IMF-约旦中央银行的扩展季度预测模型（英）-2023.8-

AnExtendedQuarterlyAdelAl-Sharkas,NedalAl-Azzam,SarahAlTalafha,RashaAbuShawish,AhmadShalein,AudayRawwaqah,AmanyAl-Rawashdeh,DanielBaksa,PhilippeKaramandJanVlcekIMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.2023AUG©2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/172IMFWorkingPaperInstituteforCapacityDevelopmentAnExtendedQuarterlyProjectionModelfortheCentralBankofJordanPreparedbyAdelAl-Sharkas,NedalAl-Azzam,SarahAlTalafha,RashaAbuShawishAhmadShalein,AudayRawwaqah,AmanyAl-Rawashdeh,DanielBaksa,PhilippeKaramandJanVlcekAuthorizedfordistributionbyPaulCashinAugust2023IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:TheCentralBankofJordan(CBJ)hasdevelopedaForecastingandPolicyAnalysisSystem(FPAS)toserveasareliableanalyticalframeworkformacroeconomicanalysis,forecastinganddecision-makingunderapeggedexchangerateregime.AttheheartoftheFPASistheCBJ’sextendedJordanAnalysisModel(JAM2.0).Themodelcapturesthemonetarytransmissionmechanismandprovidesaconsistentmonetarypolicyframeworkthatusestheexchangerateasaneffectivenominalanchor.ThispaperoutlinesthestructureandpropertiesofJAM2.0andemphasizestheenhancedinterplayandtradeoffsamongmonetary,fiscal,andforeignexchangemanagementpolicies.SimulationandforecastingexercisesdemonstrateJAM2.0’sabilitytomatchkeystylizedfactsoftheJordanianeconomy,produceaccurateforecastsofimportantmacroeconomicvariables,andexplainthecriticalrelationshipsamongpolicies.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:A.Al-Sharkasetal.2023.“AnExtendedQuarterlyProjectionModelfortheCentralBankofJordan”,IMFWorkingPaperWP/23/172.JELClassificationNumbers:E32,E37,E47,E52Keywords:Jordan;ForecastingandPolicyAnalysis;QuarterlyProjectionModel;MonetaryPolicy;TransmissionMechanismpkaram@;Dbaksa2@;janvlcekatcz@gmail.com;Authors’E-MailAddresses:NEDAL.AZZAM@.jo;Sarah.Altalafha@.joWORKINGPAPERSAnExtendedQuarterlyProjectionModelfortheCentralBankofJordanaredbyAdelAlSharkasNedalAlAzzamSarahAlTalafhaRashaAbuShawish,AhmadShalein,AudayRawwaqah,AmanyAl-Rawashdeh,DanielBaksaPhilippeKaramandJanVlcek11Acknowledgement:TheauthorscompriseCentralBankofJordan(CBJ)staffandtheIMFteam(InstituteforCapacityDevelopment(ICD))thathavejointlyparticipatedintheTechnicalAssistance(TA)projectonmodernizingCBJ’sForecastingandPolicyAnalysisSystem(FPAS).AspartofthisTAprojecttheCBJandICDteamsjointlycontributedtothedevelopmentofCBJ’sin-housecoreQuarterlyProjectionModel(QPM),theJordanAnalysisModel(JAM).TheCBJTAprojectstartedinJune2021andwascompletedinSeptember2022,financedinpartbytheCOVID-19CrisisCDInitiativeFundingProgram.TheauthorsgreatlyappreciatethestrongsupportfortheFPASTAprojectprovidedbyCBJGovernorAdelAl-SharkasandtheExecutiveDirectoroftheResearchDepartment,NedalAl-Azzam.TheauthorsarealsogratefultoPaulCashinforprovidingeditsandcomments,AndyBerg,AdamRemo,andDiegoRodriguezforfeedbackthroughthedevelopmentworkonFINEX,andtotheIMFMiddleEastandCentralAsiaDepartment’sJordanMissionChiefAliAbbasandteamfortheircontinuoussupportoftheTAproject.TheauthorsalsothankRahelKidaneofICDforherexcellentworkonformattingandeditingthepaper.TheviewsexpressedinthispaperarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheCentralBankofJordan,IMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.IMFWORKINGPAPERSAnExtendedQuarterlyProjectionModelfortheCentralBankofJordanINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2I.INTRODUCTION_______________________________________________________________________________4IIJORDANIANECONOMYANDMACROECONOMICPOLICYSTYLIZEDFACTSANDMODELMOTIVATION____________________________________________________________________________________5II.1GDPandProduction__________________________________________________________________5II.2Core,Non-CorePrices,andTrendsinRelativePrices__________________________________6II.3MonetaryPolicy:PolicyandMarketRates,MonetaryConditions,BankingandCredit7II.4FiscalBalancesandPublicDebt______________________________________________________10edExchangeRateRegimeandFXReserveManagementII.6ExternalSector_______________________________________________________________________13II.7Datalimitations______________________________________________________________________15II.8TrendsandGaps—AnOverview____________________________________________________15III.JORDANANALYSISMODEL—STRUCTURE______________________________________________16III.1InternalBalance_____________________________________________________________________21IIIRealAggregateDemandRealEconomy_______________21III.1.2AggregateSupply–PhillipsCurvesInflation_______________________________________24III.1.2.AHeadlineCPI/inflation__________________________________________________________24III.2.BRelativepricesandtheirtrends__________________________________________________25III.1.2.CCorepriceinflation______________________________________________________________26III.1.2.DNon-corepriceinflation_________________________________________________________27III.1.2.EGDPdeflator_____________________________________________________________________27III.2ExternalBalance_____________________________________________________________________27III.3MacroeconomicPolicies_____________________________________________________________29III.3.1MonetaryPolicy___________________________________________________________________30III.3.2FiscalPolicy________________________________________________________________________32III.3.2.AGovernmentrevenues___________________________________________________________33III.3.2.BGovernmentexpenditures_______________________________________________________33III.3.2.CDebtaccumulation______________________________________________________________34III.3.2.DFiscalanchor,deficitsandreactionfunctions____________________________________35IV.JORDANANALYSISMODEL–PROPERTIES_______________________________________________36IV.1ImpulseResponseAnalysis__________________________________________________________36IV.2Calibration__________________________________________________________________________42IV.3ModelSimulationstoAssessModelForecastingandHistoricalDataInterpretation42IV1In-SampleSimulationsandForecastingAccuracy_________________________________42IVAHistoricalfiltrationofthedataanditsinterpretation_____45V.CONCLUSION_______________________________________________________________________________53REFERENCES_______________________________________55INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3APPENDIX1:LISTOFJAM2.0MODELVARIABLES___________________________________________56APPENDIX2:JAM2.0MODELEQUATIONS___________________________________________________64A.2.1RealAggregateDemand___________________________________________________________64A.2.2AggregateSupply__________________________________________________________________65A.2.3RealInterestRateandExchangeRate______________________________________________67A.2.4BalanceofPayments_______________________________________________________________67A.2.5MonetaryPolicy____________________________________________________________________69A.2.6FiscalPolicy________________________________________________________________________70A.2.6.1Governmentexpenditures________________________________________________________70A.2.6.2Debtaccumulation_______________________________________________