人文论文定稿票据丧失救济制度

1、兰州理工大学人文学院毕业论文兰州理工大学人文学院毕业论文 的运行并不理想，存在一定的困难和不完善之处：1民事诉讼法的规定，公示催告期间票据的转让行为无效，理论上有违票据的 流通原则；实践上由于公示催告期间转让票据的的行为无效可能引起社会、银行收受 票据产生票据危机，不利于票据流通和推广；公示催告可能导致的除权判决对企业和银行存在较大风险，尤其是善意受让人将丧失票据权利。此做法虽然保护了失票人的权利，但却损害了善意受让人的利益；由于付款银行遍及全国各地公示催告的书难以送达各个付款银行给止付及公 示催告带来极大的难度，有时甚至没有实际意义；我国民事诉讼法规定的公示催告期间是60天，对于利害关系人权

2、利保护不利。法院通过公告的方式通知持票人申报权利，由于汇票到期日较长，可以长达九个月，而公示催告期间是从立案时起 60日,结果是公示催告程序往往在汇票到期日前结束， 大 多数最后持票人难以通过公告知道手中的汇票正在被公示催告，往往是在请求付款时才知道汇票被公示催告，此时票款可能已经被领走。由于公示催告的期间可能短于汇票到 期日，除权判决也完全可能在汇票到期日之前生效，因为不考虑汇票的具体到期日，规定 只要除权判决生效即可请求付款，实际上等于确认该判决可以变更票据权利的内容，这违背了除权判决的性质。2公示催告制度的完善我国民事诉讼法虽然规定了公示催告程序，但由于受当时立法客观条件的限制， 加之我

3、国经济生活发生了根本性的变化，公示催告程序存在严重缺失和漏洞，因此必须 充实和完善。公示催告期间的完善我国民事诉讼法规定，“自判决公告之日起，申请人有权向支付人请求支付，该规定看似合情合理，但是却忽略了一个重要的问题，即“如果除权判决生效的时间早 于票据上实际记载的时间，那么票据的付款人是否可以“期限未届满为由主张抗辩呢？依据我国法律规定，此种情况下，票据付款人不享有抗辩权，判决生效后，付款即负有 付款义务。这就形成了一个悖论：在票据不丧失的情况下，持票人于票据到期日前请求 付款时，通常会受到付款人的抗辩；而其在票据丧失的情况下，反倒可以根据除权判决 提前实现其票据权利，这有违法律公平公正的原

4、则。因此，法律应当对票据的公示催告 期间作出下限的规定，但不对其上限作规定，即“公示催告的期限不得少于60日，同时亦不得早于票据的到期日（2）公示催告申请的担保问题虽然公示催告涉及有公权力，但并不表示失票人可以任意实现公示催告程序。现有 公示催告程序的申请并没有要求申请人提供相应担保，这种无需提供担保也无需证明申请人是最后的合法持票人的做法显然有违公平、平等、诚信原则。首先，作为公示催告的申请人即失票人与其他现有持票人处于平等的法律地位，二 者在票据权利的形式上的差别并不能作为其正当行使票据权利的障碍。失票人申请公示催告的一个后果是导致票据的暂时被止付，若此期间票据到期，现持票人必然无法从付

5、款人或代理付款人处实现其付款请求。 此时现持票人就因为失票人的申请而使其票据权 利无法顺利行使。其次，若是为保障现持票人的票据权利的顺利行使而付款，则失票人 申请公示催告无实际意义。对失票人的票据权利不能保障就失去了票据丧失救济制度的 意义。最后，若失票人恶意申请公示催告，则在其未得到除权判决的情况下获得付款就 会损害真正持票人或其他利害关系人的利益。因此，新的公示催告制度中应当要求失票 人在申请公示催告程序时提供担保，担保的形式可以采用现金或其他等价物。无法提供 担保时，借鉴台湾地区的经验：应当允许其将票据款项提存。如此亦可平衡兼顾各方当 事人的利益和实践需要。条文可表述为：“票据丧失后，失

6、票人申请公示催告应当提供 相应的担保，此担保以足以抵销因公示催告给其他正当权利人造成的损失为限。无法提 供担保的，得申请将票据款项提存”。（3）取消公示催告期间转让票据权利行为无效的规定我国民事诉讼法第195条第2款规定：“公示催告期间，转让票据的行为无效”。 这条规定从保护失票人的利益考虑并不错误，然而，这条规定显然没有考虑到公示催告 期间善意取得票据的现持票人的权利，这样规定是不妥的。在票据丧失救济制度中，失 票人和利害关系人一般站在对立面，法律究竟要保护谁，应考虑票据的性质，考虑交易 秩序的安全和社会正义。公示催告的目的是催促与票据有利害关系的人来申报权利，至 于是否保护该利害关系人，应

