云计算与安全cloudcomputingsec课件

CloudComputingSecurityConsiderationsJoeStSauver,Ph.D.SecurityProgramsManager,Internet2@Internet2JointTechsSaltLakeCity,Utah4:10-4:30PM,Tuesday,2/2/2010Disclaimer:allopinionsstrictlymyown.CloudComputingSecurityConsider1IntroductionIntroduction23SomeCautionsAboutToday'sTalk/TopicAsyoulikelyalreadyknow,there'saLOTofhypeassociatedwithcloudcomputing.I'msorryaboutthat(butIcan'tfixthat)Cloudcomputingisahugetopic.Itencompassesdiversemodelsandtechnologies,eventhoughusersandthetradepresstendtolumpthemunderacommonname.Coveringallpotentialsecurityissuesin20minutesissimplyimpossible.Forthatmatter,pleasenotethatwe'restilldiscoveringmanyofthesecurityissueswhichwillchallengecloudcomputing!Why?Inpart,that'sbecausecloudcomputingisstillawork-in-progress.Becauseitisrapidlyevolving,whatItelltodayyoumayquicklybecomeirrelevantorobsolete.Nonetheless,there'ssomuchthrustbehindcloudcomputingthatwesimplydon'thavetheoptionofsittingbackandwaitingtounderstandaddresscloudcomputingsecurityissues.3SomeCautionsAboutToday'sT34What'sDrivingCloudComputing?DriversInclude…Thoughtleaders:Amazon,Google,MicrosoftandmanyotherInternetthoughtleadershaveallalignedbehindthecloudTheeconomy:Becausecloudcomputingshouldtheoreticallyhelpsitesavoidmajornewcapitalexpenditures(capex)whilealsocontrollingsomeongoingoperationalexpenses(opex),cloudcomputingispotentiallya"lifesaver"forfinanciallystrappedbusinesses,includingmanymajoruniversities.TheFeds:CloudcomputinghassubstantialmomentuminWashingtonDC:itwasfeaturedinthejust-releasedfederalITbudget;VivekKundra,thefederalCIO,haschampionedcreationof,a“one-stopshop”forcloudcomputingservicesforfederalagencies;DISAhascreatedaverysuccessfulcloudcomputingprojectcalled"RACE;"andHowardSchmidt,thenewfederalcybersecuritycoordinator,hassaidthatsecuringcloudcomputingwillbeatoppriority.4What'sDrivingCloudComputin45556Apps.Gov(CurrentlyaBitofAWorkInProgress)6Apps.Gov(CurrentlyaBitof67DISA'sRACE7DISA'sRACE78OurCommunityIsAlsoPressingAheadCloudcomputingseemtobeturninguponprettymucheverynetworkingandsecuritymailinglistI'monYou'veheard/willbehearinganumberofcloudcomputingtalksduringthisweek'smeeting,whichisprobablynotsurprisingsincecloudcomputingwasoneofJointTech'sexplicitfocusareas.ButI'mseeingcloudseverywhere,notjusthereatJointTechs.Heck,I'mevenseeing"clouds"(withfrequentreferencestosecurity!)appearinthingslikethelastInternet2MemberMeeting"IntroductiontoInternet2"talk8OurCommunityIsAlsoPressin89"CyberinfrastructureVisualized:"

ACloud,WithLotsof"Security"References9"CyberinfrastructureVisualiz910WhyIs"Security"EverywhereonThatSlide?Securityisgenerallyperceivedasahugeissueforthecloud:

DuringakeynotespeechtotheBrookingsInstitutionpolicyforum,“CloudComputingforBusinessandSociety,”[MicrosoftGeneralCounselBrad]SmithalsohighlighteddatafromasurveycommissionedbyMicrosoftmeasuringattitudesoncloudcomputingamongbusinessleadersandthegeneralpopulation.

Thesurveyfoundthatwhile58percentofthegeneralpopulationand86percentofseniorbusinessleadersareexcitedaboutthepotentialofcloudcomputing,morethan

90percentofthesesamepeopleareconcernedaboutthesecurity,accessandprivacyoftheirowndatain

thecloud.

