美国《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）的起源、演变和应用

Congressional

ResearchService

Informingthelegislativedebatesince1914

TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct:Origins,Evolution,andUse

UpdatedJuly14,2020

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CongressionalResearchService

CongressionalResearchService

Informingthelegislativedebatesince1914

TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct:Origins,Evolution,andUse

TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(IEEPA)providesthePresidentbroadauthoritytoregulateavarietyofeconomictransactionsfollowingadeclarationofnational

emergency.IEEPA,liketheTradingwiththeEnemyAct(TWEA)fromwhichitbranched,sitsatthecenterofthemodernU.S.sanctionsregime.ChangesintheuseofIEEPApowerssincethe

act'senactmentin1977havecausedsometoquestionwhetherthestatute'soversightprovisionsarerobustenoughgiventhesweepingeconomicpowersitconfersuponthePresidentduringadeclaredemergency,

Overthecourseofthetwentiethcentury,CongressdelegatedincreasingamountsofemergencypowertothePresidentbystatute.TWEAwasonesuchstatute.CongresspassedTWEAin1917toregulateinternationaltransactionswithenemypowersfollowingtheU.S.entryintotheFirstWorldWar.Congressexpandedtheactduringthe1930stoallowthePresidenttodeclarea

nationalemergencyintimesofpeaceandassumesweepingpowersoverbothdomesticand

internationaltransactions.Between1945andtheearly1970s,TWEAbecamethecentralmeanstoimposesanctionsaspartofU.S.ColdWarstrategy.PresidentsusedTWEAtoblock

internationalfinancialtransactions,seizeU.S.-basedassetsheldbyforeignnationals,restrict

exports,modifyregulationstodeterthehoardingofgold,limitforeigndirectinvestmentinU.S.companies,andimposetariffsonallimportsintotheUnitedStates.

SUMMARY

R45618

July14,2020

ChristopherA.Casey,

Coordinator

AnalystinInternationalTradeandFinance

lanF.Fergusson

SpecialistinInternationalTradeandFinance

DianneE.Rennack

SpecialistinForeignPolicyLegislation

JenniferK.Elsea

LegislativeAttorney

FollowingcommitteeinvestigationsthatdiscoveredthattheUnitedStateshadbeeninastateofemergencyformorethan40years,CongresspassedtheNationalEmergenciesAct(NEA)in1976andIEEPAin1977.Thepairofstatutesplacednew

limitsonpresidentialemergencypowers.Bothincludedreportingrequirementstoincreasetransparencyandtrackcosts,andtheNEArequiredthePresidenttoannuallyassessandextend,ifappropriate,anemergency.However,someexpertsarguethattherenewalprocesshasbecomeproforma.TheNEAalsoaffordedCongressthemeanstoterminateanational

emergencybyadoptingaconcurrentresolutionineachchamber.AdecisionbytheSupremeCourt,inalandmarkcase,

however,foundtheuseofconcurrentresolutionstoterminateanexecutiveactionunconstitutional.Congressamendedthestatutetorequireajointresolution,significantlyincreasingthedifficultyofterminatinganemergency.

LikeTWEA,IEEPAhasbecomeanimportantmeanstoimposeeconomic-basedsanctionssinceitsenactment;likeTWEA,PresidentshavefrequentlyusedIEEPAtorestrictavarietyofinternationaltransactions;andlikeTWEA,thesubjectsoftherestrictions,thefrequencyofuse,andthedurationofemergencieshaveexpandedovertime.Initially,Presidentstargeted

foreignstatesortheirgovernments.Overtheyears,however,presidentialadministrationshaveincreasinglyusedIEEPAtotargetnon-stateindividualsandgroups,suchasterrorists,personswhoengageinmaliciouscyber-enabledactivities,and

certainpersonsassociatedwiththeInternationalCriminalCourt.

AsofJuly1,2020,Presidentshaddeclared59nationalemergenciesinvokingIEEPA,33ofwhicharestillongoing.

Typically,nationalemergenciesinvokingIEEPAlastnearlyadecade,althoughsomehavelastedsignificantlylonger—thefirststateofemergencydeclaredundertheNEAandIEEPA,whichwasdeclaredinresponsetothetakingofU.S.embassystaffashostagesbyIranin1979,maysoonenteritsfifthdecade.

