总承包商视角下的建设项目供应链合作关系研究

1、总承包商视角下的建设工程供给链合作关系研究 博士学位论文总承包商视角下的建设工程供给链 合作关系研究RESEARCH ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECT SUPPLY CHAIN COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP FROM THE VIEW OF GENERAL CONTRACTOR 李宁2021 年 6 月 国内图书分类号:F293.3 学校代码:10213 国际图书分类号:332.3 密级:公开管理学博士学位论文总承包商视角下的建设工程供给链 合作关系研究 博 士 研 究 生:李宁 导 师:姚兵教授 副 导 师:王要武教授 申 请 学 位:管理学博士 学 科:管

2、理科学与工程 所 在 单 位:管理学院 答 辩 日 期:2021 年 6 月 授予学位单位:哈尔滨工业大学Classified Index: F293.3 U.D.C: 332.3 Dissertation for the Doctoral Degree in Management RESEARCH ON CONSTRUCTION PROJECT SUPPLY CHAIN COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP FROM THE VIEW OF GENERAL CONTRACTORCandidate: Li Ning Supervisor: Prof. Yao Bing Associ

3、ate Supervisor Prof. Wang Yaowu Academic Degree Applied for: Doctor of Management Speciality: Management Science&Engineering Affiliation: School of Management Date of Defence: June 2021 Degree-Conferring-Institution: Harbin Institute of Technology 摘 要 -I- 摘 要 高速开展的国内工程总承包市场和进一步开放的国际工程总承包市场为我国建筑企

4、业的开展提供了机遇的同时也提出了挑战。总承包企业通常凭借自身实力获得总承包权后,经业主同意后将局部工程分包给分包商完成。然而,目前的工程实践显示出建筑企业总承包工程失败的原因主要来自于建设工程供给链内部的分包商非合作行为。作为总承包商的建筑企业逐渐意识到在剧烈的市场竞争中与分包商合作的重要性,在开展自身核心能力的同时整合供给链内各种分包商资源,以整合合作的方式面对竞争。 本文立足于工程总承包管理实际,提出建设工程供给链合作关系的概念,并对此作深入研究,其目的就是通过分包商行为分析,建立一个科学的建设工程供应链合作关系决策模型,拟定合理的多准那么协商程序,设计一套有效的合作关系鼓励机制,实现建设

5、工程供给链分包商的资源整合,从而提升总承包商自身价值,推动建筑企业的可持续开展,为培养我国优秀的具有工程总承包能力的建筑企业提供理论依据。 在对国内外现有文献进行梳理的根底上,紧扣建设工程供给链合作关系这一主题,从总承包商的视角展开研究,阐述了建设工程供给链合作关系的相关概念,同时对相关理论进行分析作为后续研究的理论源泉。分析了现有总承包工程中分包商采购管理存在的问题及其产生的原因。对总承包管理过程进行重新梳理,创建了建设工程供给链合作关系管理的研究体系,并选取其中的建设工程供给链合作关系形成阶段的研究作为本文后续研究的总体指导框架。 以建设工程合作关系的形成阶段内容为根底,提出建设工程供给链

6、合作关系建立的决策过程模型,根据分包商行为对建筑企业收益的影响,将其划分为合作行为和非合作行为,并运用效用理论建立了最优效用模型分析分包商行为选择的均衡条件,说明管理分包商抛弃非合作行为而选择合作行为的措施。以主从递阶决策理论为根底,构建了以总承包商为上层决策者、分包商为下层决策者的主从博弈模型,说明了总承包商与分包商之间的决策交互作用。从增值性和互适性两个维度提出了建设工程供给链合作关系分类判断方法,提出相应的差异化的合作战略,为总承包商在选择分包商建立建设工程供给链合作关系决策奠定根底。 自动协商能够降低总承包商选择分包商建立合作关系的交易本钱,是提高建设工程合作关系效率的一项重要手段。以

7、一般协商协议为根底,比拟合同网协议与讨价还价协议的优缺点,构造了建设工程供给链合作关系自动协商的并行协哈尔滨工业大学管理学博士学位论文 - II - 议,改良现有协商协议从而更适合建设工程供给链合作关系的协商环境。根据由工程实践提出的最优价值原那么,建立了包含三个决策过程和自动协商支撑平台结构的基于并行协议的建设工程供给链合作关系的多准那么协商模型。利用 IDEF0 模型梳理了从分包协商启动到分包商成功确定过程的流程,详细阐述了每个模型阶段的工作任务,给出了协商状态转换的通信协议,提出基于贝叶斯学习机制的改进让步策略,利用该让步策略提出协商反报价可以更快速的获得有利方案。 在选择确定分包商后,

