分类的性质：自然科学中的关系与种类

TheNatureof

Classification

RelationshipsandKindsinthe

NaturalSciences

JOHNS.WILKINS

ANDMALTEC.EBACH

TheNatureofClassification

AlsobyMalteC.Ebach

BIOGEOGRAPHYINACHANGINGWORLD{withR.Tangney,2006)

COMPARATIVEBIOGEOGRAPHY:DiscoveringandClassifyingBiogeographicalPatternsofa

DynamicEarth(withL.R.Parenti,2009)

FOUNDATIONSOFSYSTEMATICSANDBIOGEOGRAPHY(wzt/1D.M.Williams,2008)

AlsobyJohnS.Wilkins

DEFININGSPECIES:ASourcebookfromAntiquitytoToday(2009)

SPECIES:AHistoryoftheIdea,SpeciesandSystematics(2009)

INTELLIGENTDESIGNANDRELIGIONASANATURALPHENOMENON(2010)

TheNatureof

Classification

RelationshipsandKindsinthe

NaturalSciences

JohnS.Wilkins

UniversityofMelbourne,Australia

and

MalteC.Ebach

UniversityofNewSouthWales,Australia

palgrave

macmillan

□9□©JohnS.WilkinsandMalteC.Ebach2014

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Firstpublished2014by

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Thispageintentionallyleftblank

Contents

ListofFiguresviii

ListofTablesix

Acknowledgmentsx

Introduction1

1TheNatureofScience9

2NatureandClassification28

3ScientificClassification60

4HomologyandAnalogy85

5MonstersandMisclassifications109

6Observation,TheoryandDomains125

7Radistics:ANeutralTerminology143

8WorththeKnowing162

Bibliography167

Index191

ListofFigures

1.1TheBaconian(B)andPopperian(P)Cycles12

1.2Thetwelvemovementsandfourmomentsof

scientificprocesses12

1.3Thescientificsysteminasocialcontext16

1.4Symbolsforcloudscorrespondingtothedifferent

figuresoftheCL,CMandCHcodes22

1.5Therelationsbetweenauniverseofdiscourseordomain,

andanobserversystem,aclassifierandaclassification24

2.1AsaGray'sschemeofclassification39

2.2Ageneralschemeofclassification40

3.1Sequencesormomentsofthetaskofclassifying

naturaltaxa66

3.2Herdman's1885"PhylogeneticTableHofanimals72

3.3Hennig'soriginaldiagram(redrawn)ofacladogram73

3.4Organismsandnon-organisms80

4.1PierreBelon'smappingofhumanandbirdskeletonsin155587

4.2Thetopologicalrelationsbetweentwoobjects94

5.1Linnaeus,initialtableofanimals113

5.2Darwin/sdiagramintheOriginDarwin1859,116-117115

5.3Hennigiannaturalandunnaturalgroups117

5.4Hybridclassificationsmixinghomologicalandanalogical

classificationschemes119

5.5Bracketinganalogousinferenceswithinhomologicalclasses120

6.1TherelationshipofTheoryandobservationinaspecific

biologicaldomain,andtheinputsfromotherdomainsand

widergeneralknowledge140

7.1Varietiesofmolecularparallelisms152

7.2KlausFuchs'arrangementsofspecies153

7.3Anearlynineteenthcentury“table”154

7.4Treediagrams155

viii

ListofTables

1.1Momentsofscientificactivity14

1.2Cloudclassification20

2.1TypetermsintheInternationalCodeforZoological

Nomenclature(ICZN),theInternationalCodeforBotanical

Nomenclature(ICBN),TheOxfordEnglishDictionary{OED),

historyofbiology,andphilosophy52

7.1Equivalencetablebetweensometermsusedinseveral

sciencesandRadisticsincludingalistofdefinitionsfor

radisticterms146

Acknowledgments

Wearegratefulforthediscussionsandinformationprovidedbyother

specialistsbothinthesciencesdiscussedandthephilosophyandhistory

ofthosesciences.Theyarenotresponsibleforanyofthemistakesand

provocationscontainedwithin.Inparticularwearemostgratefultothe

followingfordiscussionsandassistance:ReedCartwright,StevenFrench,

ChrisGlen,JimGriesemer,PaulGriffiths,JohnHarshman,MarkOlsen,

BrentMishler,DomMurphy,GaryNelson,EricScerri,EmanuelleSerelli,

ClemStanyon,TeganVanderlaan,KiplingWill,andDavidWilliams,

aswellasananonymousreviewer.ThanksalsotoChristineTurskyfor

purchasingthefirstcopyofthisbookayearinadvance.

