2025年展望：德意志银行年度洞察

DeutscheBank

ChiefInvestmentOffice

PERSPECTIVES2025

ANNUALOUTLOOK

Insightsintoyour

futureinvestmentchoices

POLITICS&POLICY–Thefutureisfiscal

BONDS–Thereturnofthepremium

STOCKS–Thekeytosuccess

2

PERSPECTIVES2025

Contents

LettertoInvestorsp.3

1Macro&strategy

Stayingthecourseinturbulenttimesp.5

2Politics&policy

Thefutureisfiscalp.8

3Bonds

Thereturnofthepremiump.10

4Dollar

Strongeconomy,strongcurrencyp.12

5Stocks

Thekeytosuccessp.14

6U.S.stocks

Centreofgravityp.16

7StocksinGermany

Positivesstillapparentp.18

8Commodities

Offtonewshoresp.20

9Infrastructure

Realassetsp.22

10Risk

Recessions,rates&rotationsp.24

Macroeconomicandassetclassforecastsp.26

Glossaryp.29

Importantnotep.31

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

3

PERSPECTIVES2025

LettertoInvestors

Deeplyinvestedingrowth

ChristianNolting,

GlobalCIO

Weliveinaworldcharacterisedbyrapidandacceleratingchange:economic,social,

politicalandtechnological.Change,inallitsforms,isoftenunsettlingbutcannotbe

ignored.Itwillcreatechallengesin2025andbeyond,butalsoinvestmentopportunities.Thisannualoutlookdiscusseswheretheyarelikelytobe.

Changeishappeningagainstquiteachallengingeconomicbackdrop.2025willnotbea

yearofrapidGDPgrowth:U.S.growthisforecastatamodest2.0%,withtheEurozone

laggingsomewaybehind(0.9%)andChinesegrowth(4.2%)wellbelowrecenthistorical

averages.Inflationcouldalsoprovetenacious,duetohigherfiscalspendingandpossible

tariffhikes.This,inturn,willgivecentralbankslessroomtocutinterestratesastheyseek

tobalancegrowthandinflationcontrol.Theresultmaywellbeuncertainandshiftingmarketexpectations,triggeringmoreboutsofvolatilitythanin2024.Geopoliticalfallout,perhapsduetochangingtradepolicy,couldaddtotheuncertainty.

SowhyamIbroadlypositiveabouttheinvestmentoutlookfor2025?Thekeywordis“productivity”.

Productivity(i.e.whatoutputwecanproducewithgiveninputs)appearstohaveincreasedonlyveryslowlyinrecentyears,andonsomerelatedmeasures(e.g.realGDPperhour

worked)mayhavefallen.Thishashadmajoreconomicandsocialcosts.AsNobelLaureate

PaulKrugmanfamouslyobservedthirtyyearsago,“productivityisn‘teverything,butinthelongrun,itisalmosteverything”.Krugmanwasreflectingtheviewsofmanyeconomists

whenhearguedthatlong-termgainsinstandardsoflivingweredependentonraising

outputperworker.Thirtyyearson,asworkernumbersfallrelativetooverallpopulations,

raisingoutputperworkerseemsevenmoreurgent.ThegoodnewsisthatAIandassociatedtechnologiesnowofferacrediblewaytodothis.Wewillpublishmoreonthisstructuralissueofproductivity–anditsimportantimplicationsforcapitalmarkets–earlynextyear.

Productivitygainswilltaketimetoaccumulate,ofcourse–thiswillbeaprocessthat

continuesanddeepensconsiderablybeyondthenecessarilylimitedtimehorizonofthis

2025outlook.Butmarketexpectationsonproductivityarealreadyhavinganimpacton

severalofthe2025investmentthemesdiscussedinthisreport.Remember,afterall,thatthevalueofafinancialassetwillnotjustreflectthepresent:italso(imperfectly)anticipatesthefuture.

