法学研究方法 作业

-精选财经经济类资料- 法学研究方法作业 “MsoNormal”The Forgotten Dinner Guest:“MsoNormal”The “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt”“MsoNormal”Standard in a Motion for a Judgment“MsoNormal”of Acquittal in a Federal Bench TrialJared KneiteltAbstract“MsoNormal”In comparison to civil trials, criminal trials are decided on more stringentstandardsofproof However, motionsforjudgmentofacquittal in criminal non-jury trials are currently decided on a mere legal sufficiency standard as opposed to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. This Article examines the lack ofreasoning and uniformity in deciding these motions as well as the potential dangers and injustices posed to a defendant by applying a lower standard. Through an examination of both domestic andforeign law, the author argues for the“MsoNormal”application ofthe “beyond a reasonable doubt “standard when determining motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal non-jury trials.Welcome to the Dinner Party: Introduction“MsoNormal”The standard for judging a civil trial is lower than the standard for“MsoNormal”judging guilt in a criminal trial, and there is no jury in a non-jury trial.“MsoNormal”Somehow-despite these two very obvious conclusions-the nineteenth“MsoNormal”century standard for determining a motion for a directed verdict in a civil“MsoNormal”jury trial is still applied to our modem motion for a judgment of acquittal“MsoNormal”in a criminal non-jury trial.“MsoNormal”In a criminal trial, at the close of the governments case-in-chief, the“MsoNormal”defense may make a motion for a judgment of acquittal on one or more“MsoNormal”offenses charged. If the motion is unsuccessful and the defense calls“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”a case, the defense may make another motion for ajudgment of acquittal“MsoNormal”at the close of its case.This Article concerns only the motion at the end“MsoNormal”of the governments case. At present, the motion will succeed only if the“MsoNormal”government has not presented legally sufficient evidence of all the“MsoNormal”elements of the particular offense or offenses.“MsoNormal”This Article discusses why, in a non-jury trial, the “beyond a reasonable“MsoNormal”doubt” standard should be applied-instead of merely the legal“MsoNormal”sufficiency standard-when the bench considers a motion for ajudgment“MsoNormal”of acquittal. Not knowing whether the government has proven-in the“MsoNormal”judges mind-the defendants guilt before inviting the defendant to call“MsoNormal”a case actually militates against the presumption of innocence, the“MsoNormal”assurance that the government discharges its burden, and the defendants“MsoNormal”right to remain silent.“MsoNormal”This Article shows that the jurisprudence in the United States“MsoNormal”improperly cites, for the standard for determining whether to grant or“MsoNormal”deny a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial, either the“MsoNormal”standard in a jury trial or the standard for appellate review. This Article“MsoNormal”examines the historical development of the motion for a“MsoNormal”judgment of acquittal and the perceived constitutional preclusion against“MsoNormal”the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Namely, the bench-as the“MsoNormal”arbiter of law-cannot usurp a defendants Sixth Amendment protection“MsoNormal”to be tried on the facts by a jury of his peers. Of course, in a non-jury“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”trial, the bench is both the arbiter of law and fact-finder; hence, there“MsoNormal”is no Sixth Amendment preclusion.“MsoNormal”At present, there is no rule in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure“MsoNormal”explicitly governing a motion for ajudgment of acquittal in a bench trial.“MsoNormal”Is it Rule 236 or Rule 29 that governs the motion?“MsoNormal”Although district court judges in almost all of the reported decisions“MsoNormal”assume Rule 29 governs, there are several cases in which district court“MsoNormal”judges have turned to Rule 23 as the governing statute. Further, even“MsoNormal”among the authors of treatises on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,“MsoNormal”there is disagreement as to what Rule governs. Wrights Federal“MsoNormal”Practice and Procedure discusses a motion for a judgment of acquittal“MsoNormal”in a bench trial under Rule 29.o Yet Moores Federal Practice states,“MsoNormal”“Rule 29 has no real application when a case is tried by the court since“MsoNormal”the plea of not guilty asks the court for a judgment of acquittal.”“MsoNormal”This Article concludes by proposing a new Rule 29 to resolve this“MsoNormal”ambiguity and to make clear that the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard“MsoNormal”is the standard that should be employed in determining a motion for“MsoNormal”a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial.“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”I. By Invitation Only: Respondez Sil Vous Plait“MsoNormal”A criminal defendant is not guilty unless proven guilty; the government“MsoNormal”bears the burden of proving the criminal defendant guilty beyond“MsoNormal”a reasonable doubt; “ and the government must“MsoNormal”introduce evidence sufficient to persuade the fact-finder, beyond a“MsoNormal”reasonable doubt, ofthe defendants guilt.14 Thus, ifthe government does“MsoNormal”not introduce evidence to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable“MsoNormal”doubt, then the defendant is not guilty.“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”At the conclusion of the governments case, the governments case“MsoNormal”will presumably-and in almost all circumstances-be at its highest. If“MsoNormal”the government has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt after“MsoNormal”the presentation of its evidence, when will it ever be able to prove its case“MsoNormal”beyond a reasonable doubt? This begs the very simple question: If the“MsoNormal”defendant is not guilty at the conclusion of the governments case-inchief,“MsoNormal”why should the defendant be “invited” to call a defense?