IMF-G-20关于粮食和能源不安全对宏观经济影响的背景说明-report（2023-03-29）

GROUPOFTWENTY

G-20BACKGROUNDNOTEONTHEMACROECONOMICIMPACTOFFOODANDENERGYINSECURITY

2023

PreparedbyStaffofthe

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND*

*DoesnotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheIMFExecutiveBoard

March2023

CONTENT

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

3

HIGHFOODANDENERGYCOSTSARETAKINGATOLL

4

A.SurgingFoodandEnergyPricesHaveFueledInflationandHurtGrowth

4

B.EnergyPriceInflationhasFedintoFoodPriceInflation

9

C.RisksofRenewedSurgesinFoodandEnergyPricesRemain

10

EARLYACTIONMUSTALSOBESMARTACTION

15

A.PolicymakersHaveRespondedtotheCost-of-LivingCrisis

15

B.Short-TermActionsmustbeAlignedwithMedium-TermPriorities

17

C.MultilateralCooperationisNeededtoSafeguardtheWorldEconomy

19

References

21

BOX

1.TheRoleofCriticalMineralsforEnergySecurityandtheGreenTransition

12

FIGURES

1.FoodandEnergyPriceDevelopments

4

2.PassthroughFromInternationaltoDomesticFoodPrices

5

3.G-20:HeadlineandCoreInflation

5

4.FoodInsecurity

6

5.DriversofFoodPriceInflationinSub-SaharanAfrica

6

6.TermsofTradeGrowthVolatility

7

7.ImpactofCommodityTermsofTradeVolatilityonActivity

8

8.Long-RunImpactofCommodityTermsofTradeVolatilityonHeadlineInflationVolatility

8

9.ChinaandCommodityImports

9

10.PassthroughfromEnergytoInternationalFoodPrices

9

11.ImportDependenceforStaples

11

12.DecompositionofChangeinEnergySecurityIndex

14

13.G-20:FiscalMeasures

16

14.CoalConsumption

16

Appendix

23

2

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

Thesurgeinfoodandenergypricesduringthepastfewyearshasfueledinflationandhurtgrowth.PricesoffoodandenergycommoditiesincreasedsteadilyfollowingtheonsetofthepandemicandreachedhistorichighsafterRussia’sinvasionofUkraine.Whileinternationalpriceshavesincemoderated,theyhavenonethelesscontributedtoupwardpressureondomesticinflation.Moreover,highenergypriceshaveincreasedinputandtransportationcosts,weighingoneconomicactivityandfeedingintohigherfoodpricesthroughproductionlinkages.Theresulthasbeenacost-of-livingcrisis,withthemostvulnerableeconomiesandpeopleparticularlyhard-hitandwithamarkedincreaseinfoodinsecurity.Inaddition,empiricalestimateshighlightthattheincreasedvolatilityofcommoditypricesislikelytoweighonmedium-termgrowthandincreaseinflationvolatility.

Thecurrentchallengescouldworsenifriskstotheoutlookmaterialize.Afurthererosionofrealincomescouldlowerhouseholdspendingandsparksocialunrest,harminglivelihoodsandgrowth.AnextendeddisruptionoftheenergysupplyinEuropeposesfurtherdownsiderisks.Moreover,unfavorableinflationdevelopmentscouldnecessitateasuddentighteningoffinancialconditionsfromlarger-than-expectedfurtherpolicyinterestrateincreases,raisingborrowingcostsformanyeconomiesthatarealreadydealingwithelevateddebtlevels.Furthergeoeconomicfragmentationcouldrestricttradeandincreaseconcentrationrisksintheenergysupply,exacerbatingfoodandenergysecurityconcerns.

