成本与管理会计（第15版） 课件 GE-hca15-ch23

CHAPTER23PerformanceMeasurement,Compensation,andMultinationalConsiderationsChapter23learningobjectivesSelectfinancialandnonfinancialperformancemeasurestouseinabalancedscorecardExamineaccounting-basedmeasuresforevaluatingabusinessunit’sperformance,includingreturnoninvestment(ROI),residualincome(RI),andeconomicvalueadded(EVA®)Analyzethekeymeasurementchoicesinthedesignofeachperformancemeasure23-2Chapter23learningobjectives,concludedStudythechoiceofperformancetargetsanddesignoffeedbackmechanismsIndicatethedifficultiesthatoccurwhentheperformanceofdivisionsoperatingindifferentcountriesiscomparedUnderstandtherolesofsalariesandincentiveswhenrewardingmanagersDescribethefourleversofcontrolandwhytheyarenecessary23-3FinancialandNonfinancialperformanceMeasuresManyorganizationsrecordfinancialandnonfinancialperformancemeasuresfortheirsubunitsonabalancedscorecard.Thescorecardsofdifferentorganizationsemphasizedifferentmeasuresbutthemeasuresarealwaysderivedfromacompany’sstrategy.Inabalancedscorecard,thefourperspectivesare:FinancialCustomerInternalbusinessprocessLearningandgrowth23-4Accounting-BasedPerformanceMeasuresRequiresseveralsteps:Chooseperformancemeasuresthatalignwiththefirm’sfinancialgoals.Choosethedetailsofeachperformancemeasure.Chooseatargetlevelofperformanceandafeedbackmechanismforeachperformancemeasure.23-5Fourcommonmeasuresofeconomicperformance:ReturnoninvestmentResidualincomeEconomicvalueaddedReturnonsales(thismeasuredoesnotaccountforinvestment)23-6ReturnonInvestment(ROI)23-7ROIisanaccountingmeasureofincomedividedbyanaccountingmeasureofinvestment.ROI,cont’dMostpopularmetricfortworeasons:Blendsalltheingredientsofprofitability(revenues,costs,andinvestment)intoasinglepercentageMaybecomparedtootherROI’sbothinsideandoutsidethefirmAlsocalledtheaccountingrateofreturn(ARR)ortheaccrualaccountingrateofreturn(AARR)23-8ROI,concluded ROImaybedecomposedintoitstwocomponentsasfollows:ROI=ReturnonSalesXInvestmentTurnover.ThisapproachisknownastheDuPontMethodofProfitabilityAnalysis.Itrecognizesthetwobasicingredientsinprofitmaking:increasingincomeperdollarofrevenueandusingassetstogeneratemorerevenues.AnimprovementtoeitherwithnochangeintheotherwillincreaseROI.23-9ResidualIncomeResidualincome(RI)isanaccountingmeasureofincomeminusadollaramountforrequiredreturnonanaccountingmeasureofinvestment.RI=Income–(RRRXInvestment)RRR=RequiredRateofReturnRequiredrateofreturntimestheinvestmentistheimputedcostoftheinvestment.Imputedcostsarecostsrecognizedinsomesituations,butnotinthefinancialaccountingrecords.23-10EconomicValueAdded(EVA)23-11EVAisavariationofRIusedbymanycompanies.Itiscalculatedasfollows:Weightedaveragecostofcapitalequalstheafter-taxaveragecostofalllong-termfundsinuse.ReturnonSales(ROS)Returnonsalesisalsoknownastheincome-to-revenuesratioorthesalesratioItisfrequentlyused,simpletocompute,andwidelyunderstood.Itdoesnottakeintoaccountinvestment.ItmeasureshoweffectivelycostsaremanagedItiscalculatedbytakingOperatingIncome/Revenuesandisexpressedasapercentage.23-12ComparingperformancemeasuresUsingtheexampleofthehotelsfromourtextbook,weseetheresultsusingeachofourmethods:(inparenthesesaretheranks)23-13HotelROIRIEVAROSSF24%(1)$120,000(2)$68,250(2)20%(2)Chicago15%(3)$60,000(3)$15,750(3)21%(1)NewOrleans17%92)$150,000(1)$73,500(1)16%(3)ChoosingdetailsofthemeasureHowshouldeachmeasurebecomputed?Severalquestionsshouldbeansweredtobegin:Whatisthetimehorizon?Whichdefinitionofinvestmentwillbeused?Howshallwecalculatevariouscomponentsofeachperformancemeasuresuchasthemeasurementofassets.Let’snowdiscusseachofthesemeasurementdetails.23-14AlternativeTimeHorizonsAnimportantelementindesigningaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresischoosingthetimehorizonoftheperformancemeasures.Multipleperiodsofevaluationaresometimesappropriate.ROI,RI,EVA,andROSallbasicallyevaluateoneperiodoftime.ROI,RI,EVA,andROSmayallbeadaptedtoevaluatemultipleperiodsoftime.23-15BenefitsofmultiyearanalysisThereareseveralbenefitstomultiyearanalysis:Benefitsofactionstakeninthecurrentperiodmaynotshowupinshort-runperformancemeasures.IfmanagersuseNPVforinvestmentdecisions,thenusingamultiyearRIforperformanceachievesgoalcongruence.Motivatesmanagerstotakealong-runperspectivebycompensatingthemonchangesinmarketprice.23-16ChoosingAlternativeDefinitionsforPerformanceMeasuresFourcommonalternativedefinitionsofinvestment:Totalassetsavailable–allassets.Totalassetsemployed–allassetslessidleassetsandassetspurchasedforfutureexpansion.Totalassetsemployedminuscurrentliabilities–totalassetsemployedlessassetsfinancedbyshort-termcreditors.Stockholder’sequity–assignliabilitiestosubunitsanddeductfromtotalassets.23-17AlternativeassetmeasurementsPossiblealternativeassetmeasurementsinclude:Currentcost–costofpurchasinganassettodayidenticaltotheonecurrentlyheld.Grossvalueoffixedassets–historicalcost.Netbookvalue(NBV)offixedassets–historicalcost.