【国际清算银行】负担得起的住房负担不起的信贷？制造业住宅的集中化和高成本贷款-2025.4

BISWorkingPapersNo1255

Affordablehousing,unaffordablecredit?Concentrationandhigh-costlendingformanufactured

homes

bySebastianDoerrandAndreasFuster

MonetaryandEconomicDepartment

April2025

JELclassification:G21,G23,L13,R31

Keywords:manufacturedhomes,mortgagemarket,competition,householdfinance,HOEPA

BISWorkingPapersarewrittenbymembersoftheMonetaryandEconomicDepartmentoftheBankforInternationalSettlements,andfromtimetotimebyothereconomists,andarepublishedbytheBank.Thepapersareonsubjectsoftopicalinterestandaretechnicalincharacter.TheviewsexpressedinthemarethoseoftheirauthorsandnotnecessarilytheviewsoftheBIS.

ThispublicationisavailableontheBISwebsite

()

.

©BankforInternationalSettlements2025.Allrightsreserved.Briefexcerptsmaybereproducedortranslatedprovidedthesourceisstated.

ISSN1020-0959(print)

ISSN1682-7678(online)

Affordablehousing,unaffordablecredit?Concentrationandhigh-costlendingfor manufacturedhomes

SebastianDoerrBIS&CEPR

AndreasFusterEPFL,SFI&CEPR

April2025

Abstract

Policymakersplacehighhopesinmanufacturedhomes—thelargestsourceofun-

subsidizedaffordablehousingintheUS—toalleviatehousingsupplyshortages.

Thispapershowsthathighmarketconcentrationinthemulti-billion-dollarman-

ufacturedhomeloanmarketallowslenderstochargesignificantlyhigherinterest

ratesthanforsite-builthomes.Loan-leveldataindicatethatborrowersincoun-

tieswithhigherlenderconcentrationfacesignificantlyhigherrates.Evidencefrom

bunchingattheregulatoryHOEPAratethreshold,aninstrumentalvariableanaly-

sis,andadifference-in-differencesanalysisaroundHOEPA’sintroductionsuggests

acausallink.Wefurthershowthatintegratedlenders,whichplayanoutsized

roleinthemanufacturedhomeloanmarket,chargeparticularlyhighrates,and

weprovideevidencesuggestingthattheselendersexploittheirmarketpowerover

borrowers.

JELCodes:G21,G23,L13,R31.

Keywords:Manufacturedhomes,mortgagemarket,competition,householdfinance,HOEPA.

SebastianDoerr(

sebastian.doerr@

):BankforInternationalSettlementsandCEPR.AndreasFuster(

andreas.fuster@epfl.ch

):EPFL,SwissFinanceInstituteandCEPR.WewouldliketothankHelenBanga,MatteoBenetton,NeilBhutta,BrianMelzer,NicolaPavanini,Jos´e-LuisPeydr´o,ChristopherSalda˜na,seminarparticipantsatUniversityofSt.Gallen