Fortheglobaleconomy,wethink2025willbeacaseofstayingthecourseinturbulenttimes.Theabilityofindividualeconomiestoweatherpossiblegeopoliticalandpolicychallenges

nextyearwillbedeterminedbyanumberoffactors.But,asthegrowthnumbershighlightedaboveshow,thereisalreadyadistinctionbetweenahightechnology,higherproductivity

U.S.economyandaEuropeaneconomythatislaggingbehindontheinterlinkedissuesofproductivityandinvestment.

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

4

PERSPECTIVES2025

Onpolitics&policy,wethinkthatthefutureisfiscal.Eventhoughinflationisnotfullytamed,thefocusofpolicyisalreadymovingfrommonetarytofiscal,aseconomiesseektofindanddrivenewformsofdevelopmentandgrowth.Expectfurtherinitiativeshere,notablyfrom

China.

Ourassetclassthemesfor2025,unsurprisingly,includeseveralonstocks.Forthose

investorswhohavetheabilitytotakerisks,thesewillbeaneffectivewaytobeinvestedin

growthandweseethemasthekeytoportfoliosuccess.Aswediscuss,therewillbeseveralreasonswhy,forstocks,theU.S.willremainthecentreofgravity.Theseincludeexpectationsaroundrisingprofits,deregulationandtaxrelief.Elsewhere,theoutlookforequitiesmay

belessvividbutisstillgenerallybright:theoutlookalsoexplainswhypositivesarestillapparentforsomeEuropeanstocksdespiterelativedomesticeconomicweakness,andthesameistrueforotherregions.

Themarketfocusonstocksshouldnotprecludeinterestinotherassetclassesin2025.

CorporatebondsintheU.S.,AsiaandEurope,forexample,arelikelytoremaininterestingforinvestorsforseveralreasons.Theseincludeinstitutionaldemand,stillhighyieldsandthe

returnofthe(term)premium.Supplyanddemandwillremainfundamentaltocommoditiessuchasoilandindustrialmetalsbutwealsoseeotherfactorsmaintainingarelativelyhigh

priceforgoldin2025.Inalternativeassets,wefocusinthisoutlookoninfrastructure–

centraltoinvestinginfuturegrowth–andwhatwecallthepublicandprivatemixology

ofinvestinginthisarea.FXconsiderationswill,asalways,beacentralconsiderationfor

investorsandhere2025willclearlybeacaseofstrongeconomy,strongcurrencyfortheU.S.dollar.Theeurowilllookweakincomparison,butraterisesandgrowthcouldsupportthe

Japaneseyen.

2025willnotalwaysbeaneasyyearforinvestorsasmarketsnavigatethroughgeopoliticalorotherrisks(includingthe“threeRs”ofrecession,ratesandrotations).Butwebelieve

thattheserisksaremanageable.Withmarketsalreadyanticipatingtheimpactoffuture

economicgrowthanddevelopment,thismeansthatbeingandstayinginvestedwillbe

essentialforportfoliosuccessbothintheshortandlongterm.Ihopeyoufindtheanalysisinthisannualoutlookusefulandweare,ofcourse,alwaysheretoguideyouthrough2025andbeyond.

ChristianNolting

GlobalCIO

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

5

PERSPECTIVES2025

1

-U.S.:softlanding,robustgrowth,stronginvestment

-Europe:modesteconomicrecoveryandpotential

productivitygrowththroughinvestment

-Asia:globalgrowth

driver–notjustChina

Macro&strategy–Stayingthecourseinturbulenttimes

Theworldisfacingenormousgeopoliticalandeconomicchallengesthatwillinalllikelihoodremainwithusin2025.TheyincludenotleastthedebatesurroundingapossiblerealignmentofinternationaltraderelationswhichhasagainintensifiedfollowingtheRepublicanvictoryinNovember’sU.S.electionandbroughtuncertaintytothefuturedevelopmentofhighly

trade-basedeconomies.Overall,however,weexpectincreasinglydynamiceconomic

growthinkeyregionsoftheworldbeyond2025,especiallyintheU.S.,AsiaandEurope,withacorrespondinglypositiveimpactongrowthsectors.

