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ABOUTGENERATIONSApril2023IPSOSVIEWSCONTENTSUnderstandinggenerationsINTRODUCTION:CONTEXT:GENERATION

MYTHS

ANDDEMOGRAPHICREALITIESPage08WHYGENERATIONALANALYSIS

MATTERSPage12PEAKPOPULATION:PREPARING

FOR

THEFALLPage18A

TOPIC

OFCONVERSATION:HOWDOPEOPLE

TALKABOUTGENERATIONS?Page25GENERATION

QUESTIONS:ISSUES

TO

THINK

ABOUTPage31HOW

TO

TELL

AMYTHFROM

AREALITYINUKGENERATIONSWESTERNGENERATIONALCONCEPTSDON’T

APPLYINSOUTH

AFRICAPage43WHY

WHERE

YO

ULIVEMATTERS

INUNDERSTANDINGGENERATIONS

ININDIAPage51Page38SUPER-AGEINGINPOST-PANDEMIC

SOUTHKOREAPage56POPULATION

BUST:HOWITALY

ISFINALLYFACING

ITSGREYRHINOPage62MEXICO:FROM

A

TEENAGECOUNTRY

TO

AN

ADULTONEIN

ACENTURYPage67Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations2IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoFOREWORDMarketingisoverrunwithstereotypes,hottakesandclichés.Someofthemostenduringinthefirsttwodecadesofthiscenturycentredonthepost-1980millennials,whowere

proclaimedasanewgenerationthatwouldcompletelydisruptbusiness.Nolonger.

Millennialsare

firmlyoutoffashionthesedays.ThebuzznowcentresonGenerationZ,born

post-1995andnowenteringtheworkforceinsignificantnumbers.Yet

therhythmofthechatteraboutgenerationsremainsthesame.Justlikethemillennialsbeforethem,articlesaboutGenZbeing“amajority”,demanding“fundamentallydifferent

things”atworkfrom

oldergenerations,orthattheirviewsontheenvironmentare“completelydifferent

toeveryoneelse”are

inabundance.BenPageGlobalChiefExecutive,IpsosBen.Page@IIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations3IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoButdecadesofresearch

showthatmuchofwhatpassesasstartlingnewinsightsaboutgenerationalchangecanbemisleadingorwrong.Fig.1

–GenerationsinthenewsLet’s

takeasanexamplethelineaboutGenerationZalreadybeinga“newmajority”.Aquicklookattheactualdatarevealsthat,evenifweincludedALLadultsintheworldtodayaged0-15inourcategorisation,weonlygetto40%ofthepopulation!Andtocontinuewithtoday’s

prevailing

GenZ

narrative,thisisa

group

whoare

oftenmadeouttobeobsessedabout‘brandpurpose’andclimatechange–

butit’s

actuallyolderpeoplethatare

more

likelytoboycottbrands.Meanwhile,ourIpsosGlobalTrends

research

tellsusthatallagegroupsare

equallyworriedaboutclimatechange.Whatyoungpeopleare

more

worriedaboutare

thoseveryimmediateissueslikelowincomesandhousing.Oftenpunditsandcommentatorsmaketwomistakes.FirsttheygetconfusedbetweengenuinecohorteffectswhichIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations4IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicodistinguishagenerationuniquely,

and“lifestageeffects”and“periodeffects”whichallgenerationspassthrough-e.g.youngpeopleofallgenerationstendtobemore

likelytogoout,exerciseetcthanolderpeople.Secondthewholeideathateveryoneborn

acrossa15-yearperiodwillbeidentical,orverysimilar,

itselfdoesnotworkbeyondsomebasicgeneralisations.Thisiswhatweunpickhere.Betteranalysiscanhelpusallseparatethemythsfromrealities.Inthisspirit,wehopethisreport

provides

ideas,informationandevensomeprovocation.

