ITIF-平台是新的组织范式 Platforms Are the New Organizational Paradigm 2023

PlatformsAretheNew

OrganizationalParadigm

ROBERTD.ATKINSONANDAURELIENPORTUESE|MARCH2023

Justastherewasoppositiontothecorporateeconomyintheearly1900s,thereisoppositiontotheplatformeconomytoday.Butlimiting“platformization”wouldhaveconsiderablelong-lastingeconomiccostsforthenationandconsumers.

KEYTAKEAWAYS

1Corporateformevolvesinresponsetoexternalforces,particularlytechnology.ThelatestevolutionistheIT-enabledplatform,whichmaymakesenseinawidevarietyofindustriesandfunctions,includingbanking,travel,education,law,andmedicine.

1IT-basedplatformsnaturallytendtowardconcentration,withoneortwocompaniesholdingmostofthemarketshare.Throughthisscaleandefficiency,theyoftenprovidehigherqualityandlowercoststhanamoredispersedmarketwould.

1Aswiththelasttwomajortransitions—theriseofcorporationsintheearly1900s,then“managerialcorporations”afterWorldWarII—theriseoftheplatformeconomytodayisbeneficialfortheeconomyandsociety,butithasstirreddiscontent.

1Criticismfrom“muckrakers,”smallbusinesses,andpoliticiansintheearly1900sproducedtheShermanandClaytonantitrustacts.Butcourtsinthaterafocusedmostlyonabusivecorporatebehavior,includingtrusts,notmarketshareitself.

1Thepost-WWIIpolicyresponseto“managerialcorporations”causedfarmoreharm,leadingtothedeclineorextinctionofamanytechnologicallyadvancedU.S.firms.Today’soppositiontoplatformsalsoposesaseverechallengetoAmerica’sfuture.

1Antitrustmustrecognizethatbelow-costpricingcanbebeneficialtoconsumers,developnewrulestobetteraccountforplatformmarketdynamics,andanalyzeallegationsofanticompetitivebehaviorbasedonconductratherthansize.

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CONTENTS

KeyTakeaways 1

Introduction 2

BusinessFormAftertheCivilWar 3

OppositiontotheIndustrialCorporation 4

OrganizationalFormAfterWorldWarII 7

OppositiontotheManagerialcorporation 9

TheRiseofthePlatformEconomy? 14

OppositiontothePlatformEconomy 16

AntitrustforthePlatformEconomy 18

IsOverallSocialWelfareHigherorLowerWithMoreCompetitors? 18

ThePotentialofSchumpeterianDisruption 19

TheNeedforEvidenceofAnyAnticompetitiveConduct 21

Conclusion 21

Endnotes 22

INTRODUCTION

Businessorganizationscantakemanyforms,fromfounder-ledtomultidivisionalmultinationalstoemergingIT-enabledplatforms.Theprevailingorganizationalforminbusinessisneithersetinstonenordecideduponbyfad.Itislargelyaresultofthetechnologicalandeconomicconditionsofthetime.TherewerenolargeU.S.corporationsbeforetheemergenceoftherailroadbecausetheproductionsystemneitherrequirednorenabledscale,whichcorporationsaredesignedtomanage.WhenrailandindustrialproductiontechnologiesevolvedaftertheCivilWar,largecorporationsbecamethenorm.JusticeLouisBrandeisandotheropponentsofthesenewcorporationssoughttosquelchthemintheirinfancy,preferringaprioreconomydominatedbyowner-led,smallandmid-sizedfirms.EvenwiththepassageoftheShermanAct,theiroppositionwaslargelystillborn;thebenefitsofthecorporationweresimplytoovast.However,hadtheBrandeisianssucceededintheirquesttoturnbacktimeAmericawouldnotbetheglobaleconomicleaderitistoday.

Wearepotentiallyatasimilartransformativepointinhistory,withdigitaltechnologiesenablingtheriseofanewkindofproductiveorganization:theplatform.Digitalplatforms,notjustintheinformationsector,havethepotentialtotransformmanyindustriesforthebetter:raisingproductivity,improvingqualityandconsumerchoice,andreducingprices.Butjustastherewassignificantoppositionagainstthetransitiontothecorporateeconomy,todaythereissignificantoppositiontotheplatformeconomy,althoughthistimenotamongthepopulacebutratheramongtheelites:activists,publicintellectualsandacademics,andelectedofficialsofbothparties.Iftheirattemptstorollbackthe“platformization”oftheU.S.economysucceed,theeconomiccoststothenationandtoconsumerswouldbeconsiderableandlong-lasting.