WeexpecttheU.S.economytocontinuegrowingrobustlyin2025.AlthoughtheU.S.labourmarkethascooled,thereisnosignofanimminentrecession.TheplansofU.S.President-

electDonaldTrump,whowillreturntotheWhiteHouseinJanuary2025,includehigh

levelsofgovernmentinvestment,intheformofcontinuingexistingspendingprogrammes,deregulationandtaxrelief.RepublicanmajoritiesinbothchambersoftheU.S.Congress

meanthattheTrumpadministrationislikelytosucceedinimplementingalargeproportionofitsplans,whichshouldgraduallybenefittheU.S.economy.Afteranincreaseof2.0%in2025,weexpectU.S.economicgrowthtoimproveslightlyto2.2%in2026.

OnekeyfactorintheanticipatedrobustgrowthoftheU.S.economyisitshighleveloftechnology-drivenproductivity.Forexample,labourproductivityintheU.S.iscurrently

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

6

PERSPECTIVES2025

around25%higherthaninEurope.Inthemid-1990s,thedifferencewasonlyaround5%.

In2022,theBidenadministrationmadeadditionalfundstotallingmorethanUSD1tn

availableinthecontextofthreemajorinfrastructurepackages.Manythousandsofprojectsarestillintheirinitialphaseandsomearelikelytocontinueintothe2030s.Inordertoreduce

Onefactorinthe

theproductivitygapandcounteractthediverginggrowthtrend,Europeshouldalsoinvest

anticipatedrobust

ininfrastructure,newtechnologiesandtheirapplicationacrosscountriesandsectors.Plans

growthoftheU.S.

forthishavealreadybeenproposed,forexample,bytheformerheadoftheEuropean

economyisits

CentralBank(ECB)MarioDraghi.Withtheincreasingimplementationofartificialintelligence

impressivelevelof

inagrowingnumberofworkprocesses,Europecouldachieveahighergrowthtrajectoryin

technology-driven

thelongterm.

productivity,which

For2025,weexpectGDPgrowthintheEurozonetoaccelerateto0.9%thankstorobust

ismuchhigherthan

labourmarketsandrisingrealwages,whichtheECBislikelytosupportwithsuccessivekey

inEurope.

interestratecutsoverthecourseoftheyear.

Globalgrowthmoderationahead–investmentneeded

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

GlobalAdvancedEconomiesEurozone

U.S.Emerginganddevelopingeconomies

20002004200820122016202020242028

GDPGrowth(%),

IMF-Forecasts2024-2029

Source:LSEGDatastream,IMF,DeutscheBankAG;DataasofDecember3,2024.

Asiagainingfurtherprominence

In2025Asiaissettobuildonitsroleastheengineofglobalgrowth.China’s

momentumisbeingcurbedbytheongoingrealestatecrisisanduncertainincomeandemploymentprospects,structuralproblemssuchasanageingsocietyandlocalgovernmentdebt.However,weexpectfurthergovernmentsupportmeasuresfor

keytechnologiessuchassemiconductorsandrenewableenergyandthecontinuingshiftfromaproduction-basedeconomytowardsgreaterconsumerorientation.

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

7

PERSPECTIVES2025

Asiaisexpectedtoboastthehighestgrowthmomentumworldwide–withapositiveimpactoncorporateprofitsasaresultofstrong

nominalgrowth.

Beijingisalsolikelytointroducesupportmeasuresinanattempttocushionthe

economicimpactondomesticconsumptionofapossibleescalationinthetrade

conflictwiththeU.S.However,ittakestimeforfiscalstimulitohaveaneffectontherealeconomy,meaningthatcurrentandpotentialfuturemeasuresmayonlystarttohaveagrowingeffectinthesecondhalfof2025.For2025asawhole,wethereforeexpectrealGDPgrowthtobeslightlyweakerthanin2024at4.2%.Incidentally,

ChinahasalreadysignificantlydiversifieditsinternationaltradepolicyintheyearssinceDonaldTrump’sfirstpresidency,makingitlessvulnerabletoapossible

increaseinU.S.tariffsonChineseimports.WhileexportstotheU.S.stillaccounted

foraround20%ofChina’stotalexportsin2017,thisfigurehasnowfallentojust13%.InsteadalargerproportionofChineseexportsisgoingtoIndiaandSoutheastAsia,furtherintensifyingthetradelinksbetweentheregion’seconomies.