We’re

lookingforward

todiscussingourresearch

–

anditsimplications–

withyou.Happyreading!Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations5IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoAT

AGL

ANCE36countriesare

alreadyseeingtheir52%believeemployersvalueunder50smore

thanover50svs10%whobelieveover50sare

more

valuedBytheendofthecentury:populationdecline53%

63%SouthKorea’s

populationofUSBabyBoomersfeeltheyhada‘better’lifethantheirparentsisexpectedtofallby53%37%

47%

>2/5Overtwo-fifthsthinkbrandsItaly’s

populationisofTurkish

GenXersfeeltheyhada

‘better’lifethantheirparentsvs27%ofBabyBoomersandadvertisers(43%&41%,expectedtofallby37%respectively)valueunder50smoreIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations6IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoKEY

LEARNINGSA

lotofwhatiswrittenabout

Where

andwhen

We

needtoIt’s

timetoaskgenerationsis

youwereborn

getready

for

ourselvessomemisleadingorwrong

matters

populationdecline

hard

questionsYe

t

usinga

generationallensisa

reallyeffective

wayofunderstandinghowandwhysocietiesandconsumersPeopleborn

thesameyearbutinThirty-sixcountriesare

losingpopulation

•

Doweknowenoughabouthowtodifferent

placeswilloftenhavehadverydifferent

experiencesandtrajectories.already,

andmore

are

settofollowthem.Birthratesare

nowbelowreplacementratiopretty

mucheverywhere.

Urgentquestionsneedtobeaskedaround

theeconomicconsequencesofageing:theimpactoffewerworkersonthetaxmarkettotheover50s?•

Whatorder

ofimportanceshouldwereallybegivingtoGenZ?change.Thereal

taskbeingtoseparate

Considertwopeoplerespectively

bornthree

effects

thatexplainchangesamongconsumers:lifecycleeffects,periodeffects

andcohorteffects.

Ifwedothat,wecanunderstandtheinChinaandtheUnitedStatesin1973.Theformativeexperiencesoftoday’s50-year-olds,

growing

upinthe1980s,were

ratherdifferent.

Anyassertions•

Justwhat’s

happeningwithMillennialsthesedays?•

Are

GenX

abouttotakeovertheworld?receipts

thatsupportpublicservices,the

•

Whatare

thespecificdynamicsofthepresent

andpredict

thefuture

ina

more

andgeneralisationswemakeaboutimpactoffewerconsumersonspending“generations”doneedtobeconsidered

powerandtheimpactoffewercreativecarefully.

mindsonourinnovationpipelines.different

generationsinmycountry?•

Dothetermsthathavebecomesowidelyusedactuallyworkhere?meaningfulway.Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations7IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoINTRODUCTIONIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations8IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoGENERATION

MYTHSANDDEMOGRAPHICREALITIESWe

thinkthat’s

thewrong

response.We

absolutelydoneedtotalkaboutgenerations.Usingagenerationallensisaneffectivewayofunderstandinghowandwhysocietiesandconsumerschange.Thereal

taskbeingtoseparatethethree

effectsthatexplainchangesamongconsumers.Betteranalysiscanshinealightonthebigpopulationtrendsthatnow

need

First,whichpatternsare

simplelifecycleeffects–forexamplepeopletendtobemore

physicallyactiveortoshapeourthinkingaboutgenerations,datemore

whentheyare

young,andallgenerationsgochangeswhichare

notyet

gettingattention.throughthislifestage.Second,whichare

periodeffects–affectingallgenerations(suchastheCovidpandemic).Andfinally,

andmostimportantly,

whichare

cohorteffects,where

wecanseethataparticulargenerationisdifferent

from

othersatthesameageandisstayingdifferent.Ifwedothat,wecanpredictthefutureinamuchmore

meaningfulway.Someacademicsthinkweshouldstopallreferencetogenerations:acoupleofyearsagoanopenletterwassenttothePewResearchCenter,

signedby1801professorsandlecturers,callingonbusinesstoceaseusinggenerationaltermsasitgivesthemalegitimacytheydon’t

deserve.BetteranalysiscanshinealightonthebigpopulationtrendsthatnowneedtoshapeourthinkingaboutIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations9IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoFig.

