国际关系专业英语（课堂PPT）

1、.1Selected Readings in International Politics2013.8-12.2Samuel P. Huntington What is the fundamental source of conflict in the world today? Samuel P. Huntington, professor at Harvard University, believes that it “will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among huma

2、nkind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics

3、. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”11.3Samuel P. Huntington Does contemporary international politics fit any of these three models? Huntingtons answer is no. It is instead “a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major po

4、wers,”12 because the settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states, and because the single superpower can veto action on key issues by combinations of other states. According to Huntington, the world can be divi

5、ded into several levels. .4Robert KaganOverall, the much-heralded return of a multipolar world of roughly equal great powers, akin to that which existed before World War II, (世界要回到多极时代，即大致相当于第二次世界大战前的世界格局的呼声至少已有几十年了。)1has been delayed for at least a few more decades. Absent some unexpected dramatic

6、change, the international system will continue to be that of one superpower and several great powers, or as the late Samuel P. Huntington called it, “uni-multipolarity.” （赞同亨廷顿的观点：世界呈单多极状态。）1 Robert Kagan, “A Changing World Order?” The Washington Post, November, 16, 2013, http:/ .5Samuel P. Huntingt

7、on What does the United States prefer? Huntington believes that the United States would clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and often acts as if such a system existed. How about the major powers? They would prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their int

8、erests, unilaterally and collectively, without being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger super power, and they feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of global hegemony. .6哈斯要回答的问题 What is the proper goal for American foreign policy? How will post-Cold Wa

9、r international society be built? .7Richard N. HaassRichard N. Richard N. Haass, a former official in the Bush administration and the current president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argues in The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War that the United States has the power to d

10、etermine history. He advocates taking a strong and active role in the post-Cold War era on a belief that it is of a “deregulated” world, a time when the old rules no longer apply and each nation puts its own interests first, which is a kind of deregulation potentially hazardous to the international

11、scene. He regards the United States as international sheriff rounding up “posses (a group of men summoned by a sheriff to help him,临时组织起来的地方团队) of other states to handle major international issues as they arise. Haass does not believe that America should be the worlds policeman, but he does think it

12、 has a responsibility to lead a communal effort to stamp out （put an end to）aggression, instability, and violence whenever necessary. He holds that “it is in the interest of the American people to adopt and support a foreign policy of regulation to manage the challenges and exploit the opportunities

13、 generated by the post-Cold War world.”15.8Richard N. Haass What is the proper goal for American foreign policy? In Haasss understanding, it is to encourage a multipolarity characterized by cooperation and concert rather than competition and conflict because in such a world, order would not be limit

14、ed to peace based on a balance of power or a fear of escalation, but would be established in a broader agreement on global purposes and problems. He agrees with the idea that Henry A. Kissinger argues in his insightful first book, A World Restored, that the competitive multipolar world of nineteenth

15、-century Europe managed to avoid great-power war because the great powers forged a consensus on certain core issues of international relations. Haass suggests that American leaders should seek to build such an international consensus for the 21st century. .9Richard N. Haass In Haasss pinion, post-Co

16、ld War international society will be built on four foundation stones: using less military force to resolve disputes between states, reducing the number of weapons of mass destruction and the number of states and other groups possessing such weapons, accepting a limited doctrine of humanitarian inter

17、vention based on a recognition that peopleand not just statesenjoy rights, and economic openness. Such a world would be relatively peaceful, prosperous, and just. .10Richard N. Haass In Haasss view, the world is becoming more multipolar, and American foreign policy should not resist such multipolari

18、ty because like unipolarity, multipolarity is simply a description which tells us about the distribution of power in the world, not about the character or quality of international relations. What does a multipolar world look like in Haasss mind? It could be one in which several hostile but roughly e

19、qual states confront one another, or one in which a number of states, each possessing significant power, work together in common. The U.S. objective, therefore, should be to persuade other centers of political, economic, and military powerincluding but not limited to nation-statesto believe that it

20、is in their self-interest to support constructive notions of how international society should be organized and should operate.16.11Kagan 要回答的问题 When Europe accepted U.S. leadership, what did U.S. legitimacy rest on with the existence of the Soviet Union? What do Europeans do after they were accustom

