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1、World Development Vol. 66, pp. 665677, 2015 0305-750X/ 2014 Published by Elsevier.Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights Increase Innovation?CASSANDRA MEHLIG SWEET b and DALIBOR SACHA ETEROVIC MAGGIO a,*a Universidad Adolfo Iba´nez, Sago, Chileb Ponticia Universidad Cato´lica, Sago, Chil

2、eSummary. Do stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) increase innovation? Recent decades have seen a global transformation in IPR standards, underpinned by the theory that stronger IPRs spur increased incentives to innovate. This study tests the impact of ever more rigorous IPR systems on innova

3、tion through an index of economic complexity of 94 countries from 1965 to 2005. Our results conrm that stronger intellectual property systems engender higher levels of economic complexity. Nevertheless, only countries withan initial above-average level of development and complexity enjoy this eect.

4、2014 Published by Elsevier .Key words innovation, development, intellectual property rights, economic complexity1. INTRODUCTIONof negotiations. The resulting change of 157 countries national patent rules to one minimum standardthrough the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property R

5、ights (TRIPS)marked a watershed moment in the global political and economic regulation of innovation. In the wake of global IPR changes, scholars have sought toThis study works to address some of the current gaps and continuing debates in intellectual property rights (IPR) litera- tures. Our period

6、of interest (19652005) is one of increasing intellectual property rigor for both industrialized and develop- ing countries. In contrast to previous studies which have used patent applications, awards, or research and development (R&D) spending as their primary indicator of innovative activity, w

7、e build on a database of 94 countries over the period from 1965 to 2005 to examine the eects of IPR changes on a countrys economic complexity (Hausmann et al., 2013). Our approach oers a number of novelties in on-going debates about innovation. First, by focusing on the countrys eco- nomic complexit

8、y measured through its export sophistication, we avoid some of the problems with standard innovation indicators to better capture if more innovative products and processes are being developed and, importantly, applied across an economy as a whole. Second we oer insights on the bene- ts and costs of

9、increasingly rigorous standards in develo economies. Third, we build on a new wave of research which is working toward unraveling the drivers of economic sophistica- tion and understanding the institutional environments whichunderstand the eects of increasing patenton eco-nomic development. Studies

10、have worked on the eects ofthe new standards on patent applications, investment in research and development, technology transfer, productivitygrowth, and inequality. 1 Yet, evidence about optimal levelsof patentremains inconclusive and some scholarshave recently called for research which “better est

11、imates theeects of IPR policy on innovation rates and also structuralms that would enable the evaluation of the eects ofdierent policies in equilibrium growth and welfare” (Acemoglu & Akcigit, 2012, p. 40).Our study addresses this ongoing debate by working to unravel the relationship between exp

12、ort sophistication and increasingly rigorous IPR standards. Our ndings yield two broad sets of results. Across a world sample, we show that the higher the intellectual property laws, the more positive impact they have on a countrys level of innovation, as mea- sured through export sophistication. Ho

13、wever, the positive eect seems to be restricted to countries that start out with an above average level of development and complexity. Forfoster more value-added production in develo (Zhu & Fu, 2013).countriesAn abundant and expanding body of research has recentlyuncovered the importance of expo

14、rt complexity as both a pre-develocountries, our results show that IPR has at bestdictor and a driver of future economic development (Anand, Mishra, & Spatafora, 2012; Hausmann, Hwang, & Rodrik, 2007; Lall, Weiss, & Zhang, 2005). This stream of work hasa non-signicant eect on economic co

15、mplexity and most often has a negative eect. These ndings are in line with theshown that a mere qutative increase in exports does not * Many generous colleagues and two major funding Grantsreect either current or potential for economic development.thisIt is not how much you export, these scholars ar

16、gue, but what you export that matters (Anand et al., 2012; Hausmann et al., 2007). At the same time that literatures in economic development and policy have established the critical role that increasing export sophistication plays as driver of economic development, the global rules governing the own

17、ership of technology and its diusionthe regulatory framework underlying product innovationhave been radically trans- formed.Intellectual property rights (IPR) standards, norms, and institutions were at the forefront of debates on productivity in the 1980s and 1990s during the WTOs Uruguay Roundwork

18、possible. The research was a part of the studies undertaken in the Millennium Nucleus for the Study of Stateness and Democracy in Latin America, Project N NS100014 where David Altman and AnthonyPezzola provided importnputs. In addition, the work greatly bene-tted from the contributions of Fr Tessada

19、, Jim Robinson and the nsco Gallego, Jeanne Lefortune, Jose al support of the Economic Historyand Cliometrics lab funding provided by Conicyt/PrograInvesti-gacio´n Asociativa Project N SOC1102. At Emory University, we thank Cliord Carrubba, Tom Clarke, and Jeery Stanton and the members of Emory