2–World

population:Preparingforafallgenerations,changeswhichare

notyetgettingattention.Becausewealsoneedtotalkaboutdemographicrealities.15+0.5nincreasingnumberofcountriesaroundtheworldnowhaveamedianpopulationagewellover40.Indeed,ifwewere

producinga“GenerationalPowerIndex”,itisGenerationXandtheBabyBoomerswhowouldcomeoutontoponmanymeasures,notleastthoserelatingtofinancialresources

oreconomicandpoliticalpower.

AremarketersmissingatrickbyconcentratingtoomuchontheneedsandaspirationsofGenerationZ?8-0.5*765Thisisbeforeweturn

ourattentiontowhatisnowverymuchontheimmediatehorizon.432Fertilityratesare

nowbelowreplacementrates(2.1children)inmostpartsoftheworld.We

nowneedtoprepare

ourselvesforaworldwhichischaracterisedbypopulationdeclineratherthanpopulationgrowth.China,SouthKorea,andItalyare

justthree

ofthe41countries1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

210080%predictioninterval95%predictioninterval60sampletrajectoriesMedianObserved=/-0.5childSource:

2022UnitedNations,DESA,Populationdivision.World

PopulationProspects

2022./wpp/*

0.5overorundercurrent

replacement

fertilityrateof2.1children.

+0.5references

iftherateis2.6children,

while-0.5iftherateis1.6children.Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations10IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicocoveringamajorityoftheworld’s

population(5.4billionoutof8billion)where

it’s

happeningalready.

So,weneedtotalkaboutwhattheprospectofanEmptyPlanetmeansforbusinesses,forgovernments,forallofus–includingthegenerationstocome.2Thisreport

formspartofa

newIpsosresearch

programmetohelpusbetterunderstandthedynamicsofgenerationalanalysisanddemographicchange.We

havetriedtochallengethenaturaltemptationtomakegeneralisations,andground

ourselvesinevidence,witha

particularemphasisonunderstandingwhatishappeningontheground,

asseenthrough

thelensofa

seriesof“casestudy”countries.Fertilityrates

are

now

belowreplacement

rates

(2.1children)

inmostpartsoftheworld.

We

now

needtoprepare

ourselvesfora

world

which

ischaracterised

by

populationdeclineratherthanpopulationgrowth.Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations11IntroductionContextPeak

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AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoCONTEXTIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations12IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoWHYGENERATIONALANALYSIS

MATTERSFig.

3–DefiningthegenerationsGenerationagein2023Born

after2012GenerationAlpha*ages<11It’s

easytogetsweptupintheterminologyofgenerations,asweenthusiasticallydescribetheworldsofGenerationZ,Millennials,GenerationX,Boomers,theSilentBorn1996-2012GenerationZages11–27Generationand–comingsoon–GenerationAlpha.Born1980-95Millennialsages28–43Thesecohortnamesare

widelyusedthesedaysbyresearchersasamore

excitingversionoftheagebracketswewere

alltrainedon.Born1966-79GenerationXages44–57Born1945-65BabyBoomersButanyassertionaboutgenerationsdoesneedtobeconsideredcarefully.

We

mustbemindfulthattermslike“Millennial”carryalotmore

implicitbaggagethan“27-42-year-olds”.ages58–78Born1928-45Pre-Warages79–95192019401960198020002020Whenweusecohortnamesratherthanagegroups,weare

makingasubliminalstatementthatwebelievewhatweare

describingisacharacteristicwhichisanenduringfeatureofthegenerationunderquestion.*Nochronological

endpointhasbeensetforthisgroupSource:

IpsosIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations13IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoWhenusedwidely,

theyalsosuggestalevelofuniformity

Whenandwhereyouwerebornmattersofthoughtorbehaviouramongthegroup

whichisrarely"GenerationXismyparents’generation.Theirgrowthenvironment,educationbackground,andtheaccurate.Muchofthenarrativeongenerationshasitsroots

inanalysisfrom

theUnitedStates,aswitnessedbythelabelsweare

using,perhapsmostnotablyBabyBoomers.changesbroughttotheminthewaveofthewholeeraare

quitedifferentfrom

mine.However,

althoughyoungpeopleinthecityhavegainedbettereducationandgrowthresources,weare

stillundergoingtremendouspersonalpressure

inmodernisation.Thepressure

isnotthesameasbefore.We

squeezeinthesubway,andbendoverourphoneswearingfacemasks,aswe're

facedwiththechallengeofanewsocialenvironment.Thisistotallydifferent

from

thatinthe60s,70s,80sand90s."InsearchofdataGenerationalanalysisisnoteasy.

