东盟经济视角：政策制定者们能伸出援助之手么

1、Global Research7 June 2019APAC Economic PerspectivesASEAN Can policymakers ride to the rescue?Challenges for trade how will ASEAN policymakers respond?Trade and technology tensions between the HYPERLINK /shared/d2CIAa7RxyBv3 US, HYPERLINK /shared/d2n6Fs0aJHDk9Rg China and other US trading partners h

2、ave continued to rise. What scope is there for ASEAN policymakers to respond? Monetary and fiscal policy space exists across ASEAN, but we suspect there is also a general desire to keep policy powder dry in case of a deeper slowdown rather than mere disruption. Under our baseline, Philippines stands

3、 out as the economy likely to see the greatest quantum of monetary and fiscal easing during the rest of the year.Consensus could be surprised by policy easing from BoT, BNM, BI and BSPWe present Thesis Maps for each ASEAN central bank. HYPERLINK /shared/d2xobHxGIy0qwBm Bank Negara Malaysia and HYPER

4、LINK /shared/d28CRIwKlo Philippines BSP have already eased policy. HYPERLINK /shared/d2nyTJbtQBU9 Our expectations of BI policy easing have been pushed back in recent weeks by currency weakness and fears of capital outflows. We project more policy rate cuts from BSP than other central banks, but thi

5、nk consensus could be surprised by incremental policy rate cuts from BoT, BNM and BI as well as BSP. In the case of a deeper easing cycle (not our base case), BI and BSP should also be among those least concerned by the zero lower bound for interest rates as a technical limit. In ASEAN, BoT is close

6、st to being technically constrained in its scope to cut rates. The zero bound should not be an issue for Singapores currency policy.Conventional monetary policy likely to be augmentedWe believe ASEAN central banks will have few qualms over pursing unconventional policies. Combinations of macro-prude

7、ntial easing, reserve ratio cuts and credit easing may be combined with lower policy rates. Weaker currencies, historically, have also been part of the policy easing suite. We doubt that US Treasury or Commerce Department statements will impact Singapores currency policy but other regional central b

8、anks may now be more likely to lean into currency depreciation pressures.Budget season provides signposts but fiscal powder likely to be kept dry Meaningful discretionary fiscal policy responses usually take much longer to execute than changes in monetary policy. Tax changes or cash handouts can be

9、quicker to arrange than (infrastructure) spending. Singapores is the only government without meaningful caveats surrounding fiscal space. Although the national government 2020 Budget season is approaching, we expect governments to keep their powder dry. That said, Philippines economy should get more

10、 of a kick than most in the remainder of the year as the delayed 2019 Budget is implemented.Figure 1: How will central bank and government policy thinking change? Economics Asia PacificEdward TeatherEconomist HYPERLINK mailto:edward.teather edward.teather+65-6495 59652020 Budget season: dates of nat

11、ional government budgetsGovernmentExpected submission of budget to legislatureIndonesia16 Aug 2019MalaysiaLate Oct 2019Philippines22 Jul 2019SingaporeLate Feb 2020ThailandJun-Sep 2019*VietnamEarly Oct 2019Source: UBSSource: UBS *could be delayed from original 13 June target, see Figure 14This report

12、 has been prepared by UBS AG, Singapore Branch. ANALYST CERTIFICATION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 26.Slower growth scenarios have become more likelyThe news flow over the month appears to have made downshifts in regional growth momentum more likely than upshifts. For example:The increase

13、in tariffs on USD200bn of US imports from China to 25% from 10% on 10 May and the imposition of Chinese tariffs in response on 1 June.The threat to increase US tariffs on the remainder of imports from China by 25ppts and the potential response.The sanctions against major Chinese electronics manufact

14、urer Huawei.The US threat to impose tariffs on Mexico.The US tariff threat on HYPERLINK /shared/d2zd0zWVdkgdgz Mexico, the HYPERLINK /shared/d2puH2ciWwR0 US Commerce Department memo on treating currency undervaluation as a subsidy and the broadening of the US Treasury departments watch list of curre

15、ncy manipulators are all warnings that other Asian countries could be targeted by US trade policy. Asian economies either have a trade surplus with the US or a large current account surplus. It is possible, but not necessarily fair, that the US might interpret a large current account surplus as evid