IEEPAgrantssweepingpowerstothePresidenttocontroleconomictransactions.Despitethesebroadpowers,CongresshasneverattemptedtoterminateanationalemergencyinvokingIEEPA.Instead,CongresshasdirectedthePresidenton

numerousoccasionstouseIEEPAauthoritiestoimposesanctions.CongressmaywanttoconsiderwhetherIEEPA

appropriatelybalancestheneedforswiftactioninatimeofcrisiswithCongress'dutytooverseeexecutiveaction.CongressmayalsowanttoconsiderIEEPA'sroleinimplementingitsinfluenceinU.S.foreignpolicyandnationalsecuritydecision-making.

CongressionalResearchService

TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct:Origins,Evolution,andUse

Contents

Introduction

1

Origins

2

TheFirstWorldWarandtheTradingwiththeEnemyAct(TWEA)

2

TheExpansionofTWEA

4

PushingBackAgainstExecutiveDiscretion

6

EnactmentoftheNationalEmergenciesActandtheInternationalEmergency

EconomicPowersAct

8

IEEPA'sStatute,itsUse,andJudicialInterpretation

10

IEEPA'sStatute

10

AmendmentstoIEEPA

11

TheInformationalMaterialsAmendmentstoIEEPA

12

USAPATRIOTActAmendmentstoIEEPA

13

IEEPATrends

17

PresidentialEmergencyUse

17

CongressionalNonemergencyUseandRetroactiveApproval 23

CurrentUsesofIEEPA

25

UseofAssetsFrozenunderIEEPA

28

PresidentialUseofForeignAssetsFrozenunderIEEPA

28

CongressionallyMandatedUseofFrozenForeignAssetsandProceedsof

Sanctions

30

JudicialInterpretationofIEEPA

33

Dames&Moorev.Regan

33

SeparationofPowers—Non-DelegationDoctrine

34

SeparationofPowers—LegislativeVeto

35

FifthAmendment“Takings”Clause

36

FifthAmendment“DueProcess”Clause

37

FirstAmendmentChallenges

40

UseofIEEPAtoContinueEnforcingtheExportAdministrationAct(EAA)

41

IssuesandOptionsforCongress

43

DelegationofAuthorityunderIEEPA

43

Definitionof"NationalEmergency"and"UnusualandExtraordinaryThreat" 44

ScopeoftheAuthority

44

TerminatingNationalEmergenciesorIEEPAAuthorities

46

TheStatusQuo

46

TheExportControlReformActof2018

47

Figures

Figure1.TimelineofNEAandIEEPAUse

16

Figure2.DeclarationsandExecutiveOrdersCitingIEEPA

18

Figure3.AverageLengthofEmergenciesCitingIEEPA

19

Figure4.CumulativeNumberofOngoingNationalEmergenciesbyYear

20

Figure5.GeographicallyDefinedEmergenciesCitingIEEPA

21

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TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct:Origins,Evolution,andUse

Tables

Table1.AmendmentstoIEEPA

11

TableA-1.NationalEmergenciesDeclaredPursuanttotheNEA

48

TableA-2.IEEPANationalEmergencyUsebyExecutiveOrder

51

Appendixes

AppendixA.NEAandIEEPAUse…………………48

Contacts

AuthorInformation…………………67

TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct:Origins,Evolution,andUse

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Introduction

Theissueofexecutivediscretionhasbeenatthecenterofconstitutionaldebatesinliberal

democraciesthroughoutthetwentiethcentury.Specifically,thequestionofhowtobalancea

commitmenttotheruleoflawwiththeexigenciesofmodernpoliticalandeconomiccriseshasbeenaconsistentconcernoflegislatorsandscholarsintheUnitedStatesandaroundtheworld.!

TheUnitedStatesConstitutionissilentonthequestionofemergencypower.Assuch,overthe

pasttwocenturies,CongressandthePresidenthaveansweredthatquestioninvariedandoftenadhocways.Intheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,theanswerwasoftenforthePresidenttoactwithoutcongressionalapprovalinatimeofcrisis,knowinglyriskingimpeachmentandpersonal

civilliability?CongressclaimedprimacyoveremergencyactionandwoulddecidesubsequentlytoeitherratifythePresident'sactionsthroughlegislationorindemnifythePresidentforanycivilliability.³

