失效模式及其影响分析英文教材课件

FAILUREMODEandEFFECTSANALYSIS

失效模式及其影响分析PhilipsCFTAsiaPacificInnovation&IndustrialSupportJAYTAN

FAILUREMODEandEFFECTSANALYFMEACourseSchedule

Day2 9.00 Real-lifeP-FMEAexercise-con’t Review

10.30 Tea-break 10.45 D-FMEA

12.00 Lunch 1.00 OrganizationAspectofFMEA 3.00 Tea-break 3.30 MaturityGrid

Day19.00 Introduction IntrotoFMEA ProcessFMEA10.30 Tea-break10.45 Process-FMEA(con’t) 12.00 Lunch 1.00 Real-lifeP-FMEAexercise 3.30 Tea-break 3.45 Real-lifeP-FMEAexercise-con’t FMEACourseSchedule Day2 D1

INTRODUCTION

TO

FMEA1

INTRODUCTION

TO

FMEACar2:NoMajorBreakdowns

非主要的破损Fewfailures

很少的失效Car1:FrequentBreakdowns

频繁地破损Manyminorcomponentsfailures

许多的小部件失效Areliabilityprogram?

Whynecessary?

一个可靠性的计划？ 为什么必须？Areliabilityprogram?

CustomerSatisfaction－顾客满意Customersatisfactionmeans:Neverhavingtosayyou’resorry!

顾客满意意味着：决不要说对不起！CustomerSatisfaction－顾客满

QUALITYENGINEERINGTOOLS

TOOLS 1DesignReview 27QCTools 3New7QCTools 4StatisticalProcessControl 5DesignofExperiments 6QualityFunctionDeployment 7FailureModeandEffectsAnalysis

APPLICATIONDesignQualityAssuranceDataanalysis/Problem-solvingBusinessProcessMgt,QFPHoldingtheimprovementQualitybreakthroughsMeetingcustomerrequirementFool-proofDesign&processes

QUALITYENGINEERINGTOOLS TOOWhatisaFMEA?Astructured,disciplined

processtosystematicallyandcomprehensively,identifyanddocumentpotential

problemsandweaknessesinadesignorprocesssothatdesignchangescanbemadeorothercorrectiveactionstakentoprevent

actualoccurrenceoffailure

一个结构化和

专业化的过程，它能系统和综合地找出并记录在设计和工艺过程中潜在的问题和缺点并由此作出设计改变或采取其它的改正措施以防止失效的实际发生WhatisaFMEA?EffectofFMEAonProcessandDesignchangesDesignStartDevelopmentProductionReleaseProductionTimeNoofEngineeringChangesTraditionalapproachFMEAapproachEffectofFMEAonProcessand

TYPESofFMEATYPE

ALIASES DESCRIPTIONProduct DesignFMEA *Focusontheproductitself,reviewFMEA D-FMEAsystems,parts&componentsProcess ProductionFMEA *Focusonthemanufacturingprocess,FMEA P-FMEA revieweachprocessstepApplication Downstreamcustomer’s*Focusoncustomer’sprocessFMEA ManufacturingFMEA *Primarilyinterestedincompatibilitybetweenyourproduct&customer’s processService *Focusonfieldservice FMEA *Concernedwithreliability,product application,maintainability TYPESofFMEATYPE ALIASES ObjectiveofFMEAFailureMode&EffectAnalysis(FMEA)isusedtoimproveproductreliability(consideringusage,environment,lifetimeetc.)qualityof(purchased)parts(incl.‘hidden’functionsofapart)reproducibilityoftheproduct(reductionoffalloff&repairsinassembly)reproducibilityoftheproductionprocess(handling,transportetc.)FocusontechnicalproblemsLinkwithMaturityGridandRiskManagement!ObjectiveofFMEAFailureModeTypesofRisksMarketRisks

havingtherightproduct

ontherighttime

TechnicalRisks

achievingtheproductspec

quality,reproducibilityProjectRisks

projectorganisation,

teamaspects,resourcesMarketRisksTechnicalRisksProjectRisksPlanningSpecificationKnow-how,capacityTypesofRisksMarketRisks