“MsoNormal”Although the government may have presented legally sufficient“MsoNormal”evidence of the offenses charged, the judge still may not find at the close“MsoNormal”of the governments case that the government proved its case beyond a“MsoNormal”reasonable doubt. For example, the judge may find the accounts of the“MsoNormal”government witnesses to be unworthy of belief or circumstantial evidence presented to be too circumspect“MsoNormal”to sustain a conviction. As always, the government must prove its case“MsoNormal”beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden is without the assistance of any“MsoNormal”defense evidence .”“MsoNormal”Effectively, “inviting” the defendant to call a defense case-despite“MsoNormal”the uncertainty of whether the government has proved its case beyond“MsoNormal”a reasonable doubt at the close of its case and whether the judge would“MsoNormal”have acquitted the defendant of an offense charged-reduces the govemments“MsoNormal”burden at that stage. This “invitation” to the defendant to call“MsoNormal”defense witnesses or for the defendant to testify on his own behalf“MsoNormal”militates against the governments obligation to prove its case. Such an“MsoNormal”invitation should be correctly considered as not only a reduction of the“MsoNormal”governments burden but“MsoNormal”also a violation of due process.“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”Elevating the governments burden at the motion for a judgment of“MsoNormal”acquittal stage to beyond a reasonable doubt actually strengthens the“MsoNormal”presumption that the defendant is not guilty and properly holds the“MsoNormal”government to its burden. This strengthens the requirement that the“MsoNormal”government prove its case based solely on its own evidence and without“MsoNormal”the assistance of the introduction of a defense case.“MsoNormal”1I. The Forgotten Dinner Guest:“MsoNormal”Historical Development of the“MsoNormal”Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal“MsoNormal”The motion for ajudgment of acquittal in criminal suits evolved from“MsoNormal”its counterpart in civil procedure. Federally, in the late 1700s, civil“MsoNormal”judges could withdraw a civil case from ajury and decide the case; then,“MsoNormal”the common law motion for non-suit came; and finally, in the midnineteenth“MsoNormal”century, the civil motion for a directed verdict emerged. 7“MsoNormal”“The motion for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases came still later“MsoNormal”and was probably influenced by these earlier developments in the civil“MsoNormal”trial.”“ “The early cases directing acquittal did so without citing any“MsoNormal”authority but apparently assumed such power was inherent in thejudges“MsoNormal”role as presiding officer.” 9“MsoNormal”Indeed, Moores Federal Practice states that Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal“MsoNormal”Procedure was modeled on Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil“MsoNormal”Procedure.20 “Thus, a motion for acquittal is equivalent“MsoNormal”to a motion for a directed verdict , or judgment notwithstanding the verdict“MsoNormal” under pre-Rules practice.” 2 1“MsoNormal”However, there still remains no legislation specifically directed“MsoNormal”towards a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a criminal bench trial.“MsoNormal”This is due to legislative oversight based, seemingly, on the mere“MsoNormal”importation of the standards employed in a civil jury trial into a criminal“MsoNormal”non-jury trial without appropriate consideration for the defendants“MsoNormal”exposure to a deprivation of his liberty, his right to remain silent, the“MsoNormal”governments burden ofproving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable“MsoNormal”doubt rather than by a preponderance, and the presumption of the“MsoNormal”defendants innocence.“MsoNormal”III. The Head of the Table:“MsoNormal”The Prevailing Legal Sufficiency Standard“MsoNormal”The standard for judging a motion for a judgment of acquittal-in a“MsoNormal”jury trial at least-is based on Burks v. United States.” “The prevailing“MsoNormal”rule has long been that a district judge is to submit a case to the jury if“MsoNormal”the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorable to the prosecution“MsoNormal”would warrant thejurys finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable“MsoNormal”doubt.”23 “Even the trial court, which has heard the testimony of witnesses“MsoNormal”first hand, is not to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility“MsoNormal”of witnesses when it judges the merits of a motion for acquittal.”24 This“MsoNormal”view is accepted on the Sixth Amendment right that a defendant be tried“MsoNormal”by a jury of his peers. In jury trials, the court cannot substitute its“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”judgment for that of the jury.25 To do so would usurp the power of the“MsoNormal”jury and violate the Sixth Amendment guarantee to be tried by ones“MsoNormal”peers26 as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments due process“MsoNormal”protections.