微观经济学行为制度和演化ppt课件

1、Lectures at Fudan University on The Economics of Behavior, Institutions, and EvolutionSamuel Bowles, /bowlesUniversity of Siena/ Santa Fe InstituteLorenzetti, Aspects of Good Government, 14 th century SienaLectures at Fudan University on The Economics of Behavior, Institutions, and Evolut

2、ion The dynamics of capitalism and the emergence of a post Walrasian paradigm in economics (Prologue, 1) Economic man and social preferences: experiments, new preference functions, and mechanism design (3, JPubE) nstitutional dynamics: the emergence of private propety (within- and between-group sele

3、ction dynamics) (2,11) Institutional persistence and innovation: stochastic evolutionary game theory (application of Young) (12) The co-evolution of preferences and institutions: agent-based modeling of group selection (13) Parochial altruism and war (and summing up) (Science 07) I would be happy to

4、 amend this programmeRelated papers at: /bowles Walrasian Economics in Retrospect. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:4, 2000 with H.Gintis “In Search of Homo economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Simple Societies American Economic Review. 91,2(2001 )(with R. Boyd, C. Camerer, E. Fehr

5、, H. Gintis, et al.). “Persistent Parochialism: the Dynamics of Trust and Exclusion in Networks, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 55, 2004, with Gintis “Social preferences and public economics: mechanism design when preferneces depend on incentives, Journal of Public Economics, 2021, fo

6、rthcoming (with S-H Hwang) “Policies designed for self interested citizens may undermine the moral sentiments Science, 2021 forthcoming. Group competition, reproductive leveling and the evolution of human altruism. Science, 314, 2006. “The co-evolution of parochial altruism and war, Science, 319 (20

7、07) with Jung-Kyoo Choi. My : samuel.bowlesgmailCapitalism and economic theory What should microeconomic theory be a theory of ? Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor we would know much of the economics that really matters. Schultz, T.W. (1980), “Nobel L

8、ecture: The Economics of Being Poor, Journal of Political Economy 88,4:639-651. The primary task to economic theory (in my view) is to understand (really existing) capitalism and its evolution (not economic systems generically, not abstract principles of optimal use of resources) Is the Walrasian (n

9、eoclassical) paradigm adequate to this task?Walrasian (neoclassical) economics A paradigm (school) is characterized by what it teaches its students and th assumptions that are necessary and sufficient for its main results. The Walrasian paradigm is characterized by Complete contracts: enforceable at

10、 low cost by third parties Absence (or nearly so) of economies of scale Economic man: exogenous, self regarding preferences What are the big facts about capitalist dynamics that this theory should explain?Leon WalrasFrom Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command,

11、and Change, Oxford U Press, 200401002003004005006007008001264 1299 1334 1369 1404 1439 1474 1509 1544 1579 1614 1649 1684 1719 1754 1789 1824 1859 1894 1929 1964 1999Real Wage Index Capitalism and Wages 1264-1999From Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and

12、Change, Oxford U Press, 2004Two Millennia of World GDP Per Capita$5,709$444$435$565$667$0$1,000$2,000$3,000$4,000$5,000$6,00011533064576107639131066121713701522167518281979Year A.D.1990 international dollars0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%1000106111221181124213031365142614871547160816691731179218531912197

13、3Share of World GDPThe WestAsiaLatin America, Africa and Eastern Europe1998 Value:From Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004 Capitalism and the Population Explosion010002000300040005000600070008000900010000BC-10000BC-9500BC-90

14、00BC-8500BC-8000BC-7500BC-7000BC-6500BC-4550BC-4050BC-3550BC-3050BC-2550BC-2050BC-1550BC-1050BC-550BC-5045095014501950MillionsFirst Development Of AgricultureAdvent of CapitalismThe Demographic Transition0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%3.0%1850187018901910193019501970199020102030Average Annual Growth RateSp

15、read of Modern MedicineIndustrial RevolutionProjected 2050: 9 BillionFrom Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004-0.6-0.4-0.60.81100010501100115012001250130013501400145015001550160016501700175018001850190019502000Devia

16、tion from 1902-1998 MeanAverage Northern Hemisphere Temperature26028030032034036038010061067112911881249131013711432149415541615167617371798186019191980Parts Per MillionCo2 in the air over the last millennium02004006008001000 A Revolution in Global Climate: Fossil Fuels and Global Warming From Bowle

17、s, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004Cities with more than a million people 1850 and presentLondon and ParisBeijingGrowing World Inequality1020304050601820185018701900192919501960197019801992Percent of Worlds Income Income Share of

18、 the Top 10% of the Worlds PopulationIncome Share of The Bottom 60% of the Worldss PopulationFrom Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004GDP per capita from 1820-1992 by region0200040006000800010000120001400016000180002000018201

19、870190019131950197319921990 $Western OffshootsWestern EuropeSouthern EuropeLatin AmericaEastern EuropeAsiaAfricaFrom Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004From Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competitio

20、n, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004$22,636$8,297$3,617$2,248$1,022$24,898$31,872$0$5,000$10,000$15,000$20,000$25,000$30,000$35,000UnitedStatesSwedenJapanMexicoChinaIndiaKenyaIncome per Capita 67.663.863.251.440.873.671.801020304050607080UnitedStatesSwedenJapanMexicoChinaIndiaKenyaLife Expec