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Thisreportassessesthepasttwomajorchangesincorporateform,andthepublicandgovernmentresponsestothem.Itthenexaminestheprospectandpotentialbenefitsofthe“platformization”oftheeconomy,aswellascurrentopposition.Finally,itdiscussesthevarietyofpolicyapproachesproposedtoaddressplatformgovernanceandwhymostwillleadtomoreharmthangood.

BUSINESSFORMAFTERTHECIVILWAR

Largecorporationsseemtobeaforceofnature.Infact,forthefirst100yearsoftheRepublic,theyplayedaminimalroleintheeconomy.Priortothe1880s–1890sindustrialrevolution,virtuallyallfirmsweresmall,local,orregional,andfamily-ownedandrun.Forexample,in1860,Pittsburghboasted17foundries,21rollingmills,76glassfactories,and47othermanufacturingestablishments,butnonewereincorporatedandalmostallweresmall.

1

BeforetheCivilWar,therewerefewmanufacturingplantswithmorethan500workers,asthecorporationhadnotyetbeenwidelyadoptedasthelegalformofbusiness.

Iftheirattemptstorollbackthe“platformization”oftheU.S.economysucceed,theeconomiccoststothenationandtoconsumerswouldbeconsiderableandlong-lasting.

Thereasonforthiswasthreefold.First,gettinggoodstomarketwasexpensive,soitmadelittlesenseforestablishmentstogetbiggerandproducelargequantities.Second,therewasextremelylimitedcommunication,whichmademanagingmulti-establishmententerprisesextremelydifficult.Finally,machinerywasquitelimited,makingithardtodomorethanonlylimitedcraftproduction.Withtheselimitations,thecorporateformwasnotneeded.

Withthedevelopmentofsteamenginesandcheaperandbetterironandsteel,thetelegraph(andthenthetelephone)andrailroadsemergedandbecauseofthecapitalcostsinvolvedandgeographicscaleneeded,becamethefirstlargecorporations.Railroadsthenenabledtheemergenceofbroaderregionalmarkets,lettingfewerandlargerfirmsgainscaleandexpandoutput.Asnewtechnologiesemerged,moreindustriesevolvedintomassproductionindustries(e.g.,ironandsteel,textiles,ceramics,agriculturalequipment,etc.)whichinturnenabledandrequiredlargerenterprisesthattookadvantageofeconomiesofscale.Atthesametime,theemergenceofnewindustriesbasedonnewtechnologies(chemicals,sewingmachines,electricalequipment,machinetools,autos,etc.)meantthatscalewastheorderoftheday.AllthismeansthattheU.S.economyledtheworldbecauseofitsembraceofthelargecorporation.

By1900,thecorporateform,especiallyintransportationandproduction,hadbecomedominant.Forexample,halftheworld’sglassandironandtwo-thirdsofthesteelcamefromPittsburgh’sfactories,mostofthemmedium-sizedtolargecorporations.Thelargestcompanyoftheday,USSteel,wasformedfromaplanhatchedbyJ.P.MorganandCarnegieSteel’spresidenttomergeCarnegieSteelwithMorgan’snumbertwo-sizedFederalSteeltomakeUSSteelthenation’sfirstbillion-dollarcompany.Duetotheunprecedentedsizeofthisnewcorporation,financiersonWallStreetgaveitthenickname“TheCorporation.”By1920,thereweremorethan10,000manufacturingplantswithmorethan500workers.

Firmsdidnotgetbiggerbecausetheirownersacquiredanewtasteforwealthandpower.Rather,thenewtechnologylet—infact,required—establishmentstogrowtohithertounprecedented

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size.Thelargerthefactoryorthecorporation,themoreefficientitcouldbecomeandthemoreitcoulddrivedowncostsandgrowevenmore.Thecostreductionsresultingfromfactoryoperationsandgeographicconcentrationofproductionoverwhelmedmade-to-orderandsmall-volumeproductioninindustryafterindustry.

Untiltheemergenceofthefactoryeconomy,therewasnostraightforwardlegalformthatwasappropriatetosuchsize.Asthetechnologysystemmadeitpossibleforindustrytobecomelarger,companiesinitiallyturnedtotrustsasawaytobecomebig.Trustsweremadeupofstockholdersofindividualsmallerfirmsthatgavetheirstocktoacentralboardintrust.Thoughtrustsweresometimesusedtoengageinanticompetitivebehavior,theyneverthelessreflectedanunderlyingrealitythatefficientproductionrequiredincreasedsizeandcoordination.

However,lawcaughtuptotheeconomicsystem.Theenactmentin1889oftheNewJerseycorporationlawthatallowedcompaniestobuystockinothercorporations,alongwiththepassageoftheShermanActin1890thatoutlawedtrusts,gavewaytomergersbetweenseparatecorporations.By1904,oneortwogiantfirms,usuallyputtogetherbymerger,controlledatleasthalftheoutputin78differentindustries.In1896,therewerefewerthan12firmsworth$10million,butby1904thereweremorethan300.

Bythelate19thandearly20thcenturies,theadvantagesoflargecorporationswerewidelyrecognizedbyleadingAmericaneconomists.JohnBatesClarkobservedthatlargeindustrialcompanieswere:

theresultofanevolution,andthehappyoutcomeofacompetitionsoabnormalthatthecontinuanceofitwouldhavemeantwidespreadruin.Asuccessfulattempttosuppressthembylawwouldinvolvethereversionofindustrialsystemstoacast-offtype,therenewalofabusesfromwhichsocietyhasescapedbyastepindevelopment.

2

TheeconomistandleaderoftheprogressivemovementRichardT.Elyagreedthat“owingtodiscoveriesandinventions,especiallytheapplicationofsteamtoindustryandtransportation,itbecamenecessarytoprosecuteenterprisesofgreatmagnitude.”

3

Bythelate19thandearly20thcenturies,theadvantagesoflargecorporationswerewidelyrecognizedbyleadingAmericaneconomists.

OPPOSITIONTOTHEINDUSTRIALCORPORATION

WhilemanyAmericans,especiallyeconomists,recognizedtheenormousbenefitsoflargecorporationstothenation,especiallyintermsofraisingwagesandlivingstandards,changeishardandsomemuckrakers,interestgroups(mostlysmallbusinesses),andpoliticalfiguresdecriedtheriseofthecorporation.

MoreandmoreAmericansbegantodistrustthisnewandunprecedentedformofcorporateorganization.Indeed,indocumentingtheemergenceofthelargecorporation,AlfredChandlerarguesthatbefore1940,thesechangeswerealmostcertainlyopposedbyamajorityoftheAmericanpeople.

4

Inaddition,manysmallbusinessownerssawthecorporationasadistinctthreat.Asaresult,manyofthenewregulatoryinitiativesputinplacebetween1880and1920,

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includingtheShermanandClaytonantitrustacts,werespurredbysmall-businessleadersresistingthechangesbroughtonbythefactoryrevolution.

5

Oneofthemostprominentcriticsoftheshifttoacorporate,industrialeconomywasthephilosopherandsocialcriticWilliamJames.Hestatedhiscaseagainsttheemergentneweconomy:

Asforme,mybedismade:Iamagainstbignessandgreatnessinallforms,andwiththeinvisiblemolecularmoralforcesthatworkfromindividualtoindividual,stealinginthroughthecranniesoftheworldlikesomanysoftrootlets,orlikethecapillaryoozingofwater,andyetrenderingthehardestmonumentsofman’spride,ifyougivethemtime.Thebiggertheunityoudealwith,thehollower,themorebrutal,themoremendaciousisthelifedisplayed.SoIamagainstallbigorganizationsassuch,nationalonesfirstandforemost;againstallbigsuccessesandbigresults;andinfavoroftheeternalforcesoftruthwhichalwaysworkintheindividualandimmediatelyunsuccessfulway,underdogsalways,tillhistorycomes,aftertheyarelongdeadandputsthemontop.