Policymakershaverespondedamiddifficultpolicytradeoffs.MonetarypolicyhasbeentightenedmarkedlyinmostG-20economiestohelpbringdowninflation.Atthesametime,fiscalmeasureshavebeenimplementedtoeasethecost-of-livingpressures,especiallyinEurope.However,inmanyeconomies,thesemeasureshaveoftenbeenuntargetedandaimedatsuppressingthepass-throughofhigherinternationalprices.Restrictionsontradehavealsobeenimposedintheattempttoensurethedomesticfoodsupply.Toaddressenergysecurityconcerns,someeconomieshavescaleduprelianceonfossilfuels,settingbackthegreentransition.

Policyactionisneededtotackletheon-goingcrisisandprepareforfutureshocks.

•Domesticpoliciesmuststayfocusedonbringingdowninflationandelevateddebtlevelswhilesupportingthemostvulnerable.Thisrequirescontinuedmonetarypolicytighteninguntilinflationisbroughtdowndurably.Fiscalmeasuresshouldbetemporaryandtargeted,allowingpricesignalstooperatetotheextentpossible,whileavoidingactingagainstmonetarypolicy.Measuresaimedatensuringenergysecurityshouldbecompatiblewiththegreentransition.

•Multilateraleffortsareurgentlyrequiredtopreventfurthergeopoliticalfragmentationandstrengthenthemultilateraltradesystem.Theremovaloffoodexportrestrictionsisnecessarytoensureglobalfoodsecurity.Thegreentransitionwillalsorelyonthefreeflowoftradetoavoiddisruptionsinmarketsforkeytransition-relatedprimaryinputs.Andstrengtheningtheglobalfinancialsafetynetisessentialforbuildingresilienceagainstfutureshocks.

PreparedundertheoverallguidanceofShekharAiyarandunderthesupervisionofLoneChristiansenbyateamledbyAdilMohommadandcomprisingChanphengFizzarotti,CarlosvanHombeeck,KyuHoLee,CedricOkou,AugustusPanton,IrvinPrifti,HugoRojas-Romagosa,andMartinStuermer.IlsePeirtsegaeleprovidedadministrativesupport.PreparedbasedoninformationavailableasofMarch8,2023.ThereportdoesnotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofG-20members.PastG-20backgroundnotesareavailableon

IMF.org.

3

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HIGHFOODANDENERGYCOSTSARETAKINGATOLL

A.SurgingFoodandEnergyPricesHaveFueledInflationandHurtGrowth

Foodandenergypricessurgedtowardrecordhighsoverthepastfewyears,owingtoglobalshocksrelatedtotheCOVID-19pandemicandthewarinUkraine,promptingsignificantsupplydisruptions.Thiscontributedtoinflationarypressuresandacost-of-livingcrisis.Moreover,globalgrowthremainssubparandcommoditytermsoftradevolatilityhaslikelyhadfurtheradverseimpact.Whilefoodandfuelpriceinflationhasrecentlymoderated,pricelevelsremainuncomfortablyhighforpeoplearoundtheworld.

1.GlobalfoodandenergypriceshaverisenmarkedlysincethestartoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Internationalfoodcommoditypricesrose38percentbetweenJanuary2020(priortotheglobalpandemic)andFebruary2022androsesharplyagainfollowingRussia’sinvasionofUkraine,beforepeakinginMarch2022(Figure1).Globalwheatpricesjumped38percentbetweenFebruaryandMarch2022.Atthesametime,energypricesincreased,withoilpricesapproximatelydoublingbetweenJanuary2020andtheirpeakinMarch2022.Moreover,thepriceofgasinEuroperosetounprecedentedhighsduringthesummerof2022,asthesupplyofRussiangastoEuropewassharplyreduced.AttheirpeakinAugust2022,Europeangaspriceswerenearly30timeshigherthaninJanuary2020.Pricesofsomefertilizers(e.g.,urea)nearlyquintupledbetweenJanuary2020andtheirpeakinApril2022and,despitesomerecentdeclines,werestillfourtimesashighinDecember2022.Whilebothfoodandenergycommoditypriceshavemoderatedfromtheirpeaks,theyremainelevated.Moreover,whileinternationalcommoditypriceswereatsimilarhighsduringtheglobalfinancialcrisis,thecurrentcost-of-livingcrisisisparticularlychallengingasitisoccurringonthebackofaglobalpandemicandinthecontextofpersistentbroad-basedinflationarypressuresinmosteconomies.