21、ed to helping shape the world?.12AnswerIt rested on three pillars. 1. Europes perception that the Soviet Union posed a strategic threat to the West; 2. Europeans also perceived the Soviet Union as a common ideological threat; and 3. Cold War bipolarity conferred what might be called “structural legi

22、timacy” on the United States.13Robert Kagan p.38Kagan complains about the unipolar status and says that what might be called “the unipolar predicament” is not the product of any specific U.S. policy or of a particular U.S. administration. His reason is that with the end of the Cold War, unprecedente

23、d U.S. global power itself has become the critical issue, one with which Europeans and Americans have only begun to grapple （struggle）. During the Cold War, even a dominant United States was compelled to listen to Europe because U.S. policy at the time sought above all else to protect and strengthen

24、 Europe. Today, Europe has lost much of that influence. It is too weak to be an essential ally but too secure to be a potential victim. During the Cold War, the United States would calculate how its actions would affect Europes security. Today it need not worry as much. That is why Europeans are now

25、 concerned about unconstrained U.S. power and about regaining some control over how it is exercised. In Kagans words, long accustomed to helping shape the world, Europeans do not want to sit back now and let the United States do all the driving, especially when they believe that it is driving danger

26、ously.14 Robert Kagan p. 35 Americans have been looking for a favorable world order of its own. Robert Kagan holds that international order does not rest on ideas and institutions but is shaped by configurations of power, and that the international order today reflects the distribution of power in t

27、he world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, a different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles are Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, will produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the i

28、nterests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. 29.15What is an offshore balancer?In a 2008 Newsweek article, the father of offshore balancing, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer, laid out the concept: “As an offshore balancer, the United States would keep its mil

29、itary forcesespecially its ground and air forcesoutside the Middle East, not smack in the center of it. Hence the term offshore. As for balancing, that would mean relying on regional powers like Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to check each other. Washington would remain diplomatically engaged, and when

30、 necessary would assist the weaker side in a conflict. It would also use its air and naval power to signal a continued U.S. commitment to the region and would retain the capacity to respond quickly to unexpected threats, like Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in 1990.” http:/ Why does Mearsheimer say that if

31、 the power structures that are now in place in Europe and Northeast Asia are benign, they are not sustainable for much longer?.17Answer Chinas rise may pose the most important foreign policy challenge to the United States in the 21st century, and the United States, therefore, should embrace the stra

32、tegy of engagement initiated by Nixon and sustained by all his successors to date, and the United States should avoid one-sided condemnations of China and instead signal their intention to develop a personal relationship of trust with their Chinese counterpart soon after taking office.18John J. Mear

33、sheimer Because China has such vast latent power potential (due to the size of its economy and its population), which is clearly the most dangerous for the United States, American foreign policy elites are trying hard to head it offby engaging China in the hope that, as it becomes more prosperous an

34、d democratic, its demands and behavior will moderate, and by keeping large numbers of troops deployed in Northeast Asia in an attempt to prevent conflicts from starting. However, Mearsheimer regards both of these policies as misguided. “U.S. interests would be best served by slowing Chinese growth r

35、ather than accelerating it, and by pulling American troops back so that they can stay out of future warsor at least join them later rather than earlier.”41.19John J. Mearsheimer It would be an aggressive one determined to achieve regional hegemonynot because a rich China would have wicked motives, b

36、ut because the best way for any state to maximize its prospects for survival is to dominate its region of the world. To Mearsheimer, although it is certainly in Chinas interest to be the hegemon in Northeast Asia, it is clearly not in the interest of the United States to have that happen. Since Chin

37、a is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, it is not too late for the United States to reverse course and do what it can to slow Chinas rise. The powerful structural imperatives of the international system, in fact, will probably force the United States t

38、o abandon its policy of constructive engagement in the near future and bring its troops home if there is no immediate threat for them to counter. .20Bader and Bush Some say that Chinas leaders and diplomats are translating economic influence into global political advantage. In Bader and Bushs view,

39、since Pearl Harbor, the United States has prevented any rival power from achieving military superiority in the Pacific. America has enforced its military dominance through alliances, bases, and political relationships, and has asserted (maintain) economic leadership through free trade and a network

40、of multilateral institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization). .21Bader and Bush Militarily, the projection of Chinese military power eastward will bump up (promote) against existing American

