市场营销渠道分析中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：营销渠道的环境特性摘要：由斯特恩和瑞文(1980)提出的比较分析营销渠道特性的政治经济学框架主要集中于渠道成员之间的关系。这篇文章通过指明环境因素如何影响渠道扩展了政治经济学的框架与斯特恩和瑞文原文结合，为研究营销渠道的区域综合性基础理论提供了更为广泛的基础。关键词：营销渠道，成员，环境因素根据比较分析营销渠道特性的政治经济学框架，我们可以就其内部的经济(如内部经济结构和流程),它的内部政治,即内部的社会政治结和过程，内部经济结构可以说是连接两个交易渠道成员的交易形式。例如,任何双边关系的垂直经济安排，从市场调节到分等级的交易。由内部的社会政治结构内力确定两个渠道成员的权利依赖关系模式定义，从最小权利到平衡权利到不平衡权利再到集中权利。内部的社会政治过程就主导情绪(例如,合作和/或冲突)进行了描述。就如列出政治经济学框架的文章所说，去完成这个框架的剩下任务就是去识别交换的内部动力以外的变量和影响因素，就是对环境特征的结构和过程有着最大影响力的因素，并且指出这些外部的因素是如何以理论的形式被组织的。渠道环境的重要性没有被研究渠道的理论和研究方法很好的反应出来。那些可能影响外部渠道的决定，外部环境因素已经有了相关参考资料，但是缺乏对外部变量和其影响进行深入调查。本文提出了环境的框架可以加上处理框架与地方之间的相互作用。然而在进行下一步之前，一些变量和预览可以避免读者理解和欣赏的局限性，我们试图最大限度的占领所有的关键环境变量。本文提出了一种框架,而不是一个理论。一个框架可以被看作是第一步在识别主要变量影响社会过程的实体，它主要是试图把变量和实体互动。所以这个框架不是理论，准确地说，它的目的是帮助个人研究，以便他们能在一个系统和特定的方向出现一个占主导地位的理论。这里将介绍框架之上的六种基本宗旨，(a)双方或“配对”的交流所代表的事物分析的基本结构单位;(b)环境感知差距对焦点可以分段在小学和中学的任务环境和一个宏观环境;(c)小学次要任务环境感知差距可以被划分为输入、输出、竞争和监管部门;(d)原有政治经济学框架可应用于研究焦点之间主要任务特性环境的相互作用;(e)次要环境最能够描述某些“定性”维度配对如何影响交流;(f)通过发展自己关注的焦点和二次任务的感知差距对环境描述显现宏观环境的影响。一系列说明性的命题均包括在如何提供一些线索框架可能用来预测的潜在来源。这篇文章一直保持在一个无所不包、范围极其宽广的目的框架。虽然牺牲了细节和一些只有被暗示或引用的概念，但客观上大功告成。一个环境不确定性如何在营销渠道双边关系中影响交易环境的主张是：P1:营销渠道双边关系的目标环境的输入和输出的不确定性越高，对于提高调和双边关系水平所要做出的努力就越大。力量均衡。最初增加了的协调性对于渠道成员来说能够更加有效的应对和吸收外部的不确定性。似乎在经济的进程中双边调停在力量均衡的改变上改变了。一个个体在面对高不确定性时会转向依靠能够有效的应对外部不确定性的个体。同样地，如Pfeffer和Salancik所说，在整个系统中一种资源有效性的评论越多，那种资源供应的不确定性越大，限制使用这种资源的可能性也就越大。当对输入和输出环境不能直接控制时，通过精致的信息系统发展监督目标环境来达到类似的控制效果。这样一个不确定的输入和输出环境信息系统的成功发展在组织管理系统时会改变渠道双边关系的权利结构。P2：较高的不确定性,在输入或输出的任务环境部门的营销渠道框架越大,提高水平的垂直全局协调差距也越难。权力平衡。协调是提高垂直通道启动的参与者能应付更有效的吸收和控制不确定性(希克森etal.1971年)。因此看来,改变力量平衡(政治结构)的差距居中调停,应该先于改变经济进程。单位面临高度不确定性将变得越来越依赖于单元,可以更有效地应对不确定性下的焦点。同时,正如普费弗和Salancik(1978)观察,更重要的是对环境资源的营销渠道框架:一个框架有效运作整个系统用于比较分析和更多不确定该资源的供给,更有可能是各国将努力使该资源的可用性控制。当直接控制的输入或输出环境是根本不可能达到的,近似控制可以通过开发一个精心制作的信息系统来监控相关行业的任务环境。成功开发这样一个信息系统对不稳定的输入或输出的环境可以改变权力结构渠道框架中赞成方的管理系统。P3：根据环境的不确定性，方向变化中渠道双边的力量平衡是由它的成员是否能够应对资源的不确定性而决定。此外，该方向在力量变化上也决定集中化的方向规划、协调和决策过程。观点P1通过P3的探索，投入产出的不确定性会对intradyadic行为产生影响。类似的协调可能会发生在渠道双边的边界。例如，向前或向后纵向协调。协调行动的方向取决于不确定性出现在哪个部门。P4；营销渠道的双边关系的输入或输出部门的不确定性越高，双边关系和其他渠道成员间建立的联系就越紧密。如果不确定性出现在输入方面，就要尝试向后纵向协调。P4是延伸了汤普森的论点，即组织通过他们最依赖的环境中的元素找寻力量。外形不确定性可能会减少使用承包、镇压或合并，所有这一切会使组织之间加强协调。垂直权利下方。如果级别冲突阻挠有效形成的区域和extradyadic协调机制，并且仍存在不确定性，合体就很可能分散或移动"宽松"的关系。这通常意味着，分销商将会减少对最初的双边合作伙伴的依赖，生产商也会开始雇佣多个渠道的分销商来减少他们的依赖性。P5：如果在输入、输出部门的不确定性环境下不能被吸收、协调或者应对，功能失调的水平冲突将会升级，同时双边关系也可能会变为"宽松"的关系。不明朗因素所产生的竞争和监管部门可能会被认为是侧向力对渠道双边产生影响。水平竞争的不确定性可以定义的一些影响列示在图2中。例如，竞争对手越多，他们的能力越强，竞争越激烈，双边关系竞争部门的不确定性就越高，除此之外，其他条件都是相同的。有关理论允许微调投入产出分析中产生的命题的不确定性。例如，P1表明的不确定性因素会增加渠道双边关系的冲突情绪。另一方面，横向竞争的不确定性实际上可能会为渠道双边带来更少冲突和更多合作的情绪。竞争威胁很可能使渠道双方将目标转向共同的敌人，从行为科学研究来看他是著名的，是更具凝聚力的。P6：营销渠道双边关系工作环境中竞争部门的不确定性越高，双边关系合作的水平就越高。