亚开行-中国的崛起及其对日本创新的竞争效应(英文)-行业资料-市场研究报告-综合-可编辑版

ADBIWorkingPaperSeries

THERISEOFTHEPEOPLE’SREPUBLIC

OFCHINAANDITSCOMPETITION

EFFECTSONINNOVATIONINJAPAN

NobuakiYamashitaand

IsamuYamauchi

No.939

March2019

AsianDevelopmentBankInstitute

NobuakiYamashitaisaSeniorLecturer,RoyalMelbourneInstituteofTechnology,Australia.IsamuYamauchiisaResearchAssociateattheResearchInstituteofEconomy,TradeandIndustry(RIETI)andaJuniorAssociateProfessoratMeijiGakuinUniversity.

TheviewsexpressedinthispaperaretheviewsoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsorpoliciesofADBI,ADB,itsBoardofDirectors,orthegovernmentstheyrepresent.ADBIdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthispaperandacceptsnoresponsibilityforanyconsequencesoftheiruse.TerminologyusedmaynotnecessarilybeconsistentwithADBofficialterms.

Workingpapersaresubjecttoformalrevisionandcorrectionbeforetheyarefinalizedandconsideredpublished.

TheWorkingPaperseriesisacontinuationoftheformerlynamedDiscussionPaperseries;thenumberingofthepaperscontinuedwithoutinterruptionorchange.ADBI’sworkingpapersreflectinitialideasonatopicandarepostedonlinefordiscussion.Someworkingpapersmaydevelopintootherformsofpublication.

Suggestedcitation:

Yamashita,N.andI.Yamauchi.2019.TheRiseofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandItsCompetitionEffectsonInnovationinJapan.ADBIWorkingPaper939.Tokyo:AsianDevelopmentBankInstitute.Available:/publications/rise-prc-and-its-competition-effects-innovation-japan

Pleasecontacttheauthorsforinformationaboutthispaper.

Email:nobu.yamashita@.au

Thisstudywasundertakenasapartoftheproject“MobilityofKnowledgeandtheInnovationPerformanceofJapaneseFirms”attheResearchInstituteofEconomy,TradeandIndustry(RIETI)inTokyo,Japan.Forusefulsuggestionsandcomments,wewouldliketothankYuqingXing,MatthiasHelble,andparticipantsattheADBworkshop.

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©2019AsianDevelopmentBankInstitute

ADBIWorkingPaper939

YamashitaandYamauchi

Abstract

Thispaperempiricallyexaminesthe“defensiveinnovation”hypothesisthatfirmswithhigherexposuretolow-wageeconomyimportcompetitionintensivelyundertakemoreinnovativeactivitybyusingahighqualityJapanesefirm-levelpaneldatasetovertheperiod1994–2005.Thenovelfeatureoftheanalysisistherelationoffirm-levelvariationsofpatentusagetoimportcompetition.TheresultssuggestthatintensifiedimportcompetitionfromthePeople’sRepublicofChinahasresultedingreaterinnovativeactivitybyJapanesefirms,consistentwiththefindingsofEuropeanfirmsinBloometal.(2016).Moreover,suchcompetitionhasalsoledtoanincreaseinnon-usedpatents.

