股权制衡论文：董事会独立性、股权制衡与大股东掏空行为研究

1、. 股权制衡论文：董事会独立性、股权制衡与大股东“掏空行为研究【中文摘要】据以往的研究分析,许多国家不管是上市公司还是非上市公司,大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突都表现得非常明显。在我国,由于体制方面的特殊原因导致了上市公司的股权构造和外部治理机制不合理,董事会、监事会受制于大股东,法律对中小股东的保护还很不够,外部审计的监视作用没有充分发挥,大股东通过频繁的关联交易巧立名目侵占上市公司利益的情况普遍存在。诸多因素综合在一起,促使我们有必要将关注的焦点从股东与管理者之间的利益冲突转移到股东之间利益冲突上来。2006年,对于我国公司,尤其对上市公司来说是重要的一年。公司的外部环境发生了重大的变化,

2、一是新会计准则的公布；二是股权分置改革根本完成。选取这一期间的样本可以近态地观察大股东“掏空行为及其影响因素的变化,还为这些政策措施的效果评价提供实证依据。本文试图用代理理论、信息不对称理论、股权制衡理论等理论和实证方法,从公司治理角度分析我国上市公司大股东的“掏空行为。理论方面,从部治理机制的两个方面股权构造、董事会治理的设计进展深入的规分析。实证方面,本文选取了我国上市公司2005年-2008年间的6093个有效样本,从大股东占款角度,对公司治理因素与大股东“掏空行为的关系进展了实证检验。主要得出了如下结论：(1)第一大股东的持股比例在股权分置改革期间以及完成股改后下降速度比拟明显,且其占

3、款行为也有明显下降,参加年度控制变量进展多变量回归分析发现,第一大股东持股比例的平方与“掏空存在正相关关系,并通过显著性检验。同时发现年度控制变量对大股东占款影响较大,这也提示我们,虽然本文的研究取得了预期的效果,但是,在今后的研究中要关注大股东“掏空方式的变化,研究大股东新的、主要的“掏空方式,以便加强管理。另外,从控股股东性质来看,国有控股股东与“掏空存在显著的止相关关系,说明我国原有的公司制度环境也是影响大股东“掏空行为的一个重要方面。其他大股东SH25、SH35与“掏空行为显著负相关,说明其他大股东对“掏空行为具有制衡作用,能够抑制大股东“掏空上市公司。(2)董事会的治理效果有限,主要

4、表现为独立董事比例对大股东的“掏空行为没有明显的监视作用。独立董事声誉变量与大股东“掏空行为负相关,在10%的水平下通过了显著性检验。但是,董事长与总经理两职合一的职权构造则加重了大股东的“掏空行为,与“掏空具有显著的正相关关系。(3)根据上面的分析结果,本文进一步做关于股权制衡、董事会独立性与大股东“掏空行为的研究。分析结果发现,在股权缺乏制衡的情况下,独立董事比例与大股东“掏空行为不存在显著相关性,而在股权制衡的情况下,独立董事比例与大股东“掏空行为显著负相关。说明股权制衡的环境更有利于独立董事独立性的发挥。然而,独立董事声誉变量在股权缺乏制衡的情况下与大股东的“掏空行为表现更为显著,为负

5、相关关系。说明控股股东为了装点门面、掩盖自身“掏空动机,在股权缺乏制衡的情况下,倾向于选择声誉好的独立董事,同时,也说明好的独立董事声誉能提高独立董事的责任感,代表其他股东的利益,监视大股东的“掏空行为。另外,董事长与总经理两职合一变量与大股东“掏空行为的关系在两种股权制衡条件下与前面的研究结论一致,即二者显著正相关。【英文摘要】According to previous research and analysis, both listed panies and non-listed panies in many countries, it is obvious that large shar

6、eholders and minority shareholders have a conflict of interest. In China, due to the special institutional causes, the ownership structure of listed panies and the internal and e*ternal governance mechanisms are unreasonable, the board of supervisors is subject to shareholder, legal protection of mi