Notleastbecauserigorousresearch

onthistopicreliesontheavailabilityoflong-termdata.Take

theexampleofGenerationZ.Theevidencerequired

toprove

manyofthestatementsthatare

madeaboutthemisoftenjustnotavailable–sometimesbecausetheissuesthatmattertoyoungpeopletodaywere

notconsideredimportant10or20yearsago.Themore

we’velookedatthistopic,theclearerwe’vebecomeabouttheneedtobeverycautiousaboutmakingtoomanygeneralisationsaboutgenerations.We

shouldnotassumethatouranalysis,groundedinourowncountry’s

experiences,isportableandcanbeuniformlyexploredacrosstheworld.Whenyouwere

born

andwhere

youwereborn

matter.Peopleborn

thesameyearbutindifferent

placeswillButgenerationalanalysisismostcertainlyworththeeffort.

oftenhavehadverydifferent

experiencesandtrajectories.Where

wecanseegenerationaldifferences(andindeedsimilarities),theyhelpustounderstandwhatisgoingonConsidertwopeoplerespectively

born

inChinaandtheUnitedStatesin1973.Theformativeexperiencesoftoday’s–GenZ,Chinanow–andtheyalsoshinealightonhowchangehappens

50-year-olds,

growing

upinthe1980s,were

ratherdifferent.inasociety,

unlockingourabilitytoplanforthefuture.Source:

IpsosEthnographyCentre

ofExcellenceIpsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations14IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoGenerationX

intheUnitedStatesGenerationX,thoseaged44-57,currentlynumber65millionpeopleintheUSalone.Theyare

thefirsttoliveinfamiliesinwhichbothMomandDadworkedoutsidethe

65millionhome.By1981,whenthefirstmillennialbabieswere

beingborn,53%ofunder18shadmotherswhowere

employedorGenerationX,thoselookingforwork.

GenerationXwere

the3aged44-57,currentlyCourtesyofApple,Left1980s,Right1990schildrenwhowitnessedthischangeasnumber65millionpeopleintheUSalone.theygrew

up.Thismakesthemthefirstbabybustgenerationwithsmallerfamilies(whichdefinesthemdemographically).Theyarealsomore

likelytohavegrown

upinanurbanenvironmentthanBabyBoomerswere.

TheycameofageastheColdWar

wasendingandagainsta1990sTheyalsofoundthemselvesindirectcompetitionforeverything,includingjobsandhousing,withthebiggestgenerationinhumanhistorysofar,BabyBoomers.Butthisisoneagegroup,growingupinaveryparticularcontext.Doesthispicture,describedaseconomicbackdropwhichwasnotalways

GenerationX,workforthepeopleborncompletelyfavourable.

between1966and1979inyourcountry?CourtesyofGatorade,1992CourtesyofCalvinKlein,1992Ipsos|

We

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generations15IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoBuildingblocksforanalysisWhenfacedwithanapparentdifferencebetweengenerationalcohorts,wetendtoconsiderwhythisisthecasethroughthree

lenses.010203Lifecycleeffects:People’s

orientationschangeastheyage,drivenbylifestagesorevents.Forexample,theymaytravel(domesticallyorinternationally)tofindwork,beforegettingmarriedandhavingPeriodeffects:Attitudesandbehavioursofallcohortschangeinasimilarwayoverthesameperiod.Ourresponsetothepandemiccouldfallintothiscategoryandpresentsarichseamforanalysis.Cohorteffects:Acohorthasdifferentviews,andthesestaydifferent

overtime.Theseare

perhapsthehardestforresearcherstoidentify,

butalsopotentiallythemostimpactful,helpingusdoabetterjobatpredictingfuturechange.children.People’s

incomesriseastheyget

NotonlydidCovidaffectpeoplearoundolder,

and(insomecountriesatleast),they

theworld,butitalsogeneratedalargewilltendtoaccumulatesavings.amountofattitudinalandbehaviouraldatatoexplore.Atamore