JELClassification:O00,F10

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Contents

1.INTRODUCTION

1

2.THERISEOFTHEPRCINWORLDTRADE

2

3.DATAANDVARIABLES

6

3.1Firm-levelPatentData

6

3.2JapanIndustryProductivityData

7

4.EMPIRICALSPECIFICATIONANDRESULTS

9

5.RESULTS

10

6.CONCLUSION

13

REFERENCES

14

APPENDIX

17

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1.INTRODUCTION

Thispaperexaminesthe“‘defensiveinnovation”hypothesisfirstdiscussedinWood(1994)andsubsequentlyformalizedinThoenigandVerdier(2003).Asareactiontoimportcompetitionfromlow-wageeconomies,firmsindevelopedeconomieswouldrespondbyupgradingtheirinnovativeactivities,leadingto“defensiveskill-biasedinnovation.”Inabroadercontext,theeffectofcompetitionontherateofinnovationhasbeenoneofthemoststudiedareasintheliterature(e.g,Aghionetal.2005).Inthestudymostrelevanttoourpaper,Bloometal.(2016)foundthatalargesampleofEuropeanfirmsincreasedawiderangeoftheirinnovativeactivities(patenting,researchanddevelopment(R&D)expenditures,computeruse,andtheTFPgrowth),drivenbyintensifiedcompetitionfromthePeople’sRepublicofChina(PRC).Thisinnovationwasconductedwithin-firm.1

Buildingonthefoundationsetbythepreviouslymentionedstudies,thispaperexaminesthecausaleffectofintensifiedChineseimportcompetitionontheinnovativeactivitiesofapanelofJapanesefirmsfortheperiod1994–2005.Wefocusonpatentusagedataasanindicatorofinnovativeoutputs.Unlikeotherstudiesusingpatentstatistics,thisstudyaddstotheliteraturebyexploringstrategicpatentusageasresponsestoimportcompetitionfromalow-wageeconomy(thePRC).Itisgenerallyacknowledgedthatpatentstatisticsaremeaningfulproxiesforfirm-levelinnovation,butitiswellknownthatfirm-levelpatentingservesasmuchmorethanjustanindicatorofknowledgecapitaloutput(Nagaokaetal.2010).Well-knowninventorsurveys(e.g.,theRIETI-GeorgiaTechUS-Japansurvey)haverevealedthatmanyofthepatentsarenotusedtointroducenewproductsintothemarket;instead,theyareusedaseffectivestrategicinstrumentsto“block”othercompetitorsfrominnovatingorimitating.BoldrinandLevine(2013)presentanicecaseinvolvingMicrosoft—amarketincumbentwithastockpileofpatentsblockingGoogleinthesmartphonemarket).

Studyinginnovativefirms’responsestoChineseimportcompetitionprovidesaninterestingandexcellenttestinggroundforthefollowingreasons:First,overthepastdecades,thePRChasemergedasapivotalassembly-exporteconomyofhigh-techproducts(mainly,electronics),importingpartsandcomponentsfromotheradvancedeconomiesandexportingfinalproducts(includingthefamousiPhone).Accordingly,thePRC’sexportbundlehasdramaticallychangedfromlabor-intensivegoodstohigh-techproducts,exertingconsiderablecompetitivepressuresonfirmsindevelopedeconomies.Second,manyChineseexportscompeteatlowercostmarginsthanmosthigh-techproducts.Forinstance,astudybySchott(2008foundthatthePRC’sexportsimilarityindexhasbecomeclosertothatofOrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(OECD)economies,buttheunitpricesofChineseexportshavebeenconsistentlylowerthanOECDeconomies.

ThefindingsuggeststhatChineseimportcompetitionleadsJapanesefirmstoexpandtheirinnovativeactivities,asfoundbyBloometal.(2016.Theexpansionispartlydrivenbyanincreaseinfirms’numbersofunusedpatents,whichreflectthestrategicuseofintellectualproperty(IP)protection.

Theorganizationofthispaperisasfollows.ThenextsectionpresentsanoverviewofthePRCinworldtrade.Section3discussesthedataset,followedinSection4bythe

1AmitiandKhandelwal(2013)findthatincreasedimportcompetition(measuredbyadeclineintariffs)spursaeconomy’sexportquality(measuredbythemarketshare)intheUSmarket.

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empiricalapproachandadiscussionofthepreliminaryfindings.Section5concludesthepaper.