16、ence of persistent currency undervaluation. And we know the Trump administration looks dimly on bilateral trade deficits.Figure 2: Balance of trade with US and current account balanceThere are numerous channels through which the trade war might escalateTrade balance with US, 2018 USDbn (lhs) Current

17、 account balance, 2018 % GDP (rhs)China trade surplus with US: USD 442bn100208016601240820400-20-4-40-8CHN JPN VNM MYS IND THA KOR TWN IDNPHLSGP HKGSource: UBS estimates HYPERLINK /shared/d2sHl9GPEzqoV As we discussed last year, we expect ASEAN countries to acquiesce to US pressure rather than face

18、US tariffs. For example, we note Thailands successful campaign to get itself off the US intellectual property watch list in 2017 and Indonesias diplomatic mission to the US at the time its General System of Preferences privileges was under threat of removal. We could, however, be wrong here.Baseline

19、 assumption ASEAN avoids direct US tariffsWe continue to look at the impact of the trade war on the rest of Asia through the prism of HYPERLINK /shared/d2yrnT0MWRc Pain and Gain. First the pain, indirectly, via the deterioration in G3 growth prospects and disruption to regional trade. Secondly, the

20、gain via HYPERLINK /shared/d2jwsZxHpzhtx shifts in supply HYPERLINK /shared/d2jwsZxHpzhtx chains the impact of which we expect to evolve gradually and initially be dominated by the pain of reduced G3 demand.UBS Economics and Strategy teams have discussed scenarios as to how the trade tensions might

21、play out. Although ongoing shifts in US policy mean possible scenarios keep changing, the broad contours revolve around US-China tensions: a) an apprehensive status quo (the baseline); b) meaningful escalation in coming months; or c) some deal allowing a reduction in tensions and unwinding of tariff

22、s.If the trade war is escalated to include tariffs on essentially all US goods imports from China, HYPERLINK /shared/d2ZanhqSFHhP8J UBS Chief China economist Tao Wang has suggested an impact of 0.8-1.0ppts on Chinese GDP over 12 months while HYPERLINK /shared/d2C2h9vdw9KcB2R US Chief economist Seth

23、HYPERLINK /shared/d2C2h9vdw9KcB2R Carpenter has estimated a 0.75-1.0ppts impact on the US economy. Again, we think of the impact on the rest of Asia as indirect. Applying our framework of pain before gain we envisage that the more significant the tariff shock, the greater the incentive for supply ch

24、ains to shift to the likely benefit of the rest of Asia.The following figure gives, along with our baseline forecast, rough GDP projections for 2020 under a scenario HYPERLINK /shared/d2eAu9t2m9K (previously published here) where i) 25% tariffs are levied on all US imports from China; ii) there is r

25、etaliation from China; iii) offsetting policy stimulus across the region; and iv) shifting supply chains.It is possible that Singapore might briefly experience recessionary conditions under this scenario before the effects of the authorities monetary and fiscal response kicks in. At the other end of

26、 the scale, Vietnam could see growth accelerate due to the exceptionally high overlap with Chinese goods exported to the US and hence potential to take market share (albeit up to a point given capacity constraints).We emphasise the considerable uncertainty around these forecasts. The scale, timing a

27、nd manner of application (degree of surprise) could all be important for the ultimate impact. Disruption as a result of the sanctions against Huawei or tariffs on Mexico would change these results. The potential auto tariffs, though limited under our baseline projections for China and the US, are an

28、other possible source of pressure on growth via the impact on auto exporters.We continue to expect Pain and GainWe consider the impact of trade war escalation relative to our baseline scenarioTrade war disruption could deliver recessionary conditions in the most open economiesOther scenarios are pos

29、sibleUBS real GDP growth estimates under different tariff scenarios 2019 UBS real GDP forecast baseline2020 UBS real GDP forecast baseline2020 Scenario where 25% tariffs are levied on all imports from ChinaFigure 3: Growth projections for 2020 in scenario where 25% tariffs are levied on all US goods

30、 imports from China876543210Source: UBS estimatesHow much room is there for ASEAN policymakers to support growth?This scenario analysis allows us to explore how ASEAN policymakers might support their respective economies. The easiest policy lever to pull is monetary policy. Fiscal policy responses t