havUseofFMEAA.ReliabilityEngineering -Reliabilityimprovements.B.ProducibilityAnalysis -Lessrepairsandscrapduringmanufacturing. -ImprovementoftheZero-HourQuality.C.ProductionProcessAnalysis -Lessrepairsandscrap. -Determinationofprocesscontrolpoints. -Processrelease.AandBduringdevelopmentphase.Cduringworkpreparationphase.UseofFMEAA.ReliabilityEngi100:110:11:1PRODUCTDESIGNPROCESSDESIGNPRODUCTIONIMPROVEPRODUCTPAYBACKSLOWVISIBILITY/REWARDHIGHVISIBILITY/REWARDTIME500:1CONCEPTDESIGNQualityLever100:110:11:1PRODUCTPROCEReliabilityInvestigationbyMeansofFMEAPremises: ThenormalfunctioningoftheproductQuestion: Whatistheinfluenceof:use-timeand environmentoneachcomponentPossibilities: a.wear, b.rust, c.materialfatigue, d.contamination,e.deformationunderload(creep) f.ageing, cessfailures.Whatistheeffectonproductfunctions?ReliabilityInvestigationbyMProducibilityAnalysisbyMeansofFMEAPremises: Measuringtoolis:egFOR/ppmActions: Actionsasoutcomeofthe ProcessQualityControl(P.Q.C.)Analysis: Focusedonfailureswhicharemadeandnoticed duringtheproductionprocess.ProducibilityAnalysisbyMean2

PROCESSFMEA2

PROCESSFMEAFMEAfortheProductionProcessSubjectforAnalysis: -flowchartandscenarioofthe productionprocessFocusedon: -manipulationsoftheoperator -wrong(deviations)material -process -equipment -transport -storageFMEAfortheProductionProcesFailuremodeRPN2=SO2D2ControlsCause1RPNn=SOnDnControlsCause1DevelopmentofaProcessFMEA:AnOverviewProcessstepPurposeRPN1=SO1D1ControlsCause1EffectsSeverity,SOccurrence,OnDetection,DnFailuremodeRPN2=SO2D2Contro失效模式及其影响分析英文教材课件ProcessFMEAProcedure5Steps:EstablishtheProcessFlowAnalyzetheProcessEstablishpurposeofeachoperationandthepossiblefailuremodesDefinetheweakpointsoftheProcessEstablishactionsandresponsibilitiesProcessFMEAProcedure5Steps:Step1-EstablishProcessFlowTakeintoaccountthe:SpecificationformanufacturingSystemStructure:

- manufacturingstrategy(manual/automaticetc)

- technologies,processes&equipment

- line&factorylayout

- suppliers,transport,materialflowSystemoperation,controlandmaintenanceSystemenvironmentalconditionsTesting&qualitycontrolMakeoftheassemblyprocessa:PROCESSFLOWCHARTStep1-EstablishProcessFlowProcessFlowChart(eg)MountpartHandlingprocessGluepartAdjustmentprocessTestingMountsubassyHandlingprocessMountpartTestingStation1Station2Station3Station4ProcessFlowChart(eg)MountpProcessFlowChart(eg)EquipmentsLightpencarrierLightpencarrierPress-ontoolLightpencarrierMountingfixtureElectricscrewdriverScrewdispenserLDGUcutting/insertionmachineLightpencarrierSolderingequipmentGratingadjustmentmachineGluedispenserandcuringunitMountactuatr&installspringclipMount&secureflexassemblyCutLDGUleads&mountLDGUintoLightpenhousingSolderactuatorandLDGUtoflexassyGrating&glueingofLDGUMountrack&wirespringAssemblyprocessProcessFlowChart(eg)EquipmeFailureModeandEffectAnalysisChartFailureModeandEffectAnalysStep2-AnalysisoftheProcessExaminationof:Howthepurposeoftheprocess/operationarerealisedbythedesigners/engineers.Whataretheworkingconditions *static *dynamicStep2-AnalysisoftheProceStep3-EstablishpurposeofeachoperationandthepossiblefailuremodesWhatisthepurposeoftheprocessstep?Whichdeviationsarepossible? (FAILUREMODE)Whatistheeffectofthatdeviationontheproducibility?(EFFECT)Whatisthecauseofthatdeviation? (CAUSE)Step3-EstablishpurposeofeaMATERIALMANMACHINEMETHODMEASUREMENTENVIRONMENTPROCESSProductFunctionsProductFunctionsProductFunctionsProcessCause-EffectInvestigationPOTENTIALCAUSEEFFECTPOTENTIALFAILUREPOTENTIALMATERIALMANMACHINEMETHODMEASURPotentialFailureModesFailuremeansanyoneormoreofthefollowing… - failuretoperform/deliverfunction - failuretomeetdesignintent - failuretomeetcustomerexpectations - somethingundesirable,e.g.anoisyprojector - applicationproblem,e.g.wrongapplicationfailurecouldoccur,butwillnotnecessarilyoccurdescribein“physical”ortechnicalterms,notasasymptomrecognisablebythecustomerusebrainstormingtoensurecompleteness