ThestrategicintegrationofSoutheastAsiaisalsogatheringpace.InMalaysia,

Indonesia,ThailandandVietnamtheBRICS+organisationhasrecentlyacquirednolessthanfournewSoutheastAsiapartners.BRICS+nations’combinedshareofglobalcommoditysupplyamountsto75%ofmanganese,72%ofrareearths,and50%ofgraphite,whichenablestheregiontochartanindependentcoursewithitsgrowthplansparticularlyintheareaofsustainablegrowth.

WithinAsia,Indiaisagainlikelytostandoutin2025withexpectedGDPgrowthof6.5%,toppingthelistofG20countries.Theworld’smostpopulousnationbenefitsnotonlyfromitsgreatinnovativestrengthandalargepoolofyoungandwell-

qualifiedworkersbutalsofromthestabilityofitspoliticalsystem.Inaddition,theimpactofpotentiallyhigherU.S.tariffsislikelytobemanageable.ExportstotheU.S.accountforonlyaround2%ofthecountry’seconomicoutput.

In2024,thestrongestwagegrowthinJapaninmorethan30yearsboostedprivateconsumption,layingthefoundationsforacontinuedeconomicrecovery.Atthe

sametime,ithasbroughtbackinflation–goodnewsforthecountrywhichhas

sufferedfromdeflationarytendenciesfordecades.Japanshouldalsobenefit

fromitsbroad-basedexporteconomywhichenablesittosatisfydemandfrom

Asia’sgrowtheconomiesinareassuchasmechanicalengineering,chemicalsandtechnology.WeexpectaverageGDPgrowthof1.2%inJapanin2025.

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

8

PERSPECTIVES2025

2

Politics&policy–Thefutureisfiscal

-Shiftfromthedominanceofmonetarypolicyto

fiscalpolicy

-U.S.andJapanwith

concreteplansfor

substantialinvestment

-EuropeandChinastillonthesidelines–acuteneedtocatchup

Overthepastthreeyears,evenpeoplewhotendtopaylittleattentiontothecapitalmarketshavebeenunabletoavoidthesubjectofmonetarypolicy.Inresponsetothesignificant

increaseinpricepressuresworldwide,itwasprimarilythecentralbanksthatdroveinflationbacktotheirrespectivetargetvaluesusinginterestrateandliquiditypolicies.

Thisdominanceofmonetarypolicyisnowlikelytoweakenagainstthebackdropofmore

moderateinflationrates.FortheEurozoneandJapan,weexpectinflationtograduallymoveclosertothecentralbanks’targetof2%in2025.Tothisend,theEuropeanCentralBankis

likelytocutitsdepositrateinfivestepsfromthecurrent3.25%to2.00%bytheendof2025.TheBankofJapanischartingadifferentcoursewithitsmonetarypolicynormalisationandmaygraduallyraisekeyinterestratesfrom0.25%to1.00%.IntheU.S.,weexpectthe

disinflationprocesstocometoahaltabovetheFed’stargetinlightofrobustdemandandexpansionaryfiscalpolicy.Inflationcouldsettleatalevelof2.4%inboth2025and2026,

promptingtheFedtoloweritskeyinterestratesomewhatmorecautiouslyinthreestepsof0.25percentagepointseachtobetween3.75%and4.00%bytheendof2025.

Inthefuture,fiscalpolicyislikelytobecomefarmoreimportanttoeconomicdevelopment.IntheU.S.,forexample,theprovisionalplansoftheadministrationduetocommencein

January2025includeextensiveandpredominantlydebt-financedstateinvestment.TheTrumpplanincludesexpandingtaxreliefforprivatehouseholdsandcompanies,

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinvestedatanypointintime.Yourcapitalmaybeatrisk.ThisdocumentwasproducedinDecember2024.

