全球价值链的治理外文翻译

1、本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：Thegovernanceofglobalvaluechains出处：ReviewofInternationalPoliticalEconomy作者：GaryGereffiandJohnHumphreyAbstractThisarticlebuildsatheoreticalframeworktohelpexplaingovernancepatternsinglobalvaluechains.Itdrawsonthreestreamsofliterature-transactioncostseconomics,productionnetworks,andtechn

2、ologicalcapabilityandfirm-levellearning-toidentifythreevariablesthatplayalargeroleindetermininghowglobalvaluechainsaregovernedandchange.Theseare:(1)thecomplexityoftransactions,(2)theabilitytocodifytransactions,and(3)thecapabilitiesinthesupply-base.Thetheorygeneratesfivetypesofglobalvaluechaingoverna

3、nce-hierarchy,captive,relational,modular,andmarket-whichrangefromhightolowlevelsofexplicitcoordinationandpowerasymmetry.KeywordsGlobalvaluechainsGovernanceNetworksTransactioncostValuechainmodularityTheworldeconomyhaschangedinsignificantwaysduringthepastseveraldecades,especiallyintheareasofinternatio

4、naltradeandindustrialorganization.Twoofthemostimportantnewfeaturesofthecontemporaryeconomyaretheglobalizationofproductionandtrade,whichhavefueledthegrowthofindustrialcapabilitiesinawiderangeofdevelopingcountries,andtheverticaldisintegrationoftransnationalcorporations,whichareredefiningtheircorecompe

5、tenciestofocusoninnovationandproductstrategy,marketing,andthehighestvalue-addedsegmentsofmanufacturingandservices,whilereducingtheirdirectownershipover-corefunntixnnssuchasgenericservicesandvolumeproduction.Together,thesetwoshiftshavelaidthegroundworkforavarietyofnetworkformsofgovernancesituatedbetw

6、eenarmslengthmarkets,ontheonehand,andlargeverticallyintegratedcorporations,ontheother.Thepurposeofthisarticleistogenerateatheoreticalframeworkforbetterunderstandingtheshiftinggovernancestructuresinsectorsproducingforglobalmarkets,structureswerefertoasglobalvaluechains.Fragmentation,coordination,andn

7、etworksintheglobaleconomyForus,thestartingpointforunderstandingthechangingnatureofinter-nationaltradeandindustrialorganizationiscontainedinthenotionofavalue-addedchain,asdevelopedbyinternationalbusinessscholarswhohavefocusedonthestrategiesofbothfirmsandcountriesintheglobaleconomy.Initsmostbasicform,

8、avalue-addedchainistheprocessbywhichtechnologyiscombinedwithmaterialandlaborinputs,andthenprocessedinputsareassembled,marketed,anddistributed.Asinglefirmmayconsistofonlyonelinkinthisprocess,oritmaybeextensivelyverticallyintegrated.(Kogut,1985:15).Thekeyissuesinthisliteraturwhirenactivitiesandtechnol

9、ogiesafirmkeepsin-houseandwhichshouldbeoutsourcedtootherfirms,andwherethevariousactivitiesshouldbelocated.Tradeeconomistsarealsoconcernedwithhowglobalproductionisorganized.ArndtandKierzkowski(2001)usethetermfragmentationtodescribethephysicalseparationofdifferentpartsofaproductionprocess,arguingthatt

10、heinternationaldimensionofthisseparationisnew.Fragmentationallowsproductionindifferentcountriestobeformedintocross-borderproductionnetworksthatcanbewithinorbetweenfirms.Feenstra(1998)takesthisideaonestepfurtherbyexplicitlyconnectingtheintegrationoftradewiththedisintegrationfproductionintheglobalecon

11、omy.Therisingintegrationofworldmarketsthroughtradehasbroughtwithitadisintegrationofmultinationalfirms,sincecompaniesarefindingitadvantageoustooutsourceanincreasingshareofthHmanufacturingandserviceactivitiesbothdomesticallyandabroad.ThishasledtoagrowingproportionofinternationaltradeoccurringinCompone