locallevel,differentcountrieswillhavetheirowndynamics.AsweshowinourSouth

Korea

analysis,

its“GenerationX”are

billedasthecountry’sfirstpost-democratisationgenerationanddisplayauniquesetofcharacteristics.Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations16IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoManyofthemisperceptions

weseeariseare

frompeoplemistakinga

periodorlifecycle

effectfora

truecohorteffect.Whenwecancarryoutthiskindofanalysiseffectively,

we

maynotbepoweringoursocietiesandeconomiesasseethatreal

shiftslikedeclineinreligiousbelieforloyaltytopoliticalparties,alongsideacceptanceofLGBTrightsinmanycountries,are

here

tostay-butthatotherapparentmuchasperceivedwisdomwouldlikeustobelieve.Take

Italyasanexample.Whenitcomestohowoldtheytrendslikedeclininghomeownershipmay(ormaynot)be

are,

the“averageItalian”isnotGenerationZ,orevenshorter-lived.aMillennial.Themedianpersonintheworld’s

eighth-largest

economyis48yearsold,whichputsthemfirmlyinthelittle-written-aboutGenerationXcategory.

Thisisagroup

thathasalotofspendingpowerandconsiderableinfluenceacrossmanyaspectsofpeople’s

lives,includingfamily,

business,andpolitics.Manyofthemisperceptionsweseeariseare

from

peoplemistakingaperiodorlifecycleeffectforatruecohorteffect.Identifyingwhatisatruecohorteffectisthereforekeytounderstandinghowagenerationmaybedifferentandwillremaindifferent

astheyage.Inthenextsections,wepickuponthesethemesandsetoutsomeofthequestionsarisingfrom

ourreview,

framedagainstthebackdropofthebigdemographicchangesunderwaywhichwillshapewhathappensnext.And,talkingofageing,weneedtobeclear,

wheneverweare

makingassertionsabouttheimplicationsofdifferentgenerations’attitudesorbehaviours,aboutthebroaderdemographiccontext.BecausetheyoungergenerationsIpsos|

We

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generations17IntroductionContextPeak

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AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoPEAKPOPULATIONIpsos|

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generations18IntroductionContextPeak

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AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoPREPARING

FORTHEFALLFig.

4–PopulationinthenewsNovember15th,2022wasthe“officialday”whentheworld’s

populationtoppedeightbillion.Ittookjust37yearsforthenumberofpeopleonearthtodoublefromthefourbillionrecorded

in1975.But,contrarytowhatyoumightthink,worldpopulationgrowthisslowingdown.Inthewords

oftheUN,“whileittooktheglobalpopulation12yearstogrow

from

seventoeightbillion,itwilltakeapproximately15years—until2037—forittoreach

ninebillion,asignthattheoverallgrowthrateoftheglobalpopulationisslowing.”Ipsos|

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generations19IntroductionContextPeak

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AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoPopulationsuperpowers:preparingforafallAlthoughthetrajectoryisclear,

wehavebeenwitnessingsomethingofadebateaboutwhetherIndiahasalreadyovertakenChinaorwhetherthisissomethingabouttohappen.AccordingtotheUN’s

April2023release,thismilestoneissetformid-2023asIndia’s

populationexceedsthe1.42billionmarkandChina’s

startstofall.China’s

fallingfertilityratesare

nowwelldocumentedandstandat1.18,farbelowthereplacementrateof2.1.Earlierthisyear,

wesawaflurryofmediacoverageasjournalistsdescribedthenewsthatthepopulationofChinaisnowfalling,forthefirsttimein60years.38.5China’s

populationisnowageingveryfast.Themedianageofitspopulationrose

from

23.7yearsin1990to38.5in2022,and35%oftheChinesepopulationare

now50yearsoldorolder.ThemedianageofTogether,

thesetwopopulationsuperpowerscurrentlycomprise36%oftheworld’s

population.Theymayhaveverydifferent

historiesandcultures,butwhenitcomestotheirpopulationjourney,

thetwocountriesare

nowonthesametrack,albeitatdifferent

stages.China’s

populationrosefrom

23.7yearsin1990to38.5yearsin2022.35%oftheChinesepopulation

are

now

50yearsoldorolder.Ipsos|

We

needtotalkabout

generations20IntroductionContextPeak

PopulationTheConversationQuestionsUKSouth

AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoMeanwhile,theriseinIndia’s