10WhyIs"Security"Everywhere1011Source:

atslide17AnotherDataPointforCloudsandSecurity11Source:

atslide17Another1112CloudComputingIsManyDifferent

ThingstoManyDifferentPeopleAllofthefollowinghavebeenmentionedfromtimetotimeasexamplesof“cloudcomputing:”

--AmazonWebServicesincludingtheElasticCompute

Cloud(EC2),AmazonSimpleStorageService(S3),etc.)

--RackspaceCloud(formerlyMosso)

--Google’sAppEngine

--Windows’AzurePlatform(production/for-feeasoftoday!)

--theOGF(includingitsOpenCloudComputingInterface)

--SETI@Home,Folding@Home,,etc.

--outsourcedcampusemailservice(toGmailorL),

oroutsourcedspamfiltering(e.g.,toPostiniorIronport)

--useofvirtualization(e.g.,VMware)tohostdepartmental

systemseitheronlocalservers,oronoutsourcedVPSInreality,someofthoseactivitiesarenot(strictlyspeaking)what'susuallydefinedas"cloudcomputing,"12CloudComputingIsManyDiff1213SomeGenerallyAcceptedCharacteristicsMostpeoplewouldagreethattruecloudcomputing… --usuallyhasloworzeroupfrontcapitalcosts

--largelyeliminatesoperationalresponsibilities(e.g.,ifadisk

failsoraswitchlosesconnectivity,youdon’tneedtofixit)

--forthemostpart,cloudcomputingeliminatesknowledgeof

WHEREone’scomputationalworkisbeingdone;yourjob

isbeingrun“somewhere”outthereinthe“cloud”

--offerssubstantialelasticityandscalability:ifyouinitially

needoneCPU,that’sfine,butifyousuddenlyneed999

more,youcangetthem,too(andwithverylittledelay!)

If/whendemanddrops,youcanscaleyourusageback,too

--cloudcomputingleverageseconomiesofscale(running

megadatacenterswithtensofthousandsofcomputersis

farlessexpensive(percomputer)thanrunningasmall

machineroomwithjustamodestclusterofsystems)13SomeGenerallyAcceptedChar1314Some"Clouds"Won'tNecessarily

HaveAllofThoseCharacteristicsForinstance,ifyoursiteisrunningalocalprivatecloud:

--thereWILLbecapitalexpendituresupfront,

--you(orsomeoneatyoursite)WILLstillcareaboutthings

likehardwarefailures,and

--youlikelyWON'Thavetheillusionofaseeminglyinfinite

inventoryofprocessors(ormemoryordisk)

Nonetheless,alocalprivatecloudservicemayfunctionallyworkthesamewayasapubliccloudservice,andhybridcloudmodelsmayevencombineprivateandpubliccloudservicesinafairlyseamlessway.Ubuntu'senterprisecloudofferingisaniceexampleofthis.14Some"Clouds"Won'tNecessar1415151516WillYourCampusOfferPrivateCloudServices?Ifyouhaven'tbeenthinkingaboutofferingprivatecloudservices,Iwouldsuggestthatyoumightwantto,includingthinkinghardaboutanypotentialsecurityissuesassociatedwithdoingso.16WillYourCampusOfferPriva16SoWhatAboutSecurityintheCloud?Fortheremainderofthistalk,we'lloutlinesomeofthesecurityissuesyoumightrunintowhenusingcloudcomputingSoWhatAboutSecurityinthe1718InSomeWays,"CloudComputingSecurity"

IsNoDifferentThan"RegularSecurity"Forexample,manyapplicationsinterfacewithendusersviatheweb.AllthenormalOWASPwebsecurityvulnerabilities

--thingslikeSQLinjection,crosssitescripting,crosssiterequestforgeries,etc.,--allofthosevulnerabilitiesarejust