12、ntsandotherintermediategoods(Yeats,2001).Ifproductionisincreasinglyfragmentedacrossgeographicspaceandbetweenfirms,thenhowarethesefragmentedactivitiescoordinated?ForArndtandKierzkowski,theoptionsareclear:Separabyofownershipisanimportantdeterminantoftheorganizationalstructureofcrossborderproductionsha

13、ring.Whereseparationofownershipisnotfeasible,multinationalcorporationsandforeigndirectinvestmentarelikelytoplayadominantrole.Whereitisfeasible,arm-lengthrelationshipsarepossibleandforeigndirectinvestmentislessimportant(ArndtandKierzkowski,2001:4).Thisbinaryviewofhowglobalproductionmightbeorganized,e

14、itherthroughmarketsorwithintransnationalfirms,isexplainedbytransactioncostseconomicsintermsofthecomplexityofinter-firmrelationshipsandtheextenttowhichtheyinvolveinvestmentsspecifictoaparticulartransaction-assetspecificity(Williamson,1975).Arm-lengthmarketrelationsworkwellforstandardproductsbecauseth

15、eyareeasilydescribedandvalued.Coordinationproblemsarereducednotonlybecausetheireaseofdescriptionmakescontractssimpletowrite,butalsobecausestandardproductscanbeproducedforstockandsuppliedasneeded.Atthesametime,becausestandardproductsaremadebyavarietyofsuppliersandboughtbyavarietyofcustomers,problemsa

16、risingfromassetspecificityarelow.Conversely,thetransactioncostsapproachoffersvariousreasonswhyfirmswillbringcertainactivitiesin-house.First,themorecustomizedtheproductorservice,themorelikelyitistoinvolvetransaction-specificinvestments.Thisraisestheriskofopportunism,whicheitherrulesoutoutsourcingalto

17、gether,ormakesitmorecostlybecausesafeguardshavetobeputinplace.Second,evenwithoutopportunism,transactioncostsincreasewheninter-firmrelationshipsrequiregreatercoordination.Forexample,non-standardinputsandintegratedproductdesignarchitecturesinvolvemorecomplextransfersofdesigninformationandthereforeinte

18、nseinteractionsacrossenterpriseboundaries.Integralproductarchitecturesaremorelikelytorequirenon-standardinputs,andchangesinthedesignofparticularpartstendtoprecipitatedesignchangesinotherareasofthesystem(Fine,1998;LangloisandRobertson,1995).Similarly,coordinationcostsincreaseforpartswhosesupplyistime

19、-sensitive,asseparateprocesseshavetobebettercoordinatedinordertosynchronizetheflowofinputsthroughthechain.Nevertheless,recognizingtheimportanceoftransactioncostsneednotleadtotheconclusionthatcomplexandtightlycoordinatedproductionsystemsalwaysresultinverticalintegration.Rather,assetspecificity,opport

20、unism,andcoordinationcostscanbemanagedattheinter-firmlevelthroughavarietyofmethods.Networkactorsinmanyinstancescontrolopportunismthroughtheeffectsofrepeattransactions,reputation,andsocialnormsthatareembeddedinparticulargeographiclocationsorsocialgroups.Networktheorists(e.g,Jarillo,1988;Lorenz,1988;P

21、owell,1990;Thorelli,1986)arguethattrust,reputation,andmutualdependencedampenopportunisticbehavior,andinsodoingtheymakepossiblemorecomplexinter-firmdivisionsoflaborandinterdependencethanwouldbepredictedbytransactioncoststheory.Furthermore,theliteratureonfirmcapabilitiesandlearning,whichhasitsrootsint

22、heresourceviewofthefirmpioneeredbyPenrose(1959),providesotherreasonswhyfirmsarepreparedtobuykeyinputsinthefaceofassetspecificityandthereforeconstructrelativelycomplexinter-firmrelationships.AccordingtoPenrose,howandwhetherfirmscancapturevaluedependsinpartonthegenerationandretentionofcompetencies(tha