Figure1.FoodandEnergyPriceDevelopments

720

640

560

480

400

320

240

160

80

0

Historicalfood,oil,andfertilizerprices

(indices,January2020=100)

Urea

Foodpriceindex

Oil(rightscale)

Feb.23

Feb.24,2022Invasion

2000200220052007201020122015201720202022

280

240

200

160

120

80

40

0

280

240

200

160

120

80

Foodandfertilizerprices

(indices,January2020=100)

Wheat

Corn

Rice

Urea(rightscale)

3/8/23

Feb.24,2022Invasion

Jan-21May-21Sep-21Jan-22May-22Sep-22Jan-23

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

3,900

3,400

Feb.24,2022Invasion

3/8/23

Gas(Europe)Gas(US)

Oil(rightscale)

Energyprices

(indices,January2020=100)

2,900

2,400

1,900

1,400

900

400

-100

Jan-21May-21Sep-21Jan-22May-22Sep-22Jan-23

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Sources:HaverAnalytics;FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations;IMF,PrimaryCommodityPriceSystemDatabase;IMF,WorldEconomicOutlook;andIMFstaffcalculations.

2Ingeneral,increasesininternationalfoodpricespassthroughtodomesticfoodprices.Whilefiscalmeasuresduringthepastseveralmonthsinsomeeconomiesweredirectedatlimitingthedomesticimpactofhigherinternationalprices(seebelow),anincreaseininternationalpricesgenerallyleadstoanincreaseindomesticprices.Basedonmonthlydataformorethan100countriesover

4

3Inturn,higherdomesticfoodand

energypricesputupwardpressureonheadlineinflation.In2022,headlineinflationpickedupstronglyinmostG-20economies,withseveraloftheserecordinginflationabovedouble-digitlevels(Figure3).Whilealargeshareoftheincreaseinheadlineinflationrelatedtothedirectimportanceoffoodandenergyintheconsumptionbasket,coreinflationalsopickedupinmanyeconomiesamidsecond-roundeffectsofearliercostshocks,thestrongdemandrecoveryin2021,andtightlabormarkets.In2022,coreinflationwasbetween1.5and3timeshigherthanin2020acrossG-20economies.Moreover,coreinflationhasyettoeaseinmanyG-20economies—andwhileheadlineinflationhasstartedtoease,itremainselevated.

1991-2020,IMFstaffestimatessuggestthata1percentincreaseininternationalfoodpricesisassociatedwithanabout0.3percentincreaseindomesticfoodpricesapproximatelyoneyearlater(Figure2).Moreover,thepass-throughfrominternationaltodomesticfoodpricesduringthisperiodwaslargerforlower-incomecountriesthanforadvancedeconomiesandtendstobelargerforeconomieswithhigherdegreesoftradeopenness—asgreatercross-borderarbitrageopportunitiesraisetheresponsivenessofdomesticpricestochangesininternationalfoodprices.1

Figure2.PassthroughFromInternationaltoDomesticFoodPrices

ResponseoffoodCPItointernational

foodpriceshock

(percent)

0.1

0

Averagepass-through,allcountriesLowincomecountries

Hightradeopennesscountries

Lowtradeopennesscountries

Highincomecountries

0123456789101112

Months

Sources:HaverAnalytics;IMF;WorldBank;IMFstaffest.

Note:ResponseofdomesticfoodCPItoa1percentshocktointernationalfoodprices.90-percentconfidencebands.

High-(low-)incomeeconomiesarethoseabove(below)+1(-1)standarddeviationoftheglobalaverage.

Figure3.G-20:HeadlineandCoreInflation

Sources:HaverAnalytics;IMF,WorldEconomicOutlook;IMFstaffcalculations.

Note:ESP:permanentinvitee.

1/G-20advancedexcludesAUS.

2/G-20advancedexcludesAUS;G-20emergingexcludesARG,SAU.