Introduction

Atrueclassificationincludesineachclass,thoseobjectswhich

havemorecharacteristicsincommonwithoneanother,than

anyofthemhaveincommonwithanyobjectsexcludedfrom

theclass.[HerbertSpencer,TheClassificationoftheSciences]1

Whereasinthething,thereisbutonesingleunity,thatsheweth

(asitwereinaglasse,atseverallpositions)thosevariousfacesin

ourunderstanding.Inaword;allthesewordsarebutartificial-

Itermes,notreal!things:Andthenotrightunderstandingthem,

isthedangerousestrockethatSchoolessuffershipwrackeagainst.

[KenelmeDigby,"ObservationsUponReligioMedici”,1642]2

Whentwospeciesofobjectshavealwaysbeenobservedto

beconjoinedtogether,Icaninfer,bycustom,theexistence

ofonewhereverIseetheexistenceoftheother;andthisI

callanargumentfromexperience.Buthowthisargumentcan

haveplace,wheretheobjects,asinthepresentcase,aresingle,

individual,withoutparallel,orspecificresemblance,maybe

difficulttoexplain.[DavidHume,DialoguesConcerningNatural

Religion,1779]3

1

2RelationshipsandKindsintheNaturalSciences

Acenturyandahalfago,however,classificationwasahottopicinthe

philosophyofscience.Itwasseenasamajoractivityinsciencebyscien­

tistsandphilosophersalike.Anditremainedatopicofintensedebatein

anumberoffields,particularlyinbiology.Whenphilosophersdiscussed

classification,though,theydidsointhelightoftheories,andagood

manyscientificclassifierstookthemattheirword,treatingallclassifica­

tionsasbeinghypothesesorbasedupontheories.

Inthisbookwewillattempttorediscovertherolethatclassification

playsinscience.Consequently,whatourtargetis,isnaturalclassifica-tion,

andnottheclassificationofconceptsortheoreticalobjects.Itiswhat

botanists,zoologists,andgeologistsdidbeforetheyhadexplana-tionsof

phenomena.Itiswhatpsychologydidbeforeithadetiologiesof

pathologicalconditions.Itisanunderappreciatedaspectofunder­

standinghowsciencesdevelop.

Wewillfirstconsidertherelationoftheoreticalontologiesandempir­

icalobservations.Sincemostphilosophyofsciencehastreatedontolo­

giesinscienceasbeingtheory-derived,andsubsequentclassifications

baseduponthat,wethoughtitworthwhiletoopensomespacefornon-

theoreticalclassification.Inshort,wearguethatobservationcanleadto

classificationintheabsenceofatheoryofagivendomain.Oncethere

areclassificationsinsuchtheory-freefields,thenexplanationscanbe

developed.Suchclassificationsarephenomenatobeexplained.

InChapter1,wedescribeawaytoconceptualizescienceasafield

ofpossibilitiesfromactiveconceptualization(theorization)topassive

conceptualization(classification),andfromactiveobservation(experi­

ment)topassiveobservation(patternrecognitionofphenomena),

settingupthesceneforlaterchapters.

InChapter2,weintroducethenotionofanaturalclassification

andtheroleclassificationplaysinsciences.Weconsiderthedifference

betweentaxonomyandsystematics,andintroducethequestionof

theory-dependenceofobservation.Thephilosophicalbackgroundofclas­

sificationisintroduced,alongwiththequestionofessentialismandnatural

kinds,whichwereplaceinclassificationwiththemethodoftypes.

InChapter3,weconsiderthesociologicalandphenomenalaspectsof

classification.Thetribalismoftaxonomyandsystematicsisdiscussed,

leadingtothetasksofclassification,toordertaxaandobjectssothat

inferencescanbemadefromthem.Classingandorderingobjectsare

distinctactions.Weconsidertheiconographicalrepresentationsofclas­

sification,anddeflate“tree-thinking"somewhat.Wenotetheinfluence

onthethinkingofclassifiersoftheontologicalfallacy,believingthat

Introduction3

becausewehavegivenanametoagroupwethinkwesee,thatthat

groupmustexist.Finally,wediscussnamesandnomenclature.

InChapter5,weconsidermonstrousclassifications,ormisclas­

sifications,whichrelymoreuponfactsabouttheobserversandtheir

predilectionsthanuponthefactsabouttheobjectsclassified.Trashcan

categoriesarecommoninscience,butareaphyletic,inbiologicalterms.

Weconsiderwhatisanaturalclassification,concludingthatitisone

basedonasinglecutofaclassificatoryhierarchy(monophylyinbiology)

ratherthanamixtureofartificialandnaturalcharacters.Naturalkind

classificationsaregradesbasedontheanalogouscharacterspreferredby

aTheory.

InChapter6,weconsiderhowabandoningthefulltheory-dependence

ofobservationthesis(TDOT)affectsourviewofclassification.Wedefine

ascientificTheory(capital-T)assomethingdistinctfromthenotionthat

phenomenaareobservedbasedonpriorcriteriaofsaliencetoanobserver,

andadopttheBogen-Woodwardnotionofaphenomenonasapattern

indata.Aphenomenon,includingaclassification,istheexplicandum

thatTheoryexplains.WethenconsiderthequestionwhetherTheory

fromoutsideadomainofinvestigationcountsasTheoryDependence

withinthedomain,andthusaskwhatadomainisinscience.Wesetup

a“domainconundrum”-howcanasciencegetstartedwhenthereis

noTheoryofitsdomain?

InChapter7,wedefineaneutralterminologyforclassificationacross

allscholarlyfields.WehavechosentocallitRadistics,fromtheGreek

rootwordfor“branch”:radixtoproduceaschemaintowhich

thedebatescanbeplaced.

4RelationshipsandKindsintheNaturalSciences

InChapter8,wenotethatwhatclassificationscontributetotheinfer­

entialprocessinscienceisthattheyallowustolocatethemassofdata

pointsobservedwithoutTheoryinabroaderpattern,andtheyguide

Theory-building.Classificationisnot,inandofitself,Theory-building;

norisitfreeofTheorywhenTheoryisavailable.However,ifwehave

noTheory,ortheTheoryiscontested,thenweshouldrecognizethata

classificationschemeisastatementofwhatwedoknow,andresteasy

inourignoranceofwhatwedonot.

Thisisaphilosophybook,writtenforphilosophersandscientistsalike.

Itisnotabookforscientiststoappealtoinjustificationoftheirscience.

ToparaphraseFeynman'sfamouslyattributedsaying,4philosophyis

aboutasusefultoscienceasornithologyistobirds.Scienceisinthe

businessoffindingoutabouttheworldandexplainingit.Philosophy

isinthebusinessoftakingconcepts,andthewordsusedtoexpress

them,andtryingtomakesenseofthem,tostress-testthem.Locke

famouslyreferredtophilosophyasclearingthegroundofscience,5and

asWittgensteinwrote

Inphilosophywearenot,likethescientist,buildingahouse.Norare

weevenlayingthefoundationsofahouse.Wearemerely°tidying

uparoomM.6

Introduction5

scientificmethod;itwasanaiveinductivismthatcouldbedispensed

with,somethingthatweleftbehindinthenineteenthcentury.