23、tis,resources)thataredifficultforcompetitorstoreplicate.Inpractice,eventhemostverticallyintegratedfirmsrarelyinternalizeallthetechnologicalandmanagementcapabilitiesthatarerequiredtobringaproductorservicetomarket.Transactioncosteconomicsacknowledgesthisfactbyemployingthevariableoffrequency.Ifaninput,

24、evenanimportantone,isrequiredinfrequently,thenitwilllikelybeacquiredexternally.Thisisessentiallyanargumentaboutscaleeconomies.Theliteratureonfirmcapabilitiesandlearning,bycontrast,arguesthatthelearningrequiredtoeffectivelydevelopthecapabilitytoengageincertainvaluechainactivitiesmaybedifficult,time-c

25、onsuming,andeffectivelyimpossibleforsomefirmstoacquire,regardlessoffrequencyorscaleeconomies.Thus,firmsmustincertaininstancesdependonexternalresources.Thedoctrineofcoreompetencetakesthisastepfurther,arguingthatfirmswhichrelyonthecomplementarycompetenciesofotherfirmsandfocusmoreintensivelyontheirowna

26、reasofcompetencewillperformbetterthanfirmsthatareverticallyintegratedorincoherentlydiversified(PrahaladandHamel,1990).Theseissues,whileoftendiscussedatthelocalornationallevel,orinthecontextofadensenetworkofsocialrelations(Granovetter,1985:507),canequallybeappliedtothestructuringofglobal-scaleproduct

27、ionanddistribution.TherecentworkofgeographerssuchasHughes(2000),Hendersonetal(2002)andDickenetal(2001)hasemphasizedthecomplexityofinter-firmrelationshipsintheglobaleconomy.Thekeyinsightisthatcoordinationandcontrolofglobal-scaleproductionsystems,despitetheircomplexity,canbeachievedwithoutdirectowners

28、hip.Thetheoriesofindustrialorganizationdiscussedhere,whenconsideredcumulatively,suggestthatdifferentwaysofdealingwiththeproblemofassetspecificity,anddifferentmotivationsforconstructingcomplexfirm-to-firmrelationshipsinthefaceofassetspecificity,resultinthreemodesofindustrialorganization:market,hierar

29、chy,andnetwork.Butempiricalobservationtellsusthatnotallnetworksarealike.Inthenextsectionwedevelopatheorythatcanhelptospecifyandexplaininthisvariation.TypesofgovernanceinglobalvaluechainsIfatheoryofglobalvaluechaingovernanceistobeusefultopolicymakers,Itshouldbeparsimonious.Ithastosimplifyandabstractf

30、romanextremelyheterogeneousbodyofevidence,identifyingthevariablesthatplayalargeroleindeterminingpatternsofvaluechaingovernancewhileholdingothersatbay,atleastinitially.Clearly,history,institutions,geographicandsocialcontexts,theevolvingrulesofthegame,andpathdependencematter;andmanyfactorswillinfluenc

31、ehowfirmsandgroupsoffirmsarelinkedintheglobaleconomy.Nevertheless,asimpleframeworkisusefulbecauseitisolateskeyvariablesandprovidesaclearviewoffundamentalforcesunderlyingspecificempiricalsituationsthatmightotherwisebeoverlooked.Ourintentionistocreatethesimplestframeworkthatgeneratesresultsrelevanttor

32、eal-worldoutcomes.Inthe1990sGereffiandothersdevelopedaframework,calledglobabommoditychainsthattiedtheconceptofthevalue-addedchaindirectlytotheglobalorganizationofindustries(seeGereffiandKorzeniewicz,1994).Thisworknotonlyhighlightedtheimportanceofcoordinationacrossfirmboundaries,butalsothegrowingimpo

33、rtanceofnewglobalbuyers(mainlyretailersandbrandmarketers)askeydriversintheformationofgloballydispersedandorganizationallyfragmentedproductionanddistributionnetworks.Gereffi(1994)usedthetermbuyedrivenglobalcommoditychaintodenotehowglobalbuyersusedexplicitcoordinationtohelpcreateahighlycompetentsupply