asrelevanttoapplicationsrunningonthecloudastheyaretoapplicationsrunningonconventionalhosting.Similarly,considerphysicalsecurity.Adatacenterfullofserverssupportingcloudcomputingisinternallyandexternallyindistinguishablefromadatacenterfullof"regular"servers.Ineachcase,itwillbeimportantforthedatacentertobephysicallysecureagainstunauthorizedaccessorpotentialnaturaldisasters,buttherearenospecialnewphysicalsecurityrequirementswhichsuddenlyappearsimplybecauseoneofthosefacilitiesissupportingcloudcomputing18InSomeWays,"CloudComputi1819ThereAreSomeUniqueCloud-RelatedAreasWhichWe'reNOTGoingToWorryAboutTodayContractingforCloudServices:Eventhoughcontractualterms(includingthingslikeSLAs)canbeusedtomitigatesomerisks,I'mnotalawyer,andI'mnotgoingtopretendtobeone,sowe'renotgoingtocoverissuesrelatedtocontractingforcloudservices.Fortunately,NACUAdidagreatjobdiscussingthistopicinarecentseminar,see/meetings/VirtualSEminars/december2009/home.htmlCompliance,AuditingandeDiscovery:Becausethismeetingisprimarilyaboutresearchandeducation,notbusinessprocessesanduniversityadministration,wewillnotconsiderthepotentialneedforcloudcomputingtobecompliantwithPaymentCardIndustrysecuritystandards,FERPA,HIPAA,GLBA,orotherrelatedcompliancemandates.Sowhataresomecloud-relatedsecurityissues?19ThereAreSomeUniqueCloud-1920The"A"inTheSecurity"C-I-A"ObjectivesComputerandnetworksecurityisfundamentallyaboutthreegoals/objectives:

--confidentiality(C)

--integrity(I),and

--availability(A).Availabilityistheareawherecloudbasedinfrastructureappearstohavehaditslargest(oratleastmosthighlypublicized)challengestodate.Forexample,considersomeofthecloud-related

outageswhichhavebeenwidelyreported…20The"A"inTheSecurity"C-I2021Bitbucket,DDoS'dOffTheAir21Bitbucket,DDoS'dOffTheAi2122MaintenanceInducedCascadingFailures22MaintenanceInducedCascadin2223It'sNotJustTheNetwork:StorageIsKey,TooSee

However,seealso:MicrosoftConfirmsDataRecoveryforSidekickUsers

23It'sNotJustTheNetwork:S2324AndLet'sNotForgetAboutPowerIssues24AndLet'sNotForgetAboutP2425MitigatingCloudComputingAvailabilityIssuesRiskanalystswilltellyouthatwhenyouconfrontarisk,youcantrytoeliminatetherisk,youcanmitigate/minimizetheimpactoftherisk,oryoucansimplyaccepttherisk.Ifyoutrulyrequirenon-stopavailability,youcantryusingmultiplecloudproviders,oryoucouldusepublicandprivatecloudnodestoimproveredundancy.Somecloudcomputingservicesalsoofferservicedividedintomultiple"regions."Bydeployinginfrastructureinmultipleregions,isolationfrom"single-region-only"events(suchasthepoweroutagementionedpreviously)canbeobtained.Availabilityissuesmayalsobeabletobeatleastpartiallymitigatedattheapplicationlevelbythingslikelocalcaching.Sometimes,though,itmaysimplymakefinancialsenseforyoutojustaccepttheriskofarareandbriefoutage.(Remember,99.99availability==>52+minutesdowntime/yr)25MitigatingCloudComputingA2526MitigatingDataLossRisksTheriskofdataloss(asintheT-MobileSidekickcase)isanexceptiontotheavailabilitydiscussionontheprecedingslide.Usersmaybeabletotolerateanoccasionalserviceinterrup-tion,butnon-recoverabledatalossescankillabusiness.Mostcloudcomputingservicesusedistributedandreplicatedglobalfilesystemswhicharedesignedtoinsurethathardwarefailures(orevenlossofanentiredatacenter)willnotresultinanypermanentdataloss,butIbelievethereisstillvalueindoingatraditionaloffsitebackupofone'sdata,whetherthatdataisinusebytraditionalserversorcloudcomputingservers.Whenlookingforsolutions,makesureyoufindonesthatbacksupdataFROMthecloud(manybackupsolutionsaremeanttobackuplocaldataTOthecloud!)26MitigatingDataLossRisksTh2627CloudComputingAndPerimeterSecurityWhileI'mnotahugefanoffirewalls(asI'vepreviouslydiscussedattheSpring2008I2MMin"CyberinfrastructureArchitectures,SecurityandAdvancedApplications,"see),atleastsomesitesdofindvalueinshelteringatleastsomepartsoftheirinfrastructurebehindafirewall.Theremaybeamisconceptionthatcloudcomputingresourcescan'tbeshelteredbehindafirewall(seeforexample"HP'sHurd:Cloudcomputinghasitslimits(especiallywhenyouface1,000attacksaday),"Oct20th,2009,)Contrastthatwith"AmazonWebServices:OverviewofSecurityProcesses"(seetherefsattheback).AWShasamandatoryinboundfirewallconfiguredinadefaultdenymode,andcustomersmustexplicitlyopenportsinbound.27CloudComputingAndPerimete2728CloudComputing&Host-BasedIntrusionDetectionWhileI'mnotveryenthusiasticaboutfirewalls,Iamabigfanofwell-instrumented/well-monitoredsystemsandnetworks.Choosingcloudcomputingdoesnotnecessarilymeanforgoingyourabilitytomonitorsystemsforhostileactivity.

