大西洋理事会-2023 年全球能源议程

THE2023AtlanticCouncilGLOBALENERGYCENTERlityandngesofthechangingglobalenergylandscapeordancewiththeAtlanticrilyAtlanticCouncilthStreetNW12thFloorWashington,DC20005ncilorgHEGLOBALENERGYAGENDATHE2023GLOBALLandonDerentzChristineSuhAmeyaHadapFrederickKempemedAlHammadiH.H.SheikhaShammabintSultanbinKhalifaAlNahyanSamaBilbaoyLeónFatihBirolHelimaCroftJohnE.HerbstajidJafartevenKobosRogerMartellaAdamMatthewsBernardMensahRichardL.MorningstarTHEGLOBALENERGYAGENDATSINTRODUCTION2CONCLUSION63APPENDIX64THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDALastyearinthisspace,Iwrotethattheworldseemedtobeinaholdingpattern,asweworkedtogethertoexitthepandemicwhilekeepingdecarbonizationtargetswithinsight.Thedecarbonizationimperativeremains,butthisyear’schallengeisnowfocusedonhownewgeopoliticalthreatswillshapetheenergyfuture,pre-cipitatedbyRussia’sinvasionofUkraineinFebruary2022.Wecanonlyaccomplishtheenergytransi-tionifwe,atthesametime,payrenewedattentiontoenergysecurity.astheimmediate,near-termthreat,whiledeferringlengesmustbemetsimultaneously.Althoughtheenergyfutureremainsuncertain,manycountries,especiallythoselikeGermanyandItalythatweredeeplydependentonRussianenergysupplies,havestartedtochartanewpathtowardenergysecuritythroughcleanenergysourcesandmorereliableandresilientsupplychains.EvenaswendaffordableenergyitwasencouragingatCOP27toseetheworldcometogetheronceagaintoreiteratecommitmentstoasustainableandequitableenergytransition.Initsthirdedition,theGlobalEnergyAgendahasmunity,includingcontributionsfromleadersingov-Thisyear,theirsurveyresponsesrevealednewinsightsintotheconnectionsbetweengeopoliticsandsitionandfossilfuels,andchallengesandopportuni-tiesalongthepathtonet-zero.Respondentstendedtovotetogetherasblocsbasedontheirgeographiclocations,theirindustrieswithintheenergysector,sitionwilloccur.Wenoticedafewmajorchangesbetweenlastyear’sGlobalEnergyAgendasurveyandthisyear’s.Mostinterestingly,butnotsurprising,nearlyhalf(47percent)ofrespondentsnowbelievethatthegreat-estgeopoliticalriskisposedbyconflictwithamajorenergyproducer,incontrasttolastyear,inwhichrespondentswerefarmoredividedontheirassess-mentofgeopoliticalriskwithonly26percentchoos-ingamajorcyberattackasthegreatrisk.Therewasalsocautiousoptimismamongrespon-dentsintheirviewsofthelikelihoodofachievingnet-zeroby2050.Thisyear,45percentbelieveitlikelycentdisagreeing.Althoughthehopefulstillconstituteaminority,theirnumbersareupfrom27percentlastyear.Meanwhile,aslightmajorityof51percentthinkthatreachingnet-zerowouldhaveatmostalimitednegativeeffectonGDPorevenapositiveone.nthispublicationgivevoicetodiverseperspectives.Comingfromdifferentsegmentsoftheglobalenergylandscape,theauthorsnaturallyputforthdivergentviewsonthefutureoftheirsector.Butisthetimetoleveragetoday’senergycrisisforfasterUnitedNationsafterWorldWarII,“Neverletagoodcrisisgotowaste.”Inlastyear’sGlobalEnergyAgenda,Iwrotethat“thecoursethatwecharttonet-zeromustbesteadybutalsoambitiousenoughtomeetthechallenge.”AndafterDavoslastyear,IwrotethatIamgoing“short”onpessimismand“long”onoptimism.Ithinkthat’stherightnotetohitinayearthatwillculminatewithCOP28.hostedbytheUnitedArabEmirates,whichwillbecoloredbyattainable,prag-maticsolutionstoachievetheinclusiveandsustain-ableenergyoutcomestheworldsourgentlyneeds.PresidentandChiefExecutiveOfficerAtlanticCouncil2THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDAINTRODUCTIONI n2022,astheworldwaslearningtocopewithCOVID-19anditsdeadlytoll,Russia’sinvasionofUkraineshatteredhopesintheWestforareturntonormalcy.OverthecourseoftheandRussiasweaponizationofnaturalgasrapidlyreshapedinterdependentenergysystemsaroundtheworld.Althoughthehumanitariandevastationandmasscasualtiescausedbythewar—includingthedis-placementofmillionsofUkrainians—haveradicallysurpassedtheeconomicandpoliticalchallengesimposedontheglobalenergysystem,theongoingenergycrisishasandwillcontinuetohavefar-reach-ingconsequences.nergypricesretreatingfrommultiyearhighsanapparentcalmhassettledonthebroadermarketoutlook.Onthehorizon,however,stirsamorecom-plicatedfuture,astheenergycrisiscomplicatestheprobabilityofasmoothtransition.Aroundtheworld,volatilityfromhigherenergyandfoodpricesisfurthershrinkinghouseholdbudgetsmanypeopletochoosebetweenheatingtheirhomesandfeedingtheirfam-ilies.TheInternationalEnergyAgency’s(IEA)2022WorldEnergyOutlookestimatesthatseventy-fivemillionpeoplewhohaverecentlygainedaccesstocleanenergyarelikelytolosetheabilitytopayforextendedelectricityservices,andahundredmillionmaynolongerbeabletoaffordcleancookingsolu-tions1Priceandeconomicpressuresassociatedwithtoday’senergycrisismeanthat“thenumberofpeo-plewithoutaccesstomodernenergyisrisingforthefirsttimeindecades.”2Beyondtheseimmediateimpacts,theseverecon-strictionofRussiannaturalgasflowtoEuropehasraisedthequestionofthewar’slong-termeffects3THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDAontheglobalenergytransitionandtheoverallfightagainstclimatechange.TomakeupforthevoidleftbythenearshutoffofRussiangassupplies,Europehasturnedtotheuseofcarbon-intensivecoalandoiltogenerateelectricity,aresponsecriticizedbysomeclimateadvocatesasshortsightedinthefaceofworseningdroughts,extremeheat,risingoceans,andothereffectsofplanetarywarming.Thecurrentsurgeincarbon-intensivefossilenergyuse,how-ever,appearstransitory.Layingbarejusthowtightlyinterconnectednationalsecurityistoenergysecurity,policiesadvancedinWashingtonandBrusselsareemblematicoftheurgencywithwhichlawmakersareseekingtodecoupletheireconomiesfromrelianceheightenedtheurgencyaroundacceleratinglow-car-countries’energysecurity.TheEuropeanUnion’sRePowerEUstrategyisdentfromRussianfossilfuelswellbefore2030”byempoweringacleanenergyeconomyanchoredindeploymentofrenewableenergyandenergyeffi-55percentby2030comparedto2005levels.Thementthenation’smostsignificantpieceofclimatemajorfor3“REPowerEU:JointEuropeanActionforMoreAffordable,SecureandSustainableEnergy,”EuropeanCommission,PressRelease,March8,2022,https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_1511.4THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDATHE2023GLOBALENERGYAGENDASURVEYANDEXPERTPERSPECTIVESGiventhiscontext,itisunsurprisingthatenergylead-ersheadinto2023withacompletelydifferentout-sightsintotheirthinking,theAtlanticCouncilconducteditsthirdannualsurveyforits2023GlobalEnergyAgenda.Thesur-veywasconductedfromOctober14toNovember23,awindowthatoverlappedwiththe2022UnitedNationsClimateChangeConference,widelyknownasCOP27.Thisreportdistillsthesurveyresponses,drawingontheinsightsofenergystakeholdersfrommorethanfiftycountries,andrepresentingavarietyoffieldsassociatedwiththesector.Anappendixpro-videsadditionaldemographicdetails.Aswithlastyear’ssurvey,the2023GlobalEnergyAgendacon-tinuesatraditionofemployingvariousquestionsandinsightsfromprioryears’resultsandanalysestohelphonekeyfindings.Tocomplementoursurveyanalysis,theAtlanticCouncilGlobalEnergyCenterinvitedglobalexperts,corporateleaders,andgovernmentofficialstocon-tributeessaysforthisGlobalEnergyAgendatopro-videdeeperinsightsintoissuesfacingtheenergysectorandtheworld’sprospectsfortheenergytran-sition.Ourcontributorsspantheglobeandrepresentadiversearrayofperspectivesfromenergyleaders.Theessayscovertopicsrangingfromcriticalmineralsuppliestoadvancednuclearpowertoclimatediplo-macy,andaltogethersettheenergyagendafortheyearaheadastheworldlooksforameaningfulcom-mitmenttoclimateactionontheroadtoCOP28.wheresignificantdifferencesexistedbetweengroupsbasedonrespondents’geographicregion;whichindustrytheyworkinwithintheenergysector(oilandsattergroupisfurthersubdividedtoprovidekeyinsightsintothosewhoseeanacceleratedenergytransition(“energytransitionbulls”)andthosewhopredictaecategoriestendtovotetogetherasblocsintheirresponsesthrough-outthesurvey.Collectively,thesurveyresultsandexpertessaysthatcomposethe2023GlobalEnergyAgendahaveyieldedthefollowingkeyinsights.By20252026–20302031–20402041–2050After205010%20%30%5THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDATHECRISISINEUROPEISDUSTINGOFFTHEPLAYBOOKFORGEOPOLITICSANDENERGYRussia’swarinUkrainehasrecalibratedthecontem-porarywisdomongeopoliticalriskthatexistedjustayearago.Inthefall2021survey,whichwascon-ductedonlyafewmonthsbeforeRussia’sFebruary2022invasion,themostfrequentlymentionedgeopo-eenergysectorwasamajorcyberattack;however,atonlyaboutaquarterofrespon-dentstherewasnostrongconsensusAdditionally,aconflictincludingamajorenergyproducerwasatthetopoftherisklistforonly17percentofrespondents,rcleswastakenthatRussiawaspreparingforanarmedincursionintoUkraine.Naturally,inourfall2022survey,nearlyhalfofrespondentssaythattheRussia-Ukrainewaristhetoprisk.Representingone-tenthofglobaloilandgassupplyin2020,Russiahashistoricallyservedasameaningfulcontributortoglobalenergytrade,mak-ingitimpossibletodivorcetheKremlin’sdecisiontokets,especiallyinamomentofincreasedfragilityinthewakeofthepandemic.Theconsequencesofthispoliticalgamesmanshiponenergypolicyandtradectonenergypriceshowdebbinginthenextdecade.Thisexpectationisper-hapsanindicatorastowhyjust23percentbelieveMIDCENTURYNET-ZEROOPTIMISMISONTHERISEThereislittleconsensusonthemeansofachiev-ingnet-zeroemissionsby2050,butthenumberofpondentsthatbelievenetzeroiswithinreachintheomeoneyearagoInrecentyearstheconceptofanet-zeroenergysystemhasunques-tionablygainedtractioninpoliticalandindustrycir-Arabiahavesetnet-zerobenchmarks—2050anddverselyimpactingconomicgrowthedverselyimpactingconomicgrowth%10%20%30%40%2020survey2021survey2022survey6THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDArnet-zeroby2050,higherthanthoseinoilandgasGLOBALNORTH-SOUTHDIVIDEONACHIEVINGTHECLEANENERGYTRANSITIONgviewinsufficientresourcesasanothermajorfactorllwhereTheseperspectivesunderscoreagrowingdebateangeishelionsofdollarsincleanenergyinfrastructurecultiestionemtnfutureneedsercalpriorities%10%20%30%40%THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDAAAworkerwalkspastadomeholdingliquefiednaturalgas,onthevesselKARMOLLNGTPowershipAsia,one