Theaimofthisbookistoreviveaninterestinthephilosophyof

naturalclassification,andtolocateitwellandtrulywithinthescientific

process,bothasascientificactivitythathaspayoffsfortheorywithout

necessarilybeingderivedfromit,andasaheuristicfordiscoveryof

phenomenathatthemselvescallfortheoreticalexplanation.Weare

notinclinedtogivetechnicaldetailsorjustificationsforthisorthat

methodology-veryoftenthesearestillbeingtestedandassessedbythe

practitionersofthesciences-andtheyaregristtothemillsofspecial­

istsinstatisticsandmathematics,aswellasthelogicofprobabilityand

inference.However,theroleofclassificationinscienceitself,bywhat­

evertechniques,needstoberestoredtotheattentionofgeneralphilos­

ophyofscience,andnotmerelyassomethingthatonlybiologistsand

medicalresearchersdo.

Butthiscannotbetrue.Notonlyhavebiologistscontinuouslyand

moreorlessconsistentlyclassifiedroughlythesamesortsofthings,

species,forthedurationofthemodernbiologicalera,butothersciences,

includingphysics,havedoneitaswell,andthishasbeenenormously

fruitful,drivingboththeoryandexperiment.Classificationisapersistent

momentinascience'sdevelopment.However,itdoesnotoccurinthe

samemannerineverytheory'sordiscipline'sdevelopment.Whythisis

thecasewillbeatargetofthediscussionthatfollows.

Becausethefocushas,forthelastcentury,beensorestrictedlyupon

languageandpsychologism,thenotionofa“natural"classificationhas

verylargelygonebythewaysideinthephilosophyofscience.Whenit

hasbeenconsideredatall,itisintermsofnaturalkinds,withtheoretical

orotheressences,asintheworkofBrianEllisandJosephLaPorte.8This

isnotabookaboutnaturalkinds.

6RelationshipsandKindsintheNaturalSciences

Attheturnofthenineteenthcentury,though,classificationwasa

focalissuedebatedatlengthbyagreatmanyscientists,manyofthem

mineralogists,chemistsandphysicists,aswellasbiologists.Philosophers

likeWilliamWhewellin1840,9throughtoW.StanleyJevonsnearly

fortyyearslater,10wroteaboutthenaturalclassificationofthings.Bythe

turnofthetwentiethcentury,however,themostwidelyinfluentialtext

onclassificationwasalibrarian's,11andtheconsensusthereafterwas

thattheunitsofclassificationinbiology,species,weremerelyconven­

tionallydefinedobjectsused,asLockesaid,onlyforcommunication,a

viewrepeatedbythegreatevolutionarybiologistJohnMaynardSmith

nearlysixtyyearsafterwards.12

Interestingly,whereclassificationdidplayalargeroleinphilosophyin

thelatterhalfofthenineteenthcenturywasintheclassificationofthe

sciencesthemselves.FromAugusteComte,toHerbertSpencer,toJevons,

amajortopicwastheclassificationofthesubjectmatter,methodand

domainofthesciencesandtheirrelationtoeachother.Thisexplains

whyclassificationinphilosophyendedupbecomingclassificationof

booksandtopics;itwasseenasnotsomuchamatterofnature,butof

philosophicalconstruction.

Afurtherproblemisthewidespreadbeliefthatclassificationissolely

amatterofconvention.Eveninbiologicalsystematics,grouptermslike

speciesareoftenregardednotasnaturalobjectsorclassesorkinds,but

asconstructsofsheerconvenience.Thisisextendedtoothersciences

whenthereisnotheoreticalkindoressenceinvolved.Ingeneral,defi-

nitionalismhasbeenlargelyabandonedinthesocialsciences,whereit

iscalled“essentialism”;inpsychology,whereitiscalledtheClassical

Theory;andinphilosophy,whereitisoftenthoughttohavebeen

defeatedbyBertrandRussell,LudwigWittgensteinandHilaryPutnam.13

Initsplacearesuchtheoriesasstereotypetheory,prototypetheory,and

exemplartheory.14Thesearetheoriesofmeaningandintentionality,

andhaveonlyatangentialconnectionwithclassificationinthenatural

sciences,beingissuesinthephilosophyoflanguageandpsychology.

Assuch,theyarescientificclassificationtheoriesonlywhenthescien­

tificquestionisthedevelopmentandevolutionoflanguageandmind.