7、取决于其在取得该票据时对票据丧失是否知情或者应该知 情，而不应该取决于其取得票据的时间是在公告期内还是在公告期外（除权判决前）。这种不分行为主观善恶，绝对地将公示催告期间转让票据权利的行为都归于无效的规定， 不仅违背了票据无因性和流通性这些根本属性，而且也违背民事诉讼法平等保护双 方当事人利益的基本原则。因此，建议取消这条规定。补充有关空白票据丧失的公示催告60由于空白票据与完全票据存在着一定的差别，所以与完全票据相比，空白票据的公 示催告程序具有一定的特殊性：第一，空白票据丧失后的公示催告主要是为了防止权利 受到侵害，而不是直接实现票据权利。第二，公示催告的申请及法院的公告中关于票据 记载内

8、容的表述往往因票据存在空白记载事项而与完全的票据公示催告的公告内容有 所不同，对此，必须写明票据的补记授权。第三，由于空白票据中也有一部分是出票日 期或者到期日空白的票据，所以对法院公告期间的确定也不同于完全票据，在完全票据 的公示催告程序中，公告期间不得少于60日同时不得早于票据的到期日，但是在日期空 白的票据公示催告程序中，无法确定票据的到期日，所以可以确定公告期间不得少于 日即可。60确立撤销除权判决之诉及其程序在公示催告期间届满后无人申报权利，或者有人申报但被驳回时，人民法院可以根 据申请人的申请，作出宣告票据无效的除权判决。这是申请人申请公示催告程序希望达 到的主要目的，因为只有人民

9、法院作出除权判决，才能使申请人所享有的票据权利与该 丧失的票据本身分离，申请人可以在不占有票据的情况下主张该票据所记载的权利。然 而，除权判决的作出，仅仅是根据公示催告申请人的申请和无人申报的事实，推定该申 请人为票据权利人的。但是，这种推定完全有可能与事实不符。因为在现实生活中，利 害关系人因正当事由的耽误而未能在除权判决作出之前申报权利的情况是客观存在的。 因此在这种情况下，就会产生如何恢复利害关系人的票据权利，为其提供法律救济的问 题。对此，我国民事诉讼法第198条明确规定：禾U害关系人因正当理由不能在判决 前向法院及时申报权利的，自知道或应当知道判决公告起一年内，可以向作出判决的人 民

10、法院起诉。显然，这里明确的是除权判决的撤销之诉，但对哪些为撤销除权判决的正 当理由法律没有明确规定。由此，可以参照我国台湾法律的规定，明确以下情况得提起 撤销除权判决之诉：第一，法律不允许适用公示催告程序的；第二，没有进行公示催告 公告，或者没有按法定方式进行公告的；第三，没有按照公示催告的公告期间进行公告 的；第四，作出除权判决的法官应当回避，没有回避的。以上这些情形，利害关系人均 可以向人民法院提起撤销除权判决之诉。孔博空白票据法律制度研究J.山东大学硕士学位论文,2006 : 42.季一秀票据丧失救济制度研究J.苏州大学学位论文,2008 : 38.诉讼补救措施的缺陷及其完善1.诉讼补救

11、措施的缺陷失票人在丧失票据后，可以直接向人民法院提起民事诉讼，要求法院判令票据债务 人向其支付票据金额。我国票据法没有具体规定该类诉讼的诉因以及诉讼的主体资 格等问题,这一明显缺陷，导致失票人和法院没有法律依据可循，实际上就使诉讼这种补 救方法起不到实质作用，成为一种无法操作的程序。2诉讼补救措施的完善我国法律虽然规定了票据丧失可以通过诉讼的方式进行救济，但对于票据丧失救济诉讼程序却没有明确的规定，客观上导致实践中缺乏统一的操作规程，需要进行探索和 完善：诉讼主体。按照民事诉讼法的规定，在没有确定的被告的情况下，原告是不能提起诉讼的。而 我国目前的诉讼救济制度一大缺陷就是没有确定明确的诉讼主体

