国际经济学课件：第22章 发展中国家的债务危机

1、Prepared by Iordanis PetsasTo Accompany , Sixth Editionby Paul R. Krugman and Maurice ObstfeldSlide 22-2Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.IntroductionIncome, Wealth, and Growth in the World EconomyStructural Features of Developing CountriesDeveloping Country Borrowing and DebtLatin America: From

2、 Crisis to Uneven ReformEast Asia: Success and CrisisLessons of Developing Country CrisesReforming the Worlds Financial “Architecture”SummaryChapter OrganizationSlide 22-3Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.IntroductionThe macroeconomic problems of the worlds developing countries affect the stabil

3、ity of the entire international economy.There has been greater economic dependency between developing and industrial countries since WWII.This chapter examines the macroeconomic problems of developing countries and the repercussions of those problems on the developed countries.Example: Causes and ef

4、fects of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997Slide 22-4Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.The Gap Between Rich and PoorThe worlds economies can be divided into four main categories according to their annual per-capita income levels: Low-income economies Lower middle-income economies Upper midd

5、le-income economies High-income economiesIncome, Wealth, and Growth In the World EconomySlide 22-5Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Income, Wealth, and Growth in the World EconomyTable 22-1: Indicators of Economic Welfare in Four Groups of Countries, 1999Slide 22-6Copyright 2003 Pearson Educatio

6、n, Inc.Has the World Income Gap Narrowed Over Time?Industrial countries have shown convergence in their per capita incomes.Developing countries have not shown a uniform tendency of convergence to the income levels of industrial countries. Countries in Africa and Latin America have grown at very low

7、rates. East Asian countries have tended to grow at very high rates.Income, Wealth, and Growth in the World EconomySlide 22-7Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Income, Wealth, and Growth in the World EconomyTable 22-2: Output Per Capita in Selected Countries, 1960-1992 (in 1985 U.S. dollars)Slide

8、22-8Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Structural Features of Developing CountriesMost developing countries have at least some of the following features:History of extensive direct government control of the economyHistory of high inflation reflecting government attempts to extract seigniorage fro

9、m the economyWeak credit institutions and undeveloped capital markets Pegged exchanged rates and exchange or capital controlsHeavy reliance on primary commodity exportsHigh corruption levelsSlide 22-9Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Figure 22-1: Corruption and Per Capita IncomeStructural Featur

10、es of Developing CountriesSlide 22-10Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtThe Economics of Capital Inflows to Developing CountriesMany developing counties have received extensive capital inflows from abroad and now carry substantial debts to foreigners.Developin

11、g country borrowing can lead to gains from trade that make both borrowers and lenders better off.Slide 22-11Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Table 22-3: Current Account Balances of Major Oil Exporters, Other Developing Countries, and Industrial Countries, 1973-2000 (billions of dollars)Developi

12、ng Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-12Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Table 22-3: ContinuedDeveloping Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-13Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.The Problem of DefaultBorrowing by developing countries has sometimes led to default crises. The borrower fails to

13、repay on schedule according to the loan contract, without the agreement to the lender.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-14Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.History of capital flows to developing countries: Early 19th century A number of American states defaulted on European loans the

14、y had taken out to finance the building of canals. Throughout the 19th century Latin American countries ran into repayment problems (e.g., the Baring Crisis). 1917 The new communist government of Russia repudiated the foreign debts incurred by previous rulers. Great Depression (1930s) Nearly every d

15、eveloping country defaulted on its external debts.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-15Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Alternative Forms of Capital InflowFive major channels through which developing countries have financed their external deficits: Bond finance Bank finance Official

16、lending Direct foreign investment Portfolio investment in ownership of firms This channel has been reinforced by many developing countries efforts at privatization.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-16Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Figure 22-2: Privatization in AfricaDeveloping Cou

17、ntry Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-17Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.The five types of finance can be classified into two categories: Debt finance Bond, bank, and official finance Equity finance Direct investment and portfolio purchases of stock sharesDeveloping Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22

18、-18Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Latin America: From Crisis to Uneven ReformInflation and the 1980s Debt Crisis in Latin AmericaIn the 1970s, as the Bretton Woods system collapsed, countries in Latin America entered an era of inferior macroeconomic performance.Slide 22-19Copyright 2003 Pears

19、on Education, Inc.Unsuccessful Assaults on Inflation: The Tablitas of the 1970s 1978 Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay all turned to a new exchange- rate-based strategy in the hope of taming inflation. Tablita It is a preannounced schedule of declining rates of domestic currency depreciation against the

20、 U.S. dollar. It is a type of exchange rate regime known as a crawling peg. It declined the rate of currency depreciation against the dollar by reducing the rate of increase in the prices of internationally tradable goods to force overall inflation down.Latin America: From Crisis to Uneven ReformSli

21、de 22-20Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc. Figure 22-3: Current Account Deficits and Real Currency Appreciation in Four Stabilizing Economies, 1976-1997Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-21Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc. Figure 22-3: ContinuedDeveloping Country Borrowing and De

22、btSlide 22-22Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Developing Country Borrowing and Debt Figure 22-3: ContinuedSlide 22-23Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Developing Country Borrowing and Debt Figure 22-3: ContinuedSlide 22-24Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.The Debt Crisis of the 1980s Th

23、e great recession of the early 1980s sparked a crisis over developing country debt. The shift to contractionary policy by the U.S. led to: The fall in industrial countries aggregate demand An immediate and spectacular rise in the interest burden debtor countries had to pay A sharp appreciation of th

