隐藏着的是当今科技发展和相关制造业发展的分离。相关事实似乎证明高科技研发活动高度依附于空间，并且最终会形成地区化。虽然目前在世界范围内对于高科技研发的海外投资日益增加，但是这些投资主要都来自于

10、发达国家。对企业数据的分析表明，在那些企业技术落后于世界科学技术发展前沿的国家，例如捷克共和国，相比较于内资企业，外资企业更不太愿意冒险对高科技研发活动进行投资。在许多发展中国家，尽管国家吸引了主要以制造业为基础的全球生产商的生产资料的进入，高新技术产品出口激增，但是高新技术依然集中在别的国家。这种现象的产生并不让我们感到奇怪。虽然高新技术产品出口对于发展中国家当地科技能力的发展的帮助很小，但是很多人认为高新技术产业仍然能够凭借其潜在的溢出效应对当地的发展有所助益。然而，知识溢出效应的涉及范围到底有多大，我们仍然不能预测。正如先进的文献资料所言，溢出效应的范围应当限于当地，因为知识是隐形的对空

11、间具有高度依附性的。我们需要有适当的吸收能力，从溢出效应中收益。技术的价值不仅仅在于能够提供生产，更在于它具有可传播性；当然，当技术越是复杂时，技术在地区间的传播就越发困难。由于基于科技而产生的知识外溢是具有界限的(国家边界或者是其他有关的界限)并且受到当地的吸收能力制约，因此最终决定知识外溢效果的因素是在当地开展活动的实际技术水平而不是一般行业的技术强度。High-tech exports from developing countries: A symptom of technology spurts or statistical illusion? Martin SrholecCentr

12、e for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of OsloPaper for the DIME WP 2.3 workshop on “Industrial innovation dynamics and knowledge characteristics, 26-27 April 2006, Lund University Abstract Specialization in high-tech products is frequently used to capture technology intensity of

13、 exports. Developing countries are increasingly becoming exporters of these products, and some may even be among the most deeply specialized countries in the high-tech exports. The paper scrutinizes the relevance of the taxonomies that classify exports by technological intensity. It is shown that sp

14、ecialization in high-tech exports typically does not appear in tandem with indigenous technological capabilities in developing countries. The analysis of intra-product imports suggests that the bulk of high-tech exports can actually be attributed to the effect of increasingly international fragmenta

15、tion of production systems in electronics on trade statistics. It is confirmed in an econometric framework that while domestic technological capabilities are associated with export performance in electronics, it is the propensity to import electronics components that accounts for by far the largest

16、proportion of cross-country differences in specialization in electronics exports. The paper concludes with some implications for policy and future research. Specialization in high-tech exports: The indicator of what? It is well established in the literature that economic development requires structu

17、ral change, so it is important to analyse structural shifts along the way. It is also rightly argued that moving into manufacturing exports entails greater development opportunities because of economies of scale and scope, export diversification and typically higher skills and technological intensit

18、y, compared with exports based on exploitation of natural endowments. Although a broad distinction between primary, resource-based and manufacturing trade is relatively straightforward, it is far more complicated to differentiate technological intensity of manufacturing trade. As noted above, it is

19、customary to capture technological intensity of exports by comparing specialization in products perceived as high-tech across countries. Figure 1 provides a comparison for all countries for which the relevant data is available (a sample of 108 countries in 2003). The share of high-tech products in m

20、erchandise exports is plotted on the vertical axis against specialization in exports of electronics on the horizontal axis. The dotted lines show sample averages, which divide the figure into four quadrants with below/above average scores along the two dimensions to indicate countries specialized in

21、 exports of these products. The data for high-tech exports are based on the World Development Indicators dataset (World Bank 2005), which according to the source refers to “products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical mach

22、inery”. This is in line with the definition of the OECD taxonomy and is fairly close to exports of industries generally viewed as science-based in Pavitts taxonomy. Exports of electronics have been obtained from the Comtrade Database (United Nations 2005) and cover trade in the following products: o

23、ffice, accounting and computing machinery (75); radio, television and communications equipment (76), electrical machinery (77) and medical, precision and optical instruments (87, 881, 884 and 885) - all codes according to SITC, rev. 3. A majority of countries maintain a below-average share of high-t

