中国政府审计 问题和改革外文翻译

1、 中文4010字 本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 题 目 政府审计公告制度的现状分析及其对策 专 业 会 计 学 外文题目 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform 外文出处 Government auditing in China: Problems and reform N. incorporating Advances in International Accounting 2008，(24)：119-127 外文作者 杨寿昌，贾森泽忠孝，莫里斯彭德尔伯里 1 原文： Government auditing in China

2、: Problems and reform 1. Introduction For 30 years after its foundation in 1949, the People's Republic of China went through a series of major mass political movements which left it extremely isolated from the rest of the world, especially capitalist countries. At the brink of a total economic c

3、ollapse, China shifted its focus to economic development, began market-oriented economic reforms, and adopted an open-door policy in 1978.3 These changes revived both government auditing and independent auditing , which had been replaced by other monitoring mechanisms in the 1950s. As required by th

4、e 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC, 1982), the National Audit Office (NAO) was set up in 1983 as a department of the State Council. In addition, regional audit offices were also set up as departments of provincial, municipal and county governments. A regional government a

5、udit office is under the leadership of both the government audit office at a higher level and its supervising regional government. For example, the audit office of a provincial government is subject to the joint leadership of the NAO and the provincial government. Under the dual leadership system, f

6、or a provincial government audit office, the NAO provides auditing and regulatory guidance and monitoring while the provincial government provides resources and exercises personnel control. In addition, the NAO operates a network of branch offices in central government ministries and very large muni

7、cipalities to audit various government departments, agencies, state owned enterprises under the control of the central government, and their associated institutions. These branch audit offices located in ministries and very large municipalities are under the direct leadership of the NAO. Although th

8、is government audit system has made significant contributions toward China's economic reform and opening up to the world in the past 20 years (Chinese Auditing System Research Group, 1999), it also suffers from the lack of audit independence. The existing problems of government auditing mainly s

9、tem from 2 it being under the direct control of the executive body (the State Council). Under this system, various government departments and officials can, both theoretically and practically, interfere with government auditing, thus weakening the objectivity and fairness of the audit. However, the

10、people's congresses at various levels have begun to attach significant importance to, and make increasing use of, the audit report. At the same time, more and more taxpayers have begun to pay attention to how their money is used by the government. While the NAO's lack of independence has alw

11、ays been a problem ever since its establishment, this problem is creating increasing tensions in the current political setting because of the accountability needs of the legislature and taxpayers. The accountability relationship between the government and the legislature is compromised by the fact t

12、hat the auditor is not independent of the government. Notwithstanding these problems, the NAO has stepped up the level of public disclosure of audit findings in recent years. In 2003, the NAO for the first time disclosed to the public that serious financial problems existed in four ministries of the

13、 central government. This disclosure and the problems exposed attracted much media attention and the phrase “Audit Storm” was used to refer to the disclosure and the issues raised. This “Audit Storm” continued in 2004 and 2005 when the NAO in its annual report disclosed the serious illegal acts in o

14、ther ministries of the central government. However, although this storm has been useful in drawing attention to some of the problems that had occurred, the level of audit independence means that only a small percentage of the total were exposed. Also, even where problems are exposed, this does not e

15、nsure that the same problems will not recur. Thus, the “Audit Storm” has heightened the awareness of the need for government auditing reform. 2. Perceived problems of the current government auditing system Most interviewees believed that the current problems of government auditing have their origins

16、 in its relation to the government, i.e., the NAO is in effect an internal auditing department under the government's direct control. The following paragraphs elaborate the main problems identified in the interviews. 2.1. Lack of audit independence The majority of our interviewees acknowledged s

17、ome direct or indirect 3 intervention by people or organisations from outside the NAO. These have a strong negative impact on audit planning, the training and appointment of auditing personnel, the determination of audit tasks, the dealing with problems identified in the audit, and the disclosure of

18、 audit results. As a result, theNAOcan hardly perform any independent auditing. A director-general of a provincial government audit office commented: The problems identified in the audit should be dealt with in accordance with law, but if the problems involve the government, the audit office will ex