populationinabsolutetermshasdrawnattentionawayfrom

itsownfallingfertilityrates.Indeed,India’s

figureshavedeclinedmore

dramaticallythanChina’s

duringthepast20years,from

3.22to2.01,whichmeansthatitspopulationcouldstartdecreasingbeforetheendofthiscentury.Thosecountrieswhichhavehadalowfertilityrateforalongerperiod,likeJapan,ItalyorSouthKorea,are

ageingevenfaster.Together,

ChinaandIndiacurrently

comprise36%oftheworld’s

population.

Theymayhave

very

different

historiesandcultures,

butwhenitcomestotheirpopulationjourney,

theyare

now

onthesametrack,

albeitatdifferentstages.Italy’s

shrinkingpopulationisonlynowstartingtobecomeareal

issue,withsomequestionsabouttheprospectsforthelong-term“survival”ofadistinctItaliannation.Theveryshapeofitspopulationpyramidisstriking,withitsincreasinglytop-heavyfeatures,setagainstanarrowbase(see

page

35).PrimeMinisterGeorgia

MelonisaysItalyis“destined

to

disappear”unlessitchanges.Ipsos|

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generations21IntroductionContextPeak

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AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoFig.

5–Falling

offthepopulationcliffManycountriesare

predictedtoseetheirpopulationpeakincomingdecades.Super-Ageing

SocietiesForsomethishasalreadystarted.Thesechangesallhaveveryreal

implicationsintermsofhowsocietyandtheeconomyoperate.Around36%ofItaliansunder30are

livinginasingle-personhousehold,whilejust50%haveadrivinglicence.And,whentheyareemployed(theyoungestworkingagegroupsbeingthreetimesmore

likelytobeunemployed),theyhaveonaveragehadbetweenfourandfivedifferent

jobssincetheyenteredthelabourmarket.Thispointstoaninsecure,unsettledlifestyle.IndiaProjectedPopulationItalyProjectedPopulation20001500100050006050403019501975200020252050207521001950197520002025205020752100SouthKoreaProjectedPopulationMexicoProjectedPopulationMeanwhile,SouthKorea

isexperiencingsimilarissues,withanextremelylowfertilityrate(nowatonly0.87)andageingveryfast–just22%are

under25,andtheyareoutnumberedbytheover60s(26%).6050403020150120906030019501975200020252050207521001950197520002025205020752100Source:

UnitedNations:World

PopulationProspects

2022Ipsos|

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generations22IntroductionContextPeak

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AfricaIndiaSouthKoreaItalyMexicoFig.

6–Thecountry

contextLowerfertilityratesandageingare

increasingtherelativesizeoftheoldergenerationsinnearlyallthebigeconomies,andtheyare

becomingclosetoamajorityinsomeofthekeyAsianandEuropeanmarkets.Thisraisesquestionsaroundhowmodernsocietiestreat

theoldergenerations–docompanies,brands,employers,andpoliticiansneedtorethinkhowtheyfocustheirefforts?We

pickuponthesethemesinthenextchapter.SouthSouthIndia

Mexico

USAChinaUKItalyAfricaKoreaMedianAge282970307538773940454882LifeExpectancy646%778283Percentage65+7%8%17%13%4%12%11%1%19%12%7%17%10%7%24%10%14%1.3Percentage15-24y.o.PopulationDecline:

Whatcanbedone?16%-10%2.318%-11%2.017%-9%1.8Diff65+/14-24Therealityoffallingpopulationsisnotlimitedtoafew“outliercountries”.New

analysis

byDarrellBrickerandJohnIbbitsonidentifies36countrieswhichare

losingpopulationalready,

withmore

settofollowthem.FertilityRatePeakFertility1.71.21.60.919581965195719591963196419571964TheBrickerand