Bythetwentiethcentury,anewpatternhadbeguntoemerge.Insteadofretroactivelyjudginganexecutive'sextraordinaryactionsinatimeofemergency,CongressenactedstatutesauthorizingthePresidenttodeclareastateofemergencyandmakeuseofextraordinarydelegatedpowers.4Theexpandingdelegationofemergencypowerstoexecutives,andtheincreaseingoverningviaemergencypowerbyexecutives,wasacommontrajectoryamongtwentieth-centuryliberal

democracies.'Asinnovationquickenedthepaceofsocialchangeandglobalcrises,some

legislaturesfeltcompelledtodelegatetotheirexecutives,whotraditionalpoliticaltheoristsassumedcouldoperatewithgreater"dispatch"thanthemoredeliberateandfuture-oriented

1ClintonRossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship:CrisisGovernmentintheModernDemocracies(Princeton,NJ:

PrincetonUniversityPress,1948);EdwardCorwin,TotalWarandtheConstitution(NewYork:Knopf,1963).Giorgio

Agamben,StateofException(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2005);CarlSchmitt,PoliticalTheology:FourChaptersontheConceptofSovereignty(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1985).

2Suchananswercanbetracedto,amongothers,JohnLocke,whosepoliticaltheorywascentraltothedevelopmentofAmericanpoliticalinstitutions.JohnLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,ed.ThomasHollis(London:A.Millaretal.,1764),pp.340-341("Thispowertoactaccordingtodiscretion,forthepublicgood,withouttheprescriptionofthelaw,andsometimesevenagainstit,isthatwhichiscalledprerogative…”).

3JulesLobel,"EmergeneyPowerandtheDeclineofLiberalism,"YaleLawJoumal98,no.7(May1989),pp.1392-

1398;JohnFabianWitt,"ALostTheoryofAmericanEmergencyConstitutionalism,"LawandHistoryReview36,no.

3(Aug.2018);GeorgeM.Dennison,"MartialLaw:TheDevelopmentofaTheoryofEmergencyPowers,1776-1861,"

TheAmericanJournalofLegalHistory18,no.1(Jan.1974);SaikrishnaBangalorePrakash,Imperialfromthe

Beginning:TheConstitutionoftheOriginalErecutive(NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress,2015),pp.208-210;

MatthewWarshauer,AndrewJacksonandthePoliticsofMartialLaw(Knoxville:UniversityofTennesseePress,

2006).AsThomasJeffersonwrote,anexecutiveofficeractingillegallyforwhathedeterminestobethegoodofthecountry“doesindeedriskhimselfonthejusticeofthecontrollingpowersoftheconstitution,andhisstationmakesithisdutytoincurthatrisk."Qtd.inPrakash,ImperialfromtheBeginning,p.214.

4U.S.Congress,SpecialCommitteeonNationalEmergenciesandDelegatedEmergencyPowers,ABriefHistoryof

EmergencyPowersintheUnitedStates,committeeprint,93Cong.,2sess.,July1974(Washington,DC:GPO,

1974),pp.40-41.

5Forscholarshiponthisgeneraltrend,see,e.g.,WilliamE.Scheuerman,LiberalDemocracyandtheSocial

AccelerationofTime(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,2004);JohnM.CareyandMatthewSobergShugart,

eds,ExecutiveDecreeAuthority(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998);PeterL.Lindseth,"TheParadoxof

ParliamentarySupremacy:Delegation,Democracy,andDictatorshipinGermanyandFrance,1920s-1950s,"YaleLaw

Journal113,no.7(May2004);JulesLobel,“EmergencyPowerandtheDeclineofLiberalism”;MaryL.Dudziak,

War-Time:AnIdea,ItsHistory,ItsConsequences(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012);Corwin,TotalWarandtheConstitution;Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship.

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legislatures.Whethersuchactionssubverttheruleoflaworareastandardfeatureofhealthymodernconstitutionalordershasbeenasubjectofextensivedebate.?

TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct(IEEPA)isonesuchexampleofatwentieth-centurydelegationofemergencyauthority.8Oneof117emergencystatutesundertheumbrellaoftheNationalEmergenciesAct(NEA),°IEEPAgrantsthePresidentextensivepowertoregulateavarietyofeconomictransactionsduringastateofnationalemergency.CongressenactedIEEPAin1977toreinintheexpansiveemergencyeconomicpowersthatithaddelegatedtothePresident

undertheTradingwiththeEnemyAct(TWEA).Nevertheless,somescholarsarguethatjudicialandlegislativeactionssubsequenttoIEEPA'senactmenthavemadeit,likeTWEA,asourceofexpansiveanduncheckedexecutiveauthorityintheeconomicrealm.1Others,however,arguethatIEEPAisausefultoolforPresidentstoquicklyimplementthewillofCongresseitheras

directedbylaworasencouragedbycongressionalactivity."'