1

IMF,2022b.

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4Theresulthasbeenacost-of-living-

crisis,withthemostvulnerablehouseholdsandeconomiesdisproportionatelyexposedtotheincreaseinprices.Theriseininflationhasweighedonhouseholdbudgetseverywhere.However,householdsinlow-incomeandemergingmarketeconomiestendtospendalargershareoftheirbudgetsonfooditemsthanhouseholdsinadvancedeconomies,makingthemmoreexposedtochangesinfoodprices.2Assuch,whilefoodinsecurityhasbeenontherisesince2018,itworsenedmarkedlyduring2020–21,withunderlyingfactorsincludinghigherfoodprices,conflicts,naturaldisasters,aswellaspandemic-relateddisruptionsinfoodmarkets.Infact,

pricesmorebroadlyviasecond-roundeffects.4

5.Insomeregions,thesurgeinglobal

foodpriceshasledtoparticularlyacutechallenges.ManyeconomiesinSub-SaharanAfrica,theMiddleEast,andCentralAsiafaceacutecost-of-livingpressuresamidelevatedlocalfoodprices.Forexample,inSub-SaharanAfrica,about12percentofthepopulationwasestimatedtobeacutelyfoodinsecurein2022,withstaplefoodpricesintheregionrisingonaveragebycloseto24percentduring2020–22.Thisdenotesthesharpestincreasesincethe2008globalfinancialcrisis.Inthisrespect,IMFstaffestimatesforSub-SaharanAfricasuggestthatinthecaseofhighlyimportedstaples,thepass-throughofchangesinglobaltolocalfoodpricesisone-to-one(Figure5).Inaddition,higherimportcostsof

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Figure4.FoodInsecurity

Globalundernourishment

(millionsofundernourishedpeople)

900

850

800

750

700

650

600

550

500

000204060810121416182022

Sources:BloombergFinance,L.P.;TheIntegratedFood.

SecurityPhaseClassification(IPC);UnitedNationsFoodandAgricultureOrganization;andIMFstaffcalculations.

between2019and2021,thenumberofundernourishedpeoplegloballyincreasedbymorethan150million(Figure4).Moreover,theWorldFoodProgramestimatesthatabout345millionpeopleacrossasampleof79countrieswillbefoodinsecurein2023—almost200millionmorepeoplethaninearly2020.3Inaddition,whilefueltypicallyaccountsforalargershareofexpendituresinhigh-incomehouseholds,low-incomehouseholdsarealsonegativelyimpactedbyenergypriceincreases.Forexample,higherenergypricesleadtohigherpricesofothergoodsinthesupplychainandpushup

Figure5.DriversofFoodPriceInflationinSub-SaharanAfrica

Estimatedeffectsofexternalanddomesticfactorsonrelativepricesofhighlyimportedstaplefoods

(coefficients)

Changeinglobalfoodpriceindex

Consumptionshare

Netimportdependence

Changeinreal

effectiveexchangerate

-1-0.500.511.52

Sources:FAO;C.Okou,J.Spray,andF.Unsal,2022,

“Staple

FoodPricesinSub-SaharanAfrica:AnEmpiricalAssessment.

”Note:Estimatedeffectsonstaplefoodpricesofa1percent

increaseinlistedfactors.Highlyimportedstaples:thosewithnetimportdependenceabove75percent.Sample:15

countries(accountingfor70percentoftheSSApopulation).

2Inlow-incomecountries,theshareoffoodinhouseholdspendingisabout40percent(see

Rotherandothers,2022)

.3

WorldFoodProgram,2023.

4Amaglobeliandothers(forthcoming).

6

MedianandIQRofSD

weakeroutlookforglobalgrowth,particularlyinEurope.6Thatsaid,ashigherenergypricespromptedanincreaseinthesupplyofgasfromoutsideRussiaandareductioninenergydemand—andassizablefiscalsupportwasalsoprovided—theoverallimpactonGDPinEuropehassofarbeencontained.7Inaddition,tighterglobalfinancialconditionsfromnecessarymonetarypolicytighteninginmosteconomiestobringdowninflationiscoolingdemandandeconomicactivity.