12、。原告是失票人，这是 没有异议的，关键在于确定被告。通常情况下，失票人可以票据的付款人或代理付款人 作为票据丧失付款请求权的被告。在付款人或代理付款人死亡或被宣告破产或被终止业 务活动或由于种种理由无法查找，失票人可以请求其他票据债务人作为被告。诉讼证据。依照民事诉讼法第108条的规定，起诉必须有证明原告主体适格的身份证据，即在 起诉时，原告必须承受证明其适格主体的举证责任，而票据丧失救济诉讼是一种特别的 诉讼，原告没有现实的持有票据，理论上其无法证明其是适格的诉讼主体，但为避免诉 讼滥用，要求原告提起诉讼时提供适格主体身分证据是必需的，因此，失票人可应当提 供其丧失票据的书面证明。书面证明应

13、应当包括以下基本内容：(1)已丧失的票据所记载的事项和内容；(2)票据丧失的事实证明，且该证明应是证明其是最后合法持票人的 证明。若失票人因特殊情况无法提供上述证明，则应将原因以书面形式递交给法院，法 院若在诉讼中查明失票人无法提供上述证明的原因并非正当的特殊原因，则可将其诉讼视为是恶意诉讼，驳回其诉讼。诉讼担保。在实践中，某些当事人为了自己的某种利益或出于某种动机，故意伪报票据丧失， 申请票据丧失救济的现象比比皆是。因此，为了保护付款人及持票人的利益，在票据丧 失救济制度中特别是在公示催告和普通诉讼中规定担保制度显得尤为重要。普通民事诉讼并不要求原告提起诉讼时必须提供担保，只有在当事人要求诉

14、讼保全时方要求对方提 供担保。我国票据法也没有对丧失票据的票据权利人明确失票人提起诉讼时必须提供担 保。但票据丧失救济诉讼毕竟不同于普通民事诉讼，票据丧失诉讼的提起是在原告未现 实占有票据的情况下提起的在于补救失票人的票据权利的特殊诉讼，在不确定失票人为合法持票人的前提下，被告的权利有可能因为该诉讼受到损害，而其权利一旦被损害， 则原告应依法赔偿其损失。因此，要求原告提供担保是用来补偿被告或票据债务人因诉 讼受到损失。对于实践中如何进行担保，相关法律没有明确规定。笔者认为：一：担保 应不限于财产担保，也可实行人的担保，只要出票人、承兑人或付款人等票据义务人认 可即可；二、财产担保的具体数额不一

15、定必须与诉讼标的额等同，其标准只要票据义务 人同意即可；三、担保时间至票据付款期限届满为止；四、如果失票人因为客观原因确 实无法提供担保，可以请求人民法院裁决将票款提存在人民法院或其他指定的机构。五、完善票据丧失救济的配套制度（一）建立票据提存制度从受理公示催告到最终做出除权判决，至少需要两个多月的时间，在这漫长的期间 内，付款人资信很有可能发生重大变化，尤其是支票提示付款期限届满后出票人账户是 否会一直保持足额的资金，不但涉及到出票人的意愿，还涉及到出票人的资信状况，如 果出票人破产或涉及纠纷账户被冻结，即使失票人最终得到法院的除权判决，票据权利 可能还会落空。此外，现行票据法不承认附息票据

16、，票据到期后，如仍处于公示催告程 序中，则申请人不能提示付款，就会有利息损失。对此，我国应当借鉴大陆法系国家立 法的经验，建立票据提存制度，以充分保障失票人的票据权利。笔者认为，提存票据制 度应当具备以下要件：第一、票据提存应当根据失票人的申请，人民法院一般情况下不 得依职权主动提起；第二，提存的票据应当是到期票据，未到期的票据不得提存；第三、 票款提存后，应当由人民法院或其他提存机构进行妥善保管；第四，提存的票款必须待 除权判决作出后，根据人民法院的决定交付失票人。（二）建立非票据权利人票据丧失救济制度季一秀票据丧失救济制度研究J.苏州大学学位论文，2008 : 41-42.票据在不同流通环

17、节中均有丧失的可能，如出票人在出票后未交付前丧失票据，票 据背书过程中丧失票据，票据付款人丧失票据等情形。对此，票据权利人可以通过行使 民事上的赔偿请求权取得赔偿，一旦非票据权利人按照民法的规定对票载权利人承担了 民事责任，法律理当对非因主观原因丧失票据的非票据权利人给予适当的救济，以弥补 其经济损失。为此，应当建立非票据权利人票据丧失的救济制度。鉴于失票救济程序必 须由失票人即票载权利人进行启动，为防止失票人怠于行使这种权利而给丧失票据的非 票据权利人造成损失，笔者认为应对票载权利人的行为进行规则，以实现对失票非权利 人的法律救济。第一、非因主观原因导致失票的，票载权利人得根据失票非权利人的