34、-baseuponwhichglobal-scaleproductionanddistributionsystemscouldbebuiltwithoutdirectownership.Byhighlightingexplicitcoordinationindisintegratedchainsandcontrastingthemtotherelationshipscontainedwithinverticallyintegrated,or(producedrivenchains,theglobalcommoditychainsframeworkdrewattentiontotheroleof

35、networksindrivingtheco-evolutionofcross-borderindustrialorganization.However,theglobalcommoditychainsframeworkdidnotadequatelyspecifythevarietyofnetworkformsthatmorerecentfieldresearchhasuncovered.While,researchonthehorticultureindustry(DolanandHumphrey,2000)andthefootwearindustry(Schmitzandandtrade

36、rs)cananddoexertahighdegreeofcontroloverspatiallydispersedvaluechainsevenwhentheydonotownproduction,transportorprocessingfacilities,recentresearchonglobalproductionhashighlightedotherimportantformsofcoordination.WorkontheelectronicsindustryandcontractmanufacturingbySturgeon(2002)andbySturgeonandLee(

37、2001)contrastedthreetypesofsupplyrelationships,basedonthedegreeofstandardizationofproductandprocess:(1)the(commoditysupplierthatprovidesstandardproductsthrougharmlengthmarketrelationships,(2)thecaptivesupplierthatmakkamdardproductsusingmachinerydedicatedtothebuyersneeds,and(3)the-keysiippiiierthatpr

38、oducescustomizedproductsforbuyersandusesflexiblemachinerytopoolcapacityfordifferentcustomers.Thisanalysisemphasizedthecomplexityofinformationexchangedbetweenfirmsandthedegreeofassetspecificityinproductionequipment.Sturgeon(2002)referredtoproductionsystemsthatrelyonturn-keysuppliersasmodularproductio

39、nnetworksbecausehighlycompetentsupplierscouldbeaddedandsubtractedfromtheglobalproductionarrangementsonasas-neededbasis.Aroundthesametime,HumphreyandSchmitz(2000,2002)distinguishedbetweensuppliersinquasi-hierarchicalrelationshipswithbuyers,whosesituationcorrespondsto(captivesuppliersandnetworkrelatio

40、nshipsbetweenfirmsthatcooperatebecausetheypossesscomplementarycompetences.HumphreyandSchmitzemphasizedtheroleofsuppliercompetenceindeterminingtheextentofsubordinationofsupplierstobuyers.Ifglobalbuyersneededtoinvestinsuppliercompetence,theywouldneedbothtospecifytheproductandprocessparameterstobefollo

41、wedbysuppliersandtoguardthisinvestmentinthesupplierbyremainingthedominant,ifnotexclusive,customer.Usingtheapproachesoutlinedaboveandempiricalreferencepointstakenfrommanystudiesofglobalvaluechains,weproposeamorecompletetypologyofvalue-chaingovernance.Weacknowledge,asdomostotherframeworksthatseektoexp

42、lainindustryorganizationfromtransactionscoststoglobalcommoditychainstoorganizationaltheory-thatmarket-basedrelationshipsamongfirmsandverticallyintegratedfirms(hierarchies)makeupoppositeendsofaspectrumofexplicitcoordination,andthatnetworkrelationshipscompriseanintermediatemodeofvaluechaingovernance.W

43、hatweaddtothisconceptualizationisanextensionofthenetworkcategoryintothreedistincttypes:modular,relational,andcaptive.Thus,ourtypologyidentifiesfivebasictypesofvaluechaingovernance.Theseareanalytical,notempirical,types,althoughtheyhavebeeninpartderivedfromempiricalobservation.Theyare:Knorringa,2000)r

44、einforcedGereffisnotionthatglobalbuyers(mreatrakileetresr,s1. Markets.Marketlinkagesdonothavetobecompletelytransitory,asistypicalofspotmarkets;theycanpersistovertime,withrepeattransactions.Theessentialpointisthatthecostsofswitchingtonewpartnersarelowforbothparties.2. Modularvaluechains.Typically,sup