7.Inadditiontoelevatedpricelevels,

heightenedvolatilityincommoditytermsoftradegrowthhaslikelyadverselyimpactedgrowth(Figure6).Duringthepast2to3years,

INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND

agriculturalinputssuchasfertilizers,seeds,andfuelcontributedindirectlytofoodpriceinflation.Beyondfluctuationsinglobalfoodprices,changesinlocalfoodpricesineconomiesintheregionalsodependoncross-countryvariationinimportsharesandotherfactors:

•Importshare:EconomiesinSub-SaharanAfricarelyheavilyonimportsofstaplefoods.Between50and85percentofwheat,palmoil,andricearesourcedfromoutsidetheregion.Moreover,IMFstaffhasestimatedthatanincreaseinacountry’snetimportdependenceby1percentagepointincreasesthelocalrelativepricesofahighlyimportedstapleby0.2percentagepoints.5

•Exchangerates:Currencydepreciationcaninflatethecostofimportedstaples.A1percentagepointrealeffectiveexchangeratedepreciationisonaverageassociatedwitha0.3percentagepointincreaseintherelativepriceofhighlyimportedstaples.Moreover,higherinputcosts(e.g.,fertilizers,seeds)inducedbyweakerlocalcurrenciesinsomeeconomies(e.g.,Ghana,Nigeria),includinginthecontextofastrongerUSdollar,alsoraisedthepricesoflocallyproducedstaples(inadditiontotheeffectofdomesticsupplydisruptions).

•Consumptionshare:Ahighershareofimportedstaplefoodsinfoodconsumptionisassociatedwithhigherrelativepricesofstaples.A1percentagepointhigherconsumptionshareofahighlyimportedstapleisassociatedwithanaverage1.2percentagepointhigherrelativelocalprice.

6.Atthesametime,elevatedenergycostshaveweighedonglobaleconomicactivity.Globalgrowthprojectionsfor2022and2023havebeenreviseddownsignificantlyduringthepastyear,from4.4percentand3.8percent,respectively,intheJanuary2022WorldEconomicOutlook(WEO)Updateto3.4and2.9percent,respectivelyintheJanuary2023WEOUpdate.TheimpactofthewarinUkraineonkeyglobalenergymarketshasbeenanimportantforcecontributingtothe

Figure6.TermsofTradeGrowthVolatilityCommodityTOTgrowthvolatility

(standarddeviationofcommodityTOTgrowth)

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

19811991200120112021

Year

Sources:GrussandKebhaj(2019),andIMFstaffcalculations.Note:Medianandinterquartilerangeofstandarddeviationofyear-on-yeargrowthratesofthecommodityTOT,whichhasincreasedsince2019,andmoresoforcommodityexporters.Sample:182countries(62commodityexporters,definedasinCavalcantiandothers,2015).TOT:termsoftrade.

5

Okouandothers,2022.

Ahighlyimportedstapleisdefinedasonewithnetimportdependenceexceeding75percent.6

IMF,2022a.

7

Flanaganandothers,2022.

7

0.2

Physicalcapital

TFP

Humancapital

Income

per

capita

Commodityexporters

0.0

-0.2

-0.4

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Figure7.ImpactofCommodityTermsofTradeVolatilityonActivity

RegressioncoefficientsonCTOTgrowthvolatility

(impactongrowthrateofgivenvariable)

Income

Income

TFP

PhysicalHuman

Income

per

per

capitalcapital

per

capita

capita

capita

All

Commodityexporters

Others

0.008

0.000

-0.008

-0.016

Sources:IMFstaffestimates.

Note:CoefficientsfromGMM(blue),andcross-sectionalARDL(red)regressionsusing5-yearinterval(GMM)andannual(CS-ARDL)datafrom1970-2019.Solidbars:statisticallysignificant.

