一个国际历史性的比较2007美国次贷金融危机是否不同

1、一、 外文原文Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical ComparisonCarmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland and the NBER and Kenneth S. Rogoff Harvard University and the NBERThe first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unawa

2、re regulators, and skittish investors. It also follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number of major crisis indicators from the

3、standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices, which Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) find to the be best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows, closely tracks the average of t

4、he nineteen major post World War II banking crises in industrial countries. So, too, is the inverted v-shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. Despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the early 2000s tax cuts, the run-up in U.S. public debt is actually somewhat

5、 below the average of other crisis episodes. In contrast, the pattern of United States current account deficits is markedly worse. The book is still open on the how the current dislocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bank-centered fi

6、nancial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop i

7、n (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over five percent, and growth

8、 remained well below pre-crisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of.1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The DataOur main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward comparisons of theUnited St

9、ates 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some case

10、s earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much the “this time is different” syndro

11、me has already been repeated.First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petro

12、leum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized U.S. current account deficits, which n

13、ow soak up roughly two-thirds of all the worlds current account surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, could be justified by new elements of the global economy. Thanks to a combination of a flexible economy and the innovation of the tech boom, the United States could be expected to enjoy s

14、uperior productivity growth for decades, while superior American know-how meant higher returns on physical and financial investment than foreigners could expect in the United States.Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a striking contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads,

15、 and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices,which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthyborrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been great

16、ly magnified due to complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen ban

17、k-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart a

18、nd Rogoff (2008).These crisis episodes include:The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. Other Banking and Financial Crises: Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Germany

19、 (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984, 2007).The “Big Five” crises are all protracted large scale financial crises that are associated with major declines in economic performance for a protracted p

20、eriod. Japan (1992), of course, is the start of the “lost decade,” although the Nordic Crises and the Spanish crisis of 1977 all left deep marks on their economies as well.The remaining rich country financial crises represent a broad range of lesser events. The 1984 U.S. crisis is the savings and lo

21、an crisis and, of course, the 2007 crisis is the sub-prime crisis, which we have represented as a U.S. crisis though of course it has had a severe impact on banks from Europe to Central Asia.While generally all the crises centrally involved the banking system, we have included the 1995 UK crisis tha

22、t resulted from the bankruptcy of Barings, which was essentially an investment bank. We note that one crisis episode not encompassed by our selection criteria is the period of severe bank stress in the U.S. and Europe, especially, caused by the developing country debt crisis that began in 1982. We o

23、mit it because the bank crisis was not clearly at the epi-center of problem (which had it roots in U.S. disinflation and a drop in world commodity prices). Moreover, it overlaps somewhat with our dating of the thrift crisis. However, including it would not weaken our results.2. ComparisonsWe now pro

24、ceed to a variety of simple comparisons between the 2007 U.S. crisis and previous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature on financial crises, we look at asset prices, growth and public debt. We begin in Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing prices. Period T represents the year of the ons

25、et of the financial crisis. So period T-4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the U.S. 2007 crisis.1 The chart confirms the case study literature, showing the significant run-up in housing prices prior to a financial crisis,

26、 with the affect being particularly pronounced for the “Big five” severe cases. Housing prices in the United States, however, have risen even further.Figure 2 looks at real rates of growth in equity market price indices. (For the United States, the index is the S&P 500; Reinhart and Reinhart, 20

27、08 provide the complete listing for foreign markets.)The U.S. again looks like the archetypical crisis country, only more so. Here, however, the big five crisis countries tended to experience equity price falls earlier on. Of course, each of these crises occurred at different points in the global pr

28、oductivity cycle, which may explain some of the difference. Then, too, the monetary responses differed across these episodes, with the Federal Reserve pumping in an extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode.Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP,

29、again starting four years before the crisis. Again, the United States looks like the typical pre-crisis country, in the capital inflows accelerate going into the crisis. However, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is a large and growing l

30、iterature that attempts to rationalize why it might be beneficial for the United States to a sustained current deficit. The simplest argument is that increasing global trade and financial globalization supports larger current account imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001). The various rationales for

31、 the massive U.S. current account deficit would be more reassuring if the U.S. deficit were not almost twice the average of the earlier precrisis episodes.Real per capita GDP growth in the run-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V sha

32、pe that characterizes the earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains low for two years after. In the more severe “Big Five” cases, however, the growth shock is ever larger and more prolonged. Not encouraging for the U.S. economic outlook, the aftermath of a ba

33、nking crisis tends to have a protracted effect on real growth.Figure 5 looks at public debt as a share of GDP. Rising public debt is a near universal precursor of other post-war crises, not least the 1984 U.S. crisis. Nevertheless, although public debt is rising prior to the 2007 U.S. crisis, it is

34、rising notably more slowly than in the average of the other 18 episodes, and much more slowly than the Big Five. This shallow path of U.S. public debt also makes it clear that the large current account deficits shown earlier owe to factors other than just government excess.The correlations in these

