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1、Bernance, regulation and risk takingWeyze risk taking by bs, their ownership structures, and national bregulations. We focus on the potentials betn bmanagers and ownersover risk, and assess whether brisk taking varies with the comparativeer ofshareholders withhe corporateernantructure of each b. Mor

2、eover, we risk depends onexamine whether the relation betn national regulations and beach bs ownership structure.Policy considerations motivate this research. As emphasized by Bern Calamities and Mason (1997, 2003a, b), Keeley (1990), and recent finane (1983),l turmoil,the risk taking behavior of bs

3、 affects finanl and economic fragility. In turn,ernational and national agencies proe an array of regulations to shbrisk.Yet, researchers have not assessed how standard corporateernance mechanisms,such as ownership structure, taking behavior of individual beract with national regulations in shathe r

4、isks. This gap irprising because standard agency corporate risk taking (Jensen andtheorieggestt ownership structure influenMeckling, 1976; John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008). This gap is also potentially seriousfrom a policy. The same regulations could have different effects on brisk taking depending on

5、the comparativeer of shareholders withhe ownershipstructure of each b. Changes in policies toward bownership, such as allowingprivate equity groups to invest in bs or changing limits on ownershipconcentration, could have very different effects on bstability depending on otherbregulations.Existing re

6、search further advertises the value of simultaneously examining brisk, ownership structure, and bregulations. Studying nonfinanl firms, Agrawaland Mandelker (1987) find an inverse relation betn risk taking and the degree ofmanagerial control, while John, Litov, and Yeung (2008) findt managers enjoyi

7、nglarge private benefits of control select suboptimally conservative investment strategies.Yet, research on brisk taking typically does not incorporate information on eachbs ownership structure (Keeley, 1990; Kroszner and Rajan, 1994;mann,Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2

8、002). In an influentialexception, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) findt owner controlled bsexhibit higher shareholdings. regulations jo the United Srisk taking behaviorn bs controlled by managers with smallThey do not, however, test whether ownership structure andly shbrisk taking, or whether t

9、heir results generalizees to countries with distinct laws and regulations. No previous researchevaluates theoretical predictions concerning theeractive effects of national regulations and b-specific ownership structure on the risk taking behavior ofindividual bs.We frame our empiricalysis around thr

10、ee theoretical keystones.,diversified owners (owners who do nove a large fraction of theiral wealthinvestedhe b) tend to advocate for more brisk takingn debt holders andnonshareholder managers (managers who do nove a substantial equity stakeheb b). As in any limited liability firm, diversified owner

11、s have incentives to increase risk after collecting funds from bondholders and deitors (Galai and Masulis,1976; Esty,1998). Similarly, managers with b-specific human capital skills andprivate benefits of control tend to advocate for less risk takingn stockholderswithout those skills and benefits (Je

12、nsen andMeckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn,1985; Kane, 1985). From this, bs with an ownership structuretemers diversified owners take more riskn bs with owners who play a moresubduedernance role.Second, theory predictst regulations influence the risk-taking incentives of diversified owners differently

13、 from those of debt holders and nonshareholdermanagers. For exle, deit insuranceensifies the ability and incentives ofstockholders to increase risk (Merton, 1977; Keeley, 1990). The impetus freaterrisk taking generated by deit insurance operates on owners, not nesarily on noshareholder managers. As

14、a second exle, consider capital regulations. One goal ofcapital regulations is to reduce the risk-taking incentives of owners by forcing ownersto place more of theiral wealt riskhe b(Kim and Santomero, 1994).Capital regulations need not reduce the risk-taking incentives of influential owners,however

15、. Specifically, although capital regulations might induce the bto raisecapital, they might not force influential owners to invest more of their wealthheb. Furthermore, capital regulations might increase risk taking. Owners mightcompensate for the loss of utility from more stringent capital requireme

16、nts by selecting a riskier investment portfolio (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Buser,Chen, andKane, 1981),ensifyings betn owners and managers over brisktaking. As a final exle, many countries attempt to reduce brisk by restrictingbs from engaging in nonlending activities, such as securities and insuran