9

World

U.S.1

Eurozone

Germany

France

Italy

Spain

Japan

3.1

2.7

0.7

-0.1

1.2

0.4

3.0

-0.1

3.1

2.0

0.9

0.6

0.8

0.5

1.7

1.2

4.2

China

4.9

PERSPECTIVES2025

Forecast

Economicgrowth

Grossdomesticproduct(GDP)growthforecastsforselectedeconomies(%).

20242025

Source:DeutscheBankAG;DataasofNovember15,2024.

1Q4/Q4growth1.5%(2024),2.1%

(2025).

strengtheningthemilitaryandfacilitatingaccesstohomeloans.Totalestimatedborrowingforallmeasuresuntil2035amountstobetweenUSD7tnandUSD16tn.Thiscorrespondstoanannualaverageofasmuchas5%ofcurrentU.S.grossdomesticproduct.

InOctober,Japanalsoannounceditsplanforaneweconomicstimulusprogramme,albeitonaslightlysmallerscale.China,ontheotherhand,islikelytorefrainfromfurtherfiscal

measuresuntiltheconcreteeffectsofthenextU.S.administration’spoliciesontheChineseeconomybecomeclearer.Then,however,moresubstantialfiscalstimulusmeasurescouldbeexpectedhereaswell.

Europeisstillmoreonthesidelinesinthisfieldoftension.Acoreelementofthe

NextGenerationEUrecoveryplanistheRecoveryandResilienceFacilitywithatotalvolumeofEUR650bnforthedigitalandenergytransformationoftheeconomyby2026.However,

thesefundsareunlikelytobesufficienttoclosetheinnovationandproductivitygapwiththeU.S.andtherestoftheworld.WhiletheDraghiplanremainsavisionforthefuture,itdoes

makeclearwherethejourneyshouldlead.Inordertoclosetheinnovationgap,Europeanresearchandeducationalinstitutionsneedastrategyofexcellence,amongotherthings.

IncreasingcompetitivenessisprimarilydependentonasignificantreductioninEurope’senergypricesandreducingdependenciesinrespectofcommoditiesorkeytechnologies,forexample,requiresa“genuine”EUeconomicpolicy.Theadditionalinvestmentvolumeproposedforthisbythelong-termDraghiplanamountstobetweenEUR750bnand

EUR800bnannually.

Aninvestment

offensiveinEuropecouldserveasa

basisfortheregiontoregainthegrounditbelievesithas

lostglobally.

Governmentdeficit-relatedindicatorsrising

EurozoneGermanyU.S.China

2019

-0.6%

2019

1.3%

2019

-5.8%

2019

-6.1%

2020

-7,0%

2020

-4.4%

2020

-13.9%

2020

-9.7%

2029*

-2.7%

2029*

-0.5%

2029*

-6.0%

2029*

-8.2%

2019

84%

2019

59%

2019

108%

2019

60%

2020

97%

2020

68%

2020

132%

2020

70%

2029*

89%

2029*

58%

2029*

132%

2029*

111%

Source:IMF,DeutscheBankAG;DataasofDecember3,2024.*ForecastFiscaldeficitDebt/GDP

WebelievethatsuchaninvestmentoffensivewouldenableEuropetokeeppaceandevenregainsomeofthegroundithaslostglobally.ItshouldthenbepossiblefortheOldWorldtoagainachievemoregrowthintheyearsahead.

InEurope,MiddleEastandAfricaaswellasinAsiaPacificthismaterialisconsideredmarketingmaterial,butthisisnotthecaseinthe

U.S.Noassurancecanbegiventhatanyforecastortargetcanbeachieved.Forecastsarebasedonassumptions,estimates,opinions

andhypotheticalmodelswhichmayprovetobeincorrect.Pastperformanceisnotindicativeoffuturereturns.Performancerefers

toanominalvaluebasedonpricegains/lossesanddoesnottakeintoaccountinflation.Inflationwillhaveanegativeimpactonthe

purchasingpowerofthisnominalmonetaryvalue.Dependingonthecurrentlevelofinflation,thismayleadtoareallossinvalue,evenifthenominalperformanceoftheinvestmentispositive.Investmentscomewithrisk.Thevalueofaninvestmentcanfallaswellasriseandyoumightnotgetbacktheamountoriginallyinves