35、graphs are not necessarily causal, but in combination nevertheless suggest that if the United States does not experience a significant and protracted growth slowdown, it should either be considered very lucky or even more “special” that most optimistic theories suggest. Indeed, given the severity of

36、 most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 financial crisis, the United States should consider itself fortunate if it can have post-crisis trajectory parallel to the milder banking crises in the comparison set, as opposed to the much larger growth pauses experiences by Spain, Japan, Sweden, N

37、orway and Finland during their severe financial crises.3. ConclusionsTolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with the line “Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.” While each financial crisis no doubt has its own distinctions, there are als

38、o striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). While in the case of the United States, there

39、has been no striking de jure liberalization, there certainly has been a de facto liberalization. New unregulated, or lightly regulated, financial entities have come to play a much larger role in the financial system, undoubtedly enhancing stability against some kinds of shocks, but possibly increasi

40、ng vulnerabilities against others.Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despitemany superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue. What

41、ever the long-term outcome, the quantitative parallels to earlier post-war industrialized-country financial crises, at least in the pre-crisis period, is worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove an important mitigating factor.One last para

42、llel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system stood as an intermediary between oil-exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers in Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn p

43、laced enormous strain on money center banks.3 It is true that this time, a great deal of petro-dollars are again flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been running current account surpluses, lending rather than borrowing. Instead, a large chunk of money has effectively been

44、recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States own borders. Over a trillion dollars was channeled into the sub-prime mortgage market, which is comprised of the poorest and least credit worth borrowers within the United States. The final claimant is different, but in many ways,

45、 the mechanism is the same.二、 翻译文章一个国际历史性的比较：2007美国次贷金融危机是否不同卡门莱因哈特米马里兰大学和国家经济研究局和哈佛大学肯尼斯罗格夫学和国家经济研究局21世纪的第一次重大金融危机涉及深奥的手段，不易察觉的调整机构和活跃的投资者。它也良好地遵循了百年来金融危机的闹剧规律。这一次我们将面临抵押贷款的问题,但与之前相比，也并无什么差异。事实上，在定量指标上，很大一批危机指标都和国际金融危机的标准文献相吻合。例如，卡明斯基和卡门莱因哈特米（1999年）通过密切跟踪二战后十九次主要工业国家的银行危机研究，发现美国股票上涨和住房价格,是引起经济危机中国家

46、大量资本流入的最好指标。因此，也就是倒V形实际增长在未来数年之前的危机。尽管2000年代初期，人们广泛关注减税国家的债务情况，但美国的公共债务却低于其他经济危机波及的国家。与此相反，美国的赤字格局是明显恶化。 该书还对如何改变美国目前混乱的情况做深入的研究，但一些先例可在其他银行的善后事宜中找到。根据银行系统不同程度的损伤，工业经济体的金融危机的相当严重。较之发生在隔离状态下的货币危机，一次严重的银行危机通常具有更深远，更持久影响。平均降低产出的增长（人均）超过百分之二时通常需要2年时间才能恢复到原有趋势。五个最灾难性的案例（其中包括发作在瑞典，芬兰，日本，挪威，西班牙）， 年产量从高峰下降到

47、低谷，但三年后，其增长率超过百分之五，并保持良好的势头。1.战后银行经济危机数据：我们的主要目的是将美国2007年危机与其他战后危机做简单的比较，使用一小块更大和较长远的历史数据集延长数据，我们已经构建（见莱因哈特和肯尼斯学 罗格夫，2008。）危机围绕设定的目录银行和金融扩展数据，整个世界可以追溯到1800年（在某些情况下更早）。为了集中这些数据，目前在美国的相关情况下，我们不过多地考虑新兴市场危机，也不涉及十九世纪的工业化国家或金融危机大萧条。 不过，惊人的是“这一次是不同的”综合症已经被重复。 首先是合理化。这一次，许多分析师认为，不是所有的美国房价的庞大升值都是泡沫经济，而是金融创新的

48、理由（包括次级抵押贷款，以及来自亚洲的稳定资金流入 和石油出口国。股票价格的巨大运行也同样被认为伴随持续激增得益于美国生产率增长下降的风险 下“大稳定”的宏观经济波动。至于非凡串联的美国项目赤字过于庞大，目前大约吸收世界上所有账户盈余的三分之二。受到全球经济的新元素的影响，许多分析家认为，这些也可能是合理的。由于经济与科技创新热潮的灵活结合，美国可望在未来的几十年里享受卓越生产力的不断增长，而与外国人相比，优越的美国人更能发现物理和经济投资所能带来的高回报。接下来是现实。在过去数月，我们已经看到了显著的财富收缩和增加的传播风险还有市场运作的恶化。2007年，美国次贷危机，当然受美国房价下跌的影