________________71A.2.6.3Fiscalanchor,deficitsandreactionfunctions_____________________________________71A.2.6.4.Fiscaltargets_____________________________________________________________________72A.2.7Foreignvariables___________________________________________________________________73APPENDIX3:JAM2.0MODELPARAMETERS_________________________________________________76IMFWORKINGPAPERSAnExtendedQuarterlyProjectionModelfortheCentralBankofJordanINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4I.IntroductionThemodernizedversionofthestructuralJordanAnalysisModel,knownasJAM2.0,playsacentralroleintheCentralBankofJordan’s(CBJ)ForecastingandPolicyAnalysisSystem(FPAS).AsCBJ’scoremedium-termforecastingmodel,JAM2.0hasproventobeareliabletoolforconductingmacroeconomicanalysesandprojectionstosupportpolicyrecommendations.JAM2.0capturesJordan’smonetary-exchangerateregime,whichisbasedonanexchangerateanchorandfollowsaconventionalfixedexchangerateregime.Byprovidinganoperationalframeworkforpolicyanalysisandforecasting,JAM2.0hasbeencustomizedtoalignwithJordaniandataandcharacteristics.Iteffectivelydescribesthedynamicsofkeymacrovariables,identifiestrendsandstructuralbreaks,andanalyzespolicyresponsestosupply,demand,andfinancialshocks.1TheJordanAnalysisModel(JAM)fallswithinthecategoryofpolicy-orientedcentralbankQuarterlyProjectionModels(QPMs)thatoperateunderafixed(pegged)exchangerateregime.ThesuccessofJordan’sexchangerateregimecanbeattributedtotheCBJ’scleararticulationofinternally-consistentpolicygoalsandtheinstitutionalarrangementsthatgranttheBankthenecessarylegal,decision-making,andoperationalautonomytopursuethesegoals.TheJAM2.0model’sstructurehighlightsseveralkeyfeaturesandstylizedfactsoftheJordanianeconomyandtheCBJ’spolicyframework.Theseinclude:(i)thepeggedexchangerateregime,supportedbyacommittedexchangeratenominalanchor,whichhaseffectivelyensuredmacroeconomicstabilitythroughtheapplicationofanoperational,reserveadequacy-basedrule;(ii)thestatusofJordanasasmallopeneconomy,whichexposesittodevelopmentsintradingpartners;(iii)detaileddeterminantsofdomesticandexternaldemandandtheirdistinctimplicationsforinflation;(iv)ananalysisofinflationdynamics,includingtrendsinrelativeprices;(v)theroleoffiscalpolicy;(vi)favorableaccesstointernationalfinancialmarkets;and(vii)theuseoftheovernightinterbankmarketrate,asthecounterpartytotheCBJmainpolicyrate,tosignalthestanceofmonetarypolicy.ThemodernJAMincorporatesadditionalfeaturesthatenhanceitsabilitytoanalyzedatadynamicsandforecasteconomicdevelopmentsinthefaceofuncertainty.First,theinclusionofafiscalblockallowsforthetrackingofthetransmissionchannelsandeffectsofthe(cyclically-adjustedprimary)fiscalbalanceontherealsector.Thisfeatureenablestheassessmentoftheeconomicimpactofgovernmentstimulus,analysisofpublicdebtprojections,evaluationoffiscaladjustmentamidCOVID-19,differentiationbetweenforeignanddomesticcurrency-denominateddebt,andexplorationofcrucialfiscal-monetarypolicyinteractionsandtradeoffs.Second,conductinganexpenditure-sideGDPdecomposition,bydistinguishingbetweendomesticandforeigndemand,enhancestheunderstandingofdriversofgrowthandpolicyeffects.Third,theenrichedopeneconomyanalysisexplicitlyexaminestheroleofinterestrateandforeignexchangeintervention(FXI)policies.Thisfeaturehighlightsthetradeoffsinachievinginternalandexternalbalances,endogenizestheinteractionbetweenmarket-basedcapitalflowsandriskpremiaandmodelsthedynamicsofthebuyingandsellingofforeignexchangereserves.Overall,JAMhasproventobeaninvaluablequantitativetoolforanalyzingtheeffectsontheJordanianeconomyofdomesticandglobalsupplyshocks,globalfoodandfuelpriceshocks,andglobalfinancialshocks(changesininvestorriskappetitesandinglobal/U.S.interestrates).IthasalsoassistedtheCBJdecision-makingbodyinnavigatingcomplexpolicytradeoffsinthepresenceofheightenedeconomicuncertainty.1JAM2.0’sextensionsalignwiththenovelpropertiesintroducedinanewICDsemi-structuralmodel,theForecastingModelofInternalandExternalBalance(FINEX).SeeBerg,Hul,Karam,RemoandRodriguez(forthcoming,2023).INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND5ThemodelstructureandcalibrationofJAM2.0aretestedusingasetofsimulationstoexaminekeyempiricalfindingsandmodelproperties.TheimpulseresponsesofthemodelconfirmthatJAM2.0alignswitheconomicintuition,andtheex-postin-samplemodel-basedforecastsdemonstrateitssuccessincapturingimportantdatadynamics.Inconclusion,JAM2.0servesasacountryapplicationoftheFINEXframeworkunderapeggedexchangerateregimeandisakeyextensionincentralbanks’suiteofQPMpolicymodels.JAM2.0effectivelyaddressesthekeychallengeswithinJordan’smonetarypolicyframework,whileincorporatingessentialfrictionsandtradeoffshighlightedbytheIMF’sIntegratedPolicyFramework(IPF),2particularlyinitsemphasisontheinteractionbetweenfiscalandmonetarypolicies.FortheCBJ,highlightingthispolicyinteractionhasbeencrucialindevelopingamanageablepolicyframeworktoaddressthecomplexshocksfacedbytheJordanianeconomy.Theremainingsectionsofthepaperareorganizedasfollows.SectionIIdescribesthestylizedfactsoftheJordanianeconomy,motivatingthestructureofJAM2.0assetoutinSectionIII.SectionIVpresentsacomprehensivearrayofmodelresults,includingimpulseresponsefunctions,transmissionmechanisms,historicalsimulations,andout-of-sampleforecastingperformance.SectionVprovidesconcludingremarks.PublicationofthisversionoftheJAMfollowsonfromthecompletionoftheIMFTechnicalAssistance(TA)onthemodernizationofCBJ'ssemi-structuralmodelandFPASinSeptember2022.3Thisversionrepresentsthestateofthinkingatthetimeofcompletion,butthemodelisexpectedtoevolveasnewempiricalevidenceemergesandneweconomictheoriesaredeveloped.Trackingthemodel’sperformanceandaddressingfeedbackfromJordanianpolicymakersareessentialforensuringitremainsareliableanalyticaltoolforpolicymakinginthefuture.II.JordanianEconomyandMacroeconomicModelMotivationToensureitsapplicabilityinmacroeconomicpolicyanalysisandmonetarypolicymaking,theJAM2.0incorporatesthekeystylizedfactsoftheJordanianeconomyandcloselyalignswithCBJ’spolicyframework.Recognizingthepolicyrelevanceofintegratingcountry-specificfeaturesintotheanalyticalframework,thissectionpresentsthestylizedfactsofJordanthathavemotivatedspecificdeviationsfromastandardQPM.Thesedeparturesenhancethemodel’sstructureandpropertiesandaredetailedinSectionsIIIandIVofthepaper.uctionQPMstypicallyhavealimitationofbeinghighlyaggregated,primarilyfocusingontotalGDP.Inresponsetothislimitation,JAM2.0hasintroducedanoperationallevelofdecomposition,allowingforamoredetailedanalysisofspecificvariables.Thisdecompositioncanbecomplementedbyothermodelstoprovideinsightsintothebehaviorofvariablesatamoredisaggregatedlevel.Expertsresponsibleforanalyzingspecificsectorsarebestpositionedtodevelopfurtherdisaggregatedtoolsandmodelsasneeded,insupportofCBJ’sEconomicModelingDivision(EMD)asthecoregroupformonetarypolicyanalysisandprojections.2SeeAdrianetal.(2021)andBasuetal.(2020).3SeeMæhleetal.(2021)foradetailedaccountofthepracticalaspectsofFPASimplementationinthecontextoftheIMF’sTechnicalAssistance(TA)providedtocentralbanks.IthighlightstheroleofcanonicalQPMsasthecornerstoneofamodernforward-lookingforecastingandpolicyanalysisframework.