31、ypically take longer to arrange, with increases in spending taking longer than changes in taxes to effect.Monetary and fiscal policy space exists across ASEAN, but we suspect there is also a general desire to keep policy powder dry in case of a deeper slowdown rather than mere disruption. Philippine

32、s stands out as the economy likely to see the greatest quantum of monetary and fiscal easing during the rest of the year.Monetary policy BNM, BSP, BI & BoT to ease under baseline scenarioAs a framework we believe that all monetary policymakers consider the same objectives albeit with different empha

33、sis at different times. We consider each of the policy drivers at the national level in more detail on pages 12 through 23.Inflation Central banks set policy to achieve stability in the spending power of the currency viewed through either the prism of CPI inflation or the value of the exchange rate.

34、Resource utilisation Usually less explicit than the inflation goal, all central banks come under pressure to avoid unemployment in the economy of people but also capital.Financial stability Asian central banks have learnt from experience that their other goals cannot be met unless financial stabilit

35、y is maintained.Figure 4 puts some numbers to these drivers. The output gap is an unobservable conceptual notion for broad resource utilisation. A negative output gap implies excess capacity. The penultimate column in the Figure below shows estimates of the output gap inferred from central bank comm

36、ents (in the case of Vietnam we use IMF estimates as a proxy for the authoritys). The final column presentsWe consider policy options available to ASEANs authoritiesSpace to ease exists across region, but Philippines likely to see more easing than most during 2019A framework for thinking about monet

37、ary policy across the regionestimates of what the central bank might expect the output gap to be in 2019 if UBSs growth projections become a reality.Figure 4: Inflation and resource utilisation as central banks see itinflation, Aprilforecast, 20192019estimate, ppts of GDPgap implied by UBSbaseline f

38、orecastsIndonesia3.5% +/-1ppt2.83.5% +/-1ppt2.9Marginally negative -0.5pptsMalaysiana0.20.7-1.7%1.1Marginally negative -0.5pptsPhilippines3.0% +/-1ppt3.03.1%2.6Neutral -0.5pptsSingaporena0.80.5-1.5%1.0+0.2pptsNeutralThailand2.5% +/-1.5ppt1.21.0%1.0+0.2ppts -0.5pptsVietnam4%2.9Less than 4%2.7Marginal

39、ly positive*NeutralInflation targetHeadline CPICentral bank CPIUBS CPI forecast,Central bank output gap2019 Central bank estimate of outputSource: UBS, Central Banks *Drawn from IMF estimates, which we assume are close to the governments thinkingEach central bank attaches differing weights over time

40、 to inflation, resource utilisation and financial stability. We provide more colour on each of the central banks positions on pages 12-23 but Figure 5 shows our judgement of how each of these goals is influencing central bank behaviour today and how we expect it to evolve under each of the broad tra

41、de scenarios.Specifically, under the escalation scenario, we expect central banks concerns about growth and lower inflation to become more acute. Importantly, we think concerns about leaving rates too low for too long (e.g. BoT) or weaker currencies (e.g. BI) to be assuaged by the risk to the near t

42、erm to financial stability of weaker credit and bankruptcies due to weak growth.Figure 5: Central bank monetary policy drivers under different scenarios through next 12mSource: UBSFigure 6 shows our baseline projections for policy rates which assume HYPERLINK /shared/d2hpFAiKgS6q no change HYPERLINK

43、 /shared/d2hpFAiKgS6q in Fed policy rates. Because, outside Philippines, the decline in inflation and the output gap relative to current estimates is modest, we only expect 25-50bps of incremental easing in 2019. Nonetheless, we project more rate cuts than consensus across ASEAN.Figure 6: Policy rat

44、e scenario what if 25% tariffs are levied on all US goods imported from China?Current key policy rateUBSe Baseline end 2019Consensus end 2019UBSe Baseline end 2020End 2020 scenario where 25% tariffs levied on al US imports from ChinaPolicy rate low since 2009BI 7DRR6.005.505.755.505.004.25BNM OPR3.0