esNATURALGAS’APPEALISEBBINGINITSMOSTSUBSTANTIALNEAR-TERMMARKETtvastmajorityofthoseremaining(40percentofthetotal),thinkthatnaturalgaswillactasalong-termyeresourceareincreasinglyresolutetoweantheirmarketfromnaturalgas:now49percentsaythatthefuelwillhaveaperma-styearMeanwhileintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica—and,toalesserextent,theUnitedStates—theanticipationthatnatu-ralgaswillremainapermanentfixtureoftheenergymixisgrowing,upto40percentfromjust30percenttheprioryear.Takentogether,wehope2023GlobalEnergyAgendasurveyresponses,analysis,andessayswilllayoutthecontoursofthecurrentenergysys-tem,assesstheeventsandtrendsthatwillshapetheenergysystemin2023,informfact-baseddebateandanalysisaboutthebestpathforward,andsetthesharedenergyagendafortheyear.8THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDAlCHAPTER1GeopoliticsandEnergySecurityRussia’sinvasionofukrainelastFebruarydramaticallytransformedpoliticalriskperceptionswithintheenergysectorin2022,surmountingeventhemostpressingglobalchallengesfromrecentyears,includingthepan-demic.Ofcourse,currenteventsoftenweighheavilyonpublicperception.Whenthe2022GlobalEnergyAgendasurveywasconductedinlate2021,thecyberattackontheColonialPipeline—whichcrippledfuelsupplyalongmuchoftheandwasfront-of-mindformanyrespondents,whilethespecterofRussianaggressionwasstilladistant-seem-ingpossibility.Itwasthereforeunsurprisingthatamili-taryconflictwasnotatopconcernamongsurveypar-ticipantsatthetime,whilethemostfrequentlycitedrisk—accordingto26percentofrespondents—wasamajorcyberattack.HavingnowwitnessedthebrutalityofRussia’sattackonUkraineandthesubsequentfalloutimpact-ingallfacetsoftheglobalenergysystem,roughlyhalfoftherespondentsnamethewar’scontinuationorescalationasthedominantenergyriskingeopolitics.Meanwhile,concernovercyberattackstotheenergysystemdroppedbyhalf,from26percentto13percent.Arguably,thisdeclineismoreofatestamenttotheenormousmagnitudeofthewar’simpactonenergycontinuedonpage149cturevingatleasteenergyproducingcountryrgyproducingcountrysupply/productionActivationofNordStream2THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDA0%10%20%30%40%50%60%LEADERSHIPINSIGHTWhytoday’sglobalenergycrisispromisestobeaturningpointtowardacleanerandmoresecurefuturebyFatihBirolR ussia’sinvasionofUkraineinFebruaryhasthrownenergymarketsintoturmoil,set-tingoffthefirsttrulyglobalenergycrisis,withimpactsthatwillbefeltforyearstocome.Internationaltradingroutesandinvestmentflowsthathadbuiltupoverdecadesarebeingpro-foundlyreshaped.Households,businesses,andentireeconomiesarestrugglingtopayforfoodandenergy,leadingtorisingpovertyandinsecu-ityGeopoliticalrisksareontheriseDespitethesemajordifficulties,I’moptimis-ticaboutthelong-termeffectsofthecurrentcri-icyresponsesbymanygovernmentsaroundtheworld,thecrisisissettoaccelerateourtransitiontoanenergysystemthatisnotonlycleaner,butmoreaffordableandsecure.InourrecentWorldEnergyOutlook2022,theInternationalEnergyAgency’s(IEA)analysisshowsthatforthefirsttimeever,today’sprevail-inggovernmentpolicieswillresultinadistinctpeakinglobaldemandforfossilfuelsinthecom-thisscenario,coal’srecentcrisis-drivenreboundfallsbackwithinthenextewyearsnaturalgasdemandreachesaplateauesofelecsoffinthemid-2030sbeforeebbingslightlytomid-century.dem.Now,theyarepartingways.However,thetransitiontocleanenergyisnotyethappeningquicklyenoughtoavoidsevereimpactsfromcli-matechange.Whatwedoseeisincreasingambitionandactionaroundtheworldtoacceleratethetran-sition.Whilealotofpublicattentionhasfocusedontheshort-termmeasuresmanygovernmentshavetakentoshieldconsumersandbusinessesfromhigherenergyprices,manyofthosesamegovernmentsarealsotakinglonger-termstepstoaddresstheunderlyingfragilitiesofourenergysystems.ThemostnotableresponsesincludetheUSInflationReductionAct,theEuropeanUnion’sFitfor55packageandREPowerEUplan,Japan’sGreenTransformation(GX)programme,SouthKorea’saimtoincreasetheshareofnuclearandenergytargetsinChinaandIndia.TheInflationReductionActaloneputscloseto$400billiononthetableintheformoftaxincentives,subsi-dies,andsupportfortechnologiesrangingfromptureandthiswillmobilizefarmoreinprivatesectorinvestment.Takentogether,thesenewmeasuresbygovern-mentsworldwidearesettohelppropelglobalcleanenergyinvestmenttomorethan$2trillionayearby2030,ariseofmorethan50percentfromtoday.Howhasthecurrentcrisisacceleratedthesemoves?Withthedroughtsandfloodswe’vewit-nessedinrecentyearshighlightingthegrowingimpactsofclimatechange,theenvironmentalcaseforcleanenergyneedednoreinforcement.Buttoday’ssoaringenergypriceshavemadetheeconomicargumentsinfavorofcost-competitiveandaffordablecleantechnologiesstrongerthanever.Now,withthewarinUkraine,theenergysecuritycaseforcleanenergyhascometothefore,withcountriesrecognizingtherisksofrely-ingtooheavilyonimportedfossilfuels.outcomefortheworld’speopleandfortheplanet.Ifachievetheircurrentnationalclimatepledgesontimeandinfull,IEAanalysisshowsthatitwouldlimittheriseinglobalaveragetem-lyrobustcleanenergyplanswe’reseeingprovidegroundsforoptimismthatcountriescanmoveclosertodeliveringtheconcretepoliciesandimplementationneededtomaketheseambitiouspledgesareality.However,therestillremainsanin to une“implementationgap”betweentoday’spolicyset-ingswhichwouldmostlikelyleadtoatemperatureriseofaround2.5degreesCelsius,fartoohightoavoidsevereclimaterisks—andwhat’sneededtoachievenationalclimatepledges.Andweneedevengreaterambitionandstron-gerimplementationtoreachnetzerogloballyby2050andhaveachanceofstabilizingthetemperatureriseataround1.5degreesCelsius.Thiswouldrequiredoublingglobalcleanenergyinvestmentsfromthecurrentprojectedleveltoaround$4trillionayearby2030.Wecanaccomplishthisfasterprogressifstrongactionistakenimmediately.Investmentsincleanelectricityandelectrification,alongwithanexpandedandmodernizedgrid,offerclearandcost-effectiveopportunitiestocutemissionsrerapidlywhilebringingdownelectricitycostsMaintainingtoday’sgrowthratesfordeploymentofsolarPV,wind,electricvehicles,andbatteriesrequiressupportivepoliciesnotjustintheearlynologiesbutacrosstheworld.istheunevendistributionofcleanenergyinvest-mentaroundtheworld.IfChinaisexcluded,thentheamountbeinginvestedincleanenergyeachyearinemerginganddevelopingeconomieshasremainedflatsincetheParisAgreementin2015.ThecostofcapitalforasolarPVplantin2021inkeyemergingeconomiesisbetweentwoandthreetimeshigherthaninadvancedeconomies.urtherexacerbatingthisdivide.Internationalefforts,especiallyfrommulti-lateraldevelopmentbanks,areneededtostepupclimatefinanceindevelopingandemergingmarkets,andtotackletheperceivedrisksthatdeterinvestors.ThereisimmensevalueinbroadnationaltransitionstrategiessuchasJustEnergyTransitionPartnerships,liketheoneannouncedbyIndonesiaandagroupofleadingeconomiesattheG20SummitinNovember,thatintegrateinternationalsupportandambitiousnationalpol-icyactions,whilealsoprovidingsafeguardsforenergysecurityandthesocialconsequencesofchange.WhatisundeniableisthatenergymarketsandpoliciesarechangingdramaticallybeforeoureyesasaresultofthewarinUkraine.Andthesearen’tjustshort-termblips,butchangesthatwilllookbackwewillseeasahistoriccleanermoresecureandmoreaffordableenergysystem.InternationalEnergyAgency.LEADERSHIPINSIGHTbyJohnE.HerbstI nthewinterof2005-2006,oneyearaftertheOrangeRevolution,MoscowshutoffthegastoUkraineinanefforttopunishUkraineforrejectingPutin’scandidateforpresident,ViktorYanukovych.Ultimately,Russia’sactionssuc-cessfullycoercednewlyelectedPresidentVictoruptdealforthedeliveryofgasinthefuture.ThatdidlittletoinhibitMoscowfromshuttingoffthegastoUkraineasecondtimein2009.AsambassadortoUkrainein2005,Ihadwarnedoftheseveryscenarios,sendingfor-malmessagesbacktoWashingtonregardingthelegitimacyofMoscow’shintsofshuttingoffgassuppliestoEurope.Yet,EuropeanenergydependenceonMoscowonlygrewaftergascut-offstoUkraine,startingwiththegaspipelineNordStream1,whichstretchesfromRussiantoinEvenafterMoscowseizedCrimeaandbeganitshybridwarineasternUkraine,GermanChancellorAngelaMerkelin2015increasedthisdependencebysigningadealtoconstructanothergaspipeline—NordStream2—tobringputintooperationthiscontroversialpipelinepro-ceededthroughout2021,despiteclearRussiannpreparationforthemassiveinvasionofFebruary20221OnlyMoscow’s“annexation”ofUkraine’soccupiedLuhanskandDonetskOblastsandthentheinva-lineswereultimatelysabotagedinSeptember2022.AllofthisisareminderthatinthenormaldependenceonRussianhydrocarbonsbeganwiththeopeningoftheUrengoi-Pomary-Uzhgorodpipelinein1984.Theeconomicsofthisgrowingdependencewasobvious.Russiahadmajorsupplies,itwasrelativelynearby,andetheSovietFirstSecretaryin1985;thoserelationswarmedquickly;andsixyearslatertheSovietUnioncollapsed.Inthe1990s,aprincipalgoaloffullyintotheinternationalcommunity,includingmembershipintheInternationalMonetaryFund(1992);theGroupofSeven(G7),whichbecametheG8(1998);andtheWorldTradeOrganizationearimprovementofpoliticalrelationsprovidedtherightframeworkforclosereconomicties.ThisbackgroundisessentialforconsideringrgymarketsafteritswarofaggressionagainstUkraineends.TheanswertothatquestionbeginsbyaskingthepresumptionthatUSandWesternaideithercontinuesandevenincreases,inwhichcaseUkrainewillsucceedindrivingRussianforcesoutofall,ormost,ofitsterritoryandnegotiatingastablepeace,evenifsomekeyquestions,suchasthestatusofCrimea,areleftforfutureresolu-tion.ThesecondquestioniswhatsortofRussiaemergesfromthisdefeat.IfitisaRussiaseeth-ingwithresentment—ofthekindthatcharacter-izesmajorRussianmediatoday—thenthepros-pectofimprovedrelationsandgrowingeconomictiesisminute.TheWestwouldhavetotreatthatutionButifitisaRussiarecognizingthattheinvasionofUkrainewasillegiti-mate