19、perience interference from the governmental official in charge or from other authorities. Some interviewees acknowledged the lack of independence of government auditing, but at the same time they did not want to exaggerate the problem. Being a department directed by the government, how can the audit

20、 officework independently free from the interference of the government or the chief government officers (CGO)? Is the result of interference inevitably detrimental? The interviewees found it hard to answer these questions. Besides, the audit office and the government are at different administrative

21、levels and may not always have consistent perceptions on auditing. Under this circumstance, as was revealed in the interviews, the audit office, being at the lower level, would normally follow the government's will and this is understandable. We argue that if auditing is supposed to satisfy mere

22、ly the needs of the government, or if government audit is supposed to play a supporting role to governmental work, then the problem of limited audit independence is relatively partial, because government auditing still achieves its main objective. But if the people's congress and taxpayers outsi

23、de the government are also audit clients, and entrust the government audit office to investigate how the government implemented fiscal budgets approved by the people's congress, then the control relationship between the audit office and the government becomes a severe problem. An immediate conse

24、quence of the lack of audit independence is that the audit report may no longer possess objectivity and fairness and it is therefore less likely to gain the trust and acceptance by the people's congress and the public. 2.2. Restricted disclosure of audit results 4 The interviewees generally felt

25、 that the disclosure of audit results might be restricted. A deputy CGO (a deputy mayor) of a municipal government commented in the interview: The audit report follows governmental arrangements, but this does not necessarily indicate that the government will prevent the disclosure of audit issues. W

26、hoever acts as the CGO faces external pressure and thus s/he will disclose something, explain it to the people's congress, and also save the face of the audit office. But will the CGO disclose all the issues or important issues then? Will the issues concerning his/her annual report be disclosed

27、as they really are? One can never tell. A director-general from the NAO admitted: In fact, some government officials interfere with the audit office in reporting audit results to the People's Congress. They even directly demand the audit office to remove big issues that violate regulations from

28、the audit report. An official from the NAO also admitted in the interview that some local governments and related authorities interfere with the disclosure of audit findings and the resolution of audit results in order to shirk responsibilities and avoid excessive disclosure that might overshadow th

29、eir political career. The interview data thus suggests that the audit office is not only constrained by the government in terms of audit planning and the determination of audit tasks, but also the disclosure of audit results. That is, the audit office cannot make its own decisions on what to disclos

30、e, how to disclose, and when to disclose. Consequently, there is no assurance on the authority and transparency of audit reports. With the submission of audit reports to the people's congress, this problem of a lack of independence and transparency has aroused increased concerns. Since the Const

31、itution (PRC, 1982) and the Audit Law (PRC, 1994a) lack clear and rigid rules on the disclosure of audit results, the content and degree of disclosure in the current auditing system are determined and censored by the government's discretionary disclosure policies on government affairs and are al

32、so heavily affected by the attitudes of CGOs. 2.3. Auditing gaps Most interviewees mentioned the same problem; the audit is only applied to government units at a lower level of the hierarchy. That is, the audit rarely examines 5 the responsibility and performance of the government itself or its CGO,

33、 and hence the depth, level, and scope of auditing are rather restricted. The following comment made by an interviewee who is a director-general at the NAO is representative of the views. From a legal point of view, there will not be any constraint on the audit of decisions made by higher-level offi

34、cials, but in practice you cannot really question them. If in the audit process we discover problems or mistaken decisions made by high-level officials, we would rather not disclose them. We would assume that the government always does the right thing. That is to say, if the problems arose from deci

35、sions made by the government, we will not bother about them any more. How can we supervise our superiors? We are only a department of the government. Some of our interviewees also mentioned that in budget auditing, since the audit does not actually involve the financial responsibility and performanc

36、e of the government and its CGO, it is unavoidable that many big issues are overlooked or neglected, especially those related to the government or CGOs themselves. Given that many problems result from governmental activity, the audit office can do nothing and the problems can appear over and over ag