20、 Universitys PIM Colloquium. Additional thanks are also due to Dani Rodrik, Ricardo Hausmann, and Oeindrila Dube. All the usual caveats apply. Final revision accepted: August 19, 2014.665666WORLD DEVELOPMENTtheory that access to technology and technology transfer are important drivers of innovation

21、and productive output, espe-At the root is the question posed by some scholars: would the predicted expansion of industrial activity by multination- als in develo countries neutralize the losses incurred by terminating imitative production in these countries? Branstetter, Fisman, Foley, and Saggi (2

22、011) review the behavior of multinational enterprises ex-ante and ex-post reforms and suggest that the outcomes are favorable. Among all these predicted benets of expanded and global IPR norms, the central argument for reforms however was that standard IPR institutions would drive innovation and bri

23、dge the globaltechnological divide. 3The TRIPS agreement codied these cheerful IPR views intoglobal trade law: from 1996 onward all members of the WTO agreed to implement IPR systems respecting a patent life of20 years. 4 In the wake of the implementation of TRIPSnorms, many scholars in political ec

24、onomy have worked to empirically assess their impact. 5 Some researchers have argued that the agreement has increased innovation(Abrams, 2009) and facilitated diusion, as inventors are more apt to share their ideas when their ownership rights are pro- tected (Moser, 2011). However, a contrasting, le

25、ss sanguine view of ever-stronger IPRs has gained strength as more studies examine the dierent eects of the treaty on countries across varying levels of economic development. McCalman (2001) has shown how increased IPRs result in wealth transfers fromcially for develocountries playing a global game

26、of tech-nological “catch-up”. This research lends urgency to theimportance of tailoring national systems to development demands and reassessing literatures on intellectual property.The paper proceeds in the following structure: Section 2 briey reviews the literature on IPR institutions and innova- t

27、ion. Section 3 presents the dataset and econometric m used in our analysis. Section 4 discusses our results while Sec-tion 5 oers pathways.s and looks toward future research2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPLEXITYOne of the primary mechanisms in intellectual property sys- tems i

28、s the patent. 2 A patent confers a set of monopoly own- ership privileges to an inventor for a nite period of time, thusprotecting the inventor from appropriability by other rms ata signicantly lower cost. The period ofrewardsinventors for their investment in innovation-producing activities. In turn

29、, society sacrices immediate access to the new technology in exchange for the benets conveyed throughthe incentive to innovate. This trade-o has been described as the “patent bargain” (Jensen, Johnson, Lorenz, & Lundvall, 2007) and it is at the center of research of intellectual property systems

30、.An early stream of theoretical work examining this trade-odevelocountries to their industrialized counterparts. Arecent study by Hudson and Minea (2013) employs a uniedeconometric approach analyzing the impact of IPR through both initial IPR and per capita GDP. They nd that global IPR homogeneity i

31、s sub-optimal, as “the same level of IPR has a dierent impact on richer countries than poorer ones” (Hudson & Minea, 2013). These works build on a stream ofevidence indicating that dierent intellectual property institu- tions may be more conducive for both rm learning and the processes of techno

32、logical catch-up (Acha, Marsili, & Nelson, 2004; Bell & Pavitt, 1993). This idea posits that IPR standards should be “development appropriate,” and drawson the notion that innovation is an incremental, cumulativeattempted to develop a mfor “optimal” patent levels(Horowitz & Lai, 1996; OD

33、onoghue & Zweimuller, 2004).One ank of scholars describes the relationship between IPRs and their benets as comprising an inverted-U curve in which IPR norms reach a peak point of rigidity from which the trade-o between the positive aspects of IPR for owners (higher returns from monopoly rights,

34、 more resulting capacity for R&D) are eclipsed by the negative aspects (reduced diu-sion, reduced competition, higher tranion costs fromprocess requiring access knowledge (Acemoglu, G examining histories ofand adaptability of technological a, & Zilibotti, 2012). Two studies industrialization

35、 (Cimoli, Dosi,licensing). The inverted U-curve relationship however hasbeen questioned by researchers who doubt that benecial out- comes taper o (Kanwar & Evenson, 2003) and suggest that innovation not only increases relative to IPR strength, but that does so in an ever amplied manner (Kanwar,

36、2007; Schneider, 2005). This school of thought predicted that appli- cation of the Norths intellectual property standards would be hugely benecial for the global South and provide an impetus for bridging the global technological divide (Lai & Qiu, 2003).Mazzoleni, & Bhaven, 2011; Odagiri, Go

37、to, Sunami, & Nelson, 2010) show through multiple cases across industrial-ized and develocountries, that IPRs were not signicantdrivers of technological advancement and that in fact, manyadvanced industrial economies achieved their development under loose IPR frameworks. 6The actual eectiveness

38、of patents and their dierencesacross industries has long been a subject of interest for innova- tion scholars. Thirty years ago renowned innovation econo- mist Edwin Manseld asked how germane patents truly wereA theoretical mdeveloped by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom(2010) is more buoyant still, positin