6

IdaTarbell’smuckrakingexposéofStandardOilmadeAmericansawareoftheruthlesspracticesofJohnD.Rockefelleranddocumentedhisuseoflegalandillegalmeanstocrushhiscompetitors,evenifoverallproductivitymighthaverisenasaresult.Theemergenceoftheselargetrustsdominatedtheimaginationoffriendsandfoesalike.Tarbellstatedthattherapidlychangingeconomiclandscapeandtheriseofmonopolistictrustswas“disturbingandconfusingpeople.”

7

Inthefaceofsuchconcerns,Congresswasarousedtopassantitrustlaws.Butfarfrombreakinguplargefirms,thelawsinsomewaysencouragedmergers.Whatwasoutlawedweretrusts.

Opponentsevenarguedthatnotonlydidtrustsandbigcorporationsunfairlydominatesmallbusinessandfarmers,buttheywereactuallynomoreefficientthanthesmallbusinessestheyputoutofbusiness.Beforehebecameasupremecourtjustice,LouisBrandiesarguedinafamousratecaseagainsttherailroadsthatbigrailroadswereeconomicallyinefficient.Infact,Brandiesarguedthatmedium-sizedcompaniesingeneralweremostefficient.

8

Heandhisalliesmadethisargumentbecausetheyknewthatthestrongestcasefortheindustrialcorporationwasthevastincreasesinefficiencytheyproduced.Indeed,Brandeiswenttogreatpainstotrytopaintsmallfirmsasbeingasefficientaslargeoneswere,declaringintestimonybeforetheU.S.Senatein1911,forexample,that“acorporationmaywellbetoolargetobethemostefficientinstrumentofproductionandofdistribution.”

9

Inaddition,heandothersarguedthatcorporationsonlygotbigbycheating.AstheeconomichistorianThomasK.McGrawwrote,“Earlyinhiscareer,Brandeisdecidedthatbigbusinesscouldbecomebigonlythroughillegitimatemeans.Byhisfrequentreferencestothe‘curseofbigness,’hemeantthatbignessitselfwasthemarkofCain,asignofpriorsinning.”

10

Inthefaceofsuchconcerns,Congresswasarousedtopassantitrustlaws.Butfarfrombreakinguplargefirms,thelawsinsomewaysencouragedmergers.Whatwasoutlawedweretrusts.Sincefirmscouldnolongergetthebenefitsofcoordinationfromtrusts,theysoughtthemoutthrough

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mergers.In1896,therewerefewerthan12firmsworth$10million,butby1904,thereweremorethan300,mostcreatedthroughmergers.

UnlikeBrandeisandotherpopulists,manyAmericanpoliticalleaderssupportedlargefirmsandmergersbecausetheysawthemasthepathtoAmericangreatness.Forexample,today,TheodoreRooseveltisoftenrememberedonlyasatrustbuster.Butthisisadistortionofhistory,ashedistinguishedbetween“good”and“bad”trustsandpreferredfederallicensingandregulationofcorporationstotheadversarialmethodsofantitrustlitigation.Inhis1905AnnualMessagetoCongress,Rooseveltdeclared:

Iaminnosensehostiletocorporations.Thisisanageofcombination,andany

efforttopreventcombinationwillnotbeuseless,butintheendvicious,because

ofthecontemptforlawwhichthefailuretoenforcelawinevitablyproduces.We

should,moreover,recognizeincordialandamplefashiontheimmensegood

effectedbycorporateagenciesinacountrysuchasours,andthewealthof

intellect,energy,andfidelitydevotedtotheirservice,andthereforenormallyto

theserviceofthepublic,bytheirofficersanddirectors.Thecorporationhascome

tostay,justasthetradeunionhascometostay.Eachcanandhasdonegreat

good.Eachshouldbefavoredsolongasitdoesgood.Buteachshouldbesharply

checkedwhereitactsagainstlawandjustice.

11

Rooseveltinsistedthatbusiness“cannotbesuccessfullyconductedinaccordancewiththe

practicesandtheoriesofsixtyyearsagounlessweabolishsteam,electricity,bigcities,and,in

short,notonlyallmodernbusinessandmodernindustrialconditions,butallthemodern

conditionsofourcivilization.”

12

ThehistorianMartinJ.Skylarnotedthat“Roosevelt’spositionwasnotthatof‘Trust-Buster’but

of‘Trust-Muster’—hewouldmusterthetrustsintothenationalservice.”