24、ech product in exports. Most low-income countries report negligible high-tech exports, although specialization in high-tech exports is by no means a privilege of the most advanced countries. Striking is the fact that the country specializing the most in high-tech exports is the Philippines, where al

25、most two-thirds of exports fall into the high-tech category. Other outliers include Malta, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan, where high-tech products account for more than a third of exports. A handful of typical examples of developing (or emerging) countries, such as China, Thailand, Costa Rica, Mexi

26、co, Hungary and Korea also perform quite well in the high-tech area. A closer look at the structure reveals that electronics accounts for the bulk of high-tech exports in most countries. The match is particularly strong for the most specialized countries, where high-tech exports are typically domina

27、ted by a limited range of electronic products. Overall correlation between the specialization in exports of high-tech products and electronics is extremely high. Figure1 shows that these indicators share more than 80% of cross-country variance, and even more if important outliers are excluded. 3 The

28、refore, in the following sections, we focus narrowly on the analysis of trade in electronics as a broad representation of high-tech exports. What does it mean? What does it tell us? Looking solely at the specialization in high-tech (or electronics) exports, one could easily conclude that a number of

29、 developing countries have been extremely successful in technological catching up. If taken literally, the figure might be interpreted to suggest that these countries have even overtaken the United States, Japan and the EU in terms of the technological intensity of their economies. Srholec (2006) di

30、rectly compares R&D intensity of the high-tech sectors in the OECD area. It is shown that some countries with a relatively low income compared with the advanced OECD members, such as Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, maintain vastly lower R&D intensity in high-tech electronic

31、s compared with the threshold that draws a cut-off point in the taxonomy between high-tech and the rest of manufacturing (around 20% of R&D in relation to value added according to OECD 2003, p. 156). It makes it truly problematic to use any high-tech labels in the context of these countries. Althoug

32、h R&D data for developing countries is scarce, a limited comparison at least at the aggregate level can be made also for non-OECD members. Specialization in high-tech exports does not match the intensity of the economy on R&D expenditure in many areas. The disparity is most striking in the Philippin

33、es, Malta, Malaysia, which have more than 45% of exports in the high-tech fields, and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica, Thailand and Mexico, also with significant high-tech exports, but in all of these countries spending on R&D remains well below 1% of GDP. Hence the fundamentals of specialization p

34、atterns of these countries are probably not based on sophisticated technological capabilities. This confirms the expectation that production systems in the high-tech fields became internationally fragmented to the extent that countries can export large amounts of high-tech products while actually ma

35、stering very limited technological capabilities themselves. The East Asian region clearly emerges as an important cluster for the manufacturing of high-tech products, but there seems to be a fairly strong divide in localization of related technological capabilities in the “first tier” of the newly i

36、ndustrialized countries and the rest of the region. A group of high-income Asian countries, namely Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, is among the top 15 countries in the world in both specialization in high-tech exports and R&D intensity, while the others fall well behind in technological capabili

37、ties. As a consequence of its sheer size and unique development trajectory, China is arguably a special case in this context. In terms of R&D intensity, China has already overtaken some of the high-income countries such as Ireland and some southern European countries. Regional differences between gr

38、avitational centres of business activity and other mainly rural areas suggest that some Chinese regions probably maintain R&D intensity substantially above the national average and even closer to that of developed countries. As suggested, the phenomenon behind the contrast between specialization in

39、high-tech exports and indigenous technology capabilities is the increasing fragmentation of value chains, particularly the separation of technological development from related manufacturing activities. The available empirical evidence seems to confirm the fact that technologically intensive activiti

40、es are sticky, highly concentrated in space and remain localized in the home areas of large multinational corporations (Patel and Pavitt 1991, Cantwell and Iammarino 1998, Pavitt and Patel 1999, Verspagen and Schoenmakers 2003). Foreign direct investment in R&D is increasing worldwide, but it is hig

41、hly concentrated among developed countries (Le Bas and Sierra 2002). Analyses of firm level data even suggest that foreign affiliates are less likely to venture into R&D activity compared to domestic owned firms in countries behind the technology frontier, such as the Czech Republic (Srholec 2005). It is therefore not surprising that R&D intensity remains