8、为了防范分包商的非合作行为,需要设计适宜的鼓励机制。在对现行建设工程合同类型和风险分担比拟的根底上,定量分析了两种激励合同的利润分担情况,得出固定总价加鼓励合同作为建设工程供给链合作关系鼓励设计中的理性选择的结论,并提出多因素目标显性鼓励和考虑分包商能力的隐性相结合的鼓励目标。在此根底上,从长远角度出发,构建了考虑分包商能力的多阶段动态鼓励模型,分析了该隐性机制的有效均衡条件。同时,根据工程实践中的多因素均衡优化要求,建立了基于多因素控制的鼓励模型,以期使总承包商的建设工程供给链合作关系鼓励设计更加符合总承包工程管理的实际需求。关键词:总承包商;总承包工程;建设工程供给链;合作关系;采购;协商

9、 Abstract -III- Abstract The rapid developing Chinese Design-Building DB market and further opened international DB market offer opportunity and challenge to Chinese construction enterprises. After general contractor attains the project theirself, he can subcontract part of work to subcontractor wit

10、h the approval of client. However, the project practice at present proved that the risk of DB is mainly caused from the interior of construction project supply chain, especially from the non-cooperation behavior of the subcontractor. As general contractor, the construction enterprise gradually reali

11、zed the importance of cooperation in the drastic market competition; therefore, it is advisible for them to integrate subcontractor resource in the supply chain by the clustered cooperationThe conception of construction project supply chain CPSC cooperation relationship was presented and deeply stud

12、ied. By analysis of subcontractor behavior, the decision making model of CPSC cooperation relationship was established, and the reasonable multi-rule negotiation procedure was specified, and the effective incentive mechanism of cooperation relationship was designed to conform the subcontractor resou

13、rce of CPSC and promote the value of general contractor. The research supplied the theoretical support to cultivate the excellent construction enterprise with the competence of project DB and drove the sustainable development of construction enterpriseAfter literature review, this dissertation conce

14、ntrated on CPSC cooperation relationship, and the research was from the view of general contractor. The conception system of CPSC cooperation relationship was analyzed. The research system of CPSC cooperation relationship management is created and the stage of relationship forming is selected as the

15、 main direction of subsequent researchOn the basis of the forming of construction project cooperation relationship, the decision process model of CPSC cooperation relationship was presented. According to the effect on the benefit of construction enterprise of the subcontractor behavior, it can be di

16、vided into the cooperation behavior and non-cooperation behavior and the optimal utility model was constructed to analyze the equilibrium condition of the choice of subcontractor behavior. Utilizing the leader-follower game theory, a leader-follower game model with the general contractor as the uppe

17、r-layer decision-maker and the subcontractor as the under-layer decision-maker was established to illustrate the decision-making alternation between the general contractor and subcontractor. From the view of the competence of increment and feasibility the method of judging the classification of CPSC

18、 cooperation relationship was studied and so as the 哈尔滨工业大学管理学博士学位论文 - IV - corresponding different types of cooperation strategy, which is the foundation of the general contractor to choose the subcontractor forming CPSC cooperation relationshipAutomatic negotiation could decrease the marketing cos

19、t of the general contractor to choose subcontractor forming the cooperation relationship and is an important method to improve the effectiveness of construction project cooperation relationshipOn the basis of the general negotiation protocol, compared the Contract Net Protocol and Bargaining Protoco

20、l, the Parallel Protocol was designed for the automatic negotiation of CPSC cooperation relationship to improve the existing negotiation protocol for the negotiation environment of CPSC cooperation relationship. According to the principle of optimal value in the project practice, the multi-criteria

21、negotiation model of CPSC cooperation relationship including three decision-making process and automatic negotiation support platform based on the Parallel Protocol was establishedUtilizing the IDEF0 model to analyze the procedure from the start of subcontract negotiation to the successful confirmat

22、ion of subcontractor, the work arrangement of each phase was designed and the communication protocol of the negotiation status transformation was given and the concession strategy was improved based on Bayesian updating mechanismAfter the confirmation of subcontractor, to prevent the non-cooperation

23、 behavior of subcontractor, a proper incentive mechanism should be designed. As the carrier of incentive mechanism, on the basis of the compare of the construction project contract and risk sharing, the incentive contract based on expected profit was designed and it was pointed out that the Fixed-Pr

24、ice-Incentive contract is the proper type of CPSC cooperation relationship incentive design. The explicit incentive on the multi-factor combined with the implicit incentive on the competence of subcontractor was presented. From the view of long-term, the multi-phase dynamic incentive model considere

25、d the competence of subcontractor was established, and the effective equilibrium condition of the implicit mechanism was analyzed. According to the requirement of multi-factor equilibrium optimization in the project practice, the incentive model on the multi-factor control was designed to make the i

26、ncentive of CPSC cooperation relationship of general contractor more suitable for the practice requirement of DB project management. The simulation result revealed that the presented incentive model could realize the Pareto improvement of the benefit of both sides and prevent the moral risk of subco

27、ntractor Keywords: general contractor, DB/EPC/Turnkey projects, construction project supply chain, cooperation relationship, subcontractor procurement, negotiation 目 录 -V- 目 录 00摘 要 99I 11Abstract. 99III22第 1 章 绪 论991 331.1 问题的提出. 991 441.2 研究的目的和意义. 992 551.2.1 课题研究的目的112 661.2.2 研究的意义. 113 771.3 国

28、内外研究现状及其评述. 115 881.3.1 建设工程供给链合作关系研究现状 115 991.3.2 建设工程供给链协商的研究现状. 119 11 .3.3 建设工程供给链的委托代理模型及鼓励机制研究现状11 2 11 .3.4 文献评述 11 5 11 .4 论文的主要研究内容和方法. 11 8 11 .4.1 主要研究内容. 11 8 11 .4.2 研究方法 19 11第 2 章 建设工程供给链合作关系及问题分析. 1122 112.1 建设工程供给链合作关系的相关概念 1122 112.1.1 工程总承包概念界定. 1122 112.1.2 建设工程供给链的内涵解析. 1125 11

29、2.1.3 建设工程供给链合作关系的含义理解 1127 22 .2 根底理论的运用 1129 22 .2.1 交易本钱理论. 1129 22 .2.2 企业能力理论. 1130 22 .2.3 委托代理理论. 1131 22 .3 传统工程总承包管理分析1132 22 .3.1 传统总承包过程及采购管理. 1132 22 .3.2 传统管理存在的问题. 1133 22 .4 建设工程供给链合作关系研究体系的构建. 1134 22 .4.1 建设工程供给链合作关系的过程重构 1134 哈尔滨工业大学管理学博士学位论文 - VI - 22 .4.2 建设工程供给链合作关系研究体系的组成. 1136

30、 332.4.3 合作关系管理对总承包商的企业效益奉献. 1139 332.5 本章小结 1141 33第 3 章 建设工程供给链合作关系的建立1142 33 .1 建设工程供给链合作关系建立的决策 1142 33 .1.1 合作关系建立的决策过程模型 1142 33 .1.2 合作关系建立的需求分析1143 33 .1.3 合作关系建立的促进力分析. 1144 33 .2 建设工程供给链合作关系建立的分包商行为分析. 1146 33 .2.1 分包商行为的分类1146 33 .2.2 分包商行为的最优效用模型及分析. 1147 443.2.3 分包商的合作态度分析 1151 443.3 总承

31、包商与分包商之间的交互作用. 1152 443.3.1 主从递阶的交互影响. 1153 443.3.2 根本假设及符号说明. 1154 443.3.3 主从决策模型的建立. 1157 443.3.4 模型的求解及决策变量的交互影响. 1157 443.4 建设工程供给链合作关系分类及差异化战略 1159 443.4.1 合作关系的分类判断. 1159 443.4.2 建设工程供给链合作关系的差异化战略1161 443.4.3 建设工程供给链合作关系分类的实证分析. 1163 553.5 本章小结 1166 55第 4 章 建设工程供给链合作关系的多准那么协商1167 554.1 建设工程供给链