45、pliersinmodularvaluechainsmakeproductstoacustomersspecifications,whichmaybemoreorlessdetailed.However,whenprovidingturkeyservicessupplierstakefullresponsibilityforcompetenciessurroundingprocesstechnology,usegenericmachinerythatlimitstransaction-specificinvestments,andmakecapitaloutlaysforcomponentsa

46、ndmaterialsonbehalfofcustomers.3. Relationalvaluechains.Inthesenetworksweseecomplexinteractionsbetweenbuyersandsellers,whichoftencreatesmutualdependenceandhighlevelsofassetspecificity.Thismaybemanagedthroughreputation,orfamilyandethnicties.Manyauthorshavehighlightedtheroleofspatialproximityinsupport

47、ingrelationalvaluechainlinkages,buttrustandreputationmightwellfunctioninspatiallydispersednetworkswhererelationshipsarebuilt-upovertimeorarebasedondispersedfamilyandsocialgroups(seeforexample,Menkhoff,1992).4. Captivevaluechains.Inthesenetworks,smallsuppliersaretransactionallydependentonmuchlargerbu

48、yers.Suppliersfacesignificantswitchingcostsandare,therefore,captive.Suchnetworksarefrequentlycharacterizedbyahighdegreeofmonitoringandcontrolbyleadfirms.5. Hierarchy.Thisgovernanceformischaracterizedbyverticalintegration.Thedominantformofgovernanceismanagerialcontrol,flowingfrommanagerstosubordinate

49、s,orfromheadquarterstosubsidiariesandaffiliates.ConclusionsInthisarticlewehavedevelopedatypologyofglobalvaluechaingovernanceandpresentedsometheoreticaljustificationsforwhythesepatternsmightoccur.Wearguethatthestructureofglobalvaluechainsdependscriticallyuponthreevariables:thecomplexityoftransactions

50、,theabilitytocodifytransactions,andthecapabilitiesinthesupply-base.Thesevariablesaresometimesdeterminedbythetechnologicalcharacteristicsofproductsandprocesses(sometransactionsareinherentlymorecomplexanddifficulttocodifythanothers,forexample)andtheyoftendependontheeffectivenessofindustryactorsandthes

51、ocialprocessessurroundingthedevelopment,dissemination,andadoptionofstandardsandothercodificationschemes.Itisthelattersetofdeterminants,inparticular,thatopensthedoorforpolicyinterventionsandcorporatestrategy.Whilethereareamultitudeoffactorsthataffecttheevolutionoftheglobaleconomy,wefeelconfidentthatt

52、hevariablesinternaltoourmodelinfluencetheshapeandgovernanceofglobalvaluechainsinimportantways,regardlessoftheinstitutionalcontextwithinwhichtheyaresituated.Thegovernanceframeworkthatweproposetakesuspartofthewaytowardamoresystematicunderstandingofglobalvaluechains,butmuchremainstobedone.17Oneofthemos

53、tpressingareasisthedevelopmentofpolicytoolsforindustrialupgradingthatareconsistentwiththeframework.Oneofthekeyfindingsofvaluechainstudiesisthataccesstodevelopedcountrymarketshasbecomeincreasinglydependentonparticipatinginglobalproductionnetworksledbyfirmsbasedindevelopedcountries.Thus,thegovernanceo

54、fglobalvaluechainsisessentialforunderstandinghowfirmsindevelopingcountriescangainaccesstoglobalmarkets,whatthebenefitsofaccessandtherisksofexclusionmightbe,andhowthenetgainsfromparticipationinglobalvaluechainsmightbeincreased.Whilethesearchforpathsofsustainabledevelopmentintheglobaleconomyisaninhere

55、ntlydifficultandelusiveobjective,ourtaskisgreatlyfacilitatedbyhavingaclearersenseofthevariouswaysinwhichglobalvaluechainsaregoverned,andthekeydeterminantsthatshapetheseoutcomes.译文：全球价值链的治理加里?格雷菲约翰冰佛莱【摘要】本文构建了一个理论框架，有助于解释全球价值链治理模式。它借鉴了三种文学：交易成本经济学，生产网络，技术能力和企业层面的学习，这对于确定三个变量在决定全球价值链治理起了很大的作用。这三个变量分别是

56、：（1）交易的复杂性；（2）编纂交易的能力；（3）供应基地的能力。该理论产生五种类型的全球价值链治理，按协调的明确和权利的不对称水平从高到低分为层次，圈养，关系，模块化和市场。【关键词】全球价值链治理网络交易成本价值链模块化在过去几十年来，世界经济的方式发生了很大变化，特别是在国际贸易和工业组织的区域中。在当代经济中最重要的两个新功能分别是生产和贸易，由此广泛的引起了发展中国家的工业能力的增长， 跨国公司通过垂直分工重新确定自己的核心竞争力，从而专注于创新和产品战略，市场营销，最高增值制造业和服务业领域，同时减少对诸如通用服务和批量生产等非核心职能的直接所有权。总之,这两个转变一方面让公平的市

57、场坐落于多样的治理网络形式，另一方面使大型企业垂直一体化。本文的目的是为了更好地了解产生在全球市场部门的生产转移治理结构的理论框架，我们称之为“全球价值链”。全球经济中的分离，协调和网络对于我们来说，了解国际贸易性质变化的出发点和产业组织是包含在增值链的概念，可发展为关注在全球经济下公司和国家的的战略的国际商业学者。在其最基本的形式中，增值链是“技术结合原材料和劳动力的投入，然后加工的投入包括组装，销售和分发的过程。一个企业可能只包含在这个过程中的一个环节，或者这可能是广泛的垂直整合”（Kogut,1985:15）。这些文献的关键问题是哪些活动和技术领域应该留在公司内部，哪些应该外包给其他公司

58、和各种活动应该在哪里进行。贸易经济学家还关心的是如何组织全球生产。ArndtandKierzkowski(2001)使用“分裂”来形容一个生产过程的不同部分物理分离，并且辩称这种分离是新的国际维。分离允许不同国家的生产形成企业内部或企业之间的跨国生产网络。Feenstra(1998)以这一思想进一步明确了在全球经济中把“解体生产”和“贸易一体化”连接起来。世界市场通过贸易一体化上升带来了跨国公司的解体，因为公司发现有利的“外包”，在国内还是在国外对他们的非核心的制造和服务活动所占比例不断增加。这导致了国际贸易中出现组件和其他中间产品的比例不断上升(Yeats,2001)如果生产正日益分散在地理

59、空间和公司之间，那么如何协调这些零散的活动？对于Arndt和Kierzkowski,选项是明确的：“可分所有权是对跨境组织结构的重要决定因素生产共享。凡所有权分离是不可行的，多跨国公司和外国直接投资有可能发挥一主导作用。哪里是可行的，保持距离的关系是可能的和外国直接投资是同样重要的”(ArndtandKierzkowski,2001:4)。怎样组织全球生产有两重观点， 或通过市场或在跨国公司， 这是用交易成本经济学的解释，在企业间关系的复杂性和他们在何种程度上涉及投资，具体到特定的交易和资产条件特异性(Williamson,1975)。保持距离市场关系的工作标准的产品很好，因为它们很容易被描述

60、和重视。协调问题归结不仅是因为他们的描述简单方便，而且还因为标准的产品可用于生产和供应库存需要。同时，因为标准的产品是由供应商，并以各种不同的客户买的，从资产专用性问题所产生的低。相反，交易费用的途径提供了各种为什么公司有一定的内部活动的原因。第一，更加个性化的产品或服务，就越有可能涉及交易的具体投资。这就产生了机会主义的风险，要么完全排除了外包，或使之更昂贵，因为保障措施要到位。其次，即使没有机会主义，交易成本增加时，公司间的关系需要更多的协调。例如，非标准输入和集成的产品设计架构涉及到更复杂的设计信息传输和跨越边界进入奖金，因此强烈的相互作用。整体产品体系结构有可能需要非标准的投入，在对特