49、响， 这反过来又导致较高水平信贷违约，特别是信誉不高的借款人。这些机构的影响金融领域的拖欠率已经大大放大捆绑技术，被认为分散风险有效投资,但实际上其取得的结果非常不透明，技术流动性不足，且不易面对下跌的房产价格。 作为2007年美国次贷危机的基准，我们绘制了一战后十九家银行危机的数据图。我们已经涉及战后波及点，其中一些重要的金融机构或金融部门的倒塌类似于卡明斯基和莱因哈特在1999年进一步讨论的文件（见Reinhart和Rogoff，2008）。这些危机事件包括：“五大”的危机：西班牙（1977），挪威（1987年），芬兰（1991），瑞典（1991年）和日本（1992年），其中今年开始在括号

50、。其他银行和金融危机：澳大利亚（1989年），加拿大（1983年），丹麦（1987年），法国（1994年），德国（1977年），希腊（1991年），冰岛（1985年），意大利（1990年）和新西兰（1987年），英国（1974年，1991年，1995年），美国（1984年，2007年）。“五大”的危机，都是大规模的旷日持久的金融危机，表现在在较长的一段时间内经济大幅下降。虽然北欧和西班牙1977年的经济危机也留下了深刻的印记，但日本1992年的经济危机才是“失去的十年”的开始。其余的富裕国家的金融危机代表了广泛范围内的小事件。1984年美国的危机是储蓄和贷款危机，当然，2007年危机是次贷危机

51、，一开始我们错误地只把它当成美国的危机，但它却波及了整个欧洲还有中亚。虽然一般危机都集中在银行系统，1995年英国的危机是导致巴林银行（本质上是一个投资银行）的破产的主要原因。 我们注意到，危机事件的选择标准不涵盖美国和欧洲的银行压力，特别是1982年发展中国家造成的国家的债务危机年。我们忽略它，因为银行危机并不是问题的中心，它植根于通货紧缩和世界商品价格下降。此外,它有点重叠于我们所说的节俭危机。2.比较我们现在进行的2007年美国的金融危机和以往的各种事件的简单比较。在金融危机的标准文献绘图中，我们来看看资产和公共债务的价格增长。我们开始通过比较图1进行房屋价格上涨的比较。T期间代表了金融

52、危机爆发的一年。所以周期T - 4是前四年的危机，并在每一种情况下继续为T +3期间，在美国2007年crisis.1图表案件个案研究文献证实，显示了金融危机时期的房价，特别是在 “五大”危机的严重影响的情况下极为明显。在美国住房价格中甚至有进一步上升的情形。图2着眼于市场的股票价格指数增长的实际利率。 （对于美国来说，该指数是标准普尔500;莱因哈特和Reinhart，2008年国外市场提供完整的清单。）美国又看起来更加像如此原型危机的国家。在这里，从五个发生危机的国家的经验来看，跟之前相比股票价格趋于下跌。当然，这些危机发生在每一个全球生产力的周期，这也许可以解释一些共同点。然后，这也是有

53、差异的，在这些事件与美联储在最近的事件的初期，货币的反应就说明了这一切。三、 朗读四、 Miguó yòu kàn qlái xiàng yuánxíng wéij de guóji, zhyu gèng rúc. Zài zhèl,Ránér, cóng dà w gè fshng wéij de guóji de jngyàn gpiào jiàgé q

54、 yú xiàdié jiào zo qián. Dngrán, zhèxi wéij fshng zài mi ygè zài quánqiú shngchnlì de zhuqí, zhè yx ky jishì yxi bùtóng de chyì din. Ránhòu, yyu chyì, zài zhèxi shìji

55、4;n y miliánch zài cìj fifán de chushu liàng zài zuìjìn de shìjiàn chqí, huòbì de fnyìng.五、 字典 - 查看字典详细内容六、 Tú 2 zhuóyn yú shìchng de gpiào jiàgé zhshù zngzhng de shíjì lìl. (

56、Duìyú miguó lái shu, gi zhshù shì biozhn pr 500; lái yn h tè hé Reinhart,2008 nián guówài shìchng tígng wánzhng de qngdn.)七、 字典 - 查看字典详细内容八、 朗读九、 Wmen xiànzài jìnxíng de 2007 nián miguó zh jin de

57、 wéij hé ywng de gè zhng shìjiàn de jindn bjiào. Zài jnróng wéij de biozhn wénxiàn huìtú, wmen lái kàn kàn zchn jiàgé, zngzhng hé gnggòng zhàiwù. Wmen kish tngguò bjiào tú 1 y

58、ùnxíng zài fángw jiàgé shàngzhng. Qíjin T dàibio le jnróng wéij bàof de y nián. Suy zhuqí T - 4 shì qián sì nián de wéij, bìng zài mi y zhng qíngkuàng xià jìxù wèi T +3 tú chú dngrán, zài miguó 2007 nián crisis.1 Túbio ànjiàn gèàn yánj