2.THERISEOFTHEPRCINWORLDTRADE

Figure1-AdepictstheriseofthePRCinworldexportsfortheperiod1990–2011.In1990,thePRC’sexportsaccountedforatinyshare(around3%)ofworldexports.Sincethen,thePRC’ssharehasgraduallyincreased.Inparticular,thePRC’sexportgrowthhasrisensincetheearly2000s.Inthesecondhalfof2000,thePRChasachievedformidableexportexpansionbyovertakingGermanyforthepositionoftheworld’slargestexporter,accountingformorethan10%ofworldexports.ThePRC’sexportsharehasbeengrowingwithoutanydisruptions,whiletheworldsharesofJapan,theUnitedStatesandGermanyhavenotgrownduringthesameperiod.Atthesametime,thePRChasbecomeanimportanteconomyintheworldimportantmarket(Figure1-B).WhiletheUnitedStatesstillaccountsforthebulkofworldimports(around15–20%inworldimports),itssharehasgraduallybeendecliningsince2000.Bycontrast,thePRC’ssharehassteadilyincreasedtocloseto10%in2011.

Figure1:TheRiseofthePeople’sRepublicofChinainWorldTrade,1990–2011

(%intotalexports)

Source:UNComtrade.

WiththeriseofthePRCinworldtrade,itsspecializationhasdramaticallychanged,aswell.Figure2depictstheshareofrelativelymorecapital-andtechnology-intensiveproductslikeelectricalmachineryandhouseholdelectricappliancesascomparedtomorelabor-intensiveproductsliketextilesandtoys.Therehasbeenanotableshiftofcomparativeadvantagesfrommorelabor-intensiveproductstowardmorecapital-andtechnology-intensiveproducts.In1992,textilesandtoysaccountedforapproximately45%ofthePRC’stotalexports.However,thissharecontinuouslydeclinedanddroppedtocloseto20%in2011.Ontheotherhand,theexportshareofelectricalmachineryandhouseholdappliancesdoubleditsshare,fromlessthan15%in1992to30%in2011.Inthisproductcategory,theexportcompositionishighlyconcentratedinInformationCommunicationTechnology(ICT)products.Otherimportantproduct

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categoriesincludeofficemachines,andtelecommunicationssoundequipment(includingmobilephones).

Basedontheincome-weightedexportbundleofChinesegoods,somecommentatorsarguethatthisisasignthatthetechnologicalcapabilityofthePRCisrapidlyconvergingtowardthetechnologicalfrontierofadvancedOECDeconomies,andisnowdirectlycompetingwiththemintheexportmarket.However,thisshouldbeinterpretedcautiously.Allowingforintra-productspecialization,itisknownthatthePRC’sexportspecializationstillrestslargelyonthelabor-intensiveassemblystageratherthanspecializationintechnologicalcontent(AthukoralaandYamashita,2006).Inotherwords,thePRC’scomparativeadvantagesstillrestsonalabor-intensivesegmentinhigh-techproducts,eventhoughtheseproductsareexportedfromthePRC(afinalassemblyeconomy).ThisexplainswhySchott(2008)observesthattheunitpriceofChineseexportbundlesareatthelowerendofthepricerange,ascomparedtothoseofOECDeconomies(thepricecompetitivenesscomingfromthePRC’slowerlaborcosts).Insum,thebulkofChineseexportsaremass-marketcommoditiesassembledwithrelativelylowunitcostsandimportedhigh-techpartsandcomponentsfromotherindustrialeconomies(notebookcomputers,mobilephones).

Figure2:StructuralChangesinthePeople’sRepublicofChina’s

ExportProductCompositions,1990–2011

(%intotalexports)

Source:UNComtrade.

Table1displaysthetopeightandbottomeightindustriesbydegreeofChineseimportcompetition1994(thebeginningoftheestimationperiod).2Inthetextileindustry,whereChinesefirmsareconsideredtohavecomparativeadvantages,thedegreeofimportcompetitionwasalreadystrongin1994—ofJapan’simportoftextileproducts,49%camefromthePRC.Thatsharecontinuedtoincrease,reaching77%in2005.Morestrikingly,thelargestincreaseinthePRC’sshareofJapaneseimportsisinofficeandserviceindustrymachines;thissharerosefrom19%in1994to76%in2005.