39、g that higher levels of IPRin the develoworld spur multiple gains,including perpetual increases in the transfer of technology to the global South, increases in R&D by Southern aliates of northern-based multinationals and nally both a decrease in the global wage gap and increase in innovation in

40、industrial- ized countries. These results are conrmed by evidence that intra-rm transfer of technology increases, especially for rms heavily dependent on patent-based technologies (Branstetter,for industries in teration and commercialization ofnew products. Reviewing surveys of 100 US rms across 13

41、industries, he found that they were only essential for a smallportion of innovations, and only in select few industries (Manseld, 1986). 7 This nding has lead researchers to ques-tion, do rmually use patents as the preferred mechanismFisman, & Foley, 2006). These multinational rms, according to

42、some researchers, cause positive spillover eects includingfor guarding secretive information? An interesting discussionon the overall importance of the global IPR regime and their potential not only to promote innovation but also to enable diusion can be found in Archibugi and Filippetti (2013).spof

43、 knowledge and skills to local workforce (Go¨ rg &Strobl, 2005; Poole, 2012) and growth of localrsTheir provocativeis that the overall eect of the(Smarzynska Javorcik, 2002, 2004). Finally, the standardizationof a reliable set of IPR norms opens markets for technology, linking innovations a

44、nd facilitating tacit and formal exchanges of technological knowledge (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001; Athreye & Cantwell, 2007).regime has been overestimated, and that eects have been“much ado about nothing.” Cohen, Nelson, and Walshs(2000) work conrms this result, nding that most rms

45、use other instruments such as trade secrecy, lead time advantages,DO STRONGER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INCREASE INNOVATION?667and complementary manufacturing strategies over patents as a means for protecting their product innovations. The use of patents and the eects of their ever-tightening sta

46、ndards remain contentious and unresolved issues.Spending on research may serve as a gauge of the process, but statistics on R&D are weak predictors of real innovative advances. Firms utilize R&D resources with varying levels of competence, xed investments in R&D over time are not ed for,

47、 and the data are skewed toward large rms, missing much of the innovative investments and advances achieved by small and medium players. One particularly damn- ing survey on the Netherlands showed that data on R&D only represented a quarter of total product innovation expenditure (Brouwer &

48、Kleinknecht, 1997). For researchers interested in development, an important limitation with R&D surveys is that the data on poor countries are scattered and inconsistent. As a(a) Getting a grip on innovation: patents and R&D spendingThe majority of studies working to gauge the impact of IPR

49、institutions on innovation have done so by measuring “inno- vation” through one of two proxies: patents granted or dis- bursements on R&D. Both these data sources present problems as accurate representations of innovative activity. 8 The rst problem with patents is that innovation is an incre- m

50、ental process, taking place through both “tacit” and “explicit” knowledge accumulation; measures of patents granted capture only the explicit side of technological innova- tion (Nelson, 2005). Along these lines, there is important evi- dence that many countries lack a “culture of patenting” whichrec

51、ent survey on R&D data collection in develocountriesindicates, we are a long way from having reliable contemporarydata and numerous institutional challenges to creating standard data collection systems persist (UNESCO, 2010).(b) Innovation through productive knowledge: the ECI indicatoris dominn

52、 the US and other western nations but less pre-valent in other societies. This is a particular challenge forIn light of the limitations encountered in traditional indica- tors of innovation, we explore the relationship between increasingly rigid IPR norms and its eects on innovation through measurem

53、ent of a countrys export sophistication as described in the “economic complexity index” (ECI). The ECI provides a number of advantages as proxy for a countrysinnovative output, giving us insight into a countrys (a) capac- ity to generate innovation which is relevant to its productive structure and (

54、b) ability to apply those innovations (be they incremental and tacit, or formal and codied). At the center of the calculation of the ECI index, two concepts characterize the complexity of an economy: diversity and ubiquity (Hausmann et al., 2013). Diversity describes the number of distinct products

55、that a country makes. Larger product diver- sity reects a greater amount of embedded knowledge and the ability of a country to apply tacit and explicit bundles of inno- vation across its productive structure. Ubiquity represents the number of countries that make a particular product. Since products

56、that demand large volumes of knowledge are feasible only in the few places where all the requisite technology and know-how are available, the more complex the product, the less ubiquitous it is expected to be. Medical imaging, for example, is a product exported by a few countries (the United States

57、and Germany being the leaders) and therefore is a product that is rare, compared with low-technological prod- ucts such as lumber, which is exported by dozens of countries. At the same time, both Germany and the United export a widecross-country studies where important changes in a countrys innovati

58、ve activity may not be captured by patent applications or awards (Varsakelis, 2001). In a long-sighted view of IPR system evolution, Lerner (2002) reviews 60 countries over 150 years and explores the determinants of patent systems. He nds evidence that intellectual property standards are highly aected by both levels of economic development and legal traditions (for example, countries with