从不同的角度看，处理竞争中的不确定性可以满足渠道双边关系任务环境部门的两个类型的渠道战略。一种策略是通过增加垂直整合以满足竞争的挑战，至少也能使凝聚力增强。一个行业中现存的公司可以通过（1）协调来控制原材料以减少竞争的不确定性，比如说矿和油；（2）协调并提前联系零售销路，比如说选择加油点；（3）要与营销渠道的最终消费者紧密相连，比如关注健康运送系统。另一种可用的策略是竞争者搜寻合作的机会，即使有时公共的政策会束缚竞争者之间合作的实现，有智慧的人也能找到克服这种限制的办法。然而，后一个策略是更有价值的，因为它提出了以渠道双方自治的行为标准、规范来对抗竞争的限制。P7：如果营销渠道双边关系的工作环境在竞争部门的不确定性不能被直接协调吸收，那每一个渠道水平都应该和竞争者建立较紧密的联系。输入、输出以及竞争部门的不确定性可能会使渠道成员在双边交换中采用新的策略来增加他的力量。但是这种力量的相继使用以及双边的教唆也会经常受到特殊法律及规范的约束。一般来说，处理规范的部门时应付不确定性，操控外部的依赖可能在面对渠道双边关系时有一个评论的范围。在图表2中来自规范化的部门的不确定性可以被定义为列示出来的可变性。因此，双边环境中的可变的、集中的、不同的规范组织越多，规范环境的不确定性可能就越大。如果规范的确定性和不确定性被认定为是规范能力来规范和约束它的确切事情，那么不确定性对于双边行为的影响很可能在输入、输出和竞争部门都是不同的。这是因为环境压力对于威胁的协调和综合的回应在不遵守事件中可能起到发现和准许的作用。如果由于不同的和可变的规范化的环境成为不确定的，渠道成员在规范和冲突需求之间最好冒不必要的险。P8：规范化环境越确定，回应规范化需求的合作、协调、整合双边行为的可能性就越大。然而，营销渠道双边关系不是消极的接受他们工作环境中的规范部门的势力。限制渠道活动的规范化压力和行为通常被渠道双边关系的政治行为和政党联合行为反对。规范化环境越不确定，有效地横向协调和政治行为的机会就越多。P9：在规范的不确定性下，营销渠道双方会对他们的工作环境的输入、输出和竞争部门渐渐感兴趣。工作环境的一个部门的组织会衍生出工作环境中其他部门的组织来面对外部的不确定性。这种现象可以解释为补偿力量，但是在那种市场社会化、社会控制政治经济利益的多元论者的社会中也可以被看作是一种正常的现象。当规范化在性质上占主导地位时，以规范化为目标的成员会通过规范的交换关系直接影响规范机构。在大多数国家中，这种交换关系似乎越来越普遍了。P10：如果营销渠道双边关系的工作环境的规范化部门的不确定性不能被联合行为吸收，营销渠道双方就会与规范化机构建立更紧密的联系。结论SternandReve提出的营销渠道的比较分析政治经济框架是以渠道双边关系的内部互动为核心的。在这篇文章中，最初的框架是考虑了环境因素对双方的结构和过程的影响。由于与其相关的一些概念化的和方法论化的难题，尤其是在一些以经验为根据的研究中，后一话题被大大的忽视了。但令人充满希望的是，在这篇文章中这个被改进了的框架将会使这个话题更易驾驭、更易理解。在此已提出环境可分为初级、二级以及宏观环境，更进一步可分为输入、输出、竞争性的和规范化的部分。初级环境中的成员是直接交换的双方。这种互动形式下，SternandReve的政治经济框架是适用的。但由非交换因素引起的外部力量却需要一个更高水平的理论研究。这篇文章已经指出，宏观组织行为的范例对概念和理论的应用在研究其他外部力量对双边行为的影响上似乎是有用的。这篇文章以不确定的概念为例，其解说性的主张是先进的。在某种意义上，这篇文章所提出的论题可能不是最新颖的。但期望那些对组织理论熟悉的读者也能对文章中提出的一些概念和一些无争议的主张感到熟悉。这个框架的目的不是为了令人大吃一惊，而是将一些相对有进步的观点与特定的营销渠道文章紧密的结合起来并能使其能够被全面的理解。从这一点来看，在内部政治经济框架的交点处应该会看到他的初步贡献。按照其主张，注意力应该放在环境力量对渠道双边关系的结构和进程的影响上，很明显这是因为通常研究的最终目的是提出更加有效的处理营销渠道关系方法。通过对这些关系的管理，双边的能力将会得到提高。这个全面的框架与SternandReve先前提出的相结合可以用来解决与渠道能力有关的很多尚未解决的问题。比如说，高水平的环境不确定性最终导致其协调性增加，那么这种协调会采取哪种形式，怎么完成这种协调才能达到最佳的效果呢？那种力量失衡、冲突频繁的协商和讨价还价等类似的市场交易会更好吗？还是说转向那种集权但冲突会降低的分等级的交易形式比较好呢？同样地，在看待环境状况和管理机制之间的互动上提出的重要问题可以用来控制和管理双边关系中的冲突问题。事实上，一个全面的、错综复杂的框架只是一个地图。它只不过是指出了一个人到达目的地的很多条路线，但是它却没说明沿路的一些障碍和不同道路可获得的一些益处。这就是理论所扮演的角色。但令人充满希望的是，这个框架以参考和协调结构为目的进行了有效的理论考查。因此，这个成果在应用框架将结构和进程与能力联系起来的做法是一个相对小但却必要的一步。当然，这个领域还必须继续前进，增进其管理适用性，这是一个较有力的挑战。TheEnvironmentofMarketingChannel:AFrameworkforComparativeAnalysisACCORDINGtothepoliticaleconomyframeworkforthecomparativeanalysisofmarketingchannels(StemandReve1980),amarketingchanneldyadcanbeanalyzedintermsof(1)itsintemaleconomy,i.e.,theintemaleconomicstructureandprocesses,and(2)itsintemalpolity,i.e.,theintemalsociopoliticalstructureandprocesses.Theintemaleconomicstructureisdescribedbythetypeoftransactionalformlinkingtwochannelmembers,i.e.,theverticaleconomicarrangementswithinanygivendyad,rangingfix)mmarketmediatedtohierarchicaltransactions.Theintemaleconomicprocessesrefertothenatureofthedecisionmechanismsemployedtodeterminetermsoftradeamongthemembersofthedyad,coveringimpersonalandroutinedecisionmaking,bargaining,andcentralizedplanningprocesses.RaviSinghAchrolisVisitingAssistantProfessorofMarketing,UniversityofNotreDame,anddoctoralcandidate,NorthwesternUniversity.TorgerandReveisResearchProfessorofOrganizationTheory,NorwegianSchoolofEconomicsandBusinessAdministration,andvisitingscholar,StanfordUniversity.LouisW.SternisA.MontgomeryWardProfessorofMarketing,Northv^resternUniversity.Theauthorsgratefullyacknowledgethecontributionsoftwoanonymousreviewerstothedevelopmentofthisarticle.JournalofMarketingTheEnvironmentofMarketingChannelDyads:AFrameworkforCoitiparativeAnalysis.Theintemalsociopoliticalstructureisdefinedbythepattemofpower-dependencerelationswhichexistbetweenanytwochannelmembers,rangingfromminimalpower,throughbalancedpower,toimbalancedandcentralizedpower..Theintema!sociopoliticalprocessesaredescribedintermsofthedominantsentiments(e.g.,cooperationand/orconflict)withinthedyad.Asindicatedintheoriginalarticleoutliningthepoliticaleconomyframework,thetasksremainingtocompletetheframeworkwere(1)toidentifytheinteractionsandvariablesoutsideoftheintemaldynamicsofdyadicexchange,whichhavethegreatestinfluenceonthestructureandprocessesofadyad,and(2)tosuggesthowtheseextemalfactorsmightbeorganizedintheoreticallyilluminatingways.Thesignificanceofachannel'senvironmentisnotwell-reflectedintheliteratureonchanneltheoryandresearch.Referenceshavebeenmadetoextemalconditionsaspossibledeterminantsofchannelstructure(e.g.,BucklinandCarman1974,Sturdivant1966),butexplicitinvestigationsintothenatureofextemalvariablesandtheirimpactsarelacking.Evenamongthoserareinquiries(e.g.,Etgar1977),thefindingsonlyseemtosharpenconsciousnessofhowfragmentarycurrentknowledgeofenvironmentalimpactsremains.Thisarticlesuggestsanenvironmentalframeworkwhichcanbecoupledwiththeearlierframeworkdealingwithintemalinteractions.Beforeproceeding,however,afewcaveatsandpreviewsmayassistthereaderinmakingsenseandappreciatingthelimitationsofourattempttocaptureallofthecriticalenvironmentalvariableswithintheconfinesofasinglearticleoflimitedlength.1.Thisarticleproposesaframework,notatheory.Aframeworkcanbeviewedasafirststepinthedirectionofidentifyinganddimensionalizingthemajorvariablesinfluencingandorderingthestructureandprocessesofsocialentities.Itisprimarilyanattempttolayoutthevariablesandtochartafieldofinteraction.Assuch,aframeworkmakesnopretensionofbeingatheory.Rather,itspurposeistohelppositionindividualresearchessothattheycanproceedinasystematicandmethodicalfashiontowardtheemergenceofadominanttheoreticalparadigm(seeZaltman,LeMasters,andHeffring1982).2.Theframeworkpresentedhererestsonsixbasictenets;(a)two-partyor"dyadic"exchangerepresentsthefundamentalunitofanalysis;(b)theenvironmentofafocaldyadcanbesectionedintoprimaryandsecondarytaskenvironmentsandamacroenvironment;(c)theprimaryandsecondarytaskenvironmentsofafocaldyadcanbepartitionedintoinput,output,competitive,andregulatorysectors;(d)theoriginalpoliticaleconomyframeworkcanbedirectlyappliedtostudyinginteractionsbetweenfocaldyadsandtheirprimarytaskenvironments;(e)thesecondarytaskenvironmentcanbestbedescribedintermsofcertain"qualitative"dimensionswhichimpactdyadicexchange;and(f)macroenvironmentalinfluencesmanifestthemselvesthroughdevelopmentsinafocaldyad'ssecondarytaskenvironment.3.Aseriesofillustrativepropositionsareincludedtoprovidesomecluesabouthowthisframeworkmightbeusedforpossiblepredictions,andtoindicatepotentialsourcesoftheory.4.Inkeepingwiththeobjectiveofanencompassingframework,therangeofthearticleisextremelybroad.Theobjectivehasbeenaccomplishedattheexpenseofdetail,andsometopicshaveonlybeenhintedatorreferenced.Laterinthisarticle,welayoutthegeneralschematicdimensionsoftheproposedframeworkandthedefmitionsonwhichitsstructurerests.ThenwediscussthevariabledimensionsweproposeasmostuseAnillustrativepropositionofhowenvironmentaluncertaintytendstoinfluencethetransactionclimateorsentimentswithinmarketingchanneldyadsis;P1：Thehighertheuncertaintyintheinputoroutputsectorsofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thehigheristhelevelofconflictwithinthedyad.Coordination.Whiledyadsentimentsmayregisterthefirsteffects,thenextmostlikelyeffectwouldbetoalterthewayinwhichdyadrelationshipsareorganized.Marketingchanneldyads,likeorganizations(cf.Thompson1967),tendtoprotectthemselvesfromextemaluncertainty.Onewayofbeingbetterabletohandleextemaluncertaintyisbybeingbetterorganized.Thesituationofhighextemaluncertaintyismetbybetterplanning,morecoordinatedactions,andhighercompetitivestrength.Intermsofadynamic,itwouldbepredictedthatasuncertaintyincreased,effortstowardsincreasingthelevelofverticalcoordinationwouldbemadebyoneorbothparties.Sucheffortsmightbereflectedintermsofthefrequencyandintensityofinteraction,andthedegreeofformalization/standardizationofdyadicprocedures,etc.P2：Thehighertheuncertaintyintheinputoroutputsectorsofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thegreatertheeffortstowardsincreasingthelevelofverticalcoordinationwithinthedyad.PowerBalances.Increasedverticalcoordinationisinitiatedbythechannelactorthatisabletocopemoreeffectivelywithorabsorbtheextemaluncertainty(Hicksonetal.1971).Thusitseemsthatchangesinthepowerbalances(politicalstructure)ofthedyadmediate(and,therefore,shouldprecede)changesineconomicprocesses.Theunitfacingahighdegreeofuncertaintywillbecomeincreasinglydependentontheunitthatcanmoreeffectivelycopewiththeextemaluncertaintyunderfocus.Also,asPfefferandSalancik(1978)observe,themorecriticalaresourceistotheEnvironmentofMarketingChannelDyads:AFrameworkforComparativeAnalysis/63effectivefunctioningoftheentiresystem,andthemoreuncertainthesupplyofthatresource,themorelikelythateffortswillbemadetocontroltheavailabilityofthatresource.Whendirectcontroloftheinputoroutputenvironmentisimpossibletoattain,approximationtocontrolcanbeachievedthroughthedevelopmentofanelaborateinformationsystemtomonitortherelevantsectorsofthetaskenvironment.Thesuccessfuldevelopmentofsuchaninformationsystemaboutuncertaininputoroutputenvironmentscanalterthepowerstructureinchanneldyadsinfavorofthepartyadministeringthesystem.P3：Underenvironmentaluncertainty,thedirectionofthechangeinthepowerbalanceofchanneldyadsisdeterminedbywhichmemberisabletocopewiththesourcesofuncertainty(thusabsorbingitonbehalfoftheother).Further,thedirectionofchangeinpoweralsodeterminesthedirectionofcentralizationofplanning,coordination,anddecisionprocesses(economicprocesses).ExtradyadicCoordination.PropositionsP,throughP3exploretheeffectsofuncertaintyininput-outputsectorsonintradyadicbehaviors.Similarcoordinativeactionsmaytakeplaceatthechanneldyadboundaries,i.e.,forwardorbackwardverticalcoordination.Thedirectionofthecoordinativeactionsdepends,itissuggested,onthesectorinwhichthecriticaluncertaintyarises.P4：Thehighertheuncertaintyintheinputoroutputsectorsofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thecloseraretheverticallinkagesestablishedbetweenthedyadandotherchannelactors.Ifuncertaintyarisesintheinputsector,backwardverticalcoordinationisattempted.Ifuncertaintyarisesintheoutputsector,forwardverticalcoordinationisattempted.TherationalebehindpropositionP4isgivenbyextendingThompson's(1967)argumentsthatorganizationsseekpoweroverthoseelementsintheirtaskenvironmentonwhichtheyaremostdependent.Extemaluncertaintymaybereducedthroughtheuseofcontracting,co-opting,orcoalescing,allresultinginincreasedcoordinationbetweenorganizations.VerticalDecentralization.Ifthelevelofconflict(oropportunisticbehavior;seeWilliamson1975)thwartseffectiveformationofintra-andextradyadiccoordinatingmechanisms,andifuncertaintycontinues,thenthedyadislikelytodecentralizeormoveto"looser"relationships.Thistypicallymeansthatdistributors(wholesalers,retailers)willbegintowidenanddifferentiatethemselves(throughtheadditionordeletionofproducts,services,andgeographicterritories),therebyreducingtheirdependenceontheoriginaldyadicpartner,andthatproducerswillbegintoemploymultiplechannels,comprisedofavarietyofdistributors,soastoreducetheirdependencyaswell.P5：Ifuncertaintyininput-outputsectorsoftheenvironmentcannotbeabsorbedbyverticalintegration/coordinationor"coping"strategies,thelevelofdysfunctionalconflictwillescalate,andthedyadislikelytomovetoa"looser"relationship.IllustrativePropositions:CompetitiveandRegulatorySectorsUncertaintiesemanatingfromthecompetitiveandregulatorysectorsmaybethoughtofaslateralforcesimpactingthechanneldyad.ThelevelofcompetitiveuncertaintycanbedefinedintermsofsomeofthedimensionslistedinFigure2.Forexample,themoreheterogeneousthecompetitorsandthegreatertheircapacity(sizeandresources),andthemoreintermediatethelevelofcompetitiveconcentration(seePfefferandSalancik1978,p.124),thehighertheuncertaintygeneratedbythecompetitivesectorofadyad'snvironment,allotherthingsbeingequal.Theorypertainingtothesedimensionspermitsfinetuningthebasicpropositionsthatariseoutofanalysisofinput-outputuncertainties.Forexample,propositionPjsuggeststhatverticaluncertaintiesincreaseconflictivesentimentsinchanneldyads.Ontheotherhand,lateralcompetitiveuncertaintiesmayinfactleadtolessconflictiveandmorecooperativesentimentswithinthechanneldyad.Competitivethreatsarelikelytomakethechanneldyadmorecooperativebecausesuchthreatsareusuallyperceivedasmovesfromacommonenemy.Itisawell-knownfindingfrombehavioralscienceresearchthatthemorestressfultheintergroupconflict,themorecohesiveandintegratedthein-groupsbecome.P6：Thehighertheuncertaintyinthecompetitivesectorofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyads,thehigheristhelevelofcooperationwithinthedyad.Dealingwithincreaseduncertaintyincompetitivesectorsofthetaskenvironmentcanbemetbytwotypesofchannelstrategies,asseenfromtheviewpointofchanneldyads.Onestrategyistomeetcompetitivechallengesthroughincreasedverticalintegrationor,atleast,betterverticalcohesion.Existingfirmsinanindustrycansubstantiallydecreasecompetitiveuncertaintyby(1)coordinatingorintegratingbackwardstocontrolsourcesofrawmaterials,suchasmineralsandoil;(2)coordinatingorintegratingfor64/JournalofMarketing,Fall1983wardtotieupretailoutlets,suchasbuyingupofchoicegasolinesites;and(3)linkingfmalcustomersmoretightlytothemarketingchannel,suchasinhealthcaredeliverysystems(Aldrich1979,Scherer1980).Theotherstrategyavailableistoforgecooperativearrangementswithcompetitors.Eventhoughpublicpolicymaysometimesbeimplementedtorestraincooperativeeffortsamongcompetitors,intelligentactorswillalwaysfindwaystopartlyovercometherestrictionsimposed.Thelatterstrategyis,however,seenasmorecostly,giventhedrivetowardchanneldyadautonomyandtheprevailingnormsandregulationsagainstrestrictionsofcompetition,atleastintheU.S.P7：Iftheuncertaintyinthecompetitivesectorofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyadscannotbeabsorbedbyverticalcoordination,closerlinkagesareestablishedwithcompetitorsateachchannellevel.Uncertaintiesintheinput,output,andcompetitivesectorsmayleadachannelactortodevisestrategiestoenhanceitspowerindyadicexchanges.Butthesubsequentuseofthispoweranddyadicsubordinationtoitareoftencircumscribedbyregulationintheformofspecificlawsand/ornormativeconstraints.Ingeneral,indealingwiththeregulatorysector,copingwithuncertaintyandhandlingexternaldependenciesare,onceagain,likelytobecriticaldimensionsconfrontingchanneldyads.TheuncertaintyemanatingfromtheregulatorysectorcanbedefinedintermsofsomeofthevariableslistedinFigure1.Thus,themorevariable,concentrated,andheterogeneoustheregulatoryorganizationsinadyad'senvironment,themoreuncertaintheregulatoryenvironmentislikelytobe.Ifregulatorycertainty-uncertaintyisdefinedintermsofcertaintyandclarityoftheregulator'sabilitytoimposetheregulationandpoliceit,theeffectsofuncertaintyondyadicbehaviorarelikelytobedifferentfromthoseproposedfortheinput,output,andcompetitivesectors.Thisisbecausetheenvironmentalpressureforverticallycoordinatedandintegratedresponsetoregulatorythreatislikelytobeadirectfunctionofthecertaintyofdiscoveryandsanctionintheeventofnoncompliance.Iftheregulatoryenvironmentisuncertainbecauseofheterogeneousandvariableregulators,channelmemberscanbetterrisknoncomplianceaswellasdefendthemselvesbytradingoffbetweenregulatorsandtheirconflictingdemands.P8：Themorecertaintheregulatoryenvironment,themorecooperative,coordinated,andintegrateddyadbehaviorbecomesinresponsetoregulatorydemands.However,marketingchanneldyadsarenotpassiverecipientsofforcesintheregulatorysectoroftheirtaskenvironment.Regulatorypressureandactionswhichrestrictchannelactivity(cfMitnick1980)areusuallycounteredbypoliticalactionsandcoalitionbehaviorbychanneldyads.Themoreuncertaintheregulatoryenvironment,themoreopportunitythereisforeffectivehorizontalcoordinationandpoliticalaction.P9：Underregulatoryuncertainty,marketingchanneldyadstendtoenterintointerestcoalitionswithactorsintheinput,output,andcompetitivesectorsoftheirtaskenvironment,tocounteruncertaintyintheregulatorysector.Organizationinonesectorofthetaskenvironment(e.g.,actionsintheregulatorysector)breedsorganizationinothersectorsofthetaskenvironment(e.g.,formationoftradeassociationsandlobbyinggroups),tocountertheexternaluncertaintyfaced.Thephenomenoncanbeinterpretedintermsofcountervailingpower,butcanalsobeseenasanormalphenomenoninapluralistsociety,withmarketsforsocial,political,andeconomicinterestscorrespondingtoapolyarchiestructuralcontextofsocialcontrol(Zald1978).Whentheregulatorycontextispredominantlypolyarchieinnature,itfollowsthatactorswhoaretargetsofregulationmayalsotrytoinfluenceregulatoryagentsdirectlybyenteringintoexchangerelationshipswiththeregulators.Suchexchangerelationshipsseemtobemoreandmorecommon(seeAmdt1979)inmostcountries.P10：Iftheuncertaintyintheregulatorysectorofthetaskenvironmentofmarketingchanneldyadscannotbeabsorbedbycoalitionbehavior,marketingchanneldyadstendtoestablishcloserlinkageswiththeregulatoryagents.ThepoliticaleconomyframeworkforthecomparativeanalysisofmarketingchannelsproposedbyStemandReve(1980)focusedoninteractionsinternaltochanneldyads.Inthisarticle,theoriginalframeworkisextendedtoaccountfortheimpactofenvironmentalforcesondyadicstructureandprocesses.Todate,thelattertopichaslargelybeenignored,especiallyinempiricalstudies,becauseoftheconceptualandmethodologicaldifficultiesassociatedwithit.Hopefully,theframeworkadvancedinthispaperwillmakethetopicmoretractable.Ithasbeensuggestedherethattheenvironmentbedisaggregatedintoprimary,secondary,andmacroenvironments,andfurtherintoinput,output,competi-TheEnuirnnmontofMarketingChannelDyads;Ativeandregulatorysectors.Actorsintheprimaryenvironmentarethosewithwhichthedyadmaintainsdirectexchange.Forsuchinteractions,theStem-Reve(1980)politicaleconomyframeworkisapplicable.Forextemalforcesgeneratedbynonexchangefactors,ahigherlevelofdimensionalizingandtheoryinductioniscalledfor.Inthisarticle,ithasbeensuggestedthattheapplicationofconstructsandtheoriesrepresentingthemajorparadigmsinthefieldofmacroorganizationbehaviorislikelytobeusefulforstudyingtheeffectsoftheseotherextemalforcesondyadicbehavior.Inthiscontext,theconstructofuncertaintywasemployedasanexample,andillustrativepropositionswereadvanced.Toasignificantextent,thetopicsaddressedinthisarticlearenotradicallynew.Itistobeexpectedthatthereaderfamiliarwithorganizationtheorywillalsobefamiliarwithmanyoftheconceptsraisedhere,andsomeofthepropositionsappearnoncontroversial.Thepurposeoftheframeworkisnottoastound,butrathertobringsomerelativelydevelopedorganizationalinsightsintoamoretightlyknitandcomprehensiblewholeinthespecificcontextsofmarketingchannels.Inthislight,itsprimarycontributionshouldbefoundinitsintersectionwiththeintemalpoliticaleconomyframework.Astheillustrativepropositionsindicate,attentionshouldfocusontheeffectofenvironmentalforcesonthestructureandprocessesofchanneldyads,becauseobviously,theeventualgoalofresearchinthistraditionmustbetosuggestmoreeffectivewaystomanagemarketingchannelrelationships.Itisthroughthemanagementoftheserelationshipsthatenhanceddyadi