32、合作关系的协商协议 1167 554.1.1 协商协议的一般模式. 1167 554.1.2 并行协议的提出 1168 554.1.3 并行协议的特点 1170 554.2 基于并行协议的多准那么协商模型构建 1170 554.2.1 多准那么的分类与识别. 1171 554.2.2 多准那么协商模型建立的最优价值原那么 1172 554.2.3 多准那么协商模型的建立 1172 664.2.4 MAS支撑平台. 1173 664.3 可协商准那么的评估分析 1176 目 录 -VII- 664.3.1 可协商准那么的效用评估 1176 664.3.2 可协商准那么评估分析流程1177 664

33、.4 多准那么协商模型的协商机制. 1177 664.4.1 协商机制的结构化流程设计. 1178 664.4.2 协商机制的协议 1183 664.4.3 价格协商的让步策略设计1185 664.5 建设工程供给链合作关系协商案例分析1190 664.5.1 案例背景 1191 774.5.2 协商分析根本数据1191 774.5.3 协商过程及分析 1194 774.6 本章小结. 11 00 77第 5 章 建设工程供给链合作关系的鼓励机制设计11 01 775.1 分包合同类型的选择与鼓励目标的识别 11 01 775.1.1 分包合同类型的选择11 01 775.1.2 鼓励目标的识

34、别. 11 04 775.2 考虑分包商能力的隐性鼓励设计 11 06 775.2.1 考虑分包商能力的隐性鼓励的作用机理 11 06 775.2.2 考虑分包商能力的隐性鼓励模型及求解 11 08 885.2.3 隐性鼓励的均衡分析11 14 885.3 基于多因素控制的显性鼓励设计 11 16 885.3.1 基于多因素控制的鼓励模型11 17 885.3.2 多因素鼓励模型的分类结果及分析11 22 885.3.3 算例模拟及模型有效性检验11 26 885.3.4 模型实际应用的建议11 31 885.4 本章小结. 11 32 88结 论. 11 33 88参考文献 11 35 88

35、攻读博士学位期间发表的论文及其他成果. 11 45 99哈尔滨工业大学博士学位论文原创性声明. 11 47 99哈尔滨工业大学博士学位论文使用授权书. 11 47 99致 谢. 11 48 99个人简历 11 49 哈尔滨工业大学管理学博士学位论文 - VIII - Contents Abstract In Chinese. I Abstract In EnglishIIIChapter 1 Introduction. 1 1.1 Advance of the issue1 1.2 Objective and significance of this research 2 1.2.1 Obje

36、ctive of this research2 1.2.2 Significance of this research 3 1.3 Present research status of the related realms and comments. 5 1.3.1 Research status of CPSC cooperation relationship 5 1.3.2 Research status of CPSC negotiation 9 1.3.3 Research status of Principle-agent model and incentive mechanism.

37、 12 1.3.4 Literature review15 1.4 Contents and methodology of the research. 18 1.4.1 Contents of this dissertation 18 1.4.2 Research methodology of this dissertation19 Chapter 2 CPSC cooperation relationship and its iusses analysis22 2.1 Correlative conceptions of the research on CPSC cooperation re

38、lationship22 2.1.1 Conception definition of the construction project DB. 22 2.1.2 Connotation analysis of construction project supply chain 25 2.1.3 Definition comprehension of the CPSC cooperation relationship. 27 2.2 Foundational theory of CPSC cooperation relationship 29 2.2.1 Transaction cost th

39、eory. 29 2.2.2 Enterprise capacity theory30 2.2.3 Principle-agent theory31 2.3 Issues and Causes in traditional DB project management32 2.3.1 Traditional process of DB project32 2.3.2 Issues of traditional DB project management33 2.4 Establishment of research system of CPSC cooperation relationship

40、34 2.4.1 Process reconstruction of forming of CPSC cooperation relationship. 34 2.4.2 Ingredient of research system of CPSC cooperation relationship36 2.4.3 Effect to the benefit of general contractor of the research. 39 2.5 Summary41 Chapter 3 Creation of CPSC cooperation relationship. 42 3.1 Decis

41、ion-making analysis of creation of CPSC cooperation relationship42 Contents -IX- 3.1.1 Decision-making process analysis of cooperation relationship creating 42 3.1.2 Demand analysis of the creation of CPSC cooperation relationship 43 3.1.3 propelling force analysis of the creation of cooperation rel

42、ationship44 3.2 Subcontractor behavior analysis of creation of cooperation relationship 45 3.2.1 Classification to subcontractor behavior. 46 3.2.2 Optimal utility model of the subcontractor behavior and analysis. 47 3.2.3 Risk attitude analysis of the subcontractor. 51 3.3 Interaction between gener