18、请 求启动失票救济程序；第二，票载权利人启动失票救济程序应在合理期间内，防止过分 迟延造成损失；第三，在非票据权利人向失票人承担民事责任后，票载权利通过失票救 济程序取得的利益由非票据权利人享有，产生的费用由非票据权利人承担。第四，因票 载权利人怠于启动失票救济程序而引起的损失，由票载权利人承担。失票救济制度，是票据权利实现的保障制度，是票据法所不可缺少的重要组成部分。 尽管我国法律对票据丧失规定了挂失止付、公示催告和普通诉讼等三种救济方式，但由 于相关救济制度在立法上理念偏后或过于粗疏，难以有效保障丧失票据的持票人的正当 权利。因此，理当对票据丧失救济法律制度进行完善， 以期更好地发挥票据汇

19、兑、支付、 流通、信用等经济功能。参考文献王春芳论票据丧失之救济J.商场现代化杂志，2007,(2)叶永禄论票据丧失司法救济之完善 J.新财经,2007,(3)朱青沙浅析票据丧失的诉讼救济制度 J.法制与社会,2009,(15)柯昌辉论票据丧失后的挂失止付J.北方法学,2011,(4) 谭波我国票据丧失的救济制度评析J.新财经,2010,(11) 沈鑫英美法系的正当持票人与我国票据法相关制度之比较研究J.知识经济,2010,(10)周小潮伪报票据丧失问题探讨J长沙铁道学院学报，2010 ,(2)陈晴票据法案例评析J对外经济贸易大学出版社，2010 ,(5)卞杰票据丧失的法律救济研究D.宁波大学

20、硕士学位论文,2005孔博空白票据法律制度研究D山东大学硕士学位论文,2006季一秀票据丧失救济制度研究D苏州大学学位论文,2008王小能票据法教程(第二版)M.北京：北京大学出版社，2001.谢怀栻票据法概论M.北京：法律出版社.2006.胡德胜，李文良中国票据制度研究M.北京：北京大学出版社，2005.张文楚票据法导论M.武汉：华中科技大学出版社 ,2006.ReviewJamesBarr Ames . The NegotiableInstrumentsLaw . The Harvard LawReviewAssociatio n,1900,12外文文献The Negotiable In

21、strume nts LawAuthor(s): James Barr AmesSource: Harvard Law Review, VOL 14, No. 4 (Dec., 1900), pp. 241-257Published by: The Harvard Law Review Associati onHOWEVER much lawyers may differ as to the expedie ncy of 1 1 the attempt to secure by codificati on uni formity in America n commercial law, all

22、 will agree that the commissi oners for pro-moting uniformity of legislation in the United States could not have selected a better subject for the begi nning of the experime nt tha n that of n egotiable paper. Eve n the opp onents of codification must admit that the Negotiable Instruments Law, frame

23、d and recommended by the commissi oners in 1896, and already en acted in fiftee n states,1 contains a nu mber of desirable cha nges in the law of Bills and Notes, and will, whe n gen erally adopted, settle definitively several questions which have given rise to much litiga-tion and conflict of decis

24、ions. On the other hand, the friends of codification who chanceto read the following pages may become convin ced- that there are serious defects of commissi on and omis-si on in the new code. Codification is with us a new art, and it is not surprising, although it is unfortunate, that the commission

25、-ers did not realize, as continental codifiers realize, the extreme importa nce of the widest possible publicati on of the proposed code, and the n ecessity of abundant criticism, especially of public crit-icism, from practising lawyers and judges, professors and writers, merchants and bankers. It i

26、s far from an agreeable task to offer criticisms at this late hour. Nor would the following criticisms be offered now but for the writers conviction that the Negotiable In strume nts Law ought not to be en acted by any state which has not yet acted in the matter, uni ess cha nged in importa nt respe

27、cts, and that those states in which it has been adopted should remedy its defects by supplemental legislation.2 The plan of making the law of Bills and Notes uniform throughout the United States has found favor in so many states that the en terprise ought to be car-ried through on the basis of the c