2Year1990dataisusedinanexperimentalstage,buttheorder-importcompletion-exposedindustriesareroughlythesameinyear1994).

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Correspondingly,intheindustrieswherebythePRC’sshareincreased,therewasadeclineinthesharesofAsiannewlyindustrializingeconomies(NIEs)—Taipei,China;HongKong,China;RepublicofKorea;andSingapore)andtheUS.Inthebottomeightindustries,anincreaseinthePRC’sshareispalpable,withstronggrowthinelectronicequipmentandsemiconductordevices.ProductionnetworksbetweenJapanandthePRCmayexplainanexpansioninChineseimportinthosehigh-techindustries.

Table1:ChangeofImportCompetitionbySourceEconomies/GroupsinJapaneseManufacturingIndustry,1994and2005

1994

Asian

PRCNIEsSEAsiaUS

Manufacturing,total11.4

15.9

10.2

25.7

Top8sectorsin1994

Coalproducts

Textileproducts

Miscellaneousceramic,stoneandclayproductsRubberproducts

Leatherandleatherproducts

Electricalgenerating,transmission,distributionandindustrialapparatus

Pigironandcrudesteel

Officeandserviceindustrymachines

68.9

48.7

34.4

33.4

26.5

24.4

23.7

19.4

13.2

15.1

19.1

18.3

19.9

24.1

4.0

16.5

0.0

8.0

3.0

10.1

5.8

19.5

3.0

21.6

2.7

5.6

13.6

15.7

5.2

19.6

7.0

22.1

Bottom8sectorsin1994

Chemicalfibers

Petroleumproducts

Electronicequipmentandelectric

measuringinstruments

Pulp,paper,andcoatedandglazedpaper

Semiconductordevicesandintegratedcircuits

Printing,platemakingforprintingand

bookbinding

Tobacco

Motorvehicles

1.2

1.0

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.1

0.0

48.9

22.4

3.1

1.7

41.7

26.0

0.0

0.3

2.7

12.0

0.6

0.9

8.2

1.0

0.0

0.0

26.4

6.2

63.9

40.7

49.1

64.7

95.3

27.7

2005

PRC

AsianNIEs

SEAsia

US

Manufacturing,total

28.6

12.8

10.9

15.2

Top8sectorsin1994

Coalproducts

92.2

1.5

0.0

0.5

Textileproducts

76.5

3.5

4.0

2.0

Miscellaneousceramic,stoneandclayproducts

60.4

5.0

3.8

9.6

Rubberproducts

58.4

6.9

17.2

5.5

Leatherandleatherproducts

46.5

1.8

2.7

2.0

Electricalgenerating,transmission,distributionandindustrialapparatus

47.2

8.5

17.2

10.2

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Pigironandcrudesteel

29.7

6.7

1.5

1.7

Officeandserviceindustrymachines

76.2

8.2

7.7

2.7

continuedonnextpage

Table1continued

2005

Asian

PRCNIEsSEAsiaUS

Bottom8sectorsin1994

Chemicalfibers13.9

Petroleumproducts2.8

Electronicequipmentandelectric10.5

measuringinstruments

Pulp,paper,andcoatedandglazedpaper7.3

Semiconductordevicesandintegrated7.9

circuits

Printing,platemakingforprintingand13.5

bookbinding

Tobacco0.6

Motorvehicles1.4

34.2

21.1

3.5

6.5

48.2

11.2

0.1

1.9

15.5

12.8

4.0

13.4

19.1

4.5

0.1

0.9

13.3

2.5

38.8

33.5

18.9

23.3

89.6

8.8

PRC

Change94–05

AsianNIEs

SEAsia

US

Manufacturing,total17.2

–3.10.7

–10.5

Top8sectorsin1994

Coalproducts

23.3

–11.7

0.0

–2.2

Textileproducts

27.8

–11.6

–4.0

–3.6

Miscellaneousceramic,stoneandclayproducts

26.0

–14.1

0.9

–4.1

Rubberproducts

25.0

–11.5

7.2

–10.2

Leatherandleatherproducts

20.0

–18.0

–3.1

–3.3