43、al contractor and subcontractor52 3.3.1 Leader-follower hierarchical interaction and selection of game model52 3.3.2 Foundational hypothesis and explanation of notation53 3.3.3 Creation of leader-follower decision-making model. 53 3.3.4 Solution of model and interaction of decision-making variables

44、57 3.4 Classification of CPSC cooperation relationship and cooperation strategy 59 3.4.1 Classification of the cooperation relationship59 3.4.2 Differentiation strategies of the CPSC cooperation relationship 61 3.4.3 Case study of classified strategy of CPSC cooperation relationship 62 3.5 Summary65

45、 Chapter 4 Multi-criteria negotiation of CPSC cooperation relationship. 67 4.1 Negotiation protocol of CPSC cooperation relationship67 4.1.1 General mode of negotiation protocol67 4.1.2 Presentation of the parallel protocol68 4.1.3 Characteristics of parallel protocol 70 4.2 Creation of multi-criter

46、ia negotiation model based on parallel protocol. 70 4.2.1 Classification and recognition of multi-criteria71 4.2.2 Optimal value principle of creation of multi-criteria negotiation model 72 4.2.3 Creation of multi-criteria negotiation model. 72 4.2.4 MAS supporting platform73 4.3 Evaluation analysis

47、 of negotiable criteria 76 4.3.1 Utility evaluation of negotiable criteria76 4.3.2 Evaluation analysis process of negotiable criteria. 77 4.4 Negotiation mechanism of multi-criteria negotiation model. 77 4.4.1 Structural decomposition of negotiation mechanism 78 4.4.2 Protocol of negotiation mechani

48、sm 83 4.4.3 Design of concession strategy of negotiation mechanism. 85 4.5 Case study of CPSC cooperation relationship negotiation90 4.5.1 Background of case study90 4.5.2 Utility function. 91 哈尔滨工业大学管理学博士学位论文 - X - 4.5.3 Negotiation process and analysis 94 4.6 Summary 100 Chapter 5 Incentive mechan

49、ism design of CPSC cooperation relationship 101 5.1 Selection of subcontractor contract and recognition of incentive target 101 5.1.1 Selection of subcontractor contract type101 5.1.2 Recognition of incentive objective104 5.2 Implicit incentive design considered subcontractors capacity106 5.2.1 Acti

50、on mechanism of implicit incentive 106 5.2.2 Implicit incentive model considered subcontractors capacity. 108 5.2.3 Effectiveness analysis of implicit incentive mechanism114 5.3 Design of explicit incentive based on multi-factor control116 5.3.1 Incentive model based on multi-factor control. 117 5.3

51、.2 Classified result and analysis of multi-factor incentive 122 5.3.3 Case simulation and validity study126 5.3.4 Suggestion of application of the model. 131 5.4 Summary 132 Conlusions. 133 References. 135 Papers published in the period of Ph.D. education145 Statement of copyright 147 Letter of auth

52、orization. 147 Acknowledgements148 Resume 149 第 1 章 绪 论 - 1 - 第 1 章 绪 论 1.1 问题的提出 改革开放 30 年,我国建筑业在产业结构和企业经营方面取得了一定的成绩:初步形成了由总承包、专业承包和劳务分包企业组成的承包商体系。然而,仍存在建筑业产业结构不合理的问题,产业集中度不高,大企业规模不够大,业务能力单一,不能很好的发挥主导、骨干作用,形成了大而不强的局面,无法带动整个建筑业升级;同时,中小企业专业化、协作化水平差。这导致建筑市场过度竞争、不标准开展。 为解决以上问题,住宅与城乡建设部出台了多部法律法规标准市场开展,如?建筑法?、?招标投标法?、?建筑业企业资质管理规定?和?建设工程工程总承包管理标准?等,并提出了旨在优化产业结构的相关政策,逐渐培育以提供工程总承包为主的大型企业、集团,和以专业化效劳和劳务效劳为主的中、小型企业。目的是在大型总承包企业的带动下,形成大中小企业,按照一定的分工合作进入市场。在外部环境趋向标准的条件下,建筑企业尤其是大型总承包企业如何寻找自身的利润增长点,提高市场竞争能力,成为摆在总承包企业面前的首要问题。 建设工程供给链合作关系管理为大型建筑企业应对竞争