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND6TheJordanianeconomyexperiencedgrowthof2.2percentin2021,4drivenbyarobustrecoveryinthemanufacturingsectorandthefinance,insurance,andbusinessservicessectors.Theestimatedoutputgapfor2021stoodat-1.7percent,expectedtocloseinthesecondhalfof2022.Thispositivedevelopmentisattributedtothestrongperformanceofalleconomicsectors,supportedbytherecoveryoftheexternalsector,includingtravelreceipts,exports,andremittances.ThesefactorswerefurtherboostedbytheaccelerationofthenationalvaccinationcampaignagainstCOVID-19,leadingtothefullreopeningoftheeconomybySeptember2021.In2022,realGDPgrowthwasprojectedtoreach2.7percent,5despitetheimpactofOmicron-relatedrestrictionsinthefirstquarterof2022.Thenascentrecoveryisunderpinnedbyaccommodativemonetaryconditions,theriseinexportcommodityprices(particularlyphosphateprices),andtherevivaloftourism.However,theeconomyhasfacedchallengesbeyond2022duetoasurgeinenergyandfoodprices,aswellasglobaltighteningofmacroeconomicpolicies,expectedtoexertdownwardpressureonrealgrowth.reNonCorePricesandTrendsinRelativePricesUnderJAM2.0,theinflationsubcomponentsaredecomposedtoestablishaconnectionwiththedeterminantsofrealmarginalcosts,6whichaimtocapturesignificantcostpressures.Inthisframework,theheadlineConsumerPriceIndex(CPI)isspecifiedasaweightedaverageofthetwomaincomponents:coreCPIandnon-coreCPI.CoreCPIrepresents55percentofthetotalweight,andnon-coreCPItheremaining45percent:-CoreCPIissplitintocoreservices(82percent)andcoregoods(18percent).Typically,coresubcomponentsarelargelydeterminedbyoutputgap,inflationexpectations,realwagepressures,realexchangerategap,andimportedinflation.ThecoreinflationmeasureusedbytheCBJispublishedbytheDepartmentofStatistics(DOS)andiscompiledusingitemswithlowvariabilityinpricechanges–thisincludesmainlyhousing,health,communication,andtransportation.-Non-coreinflationcomponentsincludehighlyvolatileitems,mainlyenergyandfooditems.CPIfoodinflationhasarelativelylargeweightof26.5percentintheoverallCPIbasket,andfuelpricesaccountfor4.7percentofCPI.FigureII.1:Inflation,yoyin%FigureII.2:Headlineinflationandcontributionsofsubcomponents,yoyin%andcontributionsinpp4Themodelusesseasonally-adjusteddata.Asaresult,theremaybedifferencescomparingmodeloutputsandthepublisheddata.ojectionsasofDecemberRealmarginalcostsareessentiallytheincreaseinproductioncosts(inrealterms)thatarerelatedtoamarginalincreaseinoutputatthefirmlevel.Thisdecompositionallowsforacomprehensiveanalysisofinflationbyconsideringbothcorecomponents(whichtendtoexhibitgreaterpersistence),andnon-corecomponents(whichmaybemorevolatile).INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND7DuringDuringtheperiodfrom2005to2013,trendsinrelativepricesindicatedadeclineincoreitempricescomparedtoheadlineCPI.Consequently,coreinflationwasnoticeablylowerduringthisperiodandbeyond.Incontrast,non-coreinflationexperiencedfastergrowththancoreinflation,leadingtonon-stationaryrelativeprices.Althoughrelativepriceshavestabilizedsince2015,itisimportanttonotethatperiodsofrelativepricechangescanberelativelyprolonged,asshowninFigureII.3.IgnoringsuchFigureII.3:Relativepriceofcoreandnon-coretoheadline,2002Q1=100trendsinrelativepriceswouldintroducebiasesinpredictingthedynamicsofinflationsubcomponents.Byincorporatingrelativepricesintothemodel,itbecomespossibletocapturetheinteractionandpass-throughofpriceincreasesamongsubcomponents.ThesedynamicstypicallyoperatethroughlabormarketandwagedynamicsinDynamicStochasticGeneralEquilibrium(DSGE)models.Followingitscontainmentin2021,headlineinflationexperiencedamoderateriseupuntilMarch2022,afterwhichitsharplyincreased,reaching5.4percent(year-on-year)inAugust2022.Severalfactorshaveplayedaroleinthisupwardtrend.Firstly,surgingfoodprices,partiallydrivenbyinputsupplybottlenecks,havebeencompoundedbytheongoingRussia