第信息不对称的市场PPT学习教案

1、会计学1第第 信息不对称的市场信息不对称的市场Slide 2第1页/共70页Slide 3第2页/共70页Slide 4第3页/共70页Slide 5第4页/共70页PHPLQHQLSHSLDHDL5,00050,00050,000买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时，买卖双方能鉴别车的质量时，将出现高质量和低质量两个市场将出现高质量和低质量两个市场10,000DLDMDM75,00025,000由于信息不对称，消费者无法确定车的质量，他们将降低由于信息不对称，消费者无法确定车的质量，他们将降低对二手车质量的期望对二手车质量的期望 。 Demand for low and high quality use

2、d cars shifts to DM.DLMDLMThe increase in QLreduces expectations anddemand to DLM. The adjustment processcontinues until demand = DL. 第5页/共70页Slide 7第6页/共70页Slide 8The Market for Insurance第7页/共70页Slide 9The Market for Insurance第8页/共70页Slide 10第9页/共70页Slide 11第10页/共70页Slide 12第11页/共70页Slide 13第12页/共7

3、0页Slide 14第13页/共70页Slide 15Days Spent on Disabled List per SeasonPrecontractPostcontractPercentage Change第14页/共70页Slide 16第15页/共70页Slide 17第16页/共70页Slide 18第17页/共70页Slide 19第18页/共70页Slide 20第19页/共70页Slide 21第20页/共70页Slide 22第21页/共70页Slide 23第22页/共70页Slide 24第23页/共70页Years ofCollegeValue ofCollegeEdu

4、c.0$100KValue ofCollegeEduc.Years ofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KGroup IGroup IICI(y) = $40,000yOptimal choice of y for Group IHow much educationshould a person obtain?The education decisionis based on benefits/costcomparison.B(y)B(y)y*y*B(y) = increase inwage associated witheach level of educ

5、ationCII(y) = $20,000yOptimal choice of y for Group I第24页/共70页Years ofCollegeValue ofCollegeEduc.0$100KValue ofCollegeEduc.Years ofCollege1234560123456$200K$100K$200KCI(y) = $40,000yOptimal choice of y for Group IB(y)B(y)y*y*Benefits = $100,000CostCI(y) = 40,000y$100,000 2.5Choose no educationCII(y)

6、 = $20,000yOptimal choice of y for Group IBenefits = $100,000CostCII(yO)= 20,000y$100,000$20,000y*y* 5Choose y*第25页/共70页Slide 27第26页/共70页Slide 28第27页/共70页Slide 29第28页/共70页Slide 30第29页/共70页Slide 31第30页/共70页Slide 32第31页/共70页Slide 33第32页/共70页Slide 34Miles per Week0$0.5050100140CostperMile$1.00$1.50$2.0

7、0D = MBMCWith moral hazard insurance companies cannot measure mileage. MC to $1.00 andmiles driven increases to 140miles/week-inefficient allocation.MCMC is the marginal costof driving. With no moral hazard and assuming insurance companies can measure milesdriven MC = MB at $1.50 and100 miles/week-e

8、fficient allocation.第33页/共70页Slide 35第34页/共70页Slide 36第35页/共70页Slide 37第36页/共70页Slide 38第37页/共70页Slide 39第38页/共70页Slide 40第39页/共70页Slide 41第40页/共70页Slide 42第41页/共70页Slide 43第42页/共70页Slide 44第43页/共70页Slide 45第44页/共70页Slide 46Return On Investment19771981第45页/共70页Slide 47第46页/共70页Slide 48第47页/共70页Slide

9、 49第48页/共70页Slide 50Poor LuckGood Luck第49页/共70页Slide 51第50页/共70页Slide 52第51页/共70页Slide 53第52页/共70页Slide 54第53页/共70页Slide 55第54页/共70页Slide 56第55页/共70页Slide 57第56页/共70页Slide 58第57页/共70页Slide 59第58页/共70页Slide 60第59页/共70页Slide 61Output(units per year)2,0004,0006,00010,000010,00020,00030,00040,000Bonus($

10、 peryear)8,000If Qf = 30,000,bonus is $6,000,the maximumamount possible.Qf = 30,000Qf = 10,000If Qf = 10,000,bonus is $5,000Qf = 20,000If Qf = 20,000,bonus is $4,000第60页/共70页Slide 62第61页/共70页Slide 63第62页/共70页Slide 64第63页/共70页Slide 65Without shirking, the market wageis w*, and full-employment exists at L*Demand forLaborw*L*SLQuantity of LaborWageNo-ShirkingConstraintThe no-shirkingconstraint givesthe wage necessaryto keep workers from shirking.weLeAt the