“MsoNormal”To date, however, the Supreme Court has not considered the standard“MsoNormal”on a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a non-jury trial. This might“MsoNormal” “MsoNormal”be because esteemed and erudite practitioners have effectively written“MsoNormal”off considering the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in bench trials“MsoNormal”and, as such, the issue has not reached the Supreme Court. For example,“MsoNormal”Section 467 of Wrights Federal Practice and Procedure states, “A“MsoNormal”motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the prosecutions“MsoNormal”evidence in a case tried to the court is considered by the same standard“MsoNormal”as in ajury case.”29 However, none of the cases Wright relies on for this“MsoNormal”proposition in Section 467 are on point.“MsoNormal”IV. The Unwelcome Guest:“MsoNormal”When Wright Is Wrong“MsoNormal”For support, Wright cites United States v. Salman,o United States v.“MsoNormal”Pierce, 3 United States v. Magallon-Jimenez, 32 United States v. Carter,”“MsoNormal”and UnitedStates v. Stubler34-none ofwhich were decided by the United“MsoNormal”States Supreme Court. Salman involved a pre-trial dismissal of an“MsoNormal”indictment.” Pierce involved the test to be applied in appellate review”“MsoNormal” “MsoNormal”of the sufficiency of evidence after a trial, jury or bench, and quoted“MsoNormal”Jackson v. Virginia for the appellate standard.” Thus, Pierce did not“MsoNormal”concern a determination by the trial court on a motion for acquittal.”“MsoNormal”Both Magallon-Jimenez and Carter held that, in both jury and bench“MsoNormal”trials, “there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the“MsoNormal”evidence in the light most favorable to the , any rational trier“MsoNormal”of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a“MsoNormal”reasonable doubt.”“ As with Pierce, Magallon-Jimenez and Carter“MsoNormal”concerned the appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence and did“MsoNormal”not relate to a determination of a motion for acquittal at trial level.40“MsoNormal”Out of those five cases, Stubler was the only one that happened to be“MsoNormal”a bench trial.4 In Stubler, the defendant moved for a judgment of“MsoNormal”acquittal after he was convicted.42 The district court held that “Rule 29“MsoNormal”of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows for a motion for“MsoNormal”judgment of acquittal he standard the court must apply is“MsoNormal”whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”“ Further,“MsoNormal”the district court held “this standard remains the same a non-jury“MsoNormal”trial.” In a surprise demonstration of a lack of understanding of the“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”standard-Stublerc ited civil case law regarding the Age Discrimination“MsoNormal”in Employment Act to support that holding.4 5“MsoNormal”Wrights Federal Practice and Procedure demonstrates-by its citation“MsoNormal”to these inapposite cases-that it has not appropriately analyzed the“MsoNormal”jurisprudence in making its assertion that the standard in a bench trial is“MsoNormal”the same as in ajury trial. None of these cases concern a trial-level determination“MsoNormal”of a motion for a judgment of acquittal in a bench trial at the“MsoNormal”conclusion of the governments evidence. Thus, Wright has propounded“MsoNormal”a baseless proposition on a mere cursory examination, preventing a“MsoNormal”proper analysis of the standard. A more thorough examination is“MsoNormal”warranted.“MsoNormal”V. A Nostalgic Affair:“MsoNormal”Let Us Go Back to Camp“MsoNormal”In the United States, there are only three cases found to date in which“MsoNormal”the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard was discussed in a bench trial:“MsoNormal”United States v. Camp,46 United States v. Laikin,4 and United States v.“MsoNormal”Cascade Linen Supply Corp. of New Jersey.8“MsoNormal”In Camp, a two-defendant case tried before a district judge, a motion“MsoNormal”for ajudgment of acquittal was made after the close of the governments“MsoNormal”evidence and before either defendant put on a case.49 The court expressly“MsoNormal”considered whether the standard on the motion should be “whether the“MsoNormal”evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction” and held, “logically,”“MsoNormal”that standard meant whether the governments evidence proved the“MsoNormal”defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.o According to the court,“MsoNormal” “MsoNormal”if the government did not prove the defendant guilty and the case were“MsoNormal”to proceed, continuing with the case“MsoNormal”would put upon the defendant the risk that by his own evidence, as by“MsoNormal”testimony produced on cross-examination, he might supply the evidence“MsoNormal”which convinces the trier of fact of his guilt, where absent such evidence“MsoNormal”the trier of fact would not be so convinced. To subject the defendant in a“MsoNormal”criminal case to such a risk would be contrary to the principles by which the“MsoNormal”criminal law has developed in . It would in effect require“MsoNormal”the defendant to assist in providing a vital element of the evidence which“MsoNormal”convicts him.”“MsoNormal”Thus, Camp allowed for a coordinated effort of the presumption of“MsoNormal”innocence, the governments evidentiary burden of proving the“MsoNormal”defendant guilty , and the defendants right to remain silent“MsoNormal”to protect the defendant from conviction.”“MsoNormal”While Camps reasoning appears sensible, some courts have expressly“MsoNormal”rejected the Camp logic. In Laikin, the defendant in a bench trial“MsoNormal”requested the court to consider whether, on his motion for a judgment“MsoNormal”of acquittal, the governments evidence proved him guilty beyond a“MsoNormal”reasonable doubt. The Laikin court, citing the Seventh Circuit case of“MsoNormal”United States v. Feinberg5,4 held that the correct standard is taking the“MsoNormal”governments evidence in the light or aspect most favorable to the“MsoNormal”government.” The Feinberg” court, in making its holding, cited Glasser“MsoNormal”“MsoNormal”v. United States,57 United States v. Velasco,” and United States v.“Ms