7、nority shareholders is still weak, the supervisory of e*ternal audit did not play a good role, large shareholders assuming a frequent occupation of the interests of the listed panies through related party transactions is widespread. Number of factors bined makes us transfer our focus from the confli

8、ct of interests between shareholders and managers to the conflict of interest between shareholders. In 2006, for our panies, particularly the listed panies are an important year. The panys e*ternal environment has undergone significant changes:firstly, the promulgation of the new accounting standard

9、s; secondly, the split share structure reform is basically pleted. Select samples of this period can help us to find out the recent shareholder “tunneling change of behavior and the influence factors of tunneling, and also can provide an empirical basis to evaluate the effects of these policies and

10、measures.This paper attempts to use the agency theory, asymmetric information theory, and the power balance with shareholder structure theory, from the perspective of corporate governance, to analysis the “tunneling behavior of major shareholders of listed panies in China.Theatrically, from two aspe

11、cts of internal governance mechanisms:ownership structure, board governance, to do some depth analysis. In Evidence, the paper selected years between 2005 -2008, listed panies in China, about 6093 valid samples, from the perspective of the entrenchment of Controlling Shareholders, to analyze the cor

12、porate governance factors and substantial shareholder “tunneling behavior in an empirical test. Main conclusions are as follows:(1) during the reform period and after pletion of the reform, the largest shareholders ownership percentage is declining obviously, and so did its “tunneling behavior. At t

13、he same time, we found that the control variable of annual does greater impact on the regress analysis, it also reminds us that although this study had the desired effect, but in the future research we should focus on “tunneling changes and major “tunneling approach of large shareholders, find ways

14、to strengthen corporate management. Adding the controlling variables of year, there is a significant positive correlation between largest shareholders and “tunneling behavior in the multivariate regression analysis. It passed the significance test. In addition, from the nature of controlling shareho

15、lder, there is a significant positive correlation between the state-owned controlling shareholder and “tunneling. Other major shareholders SH25, SH35 was significantly negatively correlated with “tunneling behavior. (2) The Board of Management has limited effects. The proportion of independent direc

16、tors has no significant effect of the supervision on the major shareholders of the “tunneling behavior. So did the reputation of the independent directors. In addition, if the chairman and general manager are the same person would increase the major shareholderstunneling behavior. (3) In accordance

17、with the above analysis, we did some further research on power balance with shareholder structure, independence of the board and tunneling behavior. The results showed that in the lack of power balance with shareholder structure regress analysis, there is no significant correlation between the propo

18、rtion of independent directors and major shareholders “tunneling behavior. But in the case of power balance with shareholder structure, there is significantly negative related between the equity proportion of independent directors and major shareholders “tunneling behavior. It is indicated that the

19、environment of power balance with shareholder structure is benefit for the independence of independent directors to play. However, the reputation of the independent directors of the lack of power balances with shareholder structure even more significant than the power balances with shareholder struc

20、ture, it has negative correlation with the “tunneling behavior. It is indicated that controlling shareholders in order to cover up their own “tunneling motivation, tend to choose good reputable independent directors under the lack of power balances with shareholder structure. Meanwhile we can also g

21、et an idea that reputable independent directors can protect the benefits of other shareholders. In addition, if the chairman and general manager are the same person, no matter the corporate structure own power balances or not, it has significant positive correlation with “tunneling behavior.【关键词】股权制

22、衡 董事会独立性 掏空 大股东【英文关键词】Power Balance with Shareholder Structure Independence of the Board Tunneling Large Shareholders【目录】董事会独立性、股权制衡与大股东“掏空行为研究摘要5-6Abstract6-7第一章 绪论10-151.1 研究背景及研究意义10-121.1.1 研究背景10-121.1.2 研究意义121.2 采取的研究方案12-131.3 本课题的特色与创新之处131.3.1 本课题的特色131.3.2 可能的主要创新131.4 架构安排13-15第二章 文献综述15-202.1 国外研究回忆15