上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献

上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：InvestorpricingofCEOequityincentivesJeffP.BooneInderK.KhuranaK.K.RamanAbstractThemainpurposeofthispaperistoexploreCEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions.TheobjectiveofCEOcompensationistobetteralignCEO-shareholderinterestsbyinducingCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions.However,recentresearchsuggeststhattheseincentiveshaveasignificantdown-side(i.e.,theymotivateexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningsandlowerinformationquality).GiventheconflictbetweenthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.WeexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarepricedinthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremiumoverthe1992–2007timeperiod.Ouranalysiscontrolsfortwopotentialstructuralchangesoverthistimeperiod.Thefirstisthe1995DelawareSupremeCourtrulingwhichincreasedprotectionfromtakeovers(anddecreasedrisk)forDelawareincorporatedfirms.Thesecondisthe2002Sarbanes–OxleyActwhichimpactedcorporaterisktaking,equityincentives,andearningsmanagement.Collectively,ourfindingssuggestthatCEOequityincentives,despitebeingassociatedwithlowerinformationquality,increasefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.Keywords：CEOequityincentives，Informationquality，CostofequitycapitalIntroductionInthisstudy,weinvestigateinvestorpricingofCEOequityincentivesforalargesampleofUSfirmsovertheperiod1992–2007.BecauseincentivesembeddedinCEOcompensationcontractsmaybeexpectedtoinfluencepolicychoicesatthefirmlevel,ourobjectiveistoexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesinfluencefirmvaluethroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.Priorresearch(e.g.,Jensenetal.2004;JensenandMurphy1990)suggeststhatequity-basedcompensation,i.e.,CEOcompensationintheformofstockandoptions,providestheCEOapowerfulinducementtotakeactionstoincreaseshareholdervalue(byinvestinginmoreriskybutpositivenetpresentvalueprojects).Putdifferently,equityincentivesareexpectedtohelpmitigateagencycostsbyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders,andotherwisehelpcommunicatetoinvestorstheimportantideathatthefirm’sobjectiveistomaximizeshareholderwealth(HallandMurphy2003).However,recentresearchcontendsthatequityincentivesalsohaveaperverseordysfunctionaldownside.Inparticular,equity-basedcompensationmakesmanagersmoresensitivetothefirm’sstockprice,andincreasestheirincentivetomanipulatereportedearnings—i.e.,tocreatetheappearanceofmeetingorbeatingearningsbenchmarks(suchasanalysts’forecasts)—inanattempttobolsterthestockpriceandtheirpersonalwealthinvestedinthefirm’sstockandoptions(BergstresserandPhilippon2006;BurnsandKedia2006;ChengandWarfield2005).Statedinanotherway,CEOequityincentivescanhaveanadverseeffectonthequalityofreportedaccountinginformation.AsnotedbyBebchukandFried(2003)andJensenetal.(2004),bypromotingperversefinancialreportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformation,equity-basedcompensationcanbeasourceof,ratherthanasolutionfor,theagencyproblem.Despitetheseargumentsabouttheputativeilleffectsofequityincentives,equity-basedcompensationcontinuestobeasalientcomponentofthetotalpaypackagesforCEOs.Still,giventheconflictbetweenthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectandthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality,itisanopenempiricalquestionwhetherCEOequityincentivesincreasefirmvalue.Toourknowledge,priorresearchprovidesmixedevidenceonthisissue.Forexample,Mehran(1995)examines1979–1980compensationdataandfindsthatequity-basedcompensationispositivelyrelatedtothefirm’sTobin’sQ.Bycontrast,Aboody(1996)examinescompensationdataforasampleoffirmsforyears1980through1990,andfindsanegativecorrelationbetweenthevalueofoutstandingoptionsandthefirm’sshareprice,suggestingthatthedilutioneffectdominatestheoptions’incentivealignmenteffect.Moreover,boththesestudiesarebasedondated(i.e.,pre-1991)data.Inourstudy,weexaminewhetherCEOequityincentivesarerelatedtothefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium,i.e.,theexcessofthefirm’sexantecostofequitycapitalovertherisk-freeinterestrate(ametricdiscussedbyDhaliwaletal.2006).ConsistentwithCoreandGuay(2002),wemeasureCEOequityincentivesasthesensitivityoftheCEO’sstockandoptionportfoliotoa1percentchangeinthestockprice.Basedonasampleof16,502firm-yearobservationsovera16yearperiod(1992–2007),wefindCEOequityincentivestobenegativelyrelatedtothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,suggestingthatthepositiveincentivealignmenteffectdominatesthedysfunctionaleffectoflowerinformationquality.Inotheranalysis,weattempttocontrolfortworegulatory(structural)changesthatoccurredduringthe1992–2007timeperiodofourstudy.AspointedoutbyDaines(2001),regulatorychangescanhaveanimpactonfirmvaluesandreturnsaswellasthestructureofexecutivecompensation.First,Low(2009)findsthatfollowingthe95DelawareSupremeCourtrulingthatresultedingreatertakeoverprotection,managersreducedfirmriskbyturningdownrisk-increasing(albeitpositiveNPV)projects.Inresponse,firmsincreasedCEOequityincentivestomitigatetheriskaversion.Potentially,theimpactoftheDelawarerulingonmanagers’riskaversionandthefollow-upincreaseinequityincentives(tomitigatetheincreaseinmanagers’riskaversionfollowingtheruling)mayhaveresultedinastructuralchangeinoursampleatleastforfirmsincorporatedinDelaware.Tocontrolforthispotentialstructuralimpact,weperformouranalysisforDelawareincorporatedfirmsfor1996–2007separately.OurresultssuggestthatthefavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium)issimilarforDelawarefirmsandotherfirms.Second,anumberofstudies(e.g.,Cohenetal.2007,2008;Lietal.2008)indicatethatthe2002Sarbanes–OxleyAct(SOX)loweredequityincentives(i.e.,reducedtheproportionofequityincentivestototalcompensationpost-SOX),reducedmanagerialrisktaking,decreasedspendingonR&Dandcapitalexpenditures,andreducedaccruals-basedearningsmanagementwhileincreasingrealearningsmanagement.Sincerealearningsmanagementispotentiallymoredifficultforinvestorstodetectthanaccruals-basedearningsmanagement,apossibleconsequenceofSOXcouldbeanincreaseinagencycostssince2002.TocontrolforthepotentialstructuralchangesimposedbySOXbothintermsofexpectedreturnsandthelevelofequityincentives,weperformouranalysisforthepre-SOXandpost-SOXtimeperiodsseparately.Foreachofthetwotimeperiods,ourresultssuggestafavorableeffectofCEOequityincentivesonfirmvalue(asreflectedinthelowerexanteequityriskpremium),althoughtheeffectappearstobestrongerinthepost-SOXperiod.Ourstudycontributestotheliteratureonthevaluationofequityincentives.Weprovide(toourknowledge)first-timeevidenceontherelationbetweenCEOequityincentivesandtheexantecostofequitycapital.Priorresearchhasfocusedbyandlargeontheconsequencesofmanagerialequityincentivesforfirmperformance(Mehran1995;Hanlonetal.2003)andrisktaking(RajgopalandShevlin2002;Colesetal.2006;Hanlonetal.2004)ratherthanonvaluationperse.Asnotedpreviously,toourknowledgeonlytwopriorstudies(Aboody1996andMehran1995,bothbasedonpre-1991data)haveexaminedthepricingofmanagerialequityincentives,withmixedresults.Inourstudy,weprovideevidenceonthevaluationeffectsofCEOequityincentivesbasedonmorerecent(1992–2007)data.Byfocusingonmorerecentdata,ourfindingsrelatetoagrowinglineofresearchontheassociationbetweenequity-basedcompensationandaccountinginformationquality.Specifically,Coffee(2004)suggeststhatthe$1millionlimitonthetaxdeductibilityofcashcompensationforseniorexecutivesimposedbyCongressin1993motivatedfirmstomakegreateruseofequitycompensationwhich,inturn,increasedthesensitivityofmanagerstothefirm’sstockprice.BergstresserandPhilippon(2006)andChengandWarfield(2005)provideevidencewhichsuggeststhatequityincentivesarepositivelyrelatedtothemagnitudeofaccruals-basedearningsmanagement.Similarly,BurnsandKedia(2006)andEfendietal.(2007)reportCEOequityincentivestobepositivelyrelatedtoaccountingirregularitiesandthesubsequentrestatementofpreviouslyissuedfinancialstatements.Thus,priorresearchsuggeststhatequity-basedcompensationhasanegativeeffectonthequalityofearningsreportedbyfirms.Consistentwithseveralpublishedempiricalstudiesthatsupportthenotionthatlowerinformationqualityispricedinahighercostofequitycapital(e.g.,Bhattacharyaetal.2003;Francisetal.2005),CEOequityincentivescouldpotentiallylowerfirmvaluebyincreasingthefirm-specificequityriskpremium.Asnotedpreviously,wedocumentthatCEOequityincentives(despitetheassociatedlowerinformationquality)arerelatednegativelytothefirm’sexanteequityriskpremium,implyingthatequityincentivesincreasefirmvaluebyloweringthefirm’scostofequitycapital.Thus,ourfindingssuggestthatthepositiveCEO-shareholderincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwithequityincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffect.Since1992,theSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)hasmandatedthepublicdisclosureofexecutivecompensationdatatopromoteinformeddecisionmakingbyinvestors.Ourfindingsprovidefurtherevidencethatthesedisclosuresincreasetheinformativenessofstockpricesincompetitivesecuritiesmarkets.Collectively,giventhatCEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterest(Jensenetal.2004;Reich2007),ourfindingsindicatethatCEOequityincentivesinfluencefirmvaluefavorablythroughacostofequitycapitalchannel.ConcludingremarksPriorresearch(e.g.,GoldmanandSlezak2006;Jensenetal.2004)suggeststhatCEOequityincentivescanbeadouble-edgedsword.Ontheonehand,theseincentivescanmitigatetheagencyproblembyaligningtheinterestsoftheCEOwiththoseoftheshareholders(i.e.,byinducingCEOstoprefermoreoptimal,albeitrisky,investmentchoices).Ontheotherhand,theseincentivescanleadtoexcessivesensitivitytosharepriceperformanceandinduceexecutivestomanipulatereportedearningswithaneyeonthestockprice.Inotherwords,bypromotingperversereportingincentivesandloweringthequalityofaccountinginformationpertinenttoinvestorpricingdecisions,CEOequityincentivescanpotentiallybeapartof,notaremedyfor,theagencyproblem.However,toourknowledgethereislittletonopriorevidencetosuggestwhicheffect—thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectortheperverseinformationqualityeffect—dominates.Wecontributetotheliteratureinseveralways.First,weshowthatCEOequityincentivesarenegativelyrelatedtothefirm-specificequityriskpremium,i.e.,thepositiveincentivealignmenteffectassociatedwiththeseincentivesdominatesthedysfunctionalinformationqualityeffectinthepricingofthefirm-specificexanteequityriskpremium.Second,sinceequityincentivesareintendedtoinduceCEOstomakemoreoptimal(albeitrisky)investmentdecisions,theeffectoftheseincentivesonshareholderwealthinthepost-SOXtimeperiodisofparticularinterest.Ourresultssuggestthattheeconomicsignificanceoftheseincentives(i.e.,thepayoffforshareholdersintermsofalowerexanteequityriskpremiumandahigherfirmvalue)wasinfacthigherinthepost-SOXtimeperiod.Finally,ourfindingsprovidefurtherevidencethattheSECmandateddisclosures(since1992)ofexecutivecompensationdataincreasestheinformativenessofstockpriceswithrespecttothepotentialimplicationsofCEOequityincentivesforthecostofequitycapitalandfirmvalue.Atthistime,CEOcompensationisatopicofongoinginterestforregulatorsandinvestors(Jensenetal.2004;Reich2007).Collectively,ourfindingscomplementandextendpriorresearchonequityincentives.TheyarepotentiallyusefulinbetterinformingregulatorsandinvestorsfacedwithquestionsaboutthepossibleconsequencesofCEOequityincentivesforshareholderwealth.译文：总裁股权激励的投资者定价JeffP.BooneInderK.KhuranaK.K.Raman摘要本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题。首席执行官报酬调整的目的是通过优化调整首席执行官作为股东的利益，使首席执行官做出更多的投资决策（尽管有风险）。然而，最近的研究表明，这些激励措施有重大弊端（例如，他们鼓动高管操纵对外公开的业绩，降低会计信息质量）。鉴于积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的信息质量效果之间的冲突，“CEO股权激励是否增加公司价值”便成了一个开放的实证问题的。我们看看，在1992年至2007年间，总裁股权激励是否在公司发生特定事前，其定价高于股票风险溢价。在这一时期，我们的分析控制在两个潜在的结构变化之中。首先是1995年美国特拉华州最高法院的裁决，它增加了在美国特拉华州注册成立的公司在收购方面的保护（降低风险）。第二个是2002年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案，它影响着企业风险的承担，股权激励和盈余管理。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，总裁的股权激励尽管是低信息质量的，但是它通过调整股权资本成本，提高了公司的价值。关键词：总裁股权激励，信息质量，股权资本成本介绍在这项研究中，在这项研究中，我们通过调研美国企业在1992年至2007年期间的一个庞大的样本，调查了美国企业对总裁股权激励的投资者定价。因为首席执行官的薪酬激励是要嵌入到他们的薪酬补偿合同中的，因此预期可能影响在企业层面的政策选择。我们的目标是，审查总裁股权激励是否会通过股权资本成本这一渠道，从而影响公司价值。以前的研究（例如，延森等人在2004年的研究;詹森和墨菲在1990年的研究）认为，基于股权的补偿，即以股票和期权的形式的总裁薪酬补偿，为首席执行官提供了强大的动力，诱导他们采取行动，提高股东利益（通过投资更多的风险大，但净现值高的项目这种方式）。换句话说，股权激励制度将有助于通过调整总裁与其他股东的利益，减少代理成本，除此之外，还有助于与投资者沟通，向他们阐述公司的目标是股东财富最大化这一重要理念（霍尔和墨菲在2003的研究）。然而，最近的研究声称，股权激励也有倒行逆施的一面，或者说，也有不良的弊端。特别是，以股权激励为基础的薪酬补偿，使管理人员对该公司的股票价格更敏感，并可能为了提高他们的收益而去操纵公布的业绩，例如创建名义会议或歪曲收益基准（如分析师的预测），企图提高股票价格，以及他们的个人财富——投资于该公司的股票和期权（博格斯和菲利在2006年的研究；伯恩斯和凯迪亚2006年的研究，程沃菲尔德在2005年的研究）。换句话说，总裁股权激励可以对公开列报的会计信息的质量产生负面影响。正如别布丘克和弗瑞得（2003）和詹森等人（2004）所指出的那样，通过助长不正当的财务报告激励措施和降低会计信息的质量，以股权为基础的薪酬制度是产生代理问题的来源，而不是一种解决方案。尽管存在由股权激励而推断出的这些不良影响，以股权为基础的薪酬制度仍然在总裁们的薪酬总额占重要份额。不过，考虑到积极的总裁股权激励效应和不良的会计信息质量效果之间的冲突，总裁股权激励制度是否能增加公司价值，成为一个开放的实证问题。据我们所知，以前的研究提供了有关该问题的不同方面的证据。例如，迈赫兰（1995）研究1979年至1980年的薪酬数据，并认为股权报酬与公司的托宾Q指数呈正相关。与此相反，阿布德（1996）研究了某公司从1980年到1990年有关薪酬的样本数据，并发现尚未行使购股权价值和公司的股价呈负相关。这表明稀释效应在股票期权激励效果中占主导地位。此外，这两个研究都基于以前（即1991年之前）的数据。在我们的研究中，我们研究是否总裁股权激励与该公司特定的事前股权风险溢价，即该公司超额的事前无风险利率权益资本（达利瓦等人在2006年研究的一种度量）有关。与考尔和瓜伊（2002）一致，我们计算总裁股权激励在股票和期权的投资组合中，股票价格每变动百分之一的敏感性。以某公司观察期超过16年（1992-2007）的样本为基础，我们发现总裁股权激励与公司的事前股权风险溢价呈负相关，这由此表明了积极的股权激励效果主导了较低的信息质量这一不良影响。在其他的分析中，我们试图控制为两个常规（结构方面）的变化，这些变化在我们1992年至2007年的研究期间发生过。正如戴恩斯（2001）指出的那样，结构变化可能对公司价值、回报，以及行政补偿的结构有影响。首先，劳尔（2009）发现，继1995年特拉华州最高法院的裁决造成了更大的收购保护以来，经理用拒绝高风险的投资项目（虽然净现值是正的）这种方式来降低公司的风险。相应的，公司增加总裁的股权激励，以减轻风险规避。也许，特拉华州最高法院的关于经理人风险规避的裁决而产生的影响，和后续股权激励的增加（目的是减轻经理人风险规避的可能性）可能导致我们研究的样本中的企业，至少在特拉华州的企业的结构变革。为了控制这种潜在的结构方面的影响，我们分别根据1996年至2007年在美国​​特拉华州注册成立的公司做研究分析。我们的研究结果表明，总裁股权激励对公司价值（如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映）产生的有利影响与特拉华州的公司以及其他公司相似。其次，许多研究（例如，科恩等人在2007年和2008年的研究;李等人在2008年的研究）表明，2002年颁布的萨班斯-奥克斯利法案降低了股权激励（即降低了股权激励占报酬总额的比例），降低了管理风险承担，降低研发支出和资本支出，以及降低应计盈余管理，同时提高实际盈余管理。由于实际盈余管理对投资者来说可能比权责发生制基础下盈余管理更为困难，萨班斯法案的一个可能产生的后果就是自2002年以来，代理成本增加。为了控制由萨班斯法案带来的，无论在预期收益方面，还是股权激励水平方面表现出的潜在的结构变化，我们分别对萨班斯法案颁布前和颁布后的时间段做了分析。通过对这两个时间段的分析，我们的结果证明了，对的总裁股权激励制度对公司价值（如在事前降低股权风险溢价时反映）有积极的影响，但这积极作用似乎是在萨班斯法案颁布后发挥得更强。我们的研究对于股权激励估值方面的著