24、e dollar A collapse in the primary commodity prices The crisis began in August 1982 when Mexicos central bank could no longer pay its $80 billion in foreign debt. By the end of 1986 more than 40 countries had encountered several external financial problems.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide

25、22-25Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Reforms, Capital Inflows, and the Return of CrisisArgentina 1970s It tried unsuccessfully to stabilize inflation through a crawling peg. 1980s It implemented successive inflation stabilization plans involving currency reforms, price controls, and other meas

26、ures. 1990s It adopted a currency board (peso-dollar peg). 2001-2002 It defaulted on its debts and abandoned the peso-dollar peg.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-26Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Brazil 1980s It suffered runaway inflation and multiple failed attempts at stabilizat

27、ion accompanied by currency reforms. 1990s It introduced a new currency (the real pegged to the dollar), defended it with high interest rates, and decreased inflation under 10%.Chile 1980s It implemented more reforms and used a crawling peg type of exchange rate regime to bring inflation down gradua

28、lly. 1990-1997 It enjoyed an average growth rate of more than 8% per year and a 20% inflation decrease.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-27Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Mexico 1987 It introduced a broad stabilization and reform program and fixed its pesos exchange rate against th

29、e U.S. dollar. 1989-1991 It moved to a crawling peg and crawling band. 1994 It joined the North American Free Trade Area and achieved 7% inflation.Developing Country Borrowing and DebtSlide 22-28Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.East Asia: Success and CrisisThe East Asian Economic MiracleUntil 1

30、997 the countries of East Asia were having very high growth rates.What are the ingredients for the success of the East Asian Miracle? High saving and investment rates Strong emphasis on education Stable macroeconomic environment Free from high inflation or major economic slumps High share of trade i

31、n GDPSlide 22-29Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.East Asia: Success and Crisis Table 22-4: East Asian CA/GDPSlide 22-30Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Asian WeaknessesThree weaknesses in the Asian economies structures became apparent with the 1997 financial crisis: Productivity Rapid grow

32、th of production inputs but little increase in the output per unit of input Banking regulation Poor state of banking regulation Legal framework Lack of a good legal framework for dealing with companies in troubleEast Asia: Success and CrisisSlide 22-31Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.The Asian

33、Financial CrisisIt stared on July 2, 1997 with the devaluation of the Thai baht.The sharp drop in the Thai currency was followed by speculation against the currencies of: Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea. All of the afflicted countries except Malaysia turned to the IMF for assistance.The downtur

34、n in East Asia was “V-shaped”: after the sharp output contraction in 1998, growth returned in 1999 as depreciated currencies spurred higher exports.East Asia: Success and CrisisSlide 22-32Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.East Asia: Success and Crisis Table 22-5: Growth and the Current Account,

35、Five Asian Crisis CountriesSlide 22-33Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Crises in Other Developing RegionsRussias Crisis 1989 It embarked on transitions from centrally planned economic allocation to the market. These transitions involved: rapid inflation, steep output declines, and unemployment.

36、 1997 It managed to stabilize the ruble and reduce inflation with the help of IMF credits. 2000 It enjoyed a rapid growth rate.East Asia: Success and CrisisSlide 22-34Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.East Asia: Success and Crisis Table 22-6: Real Output Growth and Inflation: Russia and Poland,

37、1991-2000 (percent per year)Slide 22-35Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Brazils 1999 Crisis It had a public debt problem. It devalued the real by 8% in January 1999 and then allowed it to float. The real lost 40% of its value against the dollar. It struggled to prevent the real from going into

38、a free fall and as a result it entered into a recession. The recession was short lived, inflation did not take off, and financial-sector collapse was avoided.East Asia: Success and CrisisSlide 22-36Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Argentinas 2001-2002 crises Its rigid peg of its peso to the dol

39、lar proved painful as the dollar appreciated in the foreign exchange market. 2001 It restricted residents withdrawals from banks in order to stem the run on the peso, and then it stopped payment on its foreign debts. 2002 It established a dual exchange rate system and a single floating-rate system f

40、or the peso.East Asia: Success and CrisisSlide 22-37Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Lessons of Developing Country CrisesThe lessons from developing country crises are summarized as:Choosing the right exchange rate regimeThe central importance of bankingThe proper sequence of reform measuresThe

41、 importance of contagionSlide 22-38Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Reforming the Worlds Financial “Architecture”The Asian crisis convinced nearly everyone of an urgent need for rethinking international monetary relations because of two reasons:The fact that the East Asian countries had few app

42、arent problems before their crisis struckThe apparent strength of contagion through the international capital marketsSlide 22-39Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Capital Mobility and the Trilemma of the Exchange Rate RegimeThe macroeconomic policy trilemma for open economies: Independence in mon

43、etary policy Stability in the exchange rate Free movement of capitalOnly two of the three goals can be reached simultaneously.Exchange rate stability is more important for developing than developed countries.Reforming the Worlds Financial “Architecture”Slide 22-40Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, In

44、c.Reforming the Worlds Financial “Architecture” Figure 22-4: The Policy Trilemma for Open EconomiesCurrency boardCapital controlsFloating exchange rateExchange rate stabilityFreedom ofcapital movementMonetarypolicy autonomySlide 22-41Copyright 2003 Pearson Education, Inc.Proposals to reform the inte

45、rnational architecture can be grouped as preventive measures or as ex-post measures.“Prophylactic” MeasuresAmong preventive measures are: More “transparency” Stronger banking systems Enhanced credit lines Increased equity capital inflows relative to debt inflowsThe effectiveness of these measures is controversial.Reforming the Worlds Financ