21、tancy at Birth in Years945363988122020406080100120140UnitedStatesSwedenJapanMexicoChinaIndiaKenyaMortality Rate of Children Per 1000 live births010203040506070UnitedStatesSwedenJapanMexicoChinaIndiaKenyaPercentage of Population Without SchoolingTotalMalesFemales Living Well, Doing PoorlyFrom Bowles,

22、 Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004$2,388$5,140010002000300040005000600019602001World GNP per capita Getting Richer.675301020304050607019602001World Life Expectancy at Birth in Years Living Longer.7821805010015020025019602001World

23、Under Five Mortality per 1000 Live Births Fewer Infant Deaths.42.737.248.30102030405060Percentage with noschoolingMale Percentagewith no schoolingFemale Percentagewith no schoolingPercentage of World Population With No Schooling19602000More Education.Progress on a Global ScaleFrom Bowles

24、, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004From Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004From Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Comm

25、and, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004Top income shares: UK 1908-1998Top percentile share: France 1900-98Top 0.01% share: India 1922-8Top 0.1% UK, US, France, IndiaFrom Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004From Bowles, Edwards

26、and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004From Bowles, Edwards and Roosevelt, Understanding Capitalism: Competition, Command, and Change, Oxford U Press, 2004 Growth in productivity Growth in wages Uneven development among nations Population growt

27、h and urbanization Within country equalization and dis-equalization Inequality:class, ethnic group, race, sex, urban-rural, Growth of the state The information revolution (other aspects of technical change) Persistence of global poverty Institutional divergence and convergenceDoes the Walrasian para

28、digm provide an explanation of these big facts about Capitalism? Economics is the study of human behavior as a relationship between given ends and scarce means. L. Robbins(1935) :16 An economic transaction is a solved political problem . Economics has gained the title Queen of the Social Sciences by

29、 choosing solved political problems as its domain. Abba Lerner (1972):259 The first stresses exogenous preferences, the second stresses the exogenous enforcement of incomplete contractsFamiliar definitions of (neoclassical) economics Contracts Individuals Exogenous EnforcementEndogenous Enforcement

30、of incomplete contracts Exogenous PreferencesNeoclassical (Walrasian) econStiglitz, Holmstrom, Williamson, Maskin, mechanism designEndogenous PreferencesHayek, Sen, Mill Post-WalrasianAkerlof, North, Young, BinmoreOther taxonomies would be illuminating, for example, concerning the content of prefere

31、nces, e.g. self regarding or other regarding) and the role of positive feedbacks (generalized increasing returns) etc One roadmap of economics: Walrasian and post WalrasianWhat should economic theory be about?Now at last we are setting ourselves seriously to inquire whether it is necessary that ther

32、e should be any so called lower classes at all: that is whether there need be large numbers of people doomed from their birth to hard work in order to provide for others the requisites of a refined and cultured life, while they themselves are prevented by their poverty and toil from having any share

33、 or part in that life. .The answer depends in a great measure upon facts and inferences, which are within the province of economics; and this is it which gives to economic studies their chief and their highest interest.Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 1890Has neoclassical economics provided

34、 an answer to Marshall?Post-Walrasian economics differs from Walrasian (neoclassical) economics in its representation of Social interactions (incomplete contracts) Preferences (endogenous, not entirely self regarding) The importance of increasing returns (positive feedbacks) and more (for a summary,

35、 see figure 14.1)Walrasian and evolutionary economics (Figure 14.1)Precursors of Post-Walrasian economics Not everything in the contract is contractual. Emile Durkheim De la division du travail social. 1902 How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature whi

36、ch interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Adam Smith, The theory of moral sentiments, 1759 Only by misuse could the appropriation of labor by capital be called any kind of exchange at a

37、ll. Karl Marx, The Grundrisse Post-Walrasian economics addresses themes stressed prior to the advent of neoclassical economics using contemporary mathematical tools. The emergence of post Walrasian economics: Hobbes to Hayek, a brief history The classical constitutional conundrum, again Hobbes Mande

38、ville Smith Property and markets as a form of constitution Markets vs planning: the great debate Why markets won and Walrasian economics lost Which of these systems central planning or competition is likely to be more efficient depends on the question under which of them can we expect that fuller us

39、e will be made of the existing knowledge. And this, in turn, depends on whether we are more likely to succeed in putting at the disposal of a single central authority all the knowledge which ought to be used but which is initially dispersed among many different individuals, or in conveying to the in

40、dividuals such additional information as they need in order to enable them to fit their plans in with those of others.F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society 1945The Walrasian detour Virtually all of the main ideas making up the post Walrasian paradigm were developed more than 4 decades ago by

41、highly recognized scholars. Nash, Zeuthen, VN-M (game theory, including evolutionary, bargaining) Simon, Schelling (non market social interactions) Coase (transactions costs, authority in the firm) Alchian, Becker (evoutionary modeling zero intelligence age) Duesenbery, Leibenstein (endogenous prefe