Examples:corrodedcrackeddeformedoxidisedleakingfracturedmalformedflattenednon-stickingcontaminatedPotentialFailureModesFailureFailureModeandEffectAnalysisChartFailureModeandEffectAnalysEffects(ProcessFMEA)Eachfailuremodemayhaveundesirablesideeffectsonsomeorallthefollowing:

1. End-user(product) 2. Down-streamprocess(nextoperation) 3. LocalprocessAll3effectsshouldbeconsideredinanyprocessFMEAEffects(ProcessFMEA)EachSeverity(Process-FMEA)Rating

Degree Effectson Effectondown EndUser Stream/Localprocess 1 Minor

*notnoticeable *noeffect 2 low

*slightlynoticeable *noimpact/limitedeffect

3 *limitedimpactonboth 4 Moderate

*custdissatisfaction *mayrequireminorrework

5 *reducedperformance *mayreq.unscheduledrework 6 *perform.Deterioration *maycausedamagetoequip.

7

High*highdeg.ofcustdissatisfaction *maycauseseriousdisruption

8 *lossofsub-systemfunction, *mayrequiremajorrework mayendangermachine/operator

9

Veryhigh*safety-related *productionlineshutdown10 *non-compliancewith *saftetyofprodpersonnelthreatened governmentregulations~SeverityistheassessmentoftheseriousnessoftheeffectSeverity(Process-FMEA)Rating FailureModeandEffectAnalysisChartFailureModeandEffectAnalysPotentialCause(s)ofFailureHowthefailuremodecouldoccur,describedintermsofsomethingcorrectableorcontrollablelist,usingbrainstormingorFaultTreeAnalysis(FTA),everyconceivablefailurecauseassignabletoeachfailuremodecausesshouldbespecific,e.g.“operatorerror”or“machineproblem”areexamplesofcauseswhicharenotspecificenoughcausesmayormaynotbemutuallyexclusive - iferadicatingacausehasadirectimpactonthefailuremode,then, thecauseissaidtobeexclusivetothefailuremode

- whencausesarenotmutuallyexclusive,DesignofExperiments

maybeusetoidentifytherootcauses(minorcontributors)orthose whichcanbemosteasilycontrolledPotentialCause(s)ofFailureHFaultTreeexampleProblemCauseACauseBCauseCA1A2B1B2FaultTreeexampleProblemCauseOccurrence(P-FMEA)Rating

Degree BasedonSPC Baseonfailurerate

1

Remote CpK>1.67 <1ppm

2

Verylow CpK>1.33 50ppm

3

Low CpK>1.00 250ppm

4 1000ppm

5

Moderate CpK<0.83 2500ppm

6 1in80(1.25%)

7

High NotinStatistical 1in40(2.5%0

8 control 1in20(5.0%) 9

Veryhigh Failurealmost 1in8(12.5%)10 inevitable 1in2(50.0%)~canbethoughtastheprobabilityofoccurrenceofthefailuremodeOccurrence(P-FMEA)Rating DegrFailureModeandEffectAnalysisChartFailureModeandEffectAnalysCurrentcontrolsCurrentcontrolsaredescriptionsofcontrolsthat:

(a)preventthefailuremodefromoccurring

or (b)detectsthefailuremodeshoulditoccurExamplesofprocesscontrols: -fixturefool-proofing -SPC -inspectioneitheratthesubjectoperation -testingoratthesubsequentoperations -gaugeR&R -preventivemaintenance -operatortraining -GMP(goodmanufacturingpractice) -ISO9000 -SOP(standardoperatingprocedures) -humidity/pressure/tempcontrols -finiteelementanalysis -calibrationCurrentcontrolsCurrentcontroDetection(P-FMEA)Rating

Degree Description1

VeryHigh Processautomaticallydetectsfailure2 Controlwillalmostcertainlydetectfailure3

High Controlhavegoodchanceofdetectingfailure4 5 Moderate Controlmaydetectfailure6 7

Low Controlhavelowchanceofdetectingfailure8

9 VeryLow Controlprobablywillnotdetectfailure10 Nil Controlwillnotdetectfailure~Assumethefailurehasoccur,assesstheprobabilitythatthecontrolswilldetectthefailuremodebeforeshippingoutDetection(P-FMEA)Rating DeFailureModeandEffectAnalysisChartFailureModeandEffectAnalysStep4-DefinetheWeakPointsDefinetheseverityofthefailure(=S)

Effect

Rating:1.........10Definetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofthefailure(=O)

Cause

Rating:1........10Definethelikelihoodofdetectionofthefailure(=D)

TimeEffect

Rating:1........10Step4-DefinetheWeakPointsRiskPriorityNumber:(RPN)

=>SeverityxOccurrencexDetection => RPN=SxOxD

1<RPN<1000

Inthemselves,absoluteRPNnumbershavenosignificance.Theyareonlyforrankingthefailurecauses,forcorrectiveactionsRiskPriorityNumber:(RPN)RPN:AcceptancethresholdS=5(reducedperformance+degradation)O=5(approximately0.25%)

D=5(maydetectpriortoshipment)Generally,RPN125maybeagoodthresholdtouseieforRPN>125=>correctiveactionisneeded.Butthereareexceptions;SxOxDRPN 125S O D Description Action?10 1 1 Failureunlikelytoreachuser1 10 1 FrequentMinor,detectablefailure1 1 10 Minordefectreachesuserinfrequently10 10 1 Seriousandfrequentfailure1 10 10 Frequentminordefectreachesuser10 1 10 Seriousdefectreachesuser10 10 10 INTROUBLE!!!RPN:AcceptancethresholdS=Step5-EstablishActionsandResponsibilities1.Whathastobeimproved:-changeofdesign-lifetest-contactwithsupplier-controlpointbuildin,inproductionprocessetc.2.Whoisresponsible3.WhenisitfinishedStep5-EstablishActionsandRPNacceptable?CorrectiveactionsDONewRPN1Acceptable?EndYesNoNoYesRPNacceptable?CorrectiveactionsDONewRPNnAcceptable?EndYesNoNoYesCorrectiveactionsDONewRPN1EnChoiceofCorrectiveActions

Unlikelytobeeffective Preferredchoices

* Increaseinspection * Poka-yoke(fool-proofing) * Additionaltest * Processchange * Additionalcheck * designchange * Re-trainoperators * Automation * Re-writeSOP * Computerisation * Robotics

ChoiceofCorrectiveActions 失效模式及其影响分析英文教材课件CorrectiveActionPreferenceHierarchyTheintentofanyrecommendedcorrectiveactionistoimprovetheRPNratingbyreducingSeverity,Occurrence,Detectionorall3together.Emphasisshouldbeonprevention,i.e.reducingOccurrence.Shouldpreventionbeimpossible,thefollowingHierarchyofpreferenceshouldbeused: 1.Prevention,orpotentialcauseelimination 2.Detection,asearlyintheproductlifecycleaspossible: best ………atthedesignstage nextbest ………priortomassproduction then ………priortoshipment and,aslastresort………inthefield,priortocatastrophicfailure 3.Impactreduction,i.e.reduceSeverityGenerally,toreduceanyofthethreerating-O,D,S -processand/ordesignchanges/modificationarerequiredCorrectiveActionPreferenceHFMEA

is

isnot

*structured *ashow-piece *systematic *anumbergame *rigorous *aguessinggame *comprehensive *adocumentationexercise *scientific *aself-consolationexercise *adiscipline .. *preventive .. *customer-focused .. *ateameffort .. *across-functionalexercise .. *alivingdocument .. *acontinuousprocess *aone-offexerciseFMEA is isnoRealLifeFMEAExerciseRealLifeFMEAExercise3

PRODUCTD-FMEA3

PRODUCTD-FMEAProcessFMEAvsProductD-FMEA* P-FMEAdoesnotrelyonproductdesignchangestoovercomeprocessweaknesses,butitdoestakeintoconsiderationaproduct’sdesigncharacteristics* D-FMEAdoesnotrelyonprocesscontrolstoovercomedesignweaknesses,butitdoestakethetechnical/physicallimitationsofthemanufacturingprocess(i.e.theprocesscapability)intoconsideration.ProcessstepPurposePiece-partorsub-assyFunctionProcessFMEAProductFMEAProcessFMEAvsProductD-FMEAProcessFMEAvsProductD-FMEA* Hencecausessuchas“operatornotinsertingresistorproperly”&“suppliershippingwrongparts”maynotbeofconcerninaD-FMEA,butiftherearedesign-relatedfactorsthataffectinsertion,orwhichcausetransportation/shippingproblems.,thentheymustbeconsidered.ProcessstepPurposePiece-partorsub-assyFunctionProcessFMEAProductFMEAProcessFMEAvsProductD-FMEADesignFMEAAD-FMEAstartsfrom aBill-of-MaterialorFunctionalBlockDiagram

DesignFMEAcantakeeitherof2approaches:1. ComponentsBottom-upApproach Thisapproachispossibleonlywhenadesignalreadyexists. Itservestojustifyeverycomponentinthedesign.DesignFMEAAD-FMEAstartsfroDesignFMEA2. FunctionalBlockApproach(Top-down) Thisapproachhelpsdesignerspicktheoptimalsub-systemsorsub-assemblies.Itplaysapartinthedesigndecision-makingprocess Inthecaseofbig,complicatedsystems,theSelectiveFunctionalBlockApproachmaybeused--ateachleveloftheFunctionalBlockDiagrampickthemostsusceptiblesub-assyofsub-systemtoFMEADesignFMEA2. FunctionalBlockProductFunctionsTakeintoaccountthe:SpecificationSystemStructure:

- differentelementswiththeircharacteristics,performanceroles andfunctions

- connectionsbetweenelementsSystemoperation,controlandmaintenanceSystemenvironmentalconditionsUserspatternMakeofthefunctions,subsystemsandcomponents:==>FUNCTIONTREEProductFunctionsTakeintoaccProductFunctionTreeProductbasicfunctionFunctionAFunctionBFunctionCFunctionDFunctionAaFunctionAbFunctionCaFunctionCbFunctionAbaFunctionAbcFunctionCaaFunctionCabFunctionCacProductFunctionTreeProductbEffects(D-FMEA)3levelsofeffectsmustbeconsidered: 1.End-usereffects 2.Nexthigherleveleffects 3.LocaleffectsThefollowingexamplewillhelptodistinguishthe3typesofeffects:valveenginesystempowersystemcar

component nexthigher end-userunderreview level Effect Description ExampleEnd-usereffects effectsoncarperformance; noisy;jerky;cannot whatthecustomerwouldobserve runathighspeed and/orexperienceNexthigherleveleffects effectsontheengine over-heated;vibrationLocaleffects effectsonthevalveitself deteriorationEffects(D-FMEA)3levelsofefMATERIALUSEDESIGNCOMPONENTSPECIFICATIONENVIRONMENTPRODUCTPOTENTIALCAUSEEFFECTPOTENTIALFAILUREPOTENTIALProductCause-EffectInvestigationProductFunctionsProductFunctionsProductFunctionsMATERIALUSEDESIGNCOMPONENTSPECSeverity(D-FMEA)Rating

Degree Effects 1 Minor

*noperceptibleeffectonproductperformance *userwillprobablynotnoticethefailure 3 low

*customernoticesslightdeteriorationinperformance

*causesslightcustomerannoyance 5 Moderate

*causessomecustomerdissatisfaction *customernoticesreducedproductperformance

*gradualperformancedeterioration

7

High *highdegreeofcustomerdissatisfaction *lossofsub-systemfunction,eg.enginefail 10

Veryhigh *safety-related *non-compliancewithgovernmentregulationsSeverity(D-FMEA)Rating DegreeOccurrence(D-FMEA)Rating

Description Probabilityoffailure Designlifefailurerate

1

Remote Failureunlikely <1ppm

3

Low Relativelylowfailurerate 200ppm

1000ppm

5

Moderate Occasionalfailures 2500ppm 1in80(1.25%)

7

High Repeatedfailures 1in40(2.5%0 1in20(5.0%) 10

Veryhigh Failurealmostinevitable 1in8(12.5%) 1in2(50.0%)Occurrence(D-FMEA)Rating DescDetection

Approach Description Application Time-table Howearlyinproductlifecycle D-FMEA fromdesignstarttoFieldfailure? Fixed-gate What’stheprobabilityofdetection D-FMEA atanypoint(gate)inthecycle?Detection Approach DescriptionDetection(D-FMEA)Time-tableapproachRating Probabilityofdetection1 WillbedetectedpriortoProductionRelease3 VerylikelytobedetectedpriortoFinalRelease4 DetectableafterreleasebutbeforeMassProduction5 DetectablepriortoShipment7 Willbedetectedbeforeoccurrenceinthefield10 UndetectableuntilfailureoccursinthefieldDetection(D-FMEA)Time-tableaDetection(D-FMEA)FixedGateapproachRating Probabilityofdetection1 Willbedetectedindesignevaluations3 Highchanceofdetectionindesignevaluations5 Moderatechanceofdetectionindesignevaluations7 Lowchanceofdetectionduringdesignevaluations10 UndetectableuntilfailureoccursinthefieldDetection(D-FMEA)FixedGatea4

ORGANIZATIONALASPECTSOF

FMEA4

ORGANIZATIONALASPECTSOF

FOrganisationalAspectsofFMEAGeneralPointsParticipantsPreparationsReportingOrganisationalAspectsofFMEAFMEAisateameffortcoveringallrelevantdisciplinesFMEAsessionsshouldnotlastlongerthanhalfadayTheproductFMEAshouldbefocusedon:

-reliability(normalfunctioning)

-producibilityTheprocessFMEAshouldbefocusedon:

-processflow -manipulationsofoperator -deviationsinmaterial -transport

-storage

GeneralPointsFMEAisateameffortcoveringFMEA:CriticalSuccessFactors* Behonest* Bepositive* Bethorough* Attentiontodetails* Followthrough* Involvetherightpeople* “Ratherbesafethansorry”* Managementbyfact - Minimiseguess-workandgut-feel - MaximiseuseofdataandquantitativemethodsFMEA:CriticalSuccessFactorParticipantsParticipantsshouldbedirectlyinvolvedNumberofparticipantsshouldbelimitedParticipantsfromrelevantdepartments:

-Development

-Engineering

-Production

-Process -Quality -Specialist(ifnecessary) -ServiceParticipantsParticipantsshoulPreparationsforD-FMEAPreparationsshouldbedonebythedesigner,incloseco-operationwiththechairmanofthemeetingDrawingsandsufficientmodelsshouldbeavailableOnemodelshouldhavebeenincirculationTolerancecalculationsandcontourmapsshouldbeavailableSpecialpreparationsforaD-FMEA:

-thedesignshouldbebreakdowninto‘elements’

-prioritysettingsoftheseelements

-fromexistingproductsthefollowingdatashouldbeavailable:

.Presaledata

.Servicecallratefigures

.FallofffiguresPreparationsforD-FMEAPreparaReportingResultofFMEAreportedonstandardformsActionlistshouldbesetupfromthesessionandshouldbe:

-presentedonthemilestonemeetings

-knownandtrackedwithintheprojectteam

-discussedateveryprojectteammeetingReportingResultofFMEAreport5

MATURITYGRID5

MATURITYGRIDUseoftheMaturityGridObjective:Totrackmaturityindesignofproduct&processTofacilitateMilestonedecisionsTovisualisestatus:alsoproblemstobesolvedinthenextphasesInputsforMaturityGrid:OutstandingDesignIssues(TechSpec,CustomerRequirements)ProblemsfoundinDesignEvaluation/ProcessTrailsProblemsfoundinReliabilitytestsPotentialproblemsidentifiedinFMEAsessionsFMEAprovidesinputtothematuritygrid,butisnottheonlyone!UseoftheMaturityGridFMEApMaturityGridforProducts&ProcessesGravityFactor:S-nonconformitywithsafetystandard/otherrequirementA-productnotproducibleorsaleableB-notacceptedbycriticalcustomerorproductionwithbigproblemsC-canbesoldorproducedwithminordifficultiesD-problemaccepted(noactions)EvolutionFactor:4-causenotknown3-solutionnotknown2-evaluationnotyetpositive1-solutionnotyetintroduced0-solutionsintroducedProduct/ProcessmaturitygridGravityFactorEvolutionFactorSABCD43210AFMCDDRCRIRPotentialproblemsindesignMaturityGridforProducts&PNoEvaluated?Evaluationpositive?Causeknown?Solutionknown?Solutionintroduced?NoYesYesYesYesNoNoNo43210EstablishFollow-upwithevolutionofActionsGravityFactor:S-nonconformitywithsafetystandard/otherrequirementA-productnotproducibleorsaleableB-notacceptedbycriticalcustomerorproductionwithbigproblemsC-canbesoldorproducedwithminordifficultiesD-problemaccepted(noactions)EvolutionFactorNoEvaluated?Causeknown?Soluti失效模式及其影响分析英文教材课件Example:MaturityGridGravityFactor:S-nonconformitywithsafetystandard/otherrequirementA-productnotproducibleorsaleableB-notacceptedbycriticalcustomerorproductionwithbigproblemsC-canbesoldorproducedwithminordifficultiesD-problemaccepted(noactions)EvolutionFactor:4-causenotknown3-solutionnotknown2-evaluationnotyetpositive1-solutionnotyetintroduced0-solutionsintroducedGravityFactorEvolutionFactorSABCD43210AFMCDDRCRIR22Example:MaturityGridGravityTHANKYOUTHANKYOU失效模式及其影响分析英文教材课件FailureModeandEffectAnalysisChartFailureModeandEffectAnalysFAILUREMODEandEFFECTSANALYSIS

失效模式及其影响分析PhilipsCFTAsiaPacificInnovation&IndustrialSupportJAYTAN

FAILUREMODEandEFFECTSANALYFMEACourseSchedule

Day2 9.00 Real-lifeP-FMEAexercise-con’t Review

10.30 Tea-break 10.45 D-FMEA

12.00 Lunch 1.00 OrganizationAspectofFMEA 3.00 Tea-break 3.30 MaturityGrid

Day19.00 Introduction IntrotoFMEA ProcessFMEA10.30 Tea-break10.45 Process-FMEA(con’t) 12.00 Lunch 1.00 Real-lifeP-FMEAexercise 3.30 Tea-break 3.45 Real-lifeP-FMEAexercise-con’t FMEACourseSchedule Day2 D1

INTRODUCTION

TO

FMEA1

INTRODUCTION

TO

FMEACar2:NoMajorBreakdowns

非主要的破损Fewfailures

很少的失效Car1:FrequentBreakdowns

频繁地破损Manyminorcomponentsfailures

许多的小部件失效Areliabilityprogram?

Whynecessary?

一个可靠性的计划？ 为什么必须？Areliabilityprogram?