跨组织视角下的营销渠道治理：制度环境的影响

精选优质文档-----倾情为你奉上精选优质文档-----倾情为你奉上专心---专注---专业专心---专注---专业精选优质文档-----倾情为你奉上专心---专注---专业跨组织视角下的营销渠道治理：制度环境的影响跨组织视角下的营销渠道治理：制度环境的影响［Abstract］Researchesonmarketingchannelsconstituteanimportantpartofmarketingresearch.Withthechangeofthecompetitivesituationsinthemarketsandthedevelopmentofthemarketingtheories，thefocusofthemarketingchannelsresearchchangedfromemphasizingonefficiencyandbenefitstopowerandconflicts，andthentorelationshipandallianceaswellasnetworking.Mostofthepreviousmarketingchannelstudieshaveappliedanefficiency-basedtaskenvironmentperspectiveandlargelyoverlookedalegitimacy-basedinstitutionalenvironmentapproachinstudyingtheprocessofchannelgovernance.Inthepaper，Iproposethatmarketingchannelisakindofinstitutionalarrangementandinter-organizationalrelationshipinthenature.Socompaniesmustpayattentiontothedegreeofacceptanceandagreementoftheirdecisionsandbehaviorswhentheyaregoverningmarketingchannels.Thepaperfirstreviewsprevioustheoriesandstudiesonmarketingchannelgovernanceandinter-organizationalrelationships.Theauthorabsorbsvaluableideasfromthemandproposesatheoreticalframeworkandsomepropositions，andexplainsandteststheframeworkandthepropositionsthroughtwocasestudies.［摘要］营销渠道研究是营销研究的一个重要组成部分。随着市场中竞争性环境的变化以及营销理论的发展，营销渠道研究的关注点从强调效率和利益转向强调权力和冲突，进而转向联网以及关系和联盟。在研究渠道治理过程方面，以往的营销渠道研究大多采用以效率为基础的任务环境视角，而在很大程度上忽视了以合理性为基础的制度环境方法。本文提出，营销渠道从本质上说是一种制度安排和跨组织关系。因此，企业在治理营销渠道时，必须关注其决策和行为的接受度与认可度。本文先是回顾了营销渠道治理和跨组织关系方面的理论与研究，进而从中吸收有价值的观点，提出了理论框架和一些命题，并通过两则案例研究进行解释和检验。［Keywords］MarketingChannels;Inter-OrganizationalPower；TheInstitutionalEnvironment［关键词］营销渠道；跨组织能力；制度环境［中图分类号］F712［文献标识码］A［文章编号］1005-6432（2014）5-0008-101INTRODUCTIONWilkinson(2001)dividesstudiesaboutmarketingchannelsintothreestages：channelstructures，channelbehaviors，andchannelrelationships.Inthefirststage，researcherstriedtofindoutwaysofoptimizingtheefficienciesandbenefitsofmanagingmarketingchannels.Inthesecondstage，researcherstriedtounveilthepowerandconflictbetweenchannelmembers.Inthethirdstage，researcherstriedtofindoutwaysofreducingoreliminatingopportunisticbehaviorsthroughmutualcommitmentandhonest.Actually，somescholarshadbeguntostudymarketingchannelsfromtheperspectiveofnetworkgovernance.Inmostofthesestudies，manyscholarshaveusedthepoliticaleconomyframework(Achrol，ReveandStern，1983；Frazier，1999；Hutt，MokwaandShapiro，1986，SternandReve，1980).Scholarsimplicitlyhaveascribedactivechoicebehaviortochannelmemberswhilestressingefficiencyingoverningchannelrelationships.Theyhaveconsideredtheimplicationsofenvironmentaluncertaintyordependenceonenvironmentalresourcesfordyadicchannelrelationships(suchasconflictsandcooperation，Dwyer，SchurrandOh，1987)，powerbalances(suchaspower-dependencerelationships，Frazier，1983)，andrelationshipswithentitiesoutsidethedyads(suchasregulatorsandotheractors，Dutta，HeideandBergen，1999)fromtraditionaleconomicefficiencyperspectives.Intheprocess，scholarshavelargelyoverlookedtheubiquitousinfluencesoftheinstitutionalenvironmentsandhowinter-organizationalrelationshipssuchasmarketingchannelsareembeddedinthelargersocialcontext(Granovetter，1985；Grewal&Dharwadkar，2002).Recentadvancesinorganizationtheorysuggestthatorganizationsstriveforbotheconomicfitness，whichemphasizesthecompetitionforscarceresourcesandunderscorestheimportanceofthetaskenvironment，andsocialfitness，whichstressesthepursuitoflegitimacyintheeyesofimportantsocietalstakeholdersandpinpointthesignificanceoftheinstitutionalenvironment.Thetermgovernancehasbeenbroadlydefinedasa“modeoforganizingtransactions”(WilliamsonandOuchi，1981).AmoreprecisedelineationwasofferedbyPalay(1984)，whodefinesitas“ashorthandexpressionoftheinstitutionalframeworkinwhichcontractsareinitiated，negotiated，monitored，modifiedandterminated.”Heide(1994)statesthatgovernanceisamultidimensionalphenomenonthatencompassestheinitiation，terminationandongoingrelationshipmaintenancebetweenasetofparties.Inthispaper，theauthorsproposethatmarketingchannelsareinter-organizationalrelationshipsinthenature.Whencompaniesaregoverningmarketingchannels，theyareactuallygoverninginter-organizationalrelationships.Thisisaninstitutionalprocess.Theprimarymeasuringstandardofthegoverningeffectsislegitimacy，butnotthetraditionalefficiency.2THEORETICALBACKGROUNDSANDMODELInstitutionaltheoryholdsthatacompanysinstitutionalenvironmentismadeupofthenormsandvaluesofitsstakeholders，whichincludecustomers，investors，guilds，trusteecouncils，governments，andpartners.Accordingtoinstitutionaltheory，acompanyadoptssomestructure，behaviororprocesstosatisfyotherstakeholders.Thisbehaviorofseekingexternalrecognitionistheresultoftheinstitutionalenvironmentsinfluence.Therefore，legitimacybecomesakeyconceptininstitutionaltheory.Suchman(1995)“ageneralizedassumptionorperceptionoftheactionsofanentityaredesirable，proper，andappropriatewithinsomesociallyconstructednorms，values，beliefsanddefinitions.”Legitimacyrequirescompaniesbehaviorstobeconsistentwithpubliccognitionandemotionalexpectations.Thatis，companieswilladoptthosestructures，behaviors，andprocessesthatareconsideredaseffective，appropriate，andpopular.Accordingly，companiesarenotrationallypursuingefficiencybutconformingtoexternalrulesandnorms，soastomaketheirbehaviorsbeaccepted，understood，andrecognizedbyotherstakeholders.Therefore，gaininglegitimacyisofgreatimportancetocompaniesthatoperatewithintheinstitutionalenvironment.Inordertogainlegitimacy，manyaspectsoforganizationalstructuresandbehaviorsaredesignedandperformedtobeacceptedbytheinstitutionalenvironmentbutnottopursueefficiency.Marketingchannelsgovernanceisapartofacompanysoperations.Thedecisions，behaviors，andprocessesofgoverningchannelsmustbeconsistentwiththecompanysstrategy.Theyallhavetobeaccepted，understood，andrecognizedbyotherstakeholders.Thisisaninstitutionalizedprocess.Therefore，gaininglegitimacyoftheirchannel-governingdecisions，behaviors，andprocessesisalsoofgreatimportance.Marketchannelwontbeoneofthesourcesofsustainedcompetitiveadvantagesifthedecisions，behaviors，andprocessarenotlegitimate.2.1Inter-OrganizationalStudiesInter-OrganizationalinstitutionsInstitutionaltheoryinsiststhatweshouldstudyorganizationsenvironmentssoastobetterstudyandunderstandcompaniesbehaviorsandexplainorganizationalphenomena(Meyer&Rowen，1977).Institutionaltheorydividesenvironmentsintoinstitutionalenvironmentsandtaskenvironment，whichhavedifferentinfluenceonorganizations.Organizationsshouldtakeintoaccountthetaskenvironmentandtheinstitutionalenvironmentaswell，sinceorganizationsarealwaysinfluencedbytheinstitutionalenvironmentsandtheyareinstitutionalizedorganizations.Institutionaltheorystressesthatorganizationsareabletotakeinitiativestochangetheirenvironmentssoastobettersurviveanddevelop.Accordingtoinstitutionaltheory，acompanyisoperatingwithinasocialframeworkofnormsandvalues.Theireconomicbehaviorsareconstrainedbytechnology，information，income，andsocialconstructsaswell.Beingconsistentwithsocialexpectationsisbeneficialtotheirsurvivalandsuccesses(BaumandOliver，1991；CarrollandHannan，1989；DiMaggioandPowell，1983；Oliver，1991).Organizationsimprovetheirlegitimacy，resources，andsurvivingcapabilitiesthroughfollowingupsoastogainbenefits.2.2Inter-OrganizationalImitationsInter-organizationalimitationofpracticesandstructuresplaysacentralroleinseveraltheoriesoforganizationalactions(Haunschild，1993).Forexample，theoriesoforganizationallearningarguethatorganizationscopyotherorganizations，lettingothersabsorbthecostsofexperimentationordiscovery(Dutton&Freedman，1985；Levitt&March，1988；Lant&Mezias，1990).Strategicchoicetheoriessuggestthatimitationcanbeastrategicresponsetocompetitoractivities，sosecond-moverstaketheadvantagesofthefactthattherisksassociatedwithproductdevelopmenthavebeenabsorbedbyfirst-movers(Lieberman&Montgomery，1988).Institutionalizationtheoryarguesthatorganizationscopypracticesthatadoptedbyothersinanefforttogainlegitimacy(DiMaggio&Powell，1983).Itisself-evidentthatinter-organizationalimitationsareofgreatimportance.Buthowdoorganizationsimitate？Haunschild&Miner(1997)indicatethreemodesofinter-organizationalimitation，includingfrequency-basedimitation，trait-basedimitation，andoutcome-basedimitation.Withfrequency-basedimitation，organizationstendtoimitateactionsthathavebeentakenbylargenumbersofotherorganizations.Severaltheoreticalrationaleshavebeenmarshaledtosupportfrequencyimitation，andconsiderableempiricalevidencedocumentsitsoccurrence.Accordingtoearlyinstitutionalresearch，firmsadoptpracticesandstructuresthatmanyotherfirmshaveadoptedbecausewhenmanyfirmsadoptapractice，thelegitimacyofthatpracticeisenhanced(TolbertandZucker，1983；DiMaggioandPowell，1983).Thiseffectcanoccurbecausethedesireforlegitimacyleadsfirmstoadoptlegitimatepractices(MeyerandRowan，1977).Intrait-basedimitation，organizationsmayalsoselectivelyimitatepracticesthathavebeenusedbysomesubsetofotherorganizations.Argumentsfortrailimitationhavegenerallyemphasizedtheimportanceofsocialprocesses.Earlyinstitutionaltheorists(e.g.，DiMaggioandPowell，1983)suggestedthatfirmsadoptthepracticesof“legitimate”organizationsandthatlegitimacyisinferredfromtraitslikelargesizeandsuccess.Organizationsmayalsoseektoacquirestatusbyimitatinghigher-statusorganizations(FombrunandShanley，1990)，whichareusuallylargeandsuccessful.Withoutcome-basedimitation，organizationsusetheoutcomesthatoccurafterotherorganizationsuseapracticeorstructuretodeterminewhethertheyshouldadopt.Thus，neitherthenumbernorthecharacteristicsofothersdoingpractice“A”isimportant.Instead，itistheapparentoutcomesthatoccurafterotherorganizationsdo“A”thatdetermineswhether“A”willbeimitated.Practicesorstructuresthatproducedpositiveoutcomesforotherswillbeimitated；thosethatproducednegativeoutcomeswillbeavoided.Selectiveimitationdoesnotarisefromfeaturesofotherusersbutfromperceivedconsequencesofthepractice.Companiesarenotlimitedtoonlyoneofthethreemodes.Duringthecompetition，theimitationmodetheywillapplyvarieswiththeircompetitorsanddecisions.2.3Inter-OrganizationalPowerandDependenceThemostcomprehensivetheoreticalstatementoninter-organizationalpoweranddependencewasa1978bookbyPfefferandSalancik，whichpresentedadetailedtheoreticaldiscussionaswellastheresultsofanumberoftheauthorsearlierempiricalworks.PfefferandSalancikbeganwithfourkeypremises：organizationsarefirstandforemostconcernedwithsurvival；inordertosurvivetheyrequireresourceswhichtheycannotgenerateinternally；asaconsequence，organizationsmustinteractwithelementsintheenvironmentonwhichtheyaredepend，whichoftenincludeotherorganizations；survivalisthereforebasedonanorganizationsmanageitsrelationswithotherorganizations.Becauseorganizationsdependonelementsintheirenvironmentforresources，thosegroupscanmakeclaimsonthem，andorganizationsmayfindthemselvesattemptingtosatisfytheconcernsoftheseenvironmentalconstituencies.AccordingtoPfefferandSalancik，therearethreecrucialfactorsthatdeterminetowhichoneorganizationdependsonanother：theimportanceoftheresourcetotheorganizationssurvival，theextenttowhichaparticulargroupinsideoroutsidetheorganizationhasaccesstoordiscretionoveruseoftheresource，andtheextenttowhichalternativesourcesoftheresourceexist.OneimportantfeatureofPfefferandSalanciksdiscussionistheirpointthatdependencecanbemutual.Justasoneorganizationcandependonanother，twoorganizationscansimultaneouslydependoneachother.Power