45、02.753.003.252.502.00BSP reverse repo rate4.503.754.003.753.503.00BoT repo rate1.751.501.752.001.501.25SBV repo rate4.754.754.754.754.75naSource: UBS estimates, Haver, Bloomberg HYPERLINK /shared/d2tXwn5ce3I Bank Indonesia is the exception where (our) expectations of policy easing have been pushed b

46、ack in recent weeks following a weaker currency driven by regional risk aversion and a wider-than-expected trade balance. We continue to believe BI will ease policy sooner than most expect. We believe BI will be surprised by disappointing growth and come under pressure to reduce high real rates (Fig

47、ure 7). The spread of Indonesian yields over US yields highlights this view has yet to be fully anticipated by investors (Figure 8).Figure 7: BI real rates are relatively highFigure 8: IDR yields dont anticipate much policy easingCurrent policy rate less 2020 Bloomberg consensus inflation3.002.502.0

48、01.50Yield spread to US: 10 year LCY govt. bond yield less 10yr UST yield Period covered: Jan 2010 - May 2019Avg. +1 S.D.Avg. -1 S.D.Latest8.06.04.02.01.000.500.00BIRBIBSPBNMBoTCBCBoKFED0.0-2.0-4.0 Source: UBS, HaverSource: UBS, HaverEscalation = more easing (except in Vietnam)Under the trade war es

49、calation scenario the easing would likely be more aggressive because output gaps would be more negative by up to 2ppts in Singapore, around 1ppt in Malaysia and Thailand, and 0.2-0.4ppts in Indonesia and Philippines. And inflation would be lower. Vietnam is an exception given the potential for suppl

50、y chain shifts and FDI to favour that economy. Accordingly, we expect additional policy easing everywhere except Vietnam under the escalation scenario. Any Fed policy easing would make policy rate cuts in ASEAN all the more likely, in our view.Our baseline foresees no change in Singapores FX policy.

51、 We expect MAS FX policy easing under an escalation scenario. That could happen through a reduced S$NEER band slope but also a wider band. We note MAS adopted a wider band arrangement during other periods of unusual uncertainty such as post the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 and amidst global F

52、X volatility in 2010. A step down in the mid-point would likely be reserved for a deeper slowdown.Monetary policy easing would be more aggressive almost everywhere under a slower growth scenarioWe doubt that US Treasury of Commerce Department statements will impact Singapores currency policy but oth

53、er regional central banks may be more likely to lean into currency depreciation pressures. However, we expect that this policy bias will only last so long as China HYPERLINK /shared/d2t3U3PyXv does not devalue its currency.Unconventional policy possible before the zero boundThe zero lower bound for

54、policy rates has been a concern for policymakers in the US, Europe and Japan over the past decade. Reducing interest rates below zero throws up technical difficulties for central banks and the banking system. For the most part, policy rates in ASEAN are a long way from the so called zero bound. With

55、 policy rates at 1.75%, the Bank of Thailand is the obvious exception. BSP and BI are obviously far from the lower bound while the issue does not apply, at least not directly, to Singapores currency-based policy1.However, we do not expect ASEAN central banks to wait until approaching zero policy rat

56、es before deploying unconventional policy measures. Monetary policymakers in Asia have displayed few qualms about pursuing macro prudential policies, credit easing, quantitative measures or FX intervention to achieve desired monetary conditions. The Philippines BSP, for example, is taking the opport

57、unity to pursue a structural policy goal of lowering banking system Required Reserve Ratios.Fiscal space available but unlikely to be quickly deployedWhile monetary policy might be the first lever to pull in most economies in the event of lower growth and inflation, it is likely there will be an inc

58、reased focus on fiscal policy. As expectations of higher interest rates have faded away, it has dawned on policy commentators across the world that there is scope for governments to run wider deficits without driving debt to GDP ratios higher.The logic arises from the debt sustainability equation be

59、low2. The more negative the r-g numerator, the bigger the deficit an government can run without pushing up the level of debt to GDP.Unconventional policy options likely to be exploredRelatively more deficit space in Singapore, Philippines and Thailand ( ) 1 = (1 + 1 )Where:government debt to GDP in

60、year tweighted average interest rate on government debt in year tnominal GDP growth in year tprimary balance (fiscal balance less interest payments) to GDP in year tFigure 9 shows an indicative calculation of fiscal space (scope for change in the budget balance) consistent with stable debt to GDP an