-Ukrainewar.7Secondly,therehavebeenupwardadjustmentsindomesticpetroleumprices,resultinginsecond-roundeffectsthatincludedhigher-than-expectedwageandtransportfareincreases.Despiteeffortstomitigatethepass-througheffectthroughlong-termstable-priceimportcontractsfornaturalgasusedinelectricitygenerationandthephased-outblanketfuelsubsidies,thesefactorshavestillhadanimpactoninflation.Additionally,therehasbeenanincreaseinnon-commodityimportprices.Althoughtheseinflationaryfactorshaveonlybeenpartlyoffsetbythedisinflationaryeffectresultingfromlowdomesticdemand(reflectedinanegativeoutputgap)andthephased-outfiscalmeasures,challengestopricestabilityhaveemerged.Thisisevidentintheabruptpick-upinheadlineinflationandtheincreaseincoreinflationto5.4percentand4.3percent(year-on-year)respectivelyinAugust2022.Managingthesechallengeshasbecomeaprioritytomaintainpricestabilityintheeconomy.MonetaryPolicyPolicyandMarketRatesMonetaryConditionsBankingandTheCBJiscommittedtomaintainingmonetaryandfinancialstability,withaprimaryobjectiveofensuringpriceandmonetarystability.Thisisachievedbyprotectingthestabilityofthepeggedexchangerate(thefixedJordaniandinartotheU.S.dollar)andfacilitatingfullcapitalmobility8.Inlinewithitsmandate,theCBJmaintainsshort-terminterestratesthatareconsistentwiththepeggedexchangerate.Operationally,theCBJreliesonovernightinterbankratesandacorridorsystem.Thecorridorconsistsoftwokeyrates:theovernightdepositinterestrate(windowrate),whichservesasthefloor,andtheovernightrepurchaseagreementinterestrate(reporate),whichactsastheceiling.Tomanageliquidity,theCBJsetsits“CBJmainrate”at25basispoints(bps)abovethewindowrate.Currently,duetotheexcessliquidityinbanksprimarilybeingdepositedintheCBJ’sovernightdepositfacility,interbankshortrateshaveremainedclosetotheovernightdepositrate(as7WhileJordan’sstrategicwheatreserves(withstocksequivalentto12monthsofnationalconsumption)haveshieldedtheJordanianauthoritiesfromhavingtoimportwheatatelevatedglobalprices,suchinsuranceagainstabruptpricesurgesmaysisscenario8TheJordaniandinarhasbeenthenationalcurrencyofJordansince1950,andthedinarispeggedtotheU.S.dollaratarateofperdollarsince1995.IMFWORKINGPAPERSAnExtendedQuarterlyProjectionModelfortheCentralBankofJordanINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND8showninFigureII.4).Consequently,theovernightdepositrateisconsideredtheeffectiveCBJpolicyrate,guidingtheinterbankrate.ThiseffectiveinterbankrateisutilizedasthereferencerateinJAM2.0formodelingpurposes.FigureII.4:MainRatesunderCBJInterestRatesCorridorSystem(inpercent)Theassessmentofthestanceof"realmonetaryconditions"inJordanisbasedonthedynamicsoftwokeyindicators:therealinterestrate(RIR)andtherealexchangerate(RER).TheRIR,whichrepresentsthedifferencebetweenthenominalinterestrateandtheinflationrate,hasgenerallyremainedaround1percentandhasmostlybeeninpositiveterritory(asshowninFigureII.5).Althoughnominalinterestrateshavebeenrisingsinceearly2022,however,in2022,theRIRturnednegative,indicatinganaccommodativemonetarypolicystance.Thisshiftcanbeattributedtothesurgeininflationduringthatperiod.TheRER,ontheotherhand,hasexperiencedadepreciationtrendsince2019(asdepictedinFigureII.6).Thisdepreciationhasbeendrivenbyimportedinflationresultingfromrelativelyhigherincreasesinforeignprices.ThedepreciationoftheRERhascontributedtoanexpansionarymonetarypolicystance,particularlyinthefirsthalfof2022.Takentogether,thenegativeRIRandtheRERdepreciationhaveindicatedanexpansionarymonetarypolicystanceinJordan.Thesedevelopmentshavebeeninfluencedbyfactorssuchasthesurgeininflationandtheimpactofimportedinflationontheexchangerate.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND