两个英文原版案例

Whitakerv.Whitaker,52N.Y.368;MatterofWilburv.EstateofWarren,104N.Y.192;1Clark,NewYorkLawofContracts,p.517,n.46).Itappearsdehors（在…之外）thepleadings（答辩状）,thattheintiffisnotaresidentofNewYork,butofPennsylvaniaAnyrightswhichshemighthavehad,ifshehadbeenaresident,undersection101oftheSocialWelfareLawarethereforenotgermanetoaconsiderationofthiscase(also,cf.MatterofSalm,171Misc.367,371).Asintiffdoesnot,uponanysuggestedtheory,haveagoodcauseofactionagainstthedefendant,thecomintshouldbedismissedwithoutleavetopleadover.“爱和慈爱”为什么不能成为对价？列举了哪些例外Calboun在Calboun案中，说：“爱和慈爱本身或道德上的义务即构成足够的对本案为什么不能依纽约州的社会福利法主张其权利。，在Hammerv.Sindway，124N.Y.538（1891）案中，的叔叔在年满15岁时对他说，如果在年满21岁之前不喝酒、不抽烟、不．也不赌博，就可以从他叔叔那里得到5000。后来，果真按他叔叔的要求去做了对其行为的克制构成了叔叔诺言的对价。你认为本案与Hamer案的有吗？。，Schoenungv.206Wis.52,238N.W.852Wis.ActionbyLeoSchoenung,byhisguardianadlitem,againstHelenGallet,asadministratrixoftheestateofRobertH.Hippe,deceased.Judgmentfordefendant,andintiffappeals.Reversedandremanded,withdirections.该案例来自、《国际商法教学案例（英文）选编，法律2007版，第313页intiff,whileaminor,commencedthisactiononMarch13,1930,torecoverpossessionofanautoandhispromissorynotefor$250,whichhehaddeliveredtodefendantinexchangeforanotherauto ,iffappealedfromajudgmententeredMarch6,1931,dismissinghisOnApril15,1929,intiff,aminor,nineteenyearsofage,purchasedfromdefendantanautofor$300,forwhichhegavehisjudgmentnotefor$250andanauto,whichdefendantacceptedintradeatavaluationof$50.Atthattimeintiffwasanemancipated（脱离监护的）minorlivingwithhisparentsonafarm,whichwasthree fromthecitywherehewasemployedat$75permonthinanimplementbusiness.Hisbrotherwasapartownerofthatbusiness,andintiffusuallydrovewithhimtoandfromwork.Hehadbeenworkingforseveralyears,andhadbeenpermittedtokeephisearnings,whichhehadusedtoprovidehisnecessariesandtopayfortwocheaperautos.UptoJune6,1929,hehaddriventheauto,whichhehadpurchasedonApril15,1929,fromsixhundredtoonethousandonpleasuretrips,andhaduseditoccasionallyingoingtoorfromhiswork.Onseveraloccasionshehadleftitatdefendant'sgarageforadjustmentsandrepairsforwhichnochargesweremade.OnJune6,1929,herestoredtheautotodefendantbyleavingitatdefendant'sgarage,andhedemandedthereturnofhisnoteandhisformerauto.Defendantrefusedtoacceptthereturnedautoandtheoftitlethereto,andalsorefusedtoreturnintiff'snoteandhisformerauto,whichdefendanthadsoldandwhichhadbeenwrecked.Later,onJune6,defendantremovedtheauto,whichintiffhadreturned,fromdefendant'sgaragetothepublicstreetinfrontofintiff'sceofemployment.Atrafficofficerorderedintifftoremoveitfromthestreet,andintiffthentookittohisfather'sfarm,whereithasremained.Sincethenintiffofferedittodefendantseveraltimes,butdefendantrefusedtoacceptit.Thetermsofthepurchasewerefairandreasonable,andtherewasnothingwrongwiththeautowhenintiffreturneditonJune6.Thelowercourtconcludedthattheautowasnecessarytointifftocarryonhisbusinessandemployment;thathewasanemancipatedminorandliableonhiscontract;andthathewasnotentitledtorescissionandtorecoverhisnoteandformerFRITZ,Thatintiffwasanemancipatedminorwasimmaterialasamatteroflawinthisaction.Emancipationdoesnotremoveoraffectaminor'sincapacitytosubjecthimselftocontractualliabilityforthingswhicharenotnecessaries.Consequently,intifflackedcapacitytocontractforthepurchaseofthisauto,unlessitwasanecessaryforhimundertheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofthiscase.In31C.J.1077,§175,itissaid:“Theterm‘necessaries,’asusedinthelawrelatingtotheliabilityofinfantstherefor,isarelativeterm,somewhatflexible,exceptwhenappliedtosuchthingsasareobviouslyrequisiteforthemaintenanceofexistence,anddependsonthesocialpositionandsituationinlifeoftheinfant,aswellasuponhisownfortuneandthatofhisparents.Theparticularinfantmusthaveanactualneedforthearticlesfurnished;notformereornament（装饰）orpleasure.Thearticlesmustbeusefulandsuitable,buttheyarenotnecessariesmerelybecauseusefulorbeneficial.Concerningthegeneralcharacterofthethingsfurnished,tobenecessariesthearticlesmustsupplytheinfant's alneeds,eitherthoseofhisbody,orthoseofhismind.However,theterm‘necessaries'isnotconfinedtomerelysuchthingsasarerequiredforabaresubsistence（最低限度生活费）.Thereisnopositiverulebymeansofwhichitmaybedeterminedwhatareorwhatarenotnecessaries,forwhatmaybeconsiderednecessaryforoneinfantmaynotbenecessariesforanotherinfantwhosestateisdifferentastorank,socialposition,fortune,health,orothercircumstances,thequestionbeingonetobedeterminedfromtheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.”InCovaultv.Nevitt,157Wis.113,146N.W.1115,1117,51L.R.A.(N.S.)Ann.Cas.1916A,959,thequestionaroseastowhetheraminorwhoownedrealestatecouldcontractfortheemploymentofajanitor.Thiscourtsaid:“Itisclearthatintheinstantcasetheallegedcontractcouldonlybesustained,ifatall,uponthegroundthatitwasacontractfornecessaries;anditisequallyclearthatsuchacontractisnotacontractfornecessaries.22Cyc.584,585;HollingsworthonContracts,p.31;16Am.&Eng.Ency.ofLaw(2dEd.)276.Thegeneralrulerespectingnecessariesisthattheymustbesuchastosupplythe alneedsoftheinfant.Manifestlythecontractinthiscaseisnotacontractfornecessariesunderwhichaliabilitycouldbeendnorforthebenefitoftheinfant.”InWallacev.NewdaleFurnitureCo.,188Wis.205,205N.W.819,820,aminorsoughttorecovermoneywhichshehadpaidaspartofthepurchasepriceforwhichsheusedforkeeroomers,andthenreturnedduringherminoritytothedefendant.Thiscourtsaid:“Ithasnotbeencontendedbycounselfortheappellantthatthearticlespurchasedbytheintiffwerenecessaries,andthatshecouldnotrescindforthatreason,norwouldtheargumentbesoundifmade.Thefactthataminorengagesinbusinessdoesnotremovetheincapacitytomakegeneralcontracts,and,intheabsenceofstatutes,purchasesmadeintradecannotberegardedasnecessaries.”Althoughconditionsandcircumstancesmayexistbecauseofwhichanautomaybeconsideredanecessaryforaminor,ithasthusfarbeenheldthatamotorvehicleisnotanecessaryandthathiscontractforthepurchasethereofisvoidable.Inthecaseatbaranautowasnotnecessaryforthe aluseorsupportofintiff.Themerefactthathisceofemploymentwasthree fromthehomeofhisparents,withwhomheresided,didnotnecessitatehisownershipofanauto.Thatisparticularlytrueinthiscase,becausehisbrother'sauto wasavailableforintifftotraveltoandfromhisceofemployment.Likewise,inasmuchashelackedcapacitytocontractforanautoforuseinabusinessofhisown,hewasalsothusincapacitatedtocontractforanautowhichhemightoccasionallyhaveuseforinperforminghisworkforhisemployer.Itfollowsthatwhenintiff,duringhisminority,restoredthatautoandtheoftitletothedefendant,hewasentitledtothereturnofhisnoteandhisformerauto,orthevaluethereof.Judgmentreversed,andcauseremanded,withdirectionstoenterjudgmentfortherecoverybyintiffofthesumof$50,withinterestfromJune6,1929,andthesurrenderforcancellationofintiff'snotefor$250,datedApril15,1929.未成年人为什么要就生活必需品的合同承担责任？中国法律中有没有类似的规定？《民法通则》第12条规定：“不能完全辨认自己行为的精神在Covault案《选编（英文》p.315，段1）中，为什么认为，未成年雇用一个“看门人”不是为了获得生活必需品？（说：Thegeneralrulerespectingnecessariesisthattheymustbesuchastosupply alneedsofinfant.即，生活必需品仅限于个人使用ofthepurchasepriceforfurniture,whichsheusedforkeeroomers）中《选编（英文》p.315，段2）中，为什么认为，该未成年人的家具不是生活必需品？（Thefactthataminorengagesinbusinessdoesnotremovetheincapacitytomakegeneralcontracts,and,intheabsenceofstatutes,purchases