41、 deployments. Politically, Chinas authoritarian system remains at odds with American liberal democratic values. American suspicion that Chinas rise challenges U.S. leadership in East Asia combines with Chinese concern about U.S. intentions to create a climate of uncertainty. If the United States tre

42、ats China as an enemy, it will acquire an enemy; but if as a potential partner, it will gain in cooperation and support. Cooperation seems to be the best choice for the United States, and some American leaders know this.22Buck-passing 推卸责任 It is also used as a strategy in power politics when the act

43、ions of one country/nation are blamed on another, providing an opportunity for war. 一种权力政治战略，指一国行为推卸给他国，造成挑起战争的机会。 (Poker.) an article placed in a jackpot and taken by the winner, serving to remind him that when the deal passes to him he must order another jackpot. expr. pass the buck, (Informal.) t

44、o shift the responsibility for something, such as blame or work, to someone else.23Fareed Zakaria Intervention is a tool of the United States for its foreign policy. Intervention involves the interference of one nation in the affairs of another. It may be directed against a single state, factions wi

45、thin that state, or interactions among a group of states. It does not necessarily take the form of military action but may involve economic or social pressure. When applied to international law, the concept is difficult to define or describe because many relations between states involve elements of

46、coercion, because it is difficult to determine at which point pressure becomes sufficiently coercive as to be deemed intervention, and because states always claim the right to intervene on the basis of “vital interests” and never agree as to what this term involves.24Fareed Zakaria In Zakarias view,

47、 through shrewd strategic choices and some sophisticated diplomacy, Britain was able to maintain and even extend its influence for decades. In the end, however, it could not alter the fact that its power positionits economic and technological dynamismwas fast eroding. Britain declined gracefullybut

48、inexorably (in an inexorable manner无情地). The United States today faces a problem that is quite different. The U.S. economy (despite its current crisis) remains fundamentally vigorous when compared with others. American society is vibrant. It is the United States political system that is dysfunctiona

49、l, unable to make the relatively simple reforms that would place the country on extremely solid footing for the future. Washington seems largely unaware of the new world rising around itand shows few signs of being able to reorient U.S. policy for this new age.25Fareed Zakaria In Zakarias understand

50、ing, the world has been one in which the United States was utterly unrivaled for two decades. It has been, in a broader sense, a U.S.-designed world since the end of World War II. But it is now in the midst of one of historys greatest periods of change. According to him, there have been three fundam

51、ental power shifts over the last 500 years in the distribution of power that have reshaped international life: its politics, economics, and culture. The first was the rise of the Western world, a process that began in the fifteenth century and accelerated dramatically in the late eighteenth century.

52、 It produced modernity: science and technology, commerce and capitalism, the agricultural and industrial revolutions. It also produced the prolonged political dominance of the nations of the West.26Fareed Zakaria Americans are now living through the third great power shift of the modern erathe rise

53、of the rest. Over the past few decades, countries all over the world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were once unthinkable. Although they have had booms and busts (兴盛和衰败 ), the overall trend has been vigorously forward with the growth in Asia being most visible. .27Fareed Zakari

54、a Zakaria holds that since 1991, Americans have lived under a U.S. imperium (supreme power), a unique unipolar world in which the open global economy has expanded and accelerated, that this expansion is driving the next change in the nature of the international order, and that at the politico-milita

55、ry level, the United States remains in a single-superpower world. But the world will not stay unipolar for decades and then suddenly, one afternoon, become multipolar. On every dimension other than military powerindustrial, financial, social, culturalthe distribution of power is shifting, moving awa

56、y from U.S. dominance into a post-American world, one defined and directed from many places and by many people.28Wolfowitz DoctrineWolfowitz Doctrine announces the U.Ss status as the worlds only remaining superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War and proclaims

57、its main objective to be retaining that status. Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration underlying

58、 the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union,

59、 and Southwest Asia. http:/ What is regime change? How can the United States of America make use of regime change? 政权更迭是什么？ 美国如何利用政权更迭？.30Richard N. HaassTo Richard N. Haass, regime change is a policy that “allows a state to solve its problems with another state by removing the offensive regime ther

60、e and replacing it with a less offensive one.”3 In Haasss view, whereas regime change tends to be direct and immediate and to involve the use of military force or covert action, as well as attempts to isolate both politically and economically the government in question, regime evolution tends to be