布鲁盖尔研究所-冠状病毒疾病与远程工作转移英

PolicyContribution

Issuen˚09/22|June2022

COVID-19andtheshiftto

remotework

J.ScottMarcus

Executivesummary

J.Scottmarcus(scott.

marcus@)isa

SeniorFellowatBruegel

COVID-19hasacceleratedtheshifttoremotework.Enablingknowledgeworkerstodo

theirjobsfromhomeorelsewherebringsbenefitsbyincreasinglabourparticipation,avoid-

ingunproductivecommutingtime(thusreducingthecarbonfootprint),andreducingthe

gendergapbyenablingsingleparentsorpartnerswithdomestic-careresponsibilitiestowork.

AversionofthisPolicy

Contributionwillbe

publishedasachapterin

Whalley,J.,V.Stockerand

W.Lehr(eds)(2023)Beyond

thePandemic?Exploring

theimpactofCovid-19

ontelecommunications

andtheinternet,Emerald

Publishing,forthcoming

Notalljobsaresuitableforremotework,butfarmoreremoteworkisfeasiblethanwas

typicalpriortothepandemic.

Thepost-pandemicnewnormalissuretodifferbothfromthepre-pandemicnormaland

fromcurrentarrangements.Hybridarrangementsinwhichpartoftheweekisspentatthe

office,andpartathome,arelikelytobecomethenorm.

Employers,workers,educators,tradeunionsandgovernmentswillneedto

adapttothenewnormal.Foremployersandmanagers,thechangeemphasisestheneedto

managebasedonresultsratherthanhoursworked,andlikelyimpliesmanychangesinhow

theymanagetheiremployees.Workerswillneedtobeflexibleinordertocapitaliseonthe

newopportunitiesintheevolvingworldofwork,andtoensuretheyhavesuitableskillsforre-

motework.Educatorswillneedtofurtheremphasisedigitalskills,andtoacceleratetheshift

fromtraditionaleducationtolifelonglearning.Tradeunionswillneedtore-thinkhowthey

recruitworkerswhodonotseeeachothereveryday,andhowtheycanrespondtoevolving

socialprotectionneeds.Policymakerswillneedtodealwithdistributionaleffectsdrivenby

theshifttoremotework,toprotectthework-lifebalancethatremoteworkpotentiallyerodes,

andtoseektoensurethattheshifttoremoteworkdoesnoterodesocialprotection.

Recommendedcitation

Marcus,J.S.(2022)‘COVID-19andtheshifttoremotework',PolicyContribution09/2022,

Bruegel

1Introduction

IfapandemiclikeCOVID-19hademergedthirtyorfortyyearsearlier,theimpactontheglob-aleconomywouldlikelyhavebeenvastlygreater.Theshiftinmanydevelopedeconomiestoproducemoreservicesandrelativelyfewergoods,thecorrespondingshiftofthelabourforcetoincreasingrelianceonknowledgeworkers,andtheprogressiveenhancementofremotecollaborationtechnologieshavetogetherenabledaprofoundtransformationofthework-place.Byenablingknowledgeworkerstoworkfromhome,orindeedanyotherconvenientlocation,duringthepandemic,ahighlevelofproductivitywasmaintainedinmanyeconomicsectorswithoutputtingtheworkersatriskofinfection.

Thepandemichasthusacceleratedanimportantandpositiveevolutioninthenatureofwork–thoughthisisnottodisregardthehugepricehumanityhaspaid.COVID-19hasacceleratedshiftstoremoteworkintheEuropeanUnion(Ahrendtetal,2021;Eurofound,2020)andintheUnitedStates(Barreroetal,2021).Ithasalsoboostedteleconferencingandtelemedicine.Thetechnologytodomoreremotelyhasbeenaroundforyears,perhapsfordecades,butinstitutionalrigiditiespreventedthemfrombeingfullyexploited.Nowfirmsandindividualshavehadnochoicebuttoadapt,theyhavefoundthatenhanceddigitaltools,especiallydigitalpresenceandteleconferencingtools,provideworkablesolutions.

Thesechangesinbehaviourarelikelytobefairlydurablebeyondthepandemic.Hybridarrangementsarelikelytoproliferate,wheretheoldco-existswitharichermixofthenew.Manyknowledgeworkerswillspendpartoftheweekattheoffice,andtherestathomeoranywhereelsetheychoose.

InthisPolicyContribution,wefocusondevelopedcountrieswhereknowledgeworkersrepresentasubstantialfractionoftheworkforce,becauseitisindevelopedcountriesthattheproportionofknowledge-intensiveoccupationsishigh(OjalaandPyoria,2018,p.402),andwheretheshiftofknowledgeworkerstoremoteworkhasconsequentlybeenmostvisible.TheshifttoremoteworkhasplayedaparticularlynoteworthyroleinmitigatingtheimpactoftheCOVID-19pandemicintheUnitedStates,theEUandinanumberofotherOECDeconomies.

Webeginbydiscussingremoteworktrendsthatwerevisiblepriorto,andduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.Akeyquestion,giventhatmostofthenecessaryingredientswerealreadyinplacetenyearsagoormore,iswhydidn’tthistransformationoccursooner?Wethenconsiderwhatthelastingimpactofchangingworktrendsmightbe.Weconcludebysummarisingkeyfindingsandnotingtheirimplicationsforpublicpolicy.

2Trendsvisibletodate

Priortothepandemic,remoteworkhadalreadybeengrowingamonghighlyskilledknowl-edgeworkers.Thetechnologicalenablerswerealreadyinplaceandthebenefitswerealreadycleartomanyknowledgeworkers.Nonetheless,remoteworkgrewatonlyaglacialpaceformanyyears.Withthepandemic,thesituationchangedveryquickly.

Theshifthashowevermanifesteddifferentlyindifferentsectorsandfordifferentgroups,primarilybecausesometasksaremoresuitableforremoteworkthanothers.

2.1Remoteworkbyknowledgeworkers

Whatismeantby‘remotework’,whatkindofremoteworkhasgrownduetothepandemic,andwhatismeantbyknowledgeworkers?

‘Remotework’,‘workfromhome’(WFH),‘teleworking’andmorearesometimesusedasiftheywereinterchangeable,buttheyarenotidenticalinmeaning.Wefocusonremoteworkconductedbyknowledgeworkers,whichissimilartoworkfromhomeinthattheworkis

2PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

performedatalocationotherthantheemployer’spremises,butremoteworkincludesworkperformedatalocationotherthanthehome.

Remoteworkisbestunderstoodasasub-classofmulti-locationalwork.Formostworkers,theemployer’spremisesplayanimportantrole.Manyworkershavenonethelessregularlyworkedatlocationsotherthanthepremisesoftheiremployerwithoutnecessarilybeingknowledgeworkers(egintransportation,agricultureandfisheries,orconstruction).Thecircumstancesoftheseworkersmightnotbeverydifferentduringorafterthepandemicthantheywerebefore.

OjalaandPyoria(2018,pp.407-408)identifiedknowledgeworkersbasedonacombina-tionoffactors.Theytreatedautonomyintheworkprocessasrepresentingthecoreofknowl-edgework;togetherwiththeworker’slevelofeducation,itisakeyhallmarkofaknowledgeworker.Thefactorstheyusedtoidentifythoseformsofmulti-locationalworkthatconstituteknowledgeworkwere:

•Theworker’slevelofskills(whichmaydifferfromthelevelthatthejobrequires);

•Theworker’sautonomy:

−Autonomyinworkpractices;thatis,inchoosingorchanging:

•Theorderoftasks;

•Thespeedorrateofwork;and

•Methodsofwork;

−Autonomyinworkcontent:

•Involvementinimprovingtheworkorganisationorworkprocesses;

•Involvementinthechoiceofworkingpartners;

•Abilitytoapplyone’sownideasinone’sownwork;and

•Abilitytoinfluencedecisionsthatareimportantinthework;and

•Theworker’suserofICTs.

Thekindofremoteworkgreatlyacceleratedbythepandemicisthatoftheseknowledgeworkers.Thedegreeofeducationisclearlyahallmarkofthistrend.Surveyresultshelpdecomposethedifferentformsofmulti-locationalwork.Eurofound’sEuropeanWorkingConditionsSurvey(EWCS,Eurofound,2017)distinguishesamongsixworklocations:theemployer’spremises,theclient’spremises,vehicles,outsidesites,publicspacesandthehome.AnalysisofEurofoundEWCSsurveydatafrom2016byOjalaandPyoria(2018)showedthatsomeindividualsateacheducationlevelmayspendsomefractionoftheirtimeawayfromtheiremployer’spremises,butthosewithtertiaryeducationaremostlikelytospendtimeworkingfromhome:21percentversus10percentofthosewithonlysecondaryeduca-tionand9percentofthosewithonlybasiceducation1.

1Sincethequestionisformulatedtoidentifywhichworksitesareused,thenumbersaddtomorethan100percent.

3PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

Figure1:Educationalattainmentandwhereworkisperformed(EU,2015)

Employer’spremises

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Basiceducation

Home

Client’s

premises

spaces

Public

Vehicles

sites

Outside

Secondaryeducation

Employer’spremises

Home

premises

Client’s

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Vehicles

Publicspaces

Outsidesites

Tertiaryeducation

Employer’spremises

100%

Home

Client’spremises

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

Vehicles

Publicspaces

Outsidesites

Source:BruegelbasedonOjalaandPyoria(2018).

2.2Anecessaryshift

Aspreviouslynoted,theshifttoremoteworkhasmainlyhappenedindevelopedcountries,becauseitisinthosecountrieswherelargenumbersofknowledgeworkerswhocouldpo-tentiallyworkfromhomearetobefound.Thosedevelopedcountriesandregions,notablyincludingtheEUandtheUS,willneedtobehighlyproductivepost-crisistomakeupgroundlostinthecourseofthepandemic,butexperienceinrecentdecadesisnotencouraging.TheOECD(2019,p.57)foundthatpre-pandemiclabourproductivity(calculatedbytheOECDforthispurposeasGDPperhourworked)variedgreatlyamongOECDmembercountries;moreover,therateofimprovementinlabourproductivityhasbeendeclininginnearlyalldevelopedcountriesoverthepasttwentyyears2.

Makingitpossibleforworkerstodotheirjobsfromhomepotentiallycanhavebothpositiveandnegativeeffectsonworkerproductivity.Theneteffectsarehoweverdifficulttojudge.AsGascoigne(2020,p.4)noted,“productivityishardtomeasureandtocompareacrossdifferenttypesofwork.Knowledgeworkinparticular–thekindofworkmostoftendonefromhome–iscomplexandintangible,meaningthatwehavenoobjectiveevidenceontherelativeproductivityofknowledgeworkersbasedathomeorintheoffice.”

Ingeneralterms,theOECDhasnotedthatremotework“canimproveorhamperfirmper-formance,withitsoveralleffectdependingimportantlyontwomainchannels:Adirectchannelaffectsfirmperformancethroughchangingtheefficiency,motivationandknowledgecreationoftheworkforce;anindirectchannelisforteleworktofacilitatecostreductionsthatfreeupresourcesforproductivityenhancinginnovationandreorganisation”(OECD,2020,p.11).

Morespecifically,ontheplusside,remoteworkcanincreaselabourproductivityand

2Comparingtheperiod1998-2007totheperiod2008-2017,labourproductivity(measuredasGDPperhourworked)declinedineverysingleOECDcountrywiththeexceptionsofSpainandIreland(seepage57ofOECD,2019).

4PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

Sometimes

Usually

66.9

8.4.

505.45.54948494851525.4

9

0

labourparticipationinmanydifferentways.Itavoidsunproductivetimecommutingtowork.Basedonsurveyresults,Barreroetal(2021,p.4)estimatedanoverallproductivitygainof4.6percentintheUSA,allbut1percentofwhichisduetoreducedcommutingtime.WFHcanalsoenableapresentlynon-workingspouseorpartner(whomightotherwiseneedforinstancetoberesponsibleforchildcare)orasingleparenttoworkfromhome,thusincreas-inglabourparticipation.

Onthedownside,distractionsmaybegreaterwhenworkingfromhomecomparedtoworkinginanoffice,particularlyforthosewhohavechildrenathome(althoughthisconcernmightbelessinapost-pandemicworld).ItismoreovercommontoassumethatWFHislessproductivethantraditionalofficeworkbecauseemployeeinteractionislost,andwithitmanyformsofinnovation;however,theevidenceforthiswidelyheldpresumptionappearstobethinnerthanistypicallyassumed3.

MultiplestudiesintheEUandUSshowthatWFHtendstoresultinmorehoursworkedperweek(seeforinstanceBarreroetal,2021),whichshouldtendtoincreaseproductivityoverall.However,atleastonecasestudyfoundthatthisgainwasoffsetinthefirminquestionbyreducedproductivityperhour(Gibbsetal,2021).

2.3Ashiftthatwaslongincoming

Overthepastdecade,theprevalenceofremoteworkintheEUhasgrownsubstantially,butnotnearlyasmuchaswastechnicallyorpracticallyfeasible.AccordingtoEurostatsurveydata,thepercentageofthoseEUworkerswhosaidthattheyusuallyworkedathomefluctu-atedfrom4.8percentto5.5percentbetween2010and2019,butshowednoconsistentnetchangeoverthedecade(Figure2).Thepercentageofthosewhosaidthey‘sometimes’workedathomeincreasedfairlysteadilyfrom6.2percentin2010to9.0percentin2019,whichconsti-tutesrealmovementbutishardlyearth-shattering.

Figure2:Employedpersonsworkingfromhome(%)intheEU

16.0

14.0

12.0

10.0

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0

2010201120122013201420152016201720182019

Source:BruegelbasedondatafromEurostatlfsa_ehomp.

AEurofoundsurveyconductedinApril2020(Ahrendtetal,2020)askedrespondentswhethertheyhadbeenworkingfromhomepriortothepandemic.TheprevalenceofworkfromhomevariedgreatlyamongEUcountries.Unsurprisingly,workfromhomewasfarmorecommonindigitalfront-runnerstateslikeEstoniaandFinland,thaninlaggardssuchasRomaniaandLithuania;however,therearealsosomesurprises,suchastheratherhighnumberofrespondentswhoworkedfromhomedailyinFrance(Figure3).

3ClaireCainMiller,‘DoChanceMeetingsattheOfficeBoostInnovation?There’sNoEvidenceofIt’,23June2021,TheNewYorkTimes,

/2021/06/23/upshot/remote-work-innovation-office.html

.

5PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

Estonia

Finland

Netherlands*

Denmark

Belgium

Luxembourg

France

Latvia*

Czechia

Germany

Poland

Sweden*

Total(EU)

Bulgaria

Austria

Slovenia

Cyprus*

Croatia

Hungary

Greece

Portugal

Italy

Slovakia

Ireland

Spain

Malta*

Romania

Lithuania

Figure3:Frequencyofworkingfromhomebeforethepandemic(2020,bycountry)

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

DailySeveraltimesaweekSeveraltimesamonthLessoften

Source:Bruegelbasedon(Eurofound,2020).Note:*=lowreliability.

TheEUcountriesofferingthegreatestoverallflexibilityinworkingarrangementstendtobethosethatalsoaremostopentoworkingfromhome.DatafromEurofound’ssixthEWCSsurvey(Eurofound,2017)identifiedthecountrieswhereregularityofworkinghoursislowest(asignofrelativeflexibilityinworkingarrangements)versusthosewhereitishighest.Den-mark,FinlandandtheNetherlandsranknearthetopbothforflexibilityofworkinghoursandforworkfromhome,whileMaltaandSpainhavelowratingsinboth(Figure4).Butthereareexceptions.Luxembourgforexamplerankslowinflexibilityinhoursbutfairlyhighinoverallworkfromhome.

Figure4:Regularityofworkinghoursbycountry(%ofworkers)

HighMediumLow

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source:(Eurofound,2017).

SurveydatafromtheUnitedStates(DeSilver,2020)basedonthe2019NationalCompensa-tionSurveyoftheUSBureauofLaborStatistics,likewiseshowedonlysluggishgrowthinremoteworkoverthepastdecade,almostofallofwhichwasassociatedwiththoseinhigherearningquantilesandworkingintheprivateratherthanthepublicsector.Theprivatesectorshowedlimitedoverallgrowthfrom5percentin2010to7percentin2019intheshareofworkerswithaccessto‘flexibleworkplace’benefits,whilenogrowthatallwasvisibleinthepublicsector.

6PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

Remotemeetings

Overthesameperiod,income(andpresumablyskilllevelaswell)wasstronglylinkedtobeingpermittedtoworkfromhomeintheUS(DeSilver,2020).Only1percentofthelowestearning25percentofwageearnerswereabletoworkfromhomein2010,andthiswassub-stantiallyunchangedin2019.Bycontrast,about12percentofthoseinthehighestquartilewereabletoworkfromhomein2010,increasingto19percentin2019.About16percentofthoseinthehighest10percentwereabletoworkfromhomein2010,increasingto25percentin2019.

Whilethosewithhigherincomesweremoreabletoworkfromhomeduringthepan-demic,theyprobablyalsobenefittedinthattheywerelesslikelytofindthemselvesoutofwork,orworkingfewerhours,thanthoseinjobsthatrequiredphysicalpresence.TheywerealsolessexposedtoCOVID-19infection.

2.4Digitaltoolsasanenablerforremoteworkbyknowledgeworkers

AwiderangeofdistinctdigitalcapabilitieshavecontributedtothegrowthinremoteworkduringtheCOVID-19pandemic.Remotework(togetherwithremotelearningandtelemede-cine)hasbenefittedenormouslyfromtheabilitytoconductmeetingsremotelyviamodernteleconferencingandtelepresenceservicesincludingZoom,CiscoWebexandMicrosoftTeams.Alloftheseservices,aswellasawiderangeofe-commerceservices,benefitfrommodernhigh-speedfixedbroadbandnetworksthatenablehigh-speedconnectivity.

Figure5:Moderndigitalservicesandtelecommunicationsnetworkshaveenabledaneffectiveresponsetothepandemic

Telemedecine

E-commerce

Remote

learning

Remote

work

Fastweb

access

Ubiquitoushighspeedconnectivity

Source:Bruegel.

Telecommunicationsnetworksexperiencedamassivesurgeofuseinresponsetothepandemic.TheOECDhasestimatedthatinternettrafficworldwidesurgedbyupto60percentbetweenSeptember2019(pre-pandemic)andMarch2020,whenEuropeandtheUSexperi-encedthefirstwaveofthepandemic4.

Sandvine5(2020)reportedanincreaseofnearly40percentinoverallinternettrafficfrom1February2020to19April2020,whichcaptureswellthechangefrompre-pandemiccondi-tionstothoseofthefirstwaveofthepandemic.Thedatadistinguishesbetweendownstreamtrafficandupstreamtraffic,whichisimportantinthiscontext.Downstreamtraffic(towardtheuser)tendstogreatlyexceedupstreamtraffic(fromtheuser)becausethedownstreamtrafficincludesmorevideocontent(includingfromNetflixandAmazonPrime)andimages.

4ThePacketClearingHousedatacitedinOECD(2020b)reflectstrafficexchangeatpublicInternetExchangePoints,andthusignoresthetrafficthatisexchangedviaprivatepeering,whichisprobablythemajorityofalltraffic.Thedataisnonethelessindicative,andthereisnoreasontoexpectthatprivatepeeringwouldshowahugelydifferentresult.Indeed,itisbroadlyinlinewithfiguresreportedinSandvine(2020)andinOECD(2020b).

5Sandvineisafirmthatprovidesproductsandservicestooptimisenetworkqualityofservice,congestionmanagementandsecurity.

7PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

BoththeOECD(2020b)andSandvine(2020)foundthatnetworksgenerallyrespondedwelltothehugeincreaseindemand,mainlybyoptimisingtheuseofexistingnetworkcapacity,butalsoinsomecasesbyexpandingcapacity.

Therehavebeensomeproblems,andthereisreasontothink,basedonanecdotalevidence,thatUSnetworksmighthaveperformedlesswellthanEUnetworks.ApossiblereasonforthedifferencemightbeArticle4(4)oftheEuropeanElectronicCommunicationsCode(EECC),whichdeemsany“significantdiscrepancy,continuousorregularlyrecurring,betweentheactualperformanceoftheinternetaccessserviceregardingspeedorotherqual-ityofserviceparametersandtheperformanceindicatedbytheproviderofinternetaccessservices”tobeactionableunderEUmember-stateconsumerprotectionlaws.ThiseffectivelyobligesnetworkoperatorsintheEUtolimitthedegreetowhichtheyover-subscribetheirnetworks(iethedegreetowhichthecapacityofthenetworkislessthanthemaximumloadthatallcustomerscouldgenerate).

Insum,networkcapacityhasgenerallyheldupwell.Itscrucialcontributionduringthepandemichasbeentoenablevirtualmeetingsanddialogue.VideocallingSkypeandWhatsApphasalsosurged.

Zoomisanonlineinternetconferencingsystemthathasbeenperhapsthelargestbenefi-ciaryofthesetrends.WorldwidetraffictoZoom’swebsite(themeansoflaunchingZoomfromasmartphone,tabletorpersonalcomputer),asmeasuredbytheSimilarWebapplication,increasedbyafactorofroughly20fromFebruarytoApril2020,moderatedslightlyaslock-downseasedinJulyandAugust,butthenincreasedagaininSeptemberthroughNovember2020asaresultofthesecondwavelockdown(Figure3).Otheronlineteleconferencingplat-forms,suchasMicrosoftTeamsandCiscoWebex,alsoexperiencedhugejumpsinutilisationafterFebruary2020.

Figure6:MonthlynumberofvisitsfromSimilarWebuserstotheZoomwebsite

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

2,7902,724

2,555

2,256

1,904

1,7751,7001,658

1,906

803

817292106

11/2019

1/

01/2020

0/

0/

04/2020

05/2020

0/

07/2020

0/

09/2020

1/

11/2020

1/

Source:Marcusetal(2021)basedonSimilarWeb(

/website/zoom.us#overview

).

EventhoughtheinternetandarangeofrelevantonlinetoolswerealreadysufficientlymaturetosupportwidespreadusageforWFHwhenthepandemicfirstreachedEuropeandNorthAmerica,workersandfirmsnonethelesshadtoinvestsignificantmoneyandeffortindeployingthetechnologyandincorporatingitintotheirworkprocesses.AsurveyofworkersintheUSA(Barreroetal,2021)foundthattheaverageworkerinvestedmorethan15hoursand$561(about€486)inequipmentandinfrastructuretoenableWFH.TheiremployersalsohadtoinvestinadditionalequipmentandsoftwaretoenableWFH,andmayhavereimbursedsomeoftheworkerexpenses.TheinvestmentsoftimeandmoneyhavepresumablyreducedthecostofWFH,andwillthushavebenefitsbeyondthepandemic.

8PolicyContribution|Issuen˚09/22|June2022

Theshifttoremoteworkmayraisenewcybersecurityconcerns.Datathathistoricallyresidedonlyoncomputerssecuredbytheemployer(intheory,atleast)suddenlyhadtoresideonworkers’owncomputersystems,andthusoutsidefirms’securityperimeters.Discussionsofsensitivebusinessmatterstookplaceoveronlineconferencingsystemsthatinmanycasesweredesignedwithlittlethoughtgiventocybersecurity.Thisislikelytobecomeagrowingconcernovertime6.

Theshiftlikelyalsoraisesconcernsovertheprivacyofworkers,andtheirexposuretosur-veillance.Wediscussthisbelow,inthecontextofthesocietalimpactsofthegrowthinremotework.

2.5Thegrowthofremoteworkduringthepandemic

Inmanydevelopedcountriesandregionswithsignificantnumbersofknowledgeworkers,notablyincludingEuropeandtheUS,on-siteperformanceofnon-essentialjobswaseitherdiscouragedorelseoutrightprohibitedbylawduringperiodswhenthepandemicwasatitspeak.Totheextentfeasible,manyfirmsinsteadencouragedworkfromhome.Asaresult,thelevelsofremoteworkinmostEUcountriesandtheUSspikedupwardsinMarchandApril2020,andcontinuetobefarhigherthanpriortothepandemic.

Thepandemicresultedinsignificantnumbersofworkerseitherlosingtheirjobsorelseworkingfewerhours,withsignificantlydifferentimpactsintheUSversustheEU.Theshifttoremoteworkhelpedtoreducethenegativeimpactsofthesechanges,andneedstobeunder-stoodwiththisinmind.

Theunemploymentcausedbythepandemicisnotfullyreflectedintraditionalunemploy-mentstatistics,becausemanyEUcountriestreatfurloughedworkersasemployed(sincetheyarenotlookingforwork).However,thisunemploymentisclearfromsurveyresults(Euro-found,2020;Ahrendtetal,2021).IntheEU,innovativemeasurestokeepworkersemployed,albeitonreducedhoursandatreducedwages(aswiththeGermanKurzabeitergeld,anapproachemployedwithsuccessduringthe2008financialcrisis)havehelpedtominimisetheamountofpermanentunemploymenttodate(Figure7).Partlyasaresult,ahugenumberofEUworkersexperiencedareductioninthehoursworked(Figure8)intheearlymonthsofthepandemic,butdidnotlosetheirjobs.ImpactshavebeendifferentindifferentEUcountries,withlossesofjobsandhoursinthefirstwavein1Q2020tendingtobegreaterinsouthernandeasternEUcountriesthaninwesternandNordicEUcountries,thoughwithsomeexceptions.

ThedatainFigures7and8isbasedonanApril2020Eurofoundsurvey.ComparisonwithsubsequentEurofound