Itiscrucialnottotakeapsychologisticapproachandprojectprop­

ertiesofcognitivedispositionsontoscientific,thatistosay,natural,

classification.

Ouraimhereistoraiseandconsidersomeoftheoldquestionsofclas­

sificationinthemoderncontext,togetatthenatureofclassificationin

thenaturalsciences.Wethinkthatthisunderplayedaspectofscience

Introduction7

makessenseoftheoreticalandhistoricaldevelopmentofthesciences,

andofthemodesofdiscoverythatarelargelymysteriousinitsabsence.

Moreover,naturalclassificationisatoolofinferenceandtesting,and

not,asthecommonviewhasit,ahypothesisofeitherhistoryorprocess;

itallowsustotesthypothesesaboutthesematters.

Theauthorsareaworkingscientist(Ebach)andaphilosopherand

historianofbiology(Wilkins)andsothestructureoftheargumentisin

somewaysadialoguebetweenthemassurrogatesforthoseworkingin

thesciences,atthecoalface,asitwere,attemptingtogeneralizetheo­

reticalissues,andwiththosewhoapproachthesciencesfromameta­

levelperspective.Wedonotentirelyagreeoneverytopicorargument

raisedhere,andwewillattempttomakeourdifferencesknownandthe

reasonsforthemclearinthefootnotes.Considerthisbookasaninvita­

tiontoengageinadiscussionratherthanasupposedlyauthoritative

lastword.If,forphilosophers,itiswritteninanoverlynontechnical

fashion,beassuredthatforscientistsitwillbeseenastootechnical,and

sowehopetosatisfynobody.

Moreover,thisisnotaworkofgeneralabstractphilosophyoflanguage,

epistemologyormetaphysics.Weconsiderthesemattersonlysofaras

theyarerelevanttounderstandinghownaturalclassificationplaysapart

inscience.ItisWilkins,opinionthatsuchmattersarelargelydecoupled

fromthebroaderconcernsofepistemologyandmetaphysics,andcanbe

bracketedoutinthiscontext,exceptwherenotedinthetext.

8RelationshipsandKindsintheNaturalSciences

Notes

1.Spencer1864.

2.WeowethisquotetoJebMcLeish.

3.Part2,italicsoriginal.Page65inthe1779secondedition(Hume1779).

4.MostlikelyduetoStevenWeinberg,althoughitmayhavebeencoinedin

areviewbyMcHenry2000summarizingWeinberg.Inanycaseitisareuse

ofamucholdersayingaboutaestheticsandartistsbyBarnettNewman:"!

feelthatevenifaestheticsisestablishedasascience,itdoesn'taffectme

asanartist.I'vedonequiteabitofworkinornithology;Ihavenevermet

anornithologistwhoeverthoughtthatornithologywasforthebirds."He

wouldlaterhonethisremarkintothefamousquip,“Aestheticsisforthe

artistasornithologyisforthebirds”.See</

chronology.php>.

5.EssayConcerningHumanUnderstanding,Introduction:Philosophyis"employed

asanunder-labourerinclearingthegroundalittle,andremovingsomeof

therubbishthatliesinthewaytoknowledge0.

6.Monk1990,298f.

7.SeeArmstrong1978;Sloan1985.

8.Ellis2001,2002;LaPorte1996;LaPorte1997,2004.

9.Whewell1840.

10.Jevons1878.

11.Richardson1901.

12.MaynardSmith1958.

13.Wilkins2013.

14.Cf.Prinz2002.

1

TheNatureofScience

Thedancefloorofscience

Aboutthirtyyearsagotherewasmuchtalkthatgeologistsoughtonly

toobserveandnottotheorize;andIwellremembersomeonesaying

thatatthisrateamanmightaswellgointoagravelpitandcountthe

pebblesanddescribetheircolours.Howodditisthatanyoneshould

notseethatallobservationsmustbefororsomeviewifitistobeof

anyservice.[CharlesDarwin1]

Inthischapterwedescribeawaytoconceptualizescienceasafieldofpossi­

bilitiesfromactiveconceptualization(theorization)topassiveconceptuali­

zation(classification),andfromactiveobservation(experiment)topassive

observation(patternrecognitionofphenomena),settingupthesceneforlater

chapters.