37、ain. This kind of auditing exhibits a serious problem of power centralisation. 2.4. Budget audit as a mere formality Some interviewees questioned whether audit results would be reported accurately to the people's congress even if the audit office carried out budget auditing at the government lev

38、el. If the government determines the content of the audit report, budget auditing is in effect the government's “self-inspection”. The Constitution (PRC, 1982) empowers the CGO with respect to both auditing and financial matters. However, in many local governments, the CGO holds the financial de

39、cision-making powers while the deputy CGO is delegated to take charge of auditing. This situation might make it more difficult for the audit office to monitor fiscal and financial activities of the government and its CGO simply because the deputy's unwillingness to expose a CGO. This is reflecte

40、d in the remarks made by one interviewee, a deputy director-general at a provincial government audit office: The difficulty that the audit office faces in performing budget auditing is truly enormous, because fiscal and 6 financial powers rest in the hands of the CGO. Important fiscal and financial

41、issues and the annual fiscal and financial budget must be decided by the CGO. Once the budget is set, any budget adjustment must also be approved by the government and its CGO. Under such conditions, auditing fiscal and financial budgets would be equivalent to the audit of the government and it'

42、s CGO. Thus, auditors face not only the finance department but also the CGO. In the auditing process, if the finance department tells the auditor that the CGO does not give permission for something to be audited, then the auditor will not have the necessary access. Moreover, as the relationship betw

43、een the people's congress and the government is that of supervisor and supervisee, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the government audit office to serve two “masters”. In such a conflicting situation, the government audit office can only put the government's interests and requirements

44、 first, since the government is its direct “boss”. To serve the government in essence and the people's congress in appearance is an inevitable choice of the government audit office under the current system. The legislature therefore cannot directly exercise audit supervision and can only indirec

45、tly monitor the fiscal budget through auditing. The legislature also lacks other practical approaches and tools for monitoring the implementation of fiscal budgets and this limits its ability to obtain an insight into the workings of financial systems and budget implementation. The legislature can t

46、herefore play a very limited role in monitoring financial systems and fiscal budgets. 3. Reforming and Conclusion We carried out interviews in 2002 in order to comprehend and evaluate the current government auditing systemin China and identify a rational and feasible approach to reforming the system

47、. We also examined the impact of the recent “Audit Storm” on the government auditing system. The results of our investigation show that the current government auditing system in China lacks independence and transparency. The lack of independence affects the objectivity and reliability of auditing wh

48、ich is particularly important when auditing the implementation, use and control of budgeted funds by central and regional governments. It is this aspect of government auditing 7 that has the greatest need for audit independence. Our analysis of the “Audit Storm” shows that ithas increased auditing t

49、ransparency and attracted much attention from the public, the NPC officials, academics, and government officials to the serious problems in managing public finance. It has also shown that government auditing has an important role to play in protecting public interests. However, merely drawing attent

50、ion to the problems cannot prevent them from recurring. Also, government censorship means that many problems are not disclosed and it has proved difficult to extend the “Audit Storm” to local audit bureaus. All these weaknesses are rooted in the lack of independence in the current government auditin

51、g system. The “Legislature Approach” has been widely discussed among Chinese academics. Although it emphasises audit independence, it neglects the centralised nature of the government structure, the political tension between the government and the legislature, and the problems that the legislature i

52、tself faces. Therefore, implementing this approach in the current political climate may weaken the government's economic control and require a major restructuring of the government and the legislature, thus lacking practicality and feasibility. To smooth this proposed transition, we put forward

53、a “Dual-Track System” as an interim step toward a fully-fledged legislature-led state audit system. Our proposal suggests that the legislature and the government should set up separate audit organisations to exercise different audit responsibilities. The “Dual-Track System” takes into account both t

54、he need to improve audit independence and the feasibility of reform. This approach satisfies the increasing will of the Chinese legislature to strengthen budget auditing while at the same time meeting the need of the government to maintain strong economic control. Source:Suchang Yang , Jason Zezhong