;thatimperialpolicestodominateitsneigh-borsareadispensablerelic;andthatRussiacanonlyprosperifitempowersitspeopleandseeks,inthetwenty-year-oldwordsofRussiananalystDmitriTrenin,tobecomeanormalcountrytrulyoliticoeuintegratedintotheinternationalsystem,thecir-cumstanceswillbeverydifferent.2BeforeMoscow’sFebruaryinvasion,theEUreceivedapproximately40percentofitsgassup-oilfromRussiaByOctoberapproximately9percentofgasconsumedinRussia,includinggasgoingtoTurkeyandotheralsodroppedinthefallof2022to14.4percentfromover24percentinthepreviousyear.5Moscow’soilfutureisalsocloudedbyitsdecliningreserves,whichwere7percentlowerin2020thanin1991,andRussia’sFinanceMinistryisprojectingthat2023productionwilldropby7to8percent.6Moscow’sabilitytomaintainitsnat-uralgassystemandtofindnewsuppliesofoilandgasarealsobeinghinderedbytheeffectiveexportcontrolsintroducedbytheWestsincetheogytoaccessharder-to-reachoilandgas.Inapostwarworld,thosecontrolswillstayinplaceifMoscowisstillperceivedasapotentiallyaggressiveactor.IftheKremlinmakesaclearbreakwithitspast,thosecontrolswillbegintounwind,but,asaprecaution,onlyovertime.ButmetheWest,albeitwithacertaindegreeofcaution,willbelookingforneweconomicopportunitieswithRussiaandforwaystopromoteitsreintegrationintotheglobaleconomy.includingdecisionstobuildliquefiednaturalgasterminals,meansthat,inthefuture,EuropewillDevelopmentsherewillbedeterminedbyeco-nomicfactors.ButMoscowmightbeabletobuildonitsongoingenergyrelationshipswithcoun-oilandgaspurchasesarenotlimitedbysanc-tions.ItmayalsodothesamewithlandlockedEUstates—Slovakia,Hungary,andtheCzechRepublic—thathavereceivedsanctionsexemp-tionsthatallowthemtopurchaseRussianoilandnueitsenergyrelationshipwithBulgaria,whichhaslthrough2024.7oscowofcoursewillbeabletomarketitsomlikelytobehigherteryimports4“Infographic–WhereDoestheEU’sGasComeFrom?”EuropeanCouncil,updatedNovember7,2022,https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-gas-supply/.5“EUImportsofEnergyProducts–RecentDevelopments,”Eurostat,December2022,https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments#Main_suppliers_of_natural_gas_and_petroleum_oils_to_the_EU.THEGLOBALENERGYAGENDA...continuedfrompage9geopoliticsratherthanadiminishmentincyberat-tackrisk.Comparedtotheprioryear’sresponse,however,mosttopicsdidnotseedrasticchangeinthefaceofncethepercentageofrespondentswhoenvisionaconflictintheSouthorEastChinaSeasasthepredominantriskrosefrom7per-centlastyearto10percentthisyear.Additionally,trade-relateddisruptionsstillcommandroughlyonetenthofrespondentsaswell,shiftingfrom11percentto8percent.ItisworthnotingthatChinaandtradewatchersrepresentwell-definedcommunitieswithlong-standingconvictionsregardingtherisksandopportunitiesintheirrespectiveareasofexpertise,lendingsomecredencetowhytheserespondentsmaybecomparativelyunmovedbytheconflictinUkraineintheirassessmentoffuturerisks.Meanwhile,twooldworriesfellofftheradarofcollectivelynamedby17percentofrespondentsastopconcernsforthe2022outlook.WithoneofthetwoNordStream2stringssabotagedinSeptember2022,theabsenceofthepipeline’srankingthisyearisself-evident.COVID-19,incontrast,elicitsdeeperreflection.Whilegenerallythereappearstobebroadsocietalappreciationthatthevirusremainsafea-tureofmodernlife,especiallyasChinaexperiencesares