Accordingtotraditionalphilosophyofscience,bywhichofcourse

wemeanwhatWilkinswastaughtasanundergraduate,3whatscience

doesistodevelop,test,andargueovertheories.Oddly,whatascien­

tifictheoryconsistsofisrarelydiscussed,althoughthereisaconsensus

thatatheoryisaformalmodelofafamilyofmodelswithancillary

9

10RelationshipsandKindsintheNaturalSciences

hypothesesandinterpretationsofsomekind.4Inthisbookweshall

consider“theory"tocoveranyabstractrepresentationorpartofsuchan

abstractrepresentationincludingmodels.However,thefocushasbeen

ontheoriesatleastsinceJohnStuartMill'sASystemofLogicin1843,5

especiallyoncethatworkwasadoptedasthebasisfortheburgeoning

analyticphilosophymovementinBritainandAmerica,andthesubse­

quentdevelopmentoflogicalpositivismanditsheirsandsuccessors.

Positivismwasatwo-dimensionalorlinearhistoricalprogressivist

viewaboutscience.Comtehimselfheldthatsocietiesmovedthrough

thetheological,themetaphysicalandthenthepositivestages.Likewise,

individualscienceswerealsoheldtodevelopthisway.Thisprogres­

sivismpersistedlongafterpositivismdiedortransmutedintological

empiricism.EvenastheBaconianideaofsciencesdevelopingfrom

massesofnaiveobservationintolawsandtheorieswasbeingaban-doned,

peoplestillheldthattherewasaconstrainedhistoricalsequenceforthe

developmentofsciences.Forexample,ThomasKuhn's^normal

science/revolutionaryscience"distinction,andinparticularhisaevolu-

tionarymetaphor”:

Historymovesforward.Unfortunately,thisisnotnecessarilytrueof

biologicalevolution,andthereisnoreasontothinkitistrueofcultural

evolutioneither,sowhyshoulditbetrueinscience?Whymustscience

TheNatureofScience11

followasettrajectory?WhycanscientifichistorybeWhiggishwhen

therestofhistorycannot?7Thepresumptionhereisthatthehistoryof

scienceisconstrainedtodevelopinparticularways.Thisisjustfalse.

Philosophiesofsciencetendtodistinguishbetweentheconceptual

andempiricalaspectsofscience.Wemightrepresentthisasafieldof

possibilities,inwhichoneaxisisconceptualdevelopment,andtheother

ofempiricalobservation.Evenviewsbaseduponthetheory-dependence

ofobservationmakethedistinction,ifonlytoassertthepriorityofone

overanother,soletustakethisasafirstapproximation.Conceptual

tasksarethemselvesdividedintotheoreticalandclassificationtasks,the

firstbeingarepresentationofphenomena,andthesecondsupposedly

asystematizationoftheresultsofthedynamicscapturedbythetheory/

model.

Thesetwoconceptualtasksareusuallyheldinopposition,although

againsomesubordinatetheonetotheother,mostlyholdingthattheory

determinesthesortsofcategoriesintowhichthingsgetsorted.More

rarely,holdingthatone'sontology,orclassificationofpossibletypesof

things,determinesorconstrainstheories.Letusvisualizeeachtaskasa

setofgoalsconnectedbythecommonfeatureofbeingconceptual,like

adumb-bell.Empiricaltasks,similarly,aredividedintonaiveobserva­

tionandmoreinformedexperimentaltesting,whichinvolvesknowl­

edgeofthetheory.So,onthisviewofscience,the“moments"between

whichscientificbehavior“moves"looklikeFigure1.1.

TheBaconianCycle(thatis,theviewheldbythosewhothoughtthey

weredoingBaconianinduction)isshowninFigure1.1assequenceB,

whilethePopperianCycleisshownassequenceP(Popperdismisse