17、ceunderwriting (Boyd, Chang, and Smith, 1998). As with capital requirements, however,these activity restrictions could reduce the utility of owning a b,ensifying therisk-taking incentives of owners relative to managers. Thus, the impact of regulationson risk depends on structure of each bThird, whit

18、he comparative influence of owners within the.ernanceing theory suggestst bregulations affect the risk-takingincentives of owners differently from those of managers, corporateernance theorysuggestst ownership structure affects the ability of owners to influence risk(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As ar

19、gued by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), shareholderswith larger voting and cash flow (CF) right shave correspondingly greatower and,incentives to shcorporate behaviorn smaller owners.From thisownership structure influenthe ability of owners to alter brisk in response bothto standard risk shifting incent

20、ives and to incentives created by offil regulations(Boyd and Hakenes, 2008). Thus,xamine how ownership structureeracts withbregulation in shathe risk-taking behavior of individual bs.These theoretical keystones combine to make two testable predictions.,diversified owners have stronger incentives to

21、increase riskn no shareholdingmanagers, so bs witherful, diversified owners tend to be riskiern widelyheld bs, holding other factors constant. Second, bregulations (such as capitalrequirements, activity restrictions, and deit insurance) affect the risk-takingincentives of owners differently from man

22、agers, so the actual impact of regulations onrisk taking depends on the comparativeer of shareholders relative to managerswithin each bs corporateernance structure. This framework, however, doesnot consider optimal risk taking. Instead, our more modest goal is to provide the empirical assessment of

23、theoretical predictions concerning how a bs ownershipstructureeracts with national regulations in shabrisk taking.的治理、和风险承担分析了的风险，他们的股权结构，以及国家。专注于管理者和所有者之间的潜在的风险，并评估风险是否影响各的公司治理结构股东的力量对比的变化。此外，检查是否每个的股权结构与风险取决于与国家政策激励研究。正如 Bern之间的关系。e 所强调的（1983），Calamities 和 Mason（1997，2003a，b），Keeley（1990），通过最近的金融，

24、可以发现业风险承担行为影响金融和经济的脆弱性。反过来，国际机构和国家机构提出形成风险的组成。然而，研究并没有评估标准的公司管理机制，如股权结构，与国家形成的风险承担个别的行为。这种差距是令人惊讶的因为的资料表明，股权结构影响公司风险（Jensen 和 Meckling，1976；John，litov，和 Yeung， 2008）。这种差距也可以从政策的角度来看。同样的规则可能会有不同的影响，使风险取决于股东的力量占据在各的股权。在对所的政策变化中，如允许私人股本行的稳定性取决于其他投资或改变对所的限制程度，可能会对银的规定产生非常不同的影响。现有的研究在进一步深入的同时也研究风险、股权结构的价

25、值和法规。研究非金融企业，Agrawal 和 Mandelker（1987）发现风险管理和控制的程度成反比，而 Litov，litov，和 Yeung（2008）发现管理者喜欢掌握控制权和险投资策略选择。然而，对风险承担的研究通常不包含在每个的所结构信息（Keeley，1990；Kroszner 和 Rajan，1994；mann，Murdoch，和Stiglitz，2000；Demirguc-Kunt 和 Detragiache，2002）。但有一个具有的例外，Saunders，Strock，和 Travlos（1990）发现业主控制的具有较高的风险承担行为，不是由管理层控制小持股。然而，衡

26、量是否所有制结构和共同创造风险承担，或者他们的结果能否推广到以外的国家，使其具有不同的法律和。以前没有研究评估理论有关国家对风险采取约束的行为规范和具体的股权结构的交互作用。的框架为了实证分析三个方面的理论基础。第一，多元化的顾客（顾客们没有将他们的个人中的大部分投资于）倾向于支持的风险，比如债券持有人和非股东的管理者（管理者没有大量股权）。在任何有限责任公司，多元化的顾客增加风险从债券持有人和储户筹集（Galai和Masulis，1976；Esty，1998）。同样，性人力资本的能力和控制权私人收益经理倾向于主张不承担风险比股东没有那些技能和效益（ Jensen 和Meckling，1976； Demsetz 和Lehn，1985；Kane，1985）。从这个角度来看，银行的股权结构多元化，使顾客采取比较哪家管理制度风险更大。持有人和非股东管理者多元化第二，理论，的影响不同于那