社会保险外文翻译文献

养老保险外文翻译文献PAGEPAGE2社会保险外文翻译文献社会保险外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：ReintroducingIntergenerationalEquilibrium:KeyConceptsbehindtheNewPolishPensionSystemAbstractPolandadoptedanewpensionsystemin1999.ThisnewpensionsystemallowsPolandtoreducepensionexpenditure(asapercentofGDP),insteadofincreasingitasisprojectedforthemajorityofotherOECDcountries.Thispaperpresentstheconceptualbackgroundofthenewsystemdesign.Thenewsystem’slong-termbjectiveistoensureintergenerationalequilibriumirrespectiveofthedemographicsituation.ThisrequiresstabilisationoftheshareofGDPallocatedtotheentireretiredgeneration.Traditionalpensionsystemsaim,instead,atstabilisationoftheshareofGDPperretiree.ThechangeindemographicstructureobservedoverthepastforacoupleofdecadesandthishistoricattempttostabilisetheshareofGDPperretireeledtoseverefiscalproblemsandnegativeexternalitiesforgrowth,asobservedinnumerouscountries.Manycountrieshavetriedtoreformtheirpensionsystemsindifferentwaystotrytoresolvetheissueoftheseever-increasingcosts.AlthoughthePolishreformusesanumberoftechniquesappliedelsewhere,itsdesigndiffersfromthetypicalapproaches–andthelessonsandresultsarepromisingforallOECDcountries.Thispaperpresentsthetheoreticalandpracticalapplicationofthisalternativeapproachandassuch,thekeyfeaturesofthenewPolishpensionsystemdesign.IntroductionDemographictransitiontogetherwithmyopicpolicieshascausedsevereproblemsintheareaofpensionsinmanycountriesaroundtheworld.Elementsoftraditionalpensionsystems’designincludeaweaklinkofbenefitstocontributionsandthelackofcontrolovercostsofthesystem.Inclusionoftheseelementsinthepensionsystemdesignledtotheexplosionofcosts,causednegativeexternalitiesforgrowthandcontributedtopersistentlyhighunemployment.Assuch,thequestforpensionreformisnowonthetopofpolicyagendasaroundtheworld,andespeciallyinEurope.However,veryfewcountrieshavebeenabletointroducefundamentalreformsintheareaofpensionstothistime.Inthiscase,thedefinitionofreformiscrucial.Forthepurposesofthispaper,“reform”meanschangingthesysteminordertoremovetructuralinefficiencies–andnotjustplayingatthemarginswithcontributionratesandretirementagestoadjustthesystem’sparametersforshort-termfiscalandpoliticalreasons.Traditionalpensionsystemshaveproventobeinefficientinprovidingsocietieswithsocialsecurity.Atthesametimeattemptstocurethesesystemsarehamperedbyalackofconsensusonwhatcouldreplacethetraditionalsystem.Discussionsonthisissueinvolveconfusionstemmingfromtheideologicalcontextofthediscussionparticipants,aswellasfromoveruseofsuchconceptsas“pay-as-you-go”versus“funding”,or“public”versus“private”,whileatthesametimeignoringanumberofimportanteconomicissues.Furthermore,economistshavetraditionallyignoredpensions.Designingandrunningpensionsystemswaslefttonon-economists,whowerenotextensivelyconcernedwithhowtofinancepensionsinthelong-termorwithhowtocounteractthesepensionsystems’negativeexternalities.ThenewPolishpensionsystembelongstoverysmallnumberofsuccessfulattemptstoapplymodernthinkingintheareaofpensions.Thisdoesnotmean–assomemayassume–givingupsocialsecuritygoals.Rather,thekeyideawastogiveuptheinefficientmethodsofdeliveringsocialsecurityinordertosaveitsgoalsandprinciples.Thispaperconsistsoftwoparts.Thefirstfocusesonadiscussionofgeneralissuesthatneedtobeaddressedwhendesigningapensionsystem.Theseissuesarepresentedinawaythatgoesbeyondthetraditionalwayofthinkingonpensions.Inregardstothissecondpartofthepaper,itisimportanttopointoutthatmostcountriesinthecurrentEUmemberstatesandcandidatecountrieshavepensionsystemsthatareessentiallythesameatthebasicpolicylevel.Assuch,thesolutionsinonememberstateorcandidatecountrycanbeexpectedtobethesame.LikeEuropeanstatessuchasFrance,Germany,Italy,theCzechRepublic,HungaryandotherEuropeanstates,PolandandSwedenoverthepastdecadesanduntilthelate1990’sdevelopedinefficient,costlypensionsystems.Assuch,inparttwoofthepaperweshallexaminehowPolandhasnowsuccessfullyimplementedtheapproachpresentedinthefirstpartofthepaper,andcreatedafundamentallystrongandneutralpensionsystem.SelectedgeneralissuesPensionsystemdesignhastotakeintoaccountanumberofissues.TheirfullpresentationanddiscussiongoesbeyondthescopeofthispaperThispaperpresentsonlyalistoftheissuesforconsiderationandthemostimportantobservations.Thepensionsystem:externalitiesversusneutralityThedescriptionofapensionsystemdependsstronglyonboththeaggregatedandindividualviewpoint.Fromtheaggregatedperspective,thepensionsystemisawayofdividingcurrentGDPbetweenapartkeptbytheworkinggenerationandapartallocatedtotheretiredgeneration.Fromtheindividualperspective,thepensionsystemisawayofincomeallocationoveraperson’slifecycle.Theaboveholdsirrespectivetothetechnicalmethodappliedortheideologicalviewpoint.Thepensionsystem–asdefinedabove–isnotnecessarilypay-as-you-goorfunded.Suchfeaturesstemfromtechnicalelementsadditionallyappliedonthetopofthepensionsystem,ratherthanfromthesystemitself.Ifthepensionsystemdesignassumesanonymousparticipationandasubstantialscaleofredistributionthenweusuallycallthissystempay-as-you-go.Ifthepensionsystemdesignusesfinancialmarkets,thenweusuallycallitfunded.However,thesetwotypicallyusedconceptsdonotexhaustallpossiblecombinationsofanonymousversusindividualisedparticipationandfinancialversusnon-financialpensionsystemdesigntechniquesused.Thedualisticpay-as-you-goversusfundedapproachleavesasidethecombinationofindividualparticipationinasystemthatdoesnotusefinancialmarkets.Thisapproachalsoneglectsthefactthatusingfinancialmarketsmeansinvestment(pensionportfolioconsistsofprivateequities)ordeferringtaxes(pensionportfolioconsistsofgovernmentbonds),whichisobviouslynotthesame.Addingredistributionorfinancialmarketstothepensionsystemgeneratesexternalities.Theseexternalitiescanbepositiveandnegative.Redistributionwithinthepensionsystemcangeneratepositiveexternalitiesifthesystemisinexpensive,namelythepartofGDPallocatedtotheretiredgenerationisnotlarge.Iftheredistributionislarge,thenitgeneratesnegativeexternalities,suchascontributingtopersistentlyhighunemploymentandweakgrowth.Usingfinancialmarketscausespositiveexternalitiesforgrowthifthepensionsystemspendscontributionmoneyoninvestment.Ifthecontributionsarespentongovernmentdebttheymayleadtonegativeexternalitiessimilartothoseoflargeredistributivesystem,namelymoretaxdistortions.ThiscanhappeniftherateofreturnongovernmentdebtispersistentlyabovetherateofGDPgrowth.Thereexistsyetanotheroption,namelytobringthepensionsystemasclosetoeconomicneutralityaspossible.Thisoptionrequires,amongotherthings,combiningindividualparticipationinthesystemwithdividingGDPbetweengenerationsbasedonrealeconomydevelopments,suchashasbeendoneinPolandandSweden.Demographicstructure:consequencesofthechange.Irrespectiveofthepensionsystemdesigntechniqueused,thepensionsystemexchangesarightoftheretiredgenerationforapartoftheproductoftheworkinggeneration.Theexchangecanbeorganisedinvariouswaysandalsotherightscanbeexpressedinvariousways.Inparticular,therightscanbeeithertradedinthefinancialmarkets,ordefinedinrelationtosomeeconomicvariables,orjustbasedonpoliticalpromise.Inallofthesecasesthereisakindofmarketforpensionrights.Theworkinggenerationfinancescontributionsinordertopurchasetherights;theretiredgenerationsellstherightsinordertogetapartoftheproductoftheworkinggeneration.Thevarioustypesofpensionsystemscreateaninstitutionalframeworkforthismarket.KeyfeaturesofthenewPolishpensionsystemThenewPolishpensionsystemdesignisagoodexampleofapplyingtheabovedescribedwayofthinkinginpractice.Thesystemnamed“SecuritythroughDiversity”startedon1January1999.Itentirelyreplacedpreviousregulationsonoldagepensionsformajorityofworkingpopulation.Designingthenewsystemfromscratchprovidedtheuniqueopportunitytoavoidcomplicatingthesystem.Instead,thenewsystemdesignissimpleandtransparent.Themaingoalwastodesignasystemthatcanbeneutraloratleastclosetoneutralityforeconomicgrowthirrespectiveofpopulationageing.Thedesignofthenewsystemdoesnotcopyanyotherpensionsystemexistingelsewhere.StrongsimilaritycanbefoundonlytothenewSwedishpensionsystembasedonsimilarprinciplesandstartedonthesameday.16Atthesametime,withinthisgeneralframeworkthenewPolishsystemusesanumberoftechnicalconceptsdevelopedinothercountries.ThisbriefpresentationofthenewPolishpensionsystemfocusesonthegeneraleconomicdesignofthesystem,whileleavingasidemosttechnicaldetails.ThefollowingbulletshelpingraspingtheessenceoftheconceptofthenewPolishsystemdesign.Focusingontheuniversalpartofthepensionsystem;Separationoftheold-agepartofsocialsecurityfromthenon-old-agepartsofsocialsecurity;andsegmentingtheflowsofrevenue;Terminationofthepartoftheprevioussystem;Creationofanewpensionsystem,entirelybasedonindividualaccounts;Accrualaccountingwithinthesystem;Splittingeachperson’sOAcontributionsbetweentwoaccounts(firstaccount–NDC,secondaccount–FDC);Annuitisationofaccountvaluesatthemomentofretirement;Minimumpensionsupplementonthetopofbothannuitiesiftheirsumisbelowcertainlevel(financedoutofthestatebudget).Itshouldbestronglystressedthatbothaccountsareannuitisedatthesamemomentandplayexactlythesamerolewithinsocialsecurity.Inparticularthereisnosuchelementofthesystemasa“basicstatepension”.Socialredistributionexistsbutithasbeenmovedoutfromthepensionsystem.Thesoleroleofthepensionsystemisprovidingworkinggenerationwithanefficientmethodofincomeallocationovertheirlifecycle.Thecontributionratefortheentiresocialsecuritysystemhasnotchanged.Howeverworkers’salarieswere“grossedup”inordertointroducetothemtheideathattheypaypartofthecontributionandtobuildtheirawarenessoftheoverallcostofthepensionsystem.Assuch,since1January1999bothworkersandemployerssharethecostofcontributionswithoutanyrealchangeinthesizeofthetotalcontributions.Thewholeoperationaffectedpercentagesbutnotrealflowsofmoney.Thusthenewsystemisbasedonthesamecontributioninflowastheprevioussystem.FinalremarksProvidingpeoplewithsocialsecurity–includingfinancingconsumptionoftheretiredgenerationoutoftheproductoftheworkinggeneration-isveryhighonthelistofsocialprioritiesinmostcountries.ItisespeciallyimportantinEuropeansocieties.However,theinefficiencyoftraditionalpensionsystemsputachievingthisgoalatrisk.Socialandpopulistrhetoricsuggeststothepublicthatchangeswithinthepensionsystemaredangerousforsocialgoals.Inreality,formostcountriesintheworld,itisjusttheopposite.Thelongerthetraditionalpensionsystemsareheldup,themoresociallydamagingeffectswillbecreated.Polandbelongstoanon-numerousgroupofcountriesthatarepreparedforoneofthemostdifficultchallengesofourtime,namelytheageingofthepopulation.Thenewpensionsystemwillnotonlystoptheincreaseofcostsofthepensionsystembutwillalsoallowfortheirreduction.Thiswillleavemoreresourcesavailablefordevelopment,which,inturn,willcontributetostrongergrowthandtheincreaseoflivingstandardsofboththeworkingandtheretiredgeneration.TheexampleofthenewPolishpensionsystem,aswellastheSwedishone,isinterestingforyetanotherreason.Thistypeofsystemcontributestolabourmobility,whichisparticularlyneededinEurope.Freemovementoflabourcannotbeachievedifmovingfromonecountrytoanotheraffectsexpectedretirementincome.Assuch,aimingatpensionsystemneutralitywillbemoreandmoreimportantforEuropeanintegration.译文：重新引入代际均衡：波兰养老保险制度摘要波兰于1999年通过了新的养老金制度。这种新的养老保险制度允许波兰，以减少退休金支出（占GDP的百分比），而不是增加它-正如预计的经合组织其他大多数国家。本文介绍了概念背景的新系统的设计。新系统的长期目的是确保人口代际平衡，不论情况。这需要稳定的国内生产总值的份额分配给整个退休一代。传统的养老金制度的目的，相反，在稳定的份额人均国内生产总值退休人员。在人口结构的变化观察到，在过去的一夫妻几十年，这历史性的尝试，以稳定为首占GDP的比重为退休人员严重的财政问题和经济增长负外部性，如观察许多国家。许多国家曾试图改革其养老金制度不同的方法来尝试解决这些不断增加的费用问题。虽然波兰改革采用了其他地方应用技术，它的设计不同于典型的做法和教训，结果是有希望的所有经合组织国家。本文介绍了这一理论和实际应用另一种方法，因此，新的波兰养老保险制度主要特点设计。导言人口结构的转型与政策过于短视一起造成了严重的问题在全世界许多国家地区的养老金。传统的要素养老金制度的设计包括对捐款的薄弱环节和利益缺乏超过该系统的成本控制。这些因素列入养老保险制度导致爆炸的设计成本，造成了负增长的外部因素和导致失业率持续高企。因此，养老金改革的追求现已在世界各地，特别是在欧洲的政策议程的顶部。然而，很少有国家能够在引进根本性的改革面积到了这个时候养老金。在这种情况下，改革的定义是至关重要的。对于本文的目的，“改革”是指改变系统，以消除而不是仅仅在边缘玩的贡献率-结构性效率低下和退休年龄调整为短期财政和系统的参数政治传统的养老金制度已被证明是低效率的提供与社会保障。在同一时间试图治愈这些系统阻碍了缺乏共识什么可以取代传统的制度。讨论这问题涉及混乱的思想背景下产生的讨论

参与者，以及从这些概念作为过度使用“支付即用即付”与“资金”，即“公”与“私”，而在同一时间，忽略了数重要的经济问题。

此外，经济学家们忽略传统的养老金。设计和运行养老金制度是留给非经济学家，谁没有广泛关注与如何资助长期或如何弥补这些养老金养老金系统的负外部性。波兰新养老保险制度属于非常小的成功的尝试次数适用于现代思想的地区。这并不意味着如某些人承担放弃社会安全目标。相反，关键想法是放弃提供社会保障的低效率的方法，以挽救其目标和原则。

本文由两部分组成。第一个重点是一般性问题的讨论需要解决的养老保险制度设计时。这些问题是提交方式，超出了传统思维方式对养老金去。在这方面的论文的第二部分，重要的是要指出，最在目前的欧盟成员国和候选国的国家养老金系统，基本上是在政策层面基本相同。因此，解决方案在一个会员国或候选国可以预期是相同的。比如，在法国，德国，意大利，捷克共和国，匈牙利的欧洲国家和其他欧洲国家，波兰和瑞典在过去的几十年，直到晚1990年的开发效率低下，成本高昂的养老金制度。因此，在部分二论文中，我们会研究如何波兰现在已经成功实施的办法列于论文的第一部分，并建立了一个强大的和中立的根本养老保险制度。选择一般问题养老保险制度的设计已经考虑到了一些问题。它们的充分介绍和讨论超出了这个范围，本文提出仅列出审议的问题和最重要的意见。养老保险制度：外部性与中立养老保险制度的一个描述很大程度上取决于双方的汇总和个人观点。从聚合的角度，养老金制度是当前的划分方式国内生产总值之间的部分工作所保存的一代和部分分配对退休一代。从个人的角度，养老金制度是收入分配方式对一个人的生命周期。不论持有上述方法应用的技术或思想观点。养老保险制度，上述定义的，并不一定是随收随付即付或资助。这些功能源于同时在技术内容上的应用退休金制度，而不是从系统本身。如果养老保险制度设计匿名参与和承担的再分配规模相当庞大，然后我们通常称此系统随收随付友去。如果养老保险制度设计采用财务市场，那么我们通常称之为资助。然而，这些通常用于两个概念不用尽一切可能的组合匿名与个性化的参与和金融与非金融类养老保险制度设计使用的技术。二元随收随付即付与资助拨开树叶方法在一个系统中，个别参与相结合不使用金融市场。这种方法还忽略了一个事实，即使用金融市场是指投资（私募基金的投资组合养老金组成）或延税（养老政府债券投资组合的组成），这显然是不一样的。添加再分配或金融市场产生的养老保险制度外部性。这些外部可以是积极的和负面的。在再分配养老保险制度可以产生积极的外部性，如果该系统是价格便宜，即GDP的一部分分配给退休一代并不大。如果再分配是大，那么它会产生负外部