13

AsthelegalscholarDanielA.Cranenoted,“By1912,Rooseveltwasstakingapositionagainst

anytrustbustingatall.Farfromhonoringhis‘trustbuster’moniker,Rooseveltarguedforjustthe

opposite—thelegalityoflargecombinationsofcapital,nonethelesssubjecttopervasive

governmentalregulation.”

14

Indeed,althoughhisadministrationhadbroughttheantitrustcaseagainstStandardOil,RooseveltprivatelyregrettedthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtin1911tobreakupthecompany:

IdonotmyselfseewhatgoodcancomefromdissolvingtheStandardOilCompanyintofortyseparatecompanies,allofwhichwillstillremainreallyunderthesamecontrol.Whatweshouldhaveisamuchstrictergovernmentalsupervisionofthesegreatcompanies,butaccompanyingthissupervisionshouldbearecognitionofthefactthatgreatcombinationshavecometostayandthatwemustdothemscrupulousjusticejustasweexactscrupulousjusticefromthem.

15

TheShermanAntitrustActof1890declaredthat“everycontract,combinationintheformoftrustorotherwise,orconspiracyinrestraintoftradeamongtheseveralstates...wasillegal.”

16

Asaresult,thefocuswasmoreonanticompetitiveconductthanitwasonstructure(e.g.,

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breakingupfirms).WeseethisintheProgressivePartynationalplatformfrom1900whichstated:

WefavorstrengtheningtheShermanLawbyprohibitingagreementtodivideterritoryorlimitoutput;refusingtoselltocustomerswhobuyfrombusinessrivals;tosellbelowcostincertainareaswhilemaintaininghigherpricesinotherplaces;usingthepoweroftransportationtoaidorinjurespecialbusinessconcerns;andotherunfairtradepractices.

17

Andthecourtsdidfocusmostlyonabusivebehaviortoattainorretainmarketshare,notpossessionofsignificantmarketshareitself.AstheSupremeCourtwroteintheAlcoacaseof1945,“Thesuccessfulcompetitor,havingbeenurgedtocompete,mustnotbeturneduponwhenhewins.”

18

Indeed,asappliedbythecourts,antitrustlawenforcementintheearly20thcenturyfrequentlyfellheavilyonsmallbusinesses,manyofwhichwouldendupgettingchargedwithcollusion.

ORGANIZATIONALFORMAFTERWORLDWARII

Manyseetheriseofindustrial-eracompaniesasonedevelopmentfromthe1880stothepresent.Therealityisthatwhilethepost-CivilWarcorporationsrepresentedasignificantevolutionfromthemerchant-erafamilyenterprise,theywerestillafarcryfromthelargemanagerialcorporationsthatbecamethestandardafterWorldWarII.Startinginthe1930s,corporateformonceagainchangedwiththeriseofwhatChandlertermedthe“managerialcorporation.”

Pre-WWII,mostdecisionscontinuedtobemadeininformalways,withownersandtopmanagersactingontheirownintuitionandlimitedinformation.Strictandclearlinesofauthoritywerenotlaidout,anddecisionsdependedonpersonalprioritiesanddiscretion.Unlikethecorporationofthe1950s,withitslargemassesofmiddlemanagersandsupervisors,asmallgroupofmanagersoversawthousandsofworkers.Chandlernotedthat“theCarnegieCorporationdidlittletocoordinateitsvariousmining,shippingandmanufacturingunits,whichremainedseparatecompaniesunderindependentmanagement.”

19

Mostcorporationswereone-productcompaniesrunbytheirownersandasmallexecutivecadre.Itwasnotuntiltheemergenceofthepost-WWIIeconomythatthepracticeofmanagementbecamethestandard.Asaresult,by1948,thecorporatesectorheldalmost60percentofnationalincome-producingwealth,andthelargest200employersaccountedfor20percentofprivatenonagriculturalworkers.By1950,the200largestnonfinancialcorporationsaccountedfor40.3percentofvalueadded.In1901,onlyonecorporation,USSteel,hadover$1billioninassets.By1960,638corporationshadmorethan$1billioninassets(inconstantdollars).Bignesswastheorderoftheday.