42、rences, state dependent preferences) Myrdal (multiple equilibria) Why did these ideas proliferate in the 1990s and not the 1960s? Time for a break?Lecture 1, part 2Institutions and GamesCourbet, Enterrement a OrnansCoordination failures and the classical constitutional conundrum? The study of instit

43、utions is motivated by the importance of coordination failures as a cause of human suffering Coordination failure: non cooperative interaction leading to a result that is not P-efficient. The conundrum: How can social interactions be structured so that people are free to choose their own actions whi

44、le avoiding outcomes that none would have chosen? Modern fields of econ addressing this question: welfare economics, implementation theory, optimal contract theory Game theory is the fundamental analytical tool for the study of economic institutions.Why do coordination failures occur, generically? T

45、he reason why uncoordinated activities of individuals pursuing their own ends often produce outcomes that all would seek to avoid is that each persons actions affect the well-being of others and these effects are often not included in whatever optimizing process or rule of thumb which results in the

46、 actions taken by the relevant actors. More simply: actors to not take appropriate account of the effects of their actions on others. Incomplete contracts are one of the reasons why this happpens The problem thus concerns both preferences and constraints (e.g. people do not care about others, and th

47、ey are not constrained to act as if they did care)Institutions Institutions: the laws, informal rules, and conventions which give a durable structure to social interactions among the members of a population based on centrally deployed coercion (laws), social sanction (informal rules) and mutual expe

48、ctations (conventions) which make conforming to the institution a best response for virtually all members of the relevant group, given individual beliefs and preferences.Preferences, beliefs and constraints (defined in ch 3) NB institutions are group level phenomena, while preferences and beliefs ar

49、e facts about individuals: Beliefs: an individuals understanding of the relationship between her actions and consequent outcomes. Preferences: an individuals evaluation of the outcomes. Constraints: define the set of feasible actions Institutions constitute part of the constraints (you have to pay f

50、or the goods you acquire) and (as we will see) they also influence the evolution of beliefs and preferences. Tragedy of the Fishers: A Prisoners Dilemma Eye Jay 6 hours 8 hoursFish 6 hours 1,10, 1+Fish 8 hours 1+, 0 u, u Coordination typically involves problems of both allocation and distribution as

51、 in the PD game.What is the allocation problem here? What is the distribution problem? C o op era tiveN on -co o pera tiv eC o m m on Interes t C o nflictW ag e b arg ainin gL an gu age evo lutio nL ab or d iscip lineR u les o f th e ro adProp erty rig h ts (m od ern)C o ntractu al ex chan g eE v ol

52、u tio n o f n o rm sR ep aym en t o f lo an sProp erty rig h ts (p re-state)C ro p sh aresPure conflict and pure common interest games. What are they? P - i n f e r i o r N a s he x i s t sN o P - i n f e r i o r N a s hN o P - o p t i m u m i s N a s hP r i s o n e r s d i l e m m a R o c k , p a p

53、 e r , s c i s s o r sA P - o p ti m u m i s N a s hA s s u r a n c e g a m e I n v i s i b l e h a n dTragedy of the Fishers: A Prisoners Dilemma Eye Jay 6 hours 8 hoursFish 6 hours 1,10, 1+Fish 8 hours 1+, 0 u, u Common and conflicting interestThe degree of common interest: / (1- u)/(1+).or in thi

54、s case the gain from cooperation by contrast to mutual defection relative to the gain from defecting on a cooperator Or more generally, the maximum difference between the payoffs possible when both choose the same action divided by the maximum difference when they choose different actions (SW to NE

55、distance compared to SE to NW difference). C o op era tiveN on -co o pera tiv eC o m m on Interes t C o nflictW ag e b arg ainin gL an gu age evo lutio nL ab or d iscip lineR u les o f th e ro adProp erty rig h ts (m od ern)C o ntractu al ex chan g eE v olu tio n o f n o rm sR ep aym en t o f lo an

56、sProp erty rig h ts (p re-state)C ro p sh aresA taxonomy of coordination failures (considering only pure strategies)The mathematical representation of institutions As exogenously given games (e.g principal agent models of wage setting) As Nash equilibria of games (driving on the right as a mutual be

57、st response) As NE that are accessible and stable (has a large basin of attraction) in a plausible dynamic (crop shares of one half as stochastically stable states) NB the primary tool for the first is classical game theory (institutions by design) while for the second and third one uses evolutionar

58、y game theory (spontaneous order)Game theory and the theory of institutions: advantages and shortcomings Advantages over non-strategic approaches: Explicit representation of information and action sets Subject-subject (strategic) vs Subject object Shortcomings (on which, more later) Limitations of t

59、he Nash equilibrium (evolutionarily irrelevant equilibria) Cognitively implausible refinementsDesiderata for game theory: many important games are Overlapping: one plays in many games simultaneously Recursive: the structure of the game in subsequent periods is an outcome of past play Constitutive: past play of a game influences the preferences and beliefs (and therefore payoffs and equilibrium strategies) in subsequent play Asymmetric: when members of different classes, species, sexes, nations, races, age cohorts, etc interact, strategy sets typically differ (and payoff