OneexampleofatoolthatcanhelpwiththistaskisOSSEC(theOpenSourceHost-BasedIntrusionDetectionSystem),anIDSwhichsupportsvirtualizedenvironments:28CloudComputing&Host-Based2829CloudComputingAlsoRelies

ontheSecurityofVirtualizationBecausecloudcomputingisbuiltontopofvirtualization,iftherearesecurityissueswithvirtualization,thentherewillalsosecurityissueswithcloudcomputing.Forexample,couldsomeoneescapefromaguestvirtualmachineinstancetothehostOS?Whilethecommunityhastraditionallybeensomewhatskepticalofthispossibility,thatchangedwithBlackhatUSA2009,whereKostyaKortchinskyofImmunityInc.presented"Cloudburst:AVMwareGuesttoHostEscapeStory",see

BHUSA09-Kortchinsky-Cloudburst-SLIDES.pdfKostyaopined:"VMwareisn'tanadditionalsecuritylayer,it'sjustanotherlayertofindbugsin"[putanotherway,runningavirtualizationproductincreasestheattacksurface]29CloudComputingAlsoRelies2930ChoiceofCloudProviderCloudcomputingisaformofoutsourcing,andyouneedahighleveloftrustintheentitiesyou'llbepartneringwith.Itmayseemdauntingatfirsttorealizethatyourapplicationdepends(critically!)onthetrustworthinessofyourcloudproviders,butthisisnotreallyanythingnew--today,evenifyou'renotusingthecloud,youalreadyrelyonandtrust:

--networkserviceproviders,

--hardwarevendors,

--softwarevendors,

--serviceproviders,

--datasources,etc.

Yourcloudproviderwillbejustonemoreentityonthatlist.30ChoiceofCloudProviderClou3031CloudProviderLocationYouactuallywanttoknow(roughly)whereyourcloudlives.Forexample,oneofthewaysthatcloudcomputingcompanieskeeptheircostslowisbylocatingtheirmegadatacentersinlocationswherelabor,electricityandrealestatecostsarelow,andnetworkconnectivityisgood.Thus,yourcloudprovidercouldbeworkingsomeplaceyou

mayneverhaveheardof,suchasTheDalles,Oregon,

wherepowerischeapandfiberisplentiful,orjustaseasilysomeplaceoverseas.Ifyourapplicationanddatadoendupataninternationalsite,thosesystemswillbesubjecttothelawsandpoliciesofthatjurisdiction.Areyoucomfortablewiththatframework?Areyoualsoconfidentthatinternationalconnectivitywillremainupanduncongested?Canyoulivewiththelatenciesinvolved?31CloudProviderLocationYoua3132CloudProviderEmployeesIfyou'relikemostsites,you'reprobablyprettycarefulabouttheemployeesyouhireforcriticalroles(suchassysadminsandnetworkenginers).Butwhataboutyourcloudprovider?Ifyourcloudproviderhascarelessoruntrustworthysystemadministrators,theintegrity/privacyofyourdata'satrisk.Howcanyoutellifyourcloudproviderhascarefulandtrustworthyemployees?Askthem!

--Dobackgroundsgetcheckedbeforepeoplegethired?

--Doemployeesreceiveextensivein-housetraining?

--Doemployeesholdrelevantcertifications?

--Dochecklistsgetusedforcriticaloperations?

--Aresystemadministratoractionstrackedandauditableon

aposthocbasisifthere'sananomalousevent?

--Doadministrativeprivilegesgetpromptlyremovedwhen

employeesleaveorchangetheirresponsibilities?32CloudProviderEmployeesIfy3233CloudProviderTransparencyYouwillonlybeabletoassessthesufficiencyofcloudprovidersecuritypracticesifthecloudprovideriswillingtodiscloseitssecuritypracticestoyou.Ifyourprovidertreatssecuritypracticesasaconfidentialorbusinessproprietarything,andwon'tdisclosetheirsecuritypracticestoyou,you'llhaveahardtimeassessingthesufficiencyoftheirsecuritypractices.Unfortunately,youmayneedtoconsiderusingadifferentprovider.Remember:"Trust,butverify."[AproverbfrequentlyquotedbyPresidentReaganduringarmscontrolnegotiations]I'mnotknownforbeingabigMicrosoftcheerleader,butMicrosoftdeservesrecognitionforpromotingboththeirCloudComputingAdvancementActandpressingcloudvendorstopolicethemselveswhenitcomestotransparency.See/presspass/presskits/cloudpolicy/33CloudProviderTransparencyY3334AnExampleofTheWrongApproachSource:

cloudsecurityorg-interviews-guido-van-rossum-google-app-engine-python-and-security.html34AnExampleofTheWrongAppr3435ProviderFailuresAreAlsoARealPossibilityEvenforared-hottechnologylikecloudcomputing,thereisnoguaranteethatyourproviderswillfinanciallysurvive.Whatwillyoudoifyourproviderliquidates?35ProviderFailuresAreAlsoA3536PenTesting;WorkingIncidentsInTheCloudStandardpentestingprocesseswhichyoumayuseonyourowninfrastructuremaynotbeanoptioninanoutsourcedenvironment(thecloudprovidermaynotbeabletodistinguishyourtestsfromanactualattack,oryourtestsmaypotentiallyimpactotherusersinunacceptableways)Ifyoudohaveasecurityincidentinvolvingcloud-basedoperations,howwillyouhandleinvestigatingandworkingthatincident?Willyouhavetheaccesslogsandnetworktrafficlogsyoumayneed?Willyoubeabletotellwhatdatamayhavebeenexfiltratedfromyourapplication?Whatifyoursystemendsupbeingtheoriginofanattack?Areyoucomfortablewithyourprovider'sprocessesfordisclosinginformationaboutyouandyourprocesses/data?36PenTesting;WorkingInciden3637OECD,TheCloud,andPrivacyCloudComputingandPublicPolicy,14October2009

$FILE/JT03270509.PDF37OECD,TheCloud,andPrivacy3738WorldPrivacyForumPrivacyInTheCloudsReportFrom:"PrivacyintheClouds:RiskstoPrivacyandConfidentialityfromCloudComputing,"ReleasedFebruary23,2009,38WorldPrivacyForumPrivacy3839AdditionalCloudComputingSecurityResources"AWSSecurityWhitepaper,"

aws_blog/AWS_Security_Whitepaper_2008_09.pdf"CloudComputingSecurity:RainingOnTheTrendyNewParade,"BlackHatUSA2009,

/files/Cloud.BlackHat2009-iSEC.pdf“ENISACloudComputingRiskAssessment,”November20th,2009,www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/deliverables/

cloud-computing-risk-assessment/at_download/fullReport“PresentationonEffectivelyandSecurelyUsingtheCloudComputingParadigmv26,”10/7/2009,NIST,

cloud-computing-v26.ppt“SecurityGuidanceforCriticalAreasofFocusinCloudComputing,V2.1,”December2009,CloudSecurityAlliance,

39AdditionalCloudComputingS3940ThanksforTheChanceToTalkToday!Arethereanyquestions?40ThanksforTheChanceToTal40CloudComputingSecurityConsiderationsJoeStSauver,Ph.D.SecurityProgramsManager,Internet2@Internet2JointTechsSaltLakeCity,Utah4:10-4:30PM,Tuesday,2/2/2010Disclaimer:allopinionsstrictlymyown.CloudComputingSecurityConsider41IntroductionIntroduction4243SomeCautionsAboutToday'sTalk/TopicAsyoulikelyalreadyknow,there'saLOTofhypeassociatedwithcloudcomputing.I'msorryaboutthat(butIcan'tfixthat)Cloudcomputingisahugetopic.Itencompassesdiversemodelsandtechnologies,eventhoughusersandthetradepresstendtolumpthemunderacommonname.Coveringallpotentialsecurityissuesin20minutesissimplyimpossible.Forthatmatter,pleasenotethatwe'restilldiscoveringmanyofthesecurityissueswhichwillchallengecloudcomputing!Why?Inpart,that'sbecausecloudcomputingisstillawork-in-progress.Becauseitisrapidlyevolving,whatItelltodayyoumayquicklybecomeirrelevantorobsolete.Nonetheless,there'ssomuchthrustbehindcloudcomputingthatwesimplydon'thavetheoptionofsittingbackandwaitingtounderstandaddresscloudcomputingsecurityissues.3SomeCautionsAboutToday'sT4344What'sDrivingCloudComputing?DriversInclude…Thoughtleaders:Amazon,Google,MicrosoftandmanyotherInternetthoughtleadershaveallalignedbehindthecloudTheeconomy:Becausecloudcomputingshouldtheoreticallyhelpsitesavoidmajornewcapitalexpenditures(capex)whilealsocontrollingsomeongoingoperationalexpenses(opex),cloudcomputingispotentiallya"lifesaver"forfinanciallystrappedbusinesses,includingmanymajoruniversities.TheFeds:CloudcomputinghassubstantialmomentuminWashingtonDC:itwasfeaturedinthejust-releasedfederalITbudget;VivekKundra,thefederalCIO,haschampionedcreationof,a“one-stopshop”forcloudcomputingservicesforfederalagencies;DISAhascreatedaverysuccessfulcloudcomputingprojectcalled"RACE;"andHowardSchmidt,thenewfederalcybersecuritycoordinator,hassaidthatsecuringcloudcomputingwillbeatoppriority.4What'sDrivingCloudComputin444554546Apps.Gov(CurrentlyaBitofAWorkInProgress)6Apps.Gov(CurrentlyaBitof4647DISA'sRACE7DISA'sRACE4748OurCommunityIsAlsoPressingAheadCloudcomputingseemtobeturninguponprettymucheverynetworkingandsecuritymailinglistI'monYou'veheard/willbehearinganumberofcloudcomputingtalksduringthisweek'smeeting,whichisprobablynotsurprisingsincecloudcomputingwasoneofJointTech'sexplicitfocusareas.ButI'mseeingcloudseverywhere,notjusthereatJointTechs.Heck,I'mevenseeing"clouds"(withfrequentreferencestosecurity!)appearinthingslikethelastInternet2MemberMeeting"IntroductiontoInternet2"talk8OurCommunityIsAlsoPressin4849"CyberinfrastructureVisualized:"

ACloud,WithLotsof"Security"References9"CyberinfrastructureVisualiz4950WhyIs"Security"EverywhereonThatSlide?Securityisgenerallyperceivedasahugeissueforthecloud:

DuringakeynotespeechtotheBrookingsInstitutionpolicyforum,“CloudComputingforBusinessandSociety,”[MicrosoftGeneralCounselBrad]SmithalsohighlighteddatafromasurveycommissionedbyMicrosoftmeasuringattitudesoncloudcomputingamongbusinessleadersandthegeneralpopulation.

Thesurveyfoundthatwhile58percentofthegeneralpopulationand86percentofseniorbusinessleadersareexcitedaboutthepotentialofcloudcomputing,morethan

90percentofthesesamepeopleareconcernedaboutthesecurity,accessandprivacyoftheirowndatain

thecloud.

10WhyIs"Security"Everywhere5051Source:

atslide17AnotherDataPointforCloudsandSecurity11Source:

atslide17Another5152CloudComputingIsManyDifferent

ThingstoManyDifferentPeopleAllofthefollowinghavebeenmentionedfromtimetotimeasexamplesof“cloudcomputing:”

--AmazonWebServicesincludingtheElasticCompute

Cloud(EC2),AmazonSimpleStorageService(S3),etc.)

--RackspaceCloud(formerlyMosso)

--Google’sAppEngine

--Windows’AzurePlatform(production/for-feeasoftoday!)

--theOGF(includingitsOpenCloudComputingInterface)

--SETI@Home,Folding@Home,,etc.

--outsourcedcampusemailservice(toGmailorL),

oroutsourcedspamfiltering(e.g.,toPostiniorIronport)

--useofvirtualization(e.g.,VMware)tohostdepartmental

systemseitheronlocalservers,oronoutsourcedVPSInreality,someofthoseactivitiesarenot(strictlyspeaking)what'susuallydefinedas"cloudcomputing,"12CloudComputingIsManyDiff5253SomeGenerallyAcceptedCharacteristicsMostpeoplewouldagreethattruecloudcomputing… --usuallyhasloworzeroupfrontcapitalcosts

--largelyeliminatesoperationalresponsibilities(e.g.,ifadisk

failsoraswitchlosesconnectivity,youdon’tneedtofixit)

--forthemostpart,cloudcomputingeliminatesknowledgeof

WHEREone’scomputationalworkisbeingdone;yourjob

isbeingrun“somewhere”outthereinthe“cloud”

--offerssubstantialelasticityandscalability:ifyouinitially

needoneCPU,that’sfine,butifyousuddenlyneed999

more,youcangetthem,too(andwithverylittledelay!)

If/whendemanddrops,youcanscaleyourusageback,too

--cloudcomputingleverageseconomiesofscale(running

megadatacenterswithtensofthousandsofcomputersis

farlessexpensive(percomputer)thanrunningasmall

machineroomwithjustamodestclusterofsystems)13SomeGenerallyAcceptedChar5354Some"Clouds"Won'tNecessarily

HaveAllofThoseCharacteristicsForinstance,ifyoursiteisrunningalocalprivatecloud:

--thereWILLbecapitalexpendituresupfront,

--you(orsomeoneatyoursite)WILLstillcareaboutthings

likehardwarefailures,and

--youlikelyWON'Thavetheillusionofaseeminglyinfinite

inventoryofprocessors(ormemoryordisk)

Nonetheless,alocalprivatecloudservicemayfunctionallyworkthesamewayasapubliccloudservice,andhybridcloudmodelsmayevencombineprivateandpubliccloudservicesinafairlyseamlessway.Ubuntu'senterprisecloudofferingisaniceexampleofthis.14Some"Clouds"Won'tNecessar5455155556WillYourCampusOfferPrivateCloudServices?Ifyouhaven'tbeenthinkingaboutofferingprivatecloudservices,Iwouldsuggestthatyoumightwantto,includingthinkinghardaboutanypotentialsecurityissuesassociatedwithdoingso.16WillYourCampusOfferPriva56SoWhatAboutSecurityintheCloud?Fortheremainderofthistalk,we'lloutlinesomeofthesecurityissuesyoumightrunintowhenusingcloudcomputingSoWhatAboutSecurityinthe5758InSomeWays,"CloudComputingSecurity"

IsNoDifferentThan"RegularSecurity"Forexample,manyapplicationsinterfacewithendusersviatheweb.AllthenormalOWASPwebsecurityvulnerabilities

--thingslikeSQLinjection,crosssitescripting,crosssiterequestforgeries,etc.,--allofthosevulnerabilitiesarejust

asrelevanttoapplicationsrunningonthecloudastheyaretoapplicationsrunningonconventionalhosting.Similarly,considerphysicalsecurity.Adatacenterfullofserverssupportingcloudcomputingisinternallyandexternallyindistinguishablefromadatacenterfullof"regular"servers.Ineachcase,itwillbeimportantforthedatacentertobephysicallysecureagainstunauthorizedaccessorpotentialnaturaldisasters,buttherearenospecialnewphysicalsecurityrequirementswhichsuddenlyappearsimplybecauseoneofthosefacilitiesissupportingcloudcomputing18InSomeWays,"CloudComputi5859ThereAreSomeUniqueCloud-RelatedAreasWhichWe'reNOTGoingToWorryAboutTodayContractingforCloudServices:Eventhoughcontractualterms(includingthingslikeSLAs)canbeusedtomitigatesomerisks,I'mnotalawy