20

Startinginthe1930s,corporateformonceagainchangedwiththeriseofwhatChandlertermedthe“managerialcorporation.”

Thereweretwootherkeychanges.First,corporateformbeforeWWIIwaslargelyinfinanceandmanufacturing.AfterWWII,itextendedtomanyothersectors,suchasretail,hospitality,construction,andbusinessservices.AshistorianRobertGriffithstated,“Bythemiddleofthetwentiethcentury,corporatereorganizationoftheeconomyhadtakenplace.”

21

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Inthe1960s,Galbraithcapturedthechange:

Seventyyearsagothecorporationwasconfinedtothoseindustries—railroading,steamboating,steelmaking,petroleumrecoveryandrefining,somemining—where,itseemedproductionhadtobeonalargescale.Nowitalsosellsgroceries,millsgrain,publishesnewspapersandprovidespublicentertainment,allactivitiesthatwereoncetheprovinceoftheindividualproprietorortheinsignificantfirm.

22

Second,scientificandengineeringdiscoverybecamemoreimportantforcompetitiveadvantage,asmanycorporationsafterthe1920sdevelopeddedicatedresearchanddevelopment(R&D)labs.Thesourcesofinnovationchangedfrombeingbasedlargelyontechnicaltinkeringandtrialanderrorbymechanicsandinventorsworkingintheirgaragestoascience-basedoneincorporatelaboratorieswhereinnovationwasderivedfromamorefundamentalunderstandingofunderlyingprocesses.

23

AsJosephSchumpeterargued,“Technologicalprogressisincreasinglybecomingthebusinessofteamsoftrainedspecialistswhoturnoutwhatisrequiredandmakeitworkinpredictableways.”

24

Asaresult,R&Dexpendituresskyrocketedby400percentbetween1953and1964.Forexample,Dupont’sR&Dexpendituresincreasedfromaround$1millionperyearin1921toover$60millionbythemid-1950s.

25

R&Dlaboratoriesincreasedfromaround1,000in1927—withfewdoingbasicresearch—toalmost5,000in1956,withmany,suchasBellLabsconductingextensivebasicresearch.

26

Onereflectionofthisisthefactthatin1901therewere20,896patentsissuedtoindividuals,withonly4,650goingtocorporations.Thesebalancedoutbythe1930s,butbythemid-1950s,thecorporateratehadtakenoff.By1980,corporationshadobtainedaboutfivetimesmorepatentsthanindividuals.

Bythe1950s,bigcorporationshadbecomeawayoflifeandAmericanshadgrownusedtothem.Professionalmanagersnowrancorporations,somuchsothattheperiodbecameknownasthe“eraofmanagerialcapitalism.”Here,ownershipandmanagementbecameseparated,inlargepartbecause,ascompaniesbecamemuchlargerandmoretechnologicallysophisticated,therewasaneedforlargeranksofprofessionalmanagerstorunthem.Yet,ascorporationsgrew,becameevermorecomplex,andhadavastlyincreasedneedformanagementandadministration,theybecamecontrolledbyanewclassofprofessionalmanagers.

Thecompletionofthecontinentalrailsystem,telephony,airtravel,andtheinterstateenabledatrulyintegratednationalmarketthatinturnenabledscale.Atthesametime,awidearrayofnewprocesstechnologies(technologiesinvolvedinmakingproducts)enabledandrequiredlargerandmoresophisticatedcompanies.Finally,theriseofcomputing(initiallymainframes)andtelecommunicationsallowedcompaniestomuchmoreeasilymanagelargeamountsofcomplexdata.Indeed,thatpostwar“mixedeconomy”wassodifferentfromtheonethatprecededitthatanissueofFortunemagazineinOctober1955wasdevotedtothe“NewEconomy”anddealt

withthe“Americanbreakthrough”andthe“newmanagement.”

27

Finally,asChandlernoted:

Inthefirstdecadeofthetwentiethcentury,thecontrolofthelargecorporationwas,infact,theparamountpoliticalquestionoftheday.Theprotestagainstthenewtypeofbusinessenterprisewasledbymerchants,smallmanufacturers,andotherbusinessmen,includingcommercialfarmers,whofelttheireconomic

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intereststhreatenedbythenewinstitu