Electricalgenerating,transmission,distributionandindustrialapparatus

22.8

–15.6

–2.3

–9.4

Pigironandcrudesteel

Officeandserviceindustrymachines

6.0

56.7

2.7

–8.4

–1.5

–13.9

–5.3

–19.4

Bottom8sectorsin1994

Chemicalfibers

12.7

–14.7

12.8

–13.1

Petroleumproducts

1.8

–1.4

0.8

–3.7

Electronicequipmentandelectric

measuringinstruments

9.9

0.4

3.4

–25.1

Pulp,paper,andcoatedandglazedpaper

6.8

4.8

12.6

–7.1

Semiconductordevicesandintegratedcircuits

7.5

6.5

10.9

–30.3

Printing,platemakingforprintingand

bookbinding

13.1

–14.8

3.5

–41.4

Tobacco

0.6

0.1

0.0

–5.8

Motorvehicles

1.4

1.7

0.9

–18.9

Source:JIP2013database.

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3.DATAANDVARIABLES

3.1Firm-levelPatentData

Patentstatisticsasanindicatorforinnovativeoutputshaverecentlybecomewidelyavailabletoresearchersbecauseofsignificantprogressmadeindataaccessibility(e.g.,USNBERpatent,JapanPatentOffice,PATSTAT).Patentstatisticscarryimportantinvention-relatedinformationsuchasbibliographicdata,backwardandforwardcitations,thetechnologyfields,nameofinventor,andusefulness.However,ithasbeenwell-documentedfromsurvey-basedstudiesthatnotallpatentsareinuse(butrather,are“sleeping”).InJapan,ithasbeenreportedthatapproximately60%ofpharmaceuticalpatentsarenotcurrentlyinuse(Nagaokaetal.2010.3Rather,firmsobtainpatentsasadefensiveblockingmechanisminresponsetotechnologycompetition.4“Blocking”patentsmightprotectafirm’sonce-exclusivemarketasitbecomescommercialized.Thisproject,forthefirsttimeintheliterature,empiricallyrelatesthisunexploitednatureofpatentholdingstoimportcompetitionfromalow-wageeconomy.

Forthispurpose,weextractedtherelevantdatafromaJapanesefirm-levelsurvey

—theBasicSurveyofBusinessStructureandActivity,conductedbytheMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry(METIdata)5—coveringtheperiod1994–2005.

Thefirm-levelpatent-usagedataisthenmergedwithindustry-levelexposurestoChineseimportcompetition,resultinginauniquedatasetforthefollowingaspects:First,itprovidesapaneldatasetofpatentusageasitrelatestocompetitivepressures.Theavailablesurveystendtoreportsingle-yearresponses,onlydepictingthestaticnatureofpatentusage.6Usingapaneloffirm-leveldataofferstheperspectiveofwithin-firmvariationsofpatentusageinresponsetoimportcompetition.Second,thedataperiodislongenoughtocoverthePRC’schangingcomparativeadvantagefrommorelabor-intensivetomoreskill-andtechnology-intensivegoods.Third,usingpaneldataallowsfirm-specificeffectstobeincluded,because(unobserved)managerialskills(assumingtimevariantintra-firmelements)canbecontrolled,alongwithindustryandyearfixedeffects.Clearly,inacross-sectionalsetup,thiscannotbecontrolled.

Basedonfirm-levelinformation,wecreatedthepatent-usagevariablesasshowninFigure3.Inshort,foreachfirmwecountthepatentsowned(PAT),thepatentsinuse(USE)andpatentsthatarenotinuse(NON-USE).WithinPAT-USE,wehave

3Moregenerally,itismorecommoninthediscretetechnologyindustries.Inthepharmaceuticalindustry,R&Dcantakeaslongas10–15yearsbeforenewdrugscanbeintroducedintothemarket.Hence,thereisasubstantialnumberofpatentsfordrugsthatarestillintheprocessofR&Dandnotyetinthemarket.

4Itisimportanttonotethatthoseunusedpatentsmaysimplyreflectfirmsthatlacktheinternalassetstocommercialize,oraresearchingforlicensees.

5ThissurveyisgovernedbytheJapaneseStatisticsAct,andfailuretoreplyresultsinafine.Thesurveysampleisrestrictedtofirmsthathavemorethan50employeesandcapitalofmorethan30millionyen.Itcollectsfirms’accountinginformation(sales,employment,employmentcompensation,thenumberofestablishments,R&Dspending,exports,andimports).Theindustryclassificationisavailableata3-digitlevel.But,forourpurposeofanalyzingtheimpactofimportcompetition,werestrictedthesampletoonlymanufacturingfirms.Allindividualfirmsareassigneduniqueidentifiers,makingitpossibletotracktheoperationsofthesamefirmsovertime(thepaneldata).

6Motohashi(2008)usesthedatafromtheSurveyofIntellectualPropertyActivitiesbytheJapanPatentOffice(JPO)conductedin2001inordertoclassifypatentusage.Itwasfoundthatsomeofthepatentsarewithheldbyfirmswishingtousethem(orlicensethemout)inthefuture.Othersarekeptbecauseafirmneedsthemforfuturelicensingnegotiations.Thispracticeiscommonintheelectronicsindustrywherecross-licensingisoccursmorefrequently.

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informationforthenumberofpatentsbasedoninternalinventions(DEV),andthenumberofpatentsthatarelicensedout(LICENSE).Thesevariablesformthedependentvariablesintheregressionanalysisthatfollows.

Figure3:PatentUsageandVariableDefinitions

VariableSymbol

BriefExplanationsandDefinitions

PatentOwned

PAT

Thecountofpatentsowned(includingthosepurchasedandcross-licensed)reportedbyafirminagivenfiscalyear.Thisincludesthecumulativecountofpatentsownedbyfirms,notjustpatentsforwhichapplicationhasbeenmadeinagivenyear.

Use(includinglicensedout)In-houseinventions

-use

USEDEVNON-USE

Thosepatentscurrentlyinuse.

Patentsbasedoninternalinventionsthatareinuse.DefinedasPATminusUSE,includingblockingandfuturecommercialuse/negotiation.

Licensedout

LICENSE

Totalcountofpatentswhicharelicensedout.Domesticandinternationalsegregationisavailable,aswellastheamountofmoneyreceived.

Itisimportanttonoteseverallimitations.First,thepatentstatisticsinourdataisapatentpool—allpatentsinwhichthefirmshaveownership.Empiricalworkthatusespatentstatisticscollectedfromthepatentofficenormallycoversthosepatentsforwhichapplicationhasbeenmade,aswellthosepatentsthathavebeengrantedtothefirm.Inourdata,allpatentsarepresumablythosegranted(becausethesurveyquestionaskshowmanypatentsafirmowns,ratherthanpatentsthathavebeenappliedfororarebeinggranted).Sincepatentapplicationscanindicatefirms’innovativeefforts,ourmeasuremayunderestimatethem.

Second,ourpatentdataissimplythecount.However,otherstudiesemployingpatentstatisticsusuallyweightthepatentcounttoits(backwardandforward)citations,thuscontrollingforpatentquality.Thehigherquality(orsometimesmorebasic)inventionsattractmoreforwardcitationsthanlowerqualityinventions(sometimes,referredtoas“patentthickness”).Withouttheabilitytolinkourdataonfirm-ownedpatentswiththecitationinformation,weareunabletoaccountforthisqualitydimension.