55、 Xiao , Maurice Pendlebury .Government auditing in China: Problems and reformN.Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting，2008，(24)：119-127. 8 译文： 中国政府审计：问题和改革 1、简介 1949年后的30年，中华人民共和国经历了一系列重要大众政治运动,使它在世界各地极其孤立，特别是资本主义国家。在一个经济全面崩溃的边缘，中国将重点转移到经济发展，开始了以市场为导向的经济改革，并通过了197

56、8年3月的门户开放政策，同时恢复政府审计与独立审计并取代了20世纪50年代所实行的监测机制。 按照中华人民共和国1982年宪法规定，国家审计署（NAO）作为国务院的部门成立于1983年。此外，区域审计办公室还成立了省，市，县政府部门。一个地区的政府审计办公室是根据双方的政府审计办公室在更高水平上监督区政府的领导。例如，一个省级政府审计办公室是受审计署和省级政府共同领导。在双重领导体制下，为省政府审计署，审计署的审计和监管提供指导和监督，而省政府提供资源和演习人员控制。此外，审计署经营在中央部委和分支机构网络非常大的直辖市审计根据中央的政府来管制各政府部门，机构，国有企业，其他关联机构。这些分支

57、审计机关各部委由超大型城市设下的国家审计署直接领导。 虽然在过去的20年，这个政府审计制度已给中国的经济改革开放做出了重大贡献（中国审计制度的研究小组，1999年），但是在面向世界时也遭受了缺乏审计独立性的质疑。政府审计中存在的问题主要源于其下的行政机构（国务院）的直接控制之下。在这个制度下，各政府部门和官员可以在理论和实践中干扰政府审计，从而削弱了审计的客观性和公正性。然而，随着审计报告越来越多的使用，各级人民代表大会也开始重视其重要意义。与此同时，越来越多的纳税人开始注意他们的钱是如何由政府使用。虽然审计署的缺乏独立性一直是公司成立以来的问题，这个问题正在创造出越来越多的创造了电流，因为问

58、责的政治环境日益引起了立法机关和纳税人的关注。政府与立法机关之间的关系受到损害责任的事实是审计人员不独立于政府的重大原因。 由于存在这些问题，审计署已加紧在近几年的审计结果公开披露的水平。 2003年，审计署首次向公众披露了四个中央部委存在的严重财政问题。此披露和曝光的问题备受媒体的关注，“审计风暴”一次也由此而来。在2004年和20059 年，在其年度报告中披露了审计署对中央其他部委的严重违法行为。然而，尽管这场风暴已在提请人们注意所发生的问题，但是审计独立性的一些有用的手段，只有一小部分的总暴露。此外，即使问题暴露出来，这并不能确保不会再发生同样的问题。因此，“审计风暴”已加深了对政府审计

59、改革必要性的认识。 2、当前政府审计制度审计改革已知的问题 大部分受访者认为当前的政府审计的问题是与政府密切相关的，这实际上是一种行为的内部审计部门在政府的直接控制。以下各段阐述的访谈中发现的主要问题。 （1）缺乏审计独立性 我们的大多数受访者承认，审计署的一些人或组织从外面直接或间接干预。在审计发现的问题时，与审计结果公开，这些审计规划，培训和审计人员的任命，对审计任务的决心具有强大消极影响。因此，审计署也很难执行任何独立审计。一个审计局局长说道：在审计中发现问题应依法处理，但如果问题涉及到政府，审计机关将将会干扰负责的政府官员或其他机关。 一些受访者承认政府审计缺乏独立性，但同时他们也不想夸大这个问题。由政府指导的一个部门，审计机关如何能从政府或行政政府官员的干预中独立工作？这是不可避免的结果。受访者觉得难以回答这些问题。此外，审计署和政府是在不同的行政级别，对审计可能并不总有一致的看法。在这种情况下，如在访谈中透露，审计署处在较低水平者，通常