(HistoricalcostisusedtocalculateROIandthereisalwaysaquestionwhethertousegrossornetbookvalue.NBVisthemeasuremostcommonlyusedbycompaniesforinternalperformanceevaluation.)23-18TargetlevelsofperformanceandfeedbackChoosingtargetlevelsofperformance:EstablishtargetROIsusinghistorical-cost-basedmeasures.Setcontinuousimprovementtargets.Usebalancedscorecardstoestablishtargets.Choosingthetimingoffeedback(dependson):Howcriticaltheinformationisforthesuccessoftheorganization.Themanagementlevelreceivingfeedback.Thesophisticationoftheorganization’sinformationtechnology.23-19PerformanceMeasurementinMultinationalCompaniesAdditionaldifficultiesfacedbymultinationalcompanies:Theeconomic,legal,political,social,andculturalenvironmentsdiffersignificantlyacrosscountries.Importquotasandtariffsrangewidelyfromcountrytocountry.Availabilityofmaterialsandskilledlabor,aswellascostsofmaterials,labor,andinfrastructurealsodiffersignificantlyacrosscountries.Divisionsoperatingindifferentcountriesaccountfortheirperformanceindifferentcurrenciesandinflationandfluctuationinforeign-currencyexchangeratesaffectperformancemeasurement.23-20DistinguishingBetweenperformanceofManagersandtheirsubUnitsTheperformanceevaluationofamanagershouldbedistinguishedfromtheperformanceevaluationofthatmanager’ssubunit,suchasadivisionofthecompany.Thereasonforthisistorecognizethatacompanymayputthemostskilleddivisionmanagerinchargeofthedivisionwiththepoorestreturninanefforttoimprovethatdivisionandthatmaytakeyears.23-21TheTrade-Off:CreatingIncentivesvs.ImposingRiskAninherenttrade-offexistsbetweencreatingincentivesandimposingrisk.Anincentiveshouldbesomerewardforperformance.Anincentivemaycreateanenvironmentinwhichsuboptimalbehaviormayoccur:thegoalsofthefirmaresacrificedinordertomeetamanager’spersonalgoals.Themotivationforhavingsomesalaryandsomeperformance-basedcompensationistobalancethebenefitofincentivesagainsttheextracostofimposingriskonamanager.23-22MoralHazardMoralhazarddescribesasituationinwhichanemployeepreferstoexertlesseffortcomparedwiththeefforttheownerdesiresbecausetheownercannotaccuratelymonitorandenforcetheemployee’seffort.23-23IntensityofIncentivesIntensityofincentives—howlargetheincentivecomponentofamanager’scompensationshouldberelativetotheirsalarycomponent.Thetradeoffbetweenconsiderationsofsensitivityandrisk,ontheonehand,andthecongruenceofgoals,ontheother,determinestheeffectiveintensityofincentivesplacedoneachmeasureofperformance.23-24BenchmarksandrelativeperformanceevaluationBenchmarksaremetricsthatcorrespondtothebestpracticesoforganizationsandmaybeavailableinsideoroutsideoftheorganization.23-25PerformanceMeasuresattheIndividualActivityLevelManagersneedtodotwothingswhendesigningthemeasuresusedtoevaluateperformanceofindividualemployees:Designperformancemeasuresforactivitiesthatrequiremultipletasks.Designperformancemeasuresforactivitiesdoneinteams.23-26CompensationforMultipleTasks&team-basedEmployerswantemployeestoallocatetheirtimeandeffortintelligentlyamongvarioustasksoraspectsoftheirjobs.Ateamachievesbetterresultsthanindividualemployeesactingalone.1Manycompaniesrewardemployeesonteamsbasedonhowwelltheirteamperforms.23-27ExecutiveCompensationPlansBasedonbothfinancialandnonfinancialperformancemeasures,andincludeamixof:Basesalary.Annualincentives,suchascashbonuses.Long-runincentives,suchasstockoptions.Well-designedplansuseacompensationmixthatbalancesrisk(theeffectofuncontrollablefactorsontheperformancemeasure,andhencecompensation)withshort-runandlong-runincentivestoachievethefirm’sgoals.23-28StrategyandLeversofControlPerformanceevaluationmeasureshelpmanagerstracktheirprogresstowardachievingacompany’sstrategicgoals.Becausethesemeasureshelpdiagnosewhetheracompanyisperformingtoexpectations,theyarecollectivelycalledDiagnosticControlSystems.Companiesmotivatemanagersbyholdingthemaccountableandrewardingthemformeetinggoals.23-29StrategyandLeversofControl,concludedTopreventunethicalandoutrightfraudulentbehavior,companiesbalancethepushforperformance(resultingfromDiagnosticControlSystems)withthreeotherleversofcontrol:Boundarysystems.Beliefsystems.Interactivecontrolsystems.Eachleverisimportantandneedstobemonitored.Leversshouldbeinterdependentandcollectivelyrepresentalivingsystemofbusinessconduct.23-30BoundarySystemsBoundarysystemsdescribestandardsofbe