Third,ourdatadoesnotadjustforthedepreciationrateofoutdatedpatents.Itisappropriatetoadjustforthedepreciationrateofpatents,becausesomefirm-heldpatentscanbecomeobsolete.However,withnoidentificationofthegrant(orapplication)dateofeachpatent,thedeprecationratecannotbeappliedinourdata.Wethereforelookatthegrowthrateofeachpatentusage(ratherthanasimplecount),hopingtominimizethebiascomingfromthenon-depreciationofthepatents.

3.2JapanIndustryProductivityData

IndustrylevelvariablesusedintheregressionanalysisaremainlysourcedfromJapanIndustrialProductivity(JIP)data(JIP2013)storedintheonlinedatabaseintheResearchInstituteofEconomy,TradeandIndustry(RIETI)inJapan.7TheJIPdatasetisorganizedatthe3-digitindustrylevel(52manufacturingindustries).

7http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/JIP2013/SeetheAppendixforfurtherdetailsonJIPdatabase.

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3.2.1ChineseImportCompetition

WeusethevalueofimportsoriginatingfromthePRC(IMthePRC)asashareoftotalworldimports(IMWorld)asameasureoftheexposuretoChineseimportcompetitioningivenJIPindustries(asubscriptj).

CHM=Chineseimportsj.(1)

jImportsj

WealsoemploytheconventionalmethodofconstructingChineseimportpenetrationbynormalizingChineseimportondomesticabsorption(i.e.,domesticabsorption

=valueadded+imports–exports).8

CHM=Chineseimportsj

j(ValueAddedj+Importsj-Exportsj)

(2)

3.2.2InstrumentalVariable

WhileourmotivationfortheempiricalanalysisistoestimatethecausaleffectsofChineseimportcompetitiononpatentoutputs,weencounterthepossibleendogeneityproblem:Firm-levelinnovativeactivityforreasonsotherthanChineseimportcompetitionmayalsoshapetradeflows,alteringthedegreeofimportcompetitionintheindustry(forexample,moreinnovativefirmsmightopttodomoreoffshoringtothePRCinordertofacilitatetheirinnovativehomeoperations).Forthesamereason,thereversecausalityisalsoapossibility:ImportsfromthePRCmaybecorrelatedwithindustry-widetechnologyshocks(tosomedegree,industry-specificfixedeffectsmaytakecareofthisconcern,butitmightnotbesufficient).Thismakesordinaryleastsquare(OLS)estimatorsbiasedandinconsistent.

WeusedameasureofChinese(labor)productivityasaninstrumentfortheendogenousChineseimportvariablesinthetechnologyequation.Thisimpliedvolatility(IV)strategyextractsanyexogenousvariationsaffectingChineseexportsupplycapacity,whileindirectlyaffectingthelevelofinnovativeactivityonlythroughtheintensifiedimportcompetitioninJapan.Thisinstrumentisinspiredbytheuseofaninstrumentinotherstudies:Autoretal.(2015)usedtheexposuretoChineseimportcompetitionofeightadvancedeconomies9asinstrumentstomeasureUSexposuretoChineseimports.ThemotivationfortheirIVstrategywastoextractsupply-sideproductivityelementsinChineseexportperformance.However,aspointedoutbyAutoretal.(2015),theirinstrumentfacesavaliditychallenge,wherebyindustrytechnologicalchangesamongthoseadvancedeconomiesmustbeseparateincidents.Inotherwords,thetechnologicaldiffusionsmustbelimitedacrossthosehighincomeeconomies.InourimplementationoftheIVstrategy,wedirectlyusedtheproductivitymeasure(laborproductivity)ofChineseindustries,whichundoubtedlyhasbeenbehindthesurgeinChineseexportgrowth,yetisindirectlyrelatedtofirm-levelinnovativeactivity.ThesedataareextractedfromthePRCIndustrialProductivity(CIP)database.10ThereisnostrictindustrycorrelationbetweenCIP

8“Value-added”isdefinedasthedifferencebetweengrossoutputandintermediateinputs.Grossoutp