28、ommissi on ers proposed code. But in the in terest of future codificati on, as well as for the sake of the law itself, this new legislation should be in such form as to stand the fire of adverse, if also fair-min ded, critics.Before considering the defects in the new code attention should be called

29、to its merits. These are of two kin ds: first, salutary cha nges in the law; and, sec on dly, the settleme nt of con troverted questi ons.Un der the new law a n egotiable in strume nt may be made pay-able to one or more of several payees,3 or to the holder of an office for the time being.4 These pro

30、visions give effect to the tenor of the instrument and nullify certain unfortunate decisions to the contrary in which the judges failed to grasp the merca ntile con-cepti on of such in strume nts.5 Ano ther judicial error is corrected by the provision that an instrument, though indorsed in blank, ce

31、ases to be n egotiable by delivery whe never the last in dorse-me nt there on is a special in dorseme nt.6 Secti on i66 en acts that the maturity of an accepta nee for honor of a bill payable after sight shall be calculated from the date of the noting for none accepta nee, and not, as was erroneousl

32、y decided in Williams v. Germaine,7 from the date of the acceptancefor honor. Since an acceptor, by sect ion 62, en gages to pay the bill accord ing to the tenor of his accepta nee, he must pay to the innocent payee or subseque nt holder the amount called for by the bill at the time he accepted, eve

33、 n though larger tha n the origi nal amount ordered by the drawer. A bank certify ing a raised check is in the same case, since sect ion 187 assimilates a certificati on to an accepta nee. If the acceptor or certify ing bank must honor his accepta nee or certification in such a case, a fortiori a dr

34、awee who pays a raised bill or check, without acceptaneeor certification, should not re-cover the money paid from an innocent holder. These results are at varianee with numerous American decisions, but they are changes for the better, and, so far as adopted, bring the law of this country into harmon

35、y with the law of n early, if not in deed all, of the Europea n states.Other judicious cha nges for the better, but not involving the correct ion of judicial mistakes, are the following: The abolition ot days of grace; 2 the assimilation of sight and dema nd paper; 3 the provisi ons that the n egoti

36、ability of the in strume nt shall not be affected by its bearing a seal; 4 that a payor may disregard a eon-dition in an indorsement; 5 and that the holder in due course may enforce payment of an altered instrument according to its original ten or.6Especially to be comme nded are those secti ons of

37、the new code which settle, and in the right way, certa in questi ons which have bee n a prolific source of litigati on and an tag oni stic decisi ons. No-th ing but good can come from enacting that the n egotiability of an in strume nt is not destroyed by a clause provid ing for the pay-me nt of exc

38、ha nge,7 or the costs of collecti on, or an attor neys fee in case of default,8 or by a clause giving a power to eon fess judg-me nt.9The same is true of the provisi ons that ani an tecede nt debt con stitutes value; 10 that the holder in due course, although he paid less, may en force payme nt of t

39、he face value from all parties to the instrument; 11 and that a- check is not an assignment of the drawers claim upon the bank.12 The rules regulating the liability of the anomalous indorser13 are admirable, but for one slight omis-si on which may be easily remedied, as will be show n on a subse-que

40、 nt page.4 The doctrine of SECTION i6, that one who has signeda negotiable instrument complete on its face is liable there on to a holder in due course, although it was n ever delivered by him, but lost by him, or stole n from him, or eve n from some one else after his death, is somewhat startli ng

41、at first. But it should comme nd itself on reflect ion .It has bee n adopted, after much con sidera-ti on, in Germa ny.The new code, it is believed, would have gained greatly in sim-plicity, arrangement, and expression, if its framers had grasped firmly the principle that the formal right of a claim

42、ant upon a bill or note depe nds solely upon whether he is the holder by the tenor of the in strume nt, and had also give n due emphasis to the dist in c-ti on betwee n real and pers onal or equitable defences.lt is, how-ever, too late to recast the code. The critic must content himself with pointin

43、g out formal or substantial defects in particular sec-tions.If it be said that it is not worth while to make merely formal changes in sections that have been already enacted in sixteen jurisdictions, it may be answered that clearness, conciseness, and the right way of putting things are intrinsicall

44、y desirable, and that improvements of this kind do not involve any sacrifice, as to the substantive law, of the prin ciple of un iformity.It is from this point of view that the following suggestionsare made as to matters of form.SECTION 3-2 provides that an order or promise is not rendered condition