GMMsample:118countries,ofwhich62commodity

exporters.CS-ARDLsample:62commodityexporters.CTOT:commoditytermsoftrade.SeeAppendix.

Figure8.Long-RunImpactofCommodityTermsofTradeGrowthVolatilityon

HeadlineInflationVolatility

RegressioncoefficientsonCTOTgrowthvolatility

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00

OLS

GMM

CS-ARDL

Sources:IMFstaffestimates.

Note:CTOT:commoditytermsoftrade.Statistically

significantcoefficients;regressionofheadlineinflation

volatility(logsinOLSandGMMcases)on(log)volatilityof

CTOTgrowth.GMMexample:1percentincreaseinthe

standarddeviationofCTOTgrowthincreasesthestandard

deviationofheadlineinflationbyabout0.2percent.OLSand

GMM:controlforopenness,laggedinflation,andtimeand

countryfixedeffects.GMM:instrumentsforopennessand

laggedinflation.OLSandGMMpanelsample:118countries,5-yearnon-overlappingintervals,1972-2022.CS-ARDLpanel

sample:81countries,annual,1979–2019.SeeAppendix.

volatilityinchangestothecommoditytermsof

tradehasrisenmarkedly,includingduetomore

extremeweathereventssuchasdroughtsand

floods.8Inturn,ithasreachedlevelsnotseen

sincethevolatileperiodduringtheglobal

financialcrisis.Thishaslikelyfurtherweighedon

growthincommodityexportingeconomies.In

fact,IMFstaffestimatespointtoanegativeand

significantassociationbetweenhigher

commoditytermsoftradegrowthvolatilityand

percapitaincomegrowthamongcommodity

exportingeconomies.Incontrast,thereisno

significantassociationamongeconomiesthatdo

notrelyoncommodityexports(Figure7).

Further,thelikelyimpactonincomepercapita

appearstobethroughthecapitalaccumulation

channel,includingbothphysicalandhuman

capital.Inpart,thismayreflecttheharmful

impactofvolatilityonfiscalrevenuesin

commodityexportingcountries.Indeed,

evidencesuggeststhatinstitutionsdesignedto

copewithsuchrevenuevolatilityincommodity

exporters—suchassovereignwealthfunds—can

dampenthenegativeimpactongrowth.9

8Highervolatilityofchangestothe

commoditytermsoftrademayalsoincrease

volatilityinheadlineinflation.IMFstaff

estimatessuggestthateconomieswithmore

volatilecommoditytermsoftradegrowth

experiencegreaterheadlineinflationvolatility

overthemediumterm(Figure8).Forexample,

thevolatilityincommoditytermsoftradegrowth

maybelinkedtogreatervolatilityinthepricesof

importedgoods,whichmaycausemorevolatility

indomesticprices,asvolatilityinimportprices

passesthroughtodomesticpricechanges.

8Thisnotefocusesonthevolatilityintermsoftradegrowthfollowingtheresourcecurseliterature,whichconsiderstheimpactonGDPgrowthofboththelevelofcommoditytermsoftradegrowth,andthevolatilityofcommoditytermsoftradegrowth(e.g.,Cavalcanti,Mohaddes,andRaissi,JournalofAppliedEconometrics,2015).TheresultsontheimpactofcommoditytermsoftradegrowthvolatilityonpercapitaGDPgrowthshowninthenoteextendtheaforementionedstudybeyonditsoriginalsampleperiod(1970–2007).SeeFigure7andAppendix1fordetails.

9

MohaddesandRaissi,2017.

8

Figure9.ChinaandCommodityImports

Chinesecommodityimports,2021

(percentofworldtotal)

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Corn

Beef

Crudeoil

Lead

Copper

Soybeans

Tin

Aluminum

Ironore

Nickel

Sources:UNComtrade;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Figure10.PassthroughfromEnergytoInternationalFoodPrices

CIRFofinternationalfoodpricesto10percent

shocktofertilizerpricesandoilprices

(percent)

20

10

0

-10

-20

0123