Untilrecently,therehasbeenlittlecongressionaldiscussionofmodifyingeitherIEEPAoritsumbrellastatute,theNEA.Recentpresidentialactions,however,havedrawnattentionto

presidentialemergencypowersundertheNEAofwhichIEEPAisthemostfrequentlyused.

ShouldCongressconsiderchangingIEEPA,therearetwoissuesthatCongressmaywishto

address.ThefirstpertainstohowCongresshasdelegateditsauthorityunderIEEPAandits

umbrellastatute,theNEA.ThesecondpertainstochoicesmadeintheExportControlReformActof2018.

Origins

TheFirstWorldWarandtheTradingwiththeEnemyAct(TWEA)

TheFirstWorldWar(1914-1919)sawanunprecedenteddegreeofeconomicmobilization.TheexecutivedepartmentsofEuropeangovernmentsbegantoregulatetheireconomieswithor

6Scheuerman,LiberalDemocracyandtheSocialAccelerationofTime,ch.2;See,e.g.,CarlSchmitt,“ThePlightof

EuropeanJurisprudence,"tr.G.L.Ulmen,Telos83(Spring1990);JohnLocke,TwoTreatisesofGovernment,pp.340-341(“…sinceinsomegovernmentsthelawmakingpowerisnotalwaysinbeing,andisusuallytoonumerous,andsotooslow,forthedispatchrequisitetoexecution;andbecausealsoitisimpossibletoforesee,andsobylawstoprovidefor,allaccidentsandnecessitiesthatmayconcernthepublic,ortomakesuchlawsaswilldonoharm,iftheyare

executedwithaninflexiblerigour,onalloccasions,anduponallpersonsthatmaycomeintheirway;thereforethereisalatitudelefttotheexecutivepower,todomanythingsofchoicewhichthelawsdonotprescribe.").

7Forargumentsthatemergencygovernmentsubvertstheruleoflaw,see,e.g.,SanfordLevinson,"Constitutional

NormsinaStateofPermanentEmergency,"GeorgiaLawReview40,no.3(Spring2006);BruceAckerman,The

DeclineandFalloftheAmericanRepublic(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2010).Foranargumentthat

statesofemergencycanbeastandardfeatureofhealthymodernconstitutionalordersorthattheycanreflector

anticipatethepreferencesofthelegislature,see,e.g..KimLaneScheppele,"SmallEmergencies,"GeorgiaLawReview40,no.3(Spring2006),p.836;CareyandShugart,ExecutiveDecreeAuthority,p.3.

8P.L.95-223(October28,1977),91Stat.1626,codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.§1701etseq.(2018)("IEEPA").

9P.L.94-412(September14,1976),90Stat.1255,codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.§1601etseq.(2018)(“NEA”);

CRSReportR46379,EmergencyAuthoritiesUndertheNationalEmergenciesAct,StaffordAct,andPublicHealth

ServiceAct,coordinatedbyJenniferK.Elsea.

10See,e.g.,PatrickThronson,"TowardComprchensiveReformofAmerica'sEmergencyLawRegime,"MichiganJournalofLawReform46,no.2(2013),pp.757-759;“TheInternationalEmergencyEconomicPowersAct:A

CongressionalAttempttoControlPresidentialEmergencyPower,"HarvardLawReview96,no.5(Mar.,1983),p.1120.

l¹See,c.g.,Scheppele,“SmallEmergencies,"pp.845-847(StatuteslikeIEEPAshow"thatemergencieshavebeenbroughtinsidetheconstitutionalorderbybeingnormalizedintheordinarylegislativeprocess.").

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withoutthesupportoftheirlegislatures.TheUnitedStates,incontrast,wasinaprivileged

positionrelativetoitsalliesinEurope.SeparatedbyanoceanfromGermanyandAustria-

Hungary,theUnitedStateswasneverundersubstantialthreatofinvasion.Ratherthanrelyingontheinherentpowersofthepresidency,oractingunconstitutionallyandhopingforasubsequent

congressionalratification,PresidentWilsonsoughtexplicitpre-authorizationforexpansivenewpowerstomeettheglobalcrisis.!2Between1916andtheendof1917,Congresspassed22

statutesempoweringthePresidenttotakecontrolofprivatepropertyforpublicuseduringthewar.'ThesestatutesgavethePresidentbroadauthoritytocontrolrailroads,shipyards,cars,

telegraphandtelephonesystems,watersystems,andmanyothersectorsoftheAmericaneconomy.'4

TWEAwasoneofthose22statutes.!5Itgrantedtotheexecutiveanextraordinarydegreeof

controloverinternationaltrade,investment,migration,andcommunicationsbetweentheUnited

Statesanditsenemies.'6TWEAdefined"enemy"broadlyandincluded"anyindividual,

partnership,orotherbodyofindividuals[includingcorporations],ofanynationality,resident

withintheterritory…ofanynationwithwhichtheUnitedStatesisatwar,orresidentoutsideoftheUnitedStatesanddoingbusinesswithinsuchaterritory…….”I?ThefirstfoursectionsoftheactgrantedthePresidentextensivepowerstolimittradingwith,communicatingwith,ortransportingenemies(ortheirallies)oftheUnitedStates.8ThesesectionsalsoempoweredthePresidentto

censorforeigncommunicationsandplaceextensiverestrictionsonenemyinsuranceor

reinsurancecompanies.!9

ItwasSection5(b)ofTWEA,however,thatwouldformoneofthecentralbasesofpresidentialemergencyeconomicpowerinthetwentiethcentury.Section5(b),asoriginallyenacted,states:

ThatthePresidentmayinvestigate,regulate,orprohibit,undersuchrulesandregulationsashemayprescribe,bymeansoflicensesorotherwise,anytransactionsinforeignexchange,exportorearmarkingsofgoldorsilvercoinorbullionorcurrency,transfersofcreditinanyform(otherthancreditsrelatingsolelytotransactionstobeexecutedwhollywithintheUnitedStates),andtransfersofevidencesofindebtednessoroftheownershipofpropertybetweentheUnitedStatesandanyforeigncountry,whetherenemy,allyofenemyorotherwise,orbetweenresidentsofoneormoreforeigncountries,byanypersonwithintheUnitedStates;andhemayrequireanysuchpersonengagedinanysuchtransactiontofurnish,underoath,completeinformationrelativethereto,includingtheproductionofanybooksofaccount,contracts,lettersorotherpapers,inconnection

12Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship,pp.241-243;U.S.Congress,ABriefHistoryofEmergencyPowersintheUnitedStates,pp.40-41.

13J.ReubenClark,EmergencyLegislationPassedPriortoDecember,1917:DealingwiththeControlandTakingof

PrivatePropertyforthePublicUse,Benefit,orWelfare(Washington,DC:GPO,1918),pp.1-125.

l4Clark,EmergencyLegislationPassedPriortoDecember,1917.pp.1-125;Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship.p.

243;DavidM.Kennedy,OverHere:TheFirstWorldWarandAmericanSociety(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),ch.2.

i⁵ForanoverviewofTWEA'sdevelopment,seeBenjaminA.Coates,“TheSecretLifeofStatutes:ACenturyoftheTradingwiththeEnemyAct,"ModernAmericanHistory1,no.2(2018).

16P.L.65-91(October6,1917)§2,40Stat.411,codifiedasamendedat50U.S.C.§4305(2018)(“TWEA”).17Ibid

18Ibid.§3.

19Ibid.§4.

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therewithinthecustodyorcontrolofsuchperson,citherbeforeoraftersuchtransactioniscompleted.2c

ThestatutegavethePresidentexpansivecontroloverprivateinternationaleconomictransactionsintimesofwar.?IWhileCongressterminatedmanyofthewarpowersin1921,TWEAwas

specificallyexemptedbecausetheU.S.Governmenthadyettodisposeofalargeamountofalienpropertyinitscustody.2?

TheExpansionofTWEA

TheGreatDepression,amassiveglobaleconomicdownturnthatbeganin1929,presenteda

challengetoliberaldemocraciesinEuropeandtheAmericas.Todealwiththecomplexities

presentedbythecrisis,nearlyallsuchdemocraciesbegandelegatingdiscretionaryauthoritytotheirexecutivestoadegreethathadonlypreviouslybeendoneintimesofwar.?3TheU.S.

Congressresponded,inpart,bydramaticallyexpandingthescopeofTWEA,delegatingtothe

Presidentthepowertodeclarestatesofemergencyinpeacetimeandassumeexpansivedomesticeconomicpowers.

Suchadelegationwasmadepoliticallypossiblebyanalogizingeconomiccrisestowar.Inpublicspeeches,PresidentFranklinD.RooseveltassertedthattheDepressionwastobe“attacked,”

“foughtagainst,”“mobilizedfor,”and“combatted”by“greatarm[ies]ofpeople.”24The

economicmobilizationoftheFirstWorldWarhadblurredthelinesbetweentheexecutive's

militaryandeconomicpowers.AstheDepressionwaslikenedto"armedstrife"25anddeclaredtobe“anemergencymoreseriousthanwar'26byaJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,itbecameroutinetouseemergencyeconomiclegislationenactedinwartimeasthebasisforextraordinary

economicauthorityinpeacetime.?7

AstheDepressionentereditsthirdyear,thenewly-electedPresidentRooseveltaskedCongressfor“broadExecutivepowertowageawaragainsttheemergency,asgreatasthepowerthat

wouldbegiventomeifwewereinfactinvadedbyaforeignfoe."28InhisfirstactasPresident,Rooseveltproclaimedabankholiday,suspendingalltransactionsatallbankinginstitutions

locatedintheUnitedStatesanditsterritoriesforfourdays.?9Inhisproclamation,RooseveltclaimedtohaveauthoritytodeclaretheholidayunderSection5(b)ofTWEA.0However,

20Ibid.§5b.

21Jbid.$2.

22U.S.Congress,House,TradingwiththeEnemyActReformLegislation,ReportoftheCommitteeonInternational

RelationsonH.R.7738,95Cong.,Isess.,H.Rept.95-459(Washington,DC:GPO,1977),p.4.

23WilliamE.Schcuerman,"TheEconomicStateofEmergency,"CardozoLawReview21(2000),p.1872.

24See,e.g..FranklinD.Roosevelt'sInauguralAddressof1933(Washington,DC:NationalArchivesandRecords

Administration,1988);Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship.p.256;U.S.Congress,ABriefHistoryofEmergency

PowersintheUnitedStates,p.56.

25FranklinD.Roosevelt'sInauguralAddressof1933.

26NewStateIceCo.v.Liebmann,285U.S.262,306(1932)(J.Brandeis,dissenting).

27Scheuerman,"TheEconomicStateofEmergency,"p.1878.

2%FranklinD.Roosevelt'sInauguralAddressof1933.

29Pres.Proc.No.2039(Mar.6,1933).

30Inhisproclamation,PresidentRooseveltdidnotrefertothe"TradingwiththeEnemyAct,"butinsteadchosetousethemoreopaque“ActofOctober6,1917.”Pres.Proc.No.2039(Mar.6,1933).

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becausetheUnitedStateswasnotinastateofwarandthesuspendedtransactionswereprimarilydomestic,thePresident'sauthoritytoissuesuchanorderwasdubious.3I

Despitethetenuouslegality,CongressratifiedRoosevelt'sactionsbypassingtheEmergency

BankingReliefActthreedaysafterhisproclamation.2TheactamendedSection5(b)ofTWEAtoread:

DuringtimeofwarorduringanyotherperiodofnationalemergencydeclaredbythePresident,thePresidentmay,throughanyagencythathemaydesignate,orotherwise,

investigate,regulate,orprohibit3.

ThisamendmentgavethePresidenttheauthoritytodeclarethatanationalemergencyexistedandassumeextensivecontrolsoverthenationaleconomypreviouslyonlyavailableintimesofwar.

By1934,Roosevelthadusedtheseextensivenewpowerstoregulate"Everytransactionin

foreignexchange,transferofcreditbetweenanybankinginstitutionwithintheUnitedStatesandanybankinginstitutionoutsideoftheUnitedStates."34

WithAmerica'sentryintotheSecondWorldWarin1941,CongressagainamendedTWEAto

grantthePresidentextensivepowersoverthedispositionofprivateproperty,addingtheso-called“vesting”power,whichauthorizedthepermanentseizureofproperty.Nowinitsmostexpansive

form,TWEAauthorizedthePresidenttodeclareanationalemergencyand,insodoing,to

regulateforeignexchange,domesticbanking,possessionofpreciousmetals,andpropertyinwhichanyforeigncountryorforeignnationalhadaninterest.35

TheSecondWorldWarendedin1945.Followingtheconflict,thealliedpowersconstructed

institutionsandsignedagreementsdesignedtokeepthepeaceandtoliberalizeworldtrade.

However,theUnitedStatesdidnotimmediatelyresumeapeacetimeposturewithrespectto

emergencypowers.Instead,theonsetoftheColdWarrationalizedthecontinueduseofTWEAandotheremergencypowersoutsidethecontextofadeclaredwar.6Overthenextseveral

decades,Presidentsdeclaredfournationalemergenciesandassumedexpansiveaut