45、al by the addition of A statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument. What do these words mean ? Do they cover the case of a note coupled with the words, Given as collateral security for As debt to the payee ? Such an inter-pretation, although a literal one, would be deplorable, a

46、nd would nullify several decisions.1 Mr. Crawford, the draftsman of the code, suggeststhat this sub-section applies to the case of notes containing a statement that it is given for a chattel which is to be the property of the owner of the note until the note is paid.2 Such a note is deemed negotiabl

47、e in several states,3 and justly, being in effect nothing more than a note secured by a chattel mortgage. But it is highly improbable that the courts of Massachusetts,Kansas, and Minnesota, which have taken the opposite view, will treat this sub-sect ion as cha nging the law of those states. One New

48、 York judge has already ruled that the Negotiable Instruments Law has no application to such a note.2 Many cases have decided that the statement of a consideration in a note is not notice to a transferee of its failure.3 But the doctrine of these cases, which are doubtless the only ones which this s

49、ub-section can fairly be made to cover, is a rule as to bonafides, and has nothing to do with con-ditions. The sub-sect ion in questi on should be stricke n from the act. If in terpreted literally, it is mischievous. If not take n liter-ally, it is obscure, in artistic, and useless.SECTION 36-2 and

50、3. An indorsement is restrictive which either (I) 1c onstitutes the in dorsee the age nt of the in dorser, or (2) vests the title in the in dorsee in trust for or to the use of some other person. Since the so-called agent of the indorser has, under section 37, the right to sue in his own n ame on th

51、e in strume nt, but for the ben efit of the in dorser, he is in truth a trustee, and not a mere age nt. The sub-secti ons 2 and 3 should therefore be con-solidated as follows: An indorsement is restrictive which vests the title in the indorsee in trust for the indorser or some third person. SECTION

52、137 is to the effect that a drawee who destroys a bill delivered to him for acceptance, or refuses to return it within the usual time, shall be deemed to have accepted it. A refusal to accept is an accepta nce! Such a perversi on of Ian guage would be stra nge eno ugh any where, but in a deliberatel

53、y framed code is well-nigh in explicable. As a con seque nce of this fan tastic pro-visi on the holder may bring con curre nt actions: against the drawee because of his fictitious acceptance, and against the drawer be-causeof the drawees non-acceptance.Nor is anything gained by this fiction, of whic

54、h there is no trace in the En glish act. All the dema nds of justice are met by holdi ng the misc on duct ing drawee liable for a con versi on of the bill.4 The sect ion should be can-celled as worse than useless. The following sections of the code seem to the writer to be defective, not merely in p

55、oint of form, but in substance.SECTION 9-3 declares an instrument to be payable to bearer, although it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person. Such a rule ignores the tenor of the in strume nt; inor is there any judicial precede nt or merca ntile custom in support of the no t

56、io n that a bill payable to a fictitious payee, but niot indorsed in the name of such payee, is payable to bearer. In all the reported cases, inistruments payable to a fictitious payee have been in-dorsed in the n ame of such payee before n egotiati on. By the comb ined effect of this sect ion and s

57、ect ion i6, if a note payable to a fictitious payee were stole n from the maker, and in dorsed by the thief in the name of the payee, the maker would be liable upon the note to any holder in due course. For, the note being. already payable to bearer, the forged indorsement in the payees n ame would

58、be of no legal sig nifica nee. Such a result would be a cruel injustice to the maker. The sect ion should be materially cha nged. The real an id comme ndable object of the sect ion would be atta in ed, without resort ing to a ficti on, by a provisi on as fol-lows: If a bill be draw n, or a note made

59、, payable to the order of a pers on known by the drawer or maker to be fictitious or nion-existe nt, or of a liv ing pers on not in ten ded to have any in terest in the in strume nt, and if such bill or note be in dorsed by the drawer or maker in the n ame of the nominal payee, the instru-ment will

60、have the same effect as a bill or note payable to the order of, and in dorsed by, the drawer or maker respectively.中文翻译作者：詹姆斯巴尔艾姆斯来源：哈佛法律评论,14卷，第4期（1900年12月）,241 -257出版：哈佛法律评论协会摘要票据法律尽管许多律师关于确保安全通过统一 编纂的美国商法，有不同的企图，所有人都会 同意委员为促进美国立法的统一，不能选择一个更好的主题开始实验而是可流通票据。 即使是反对编纂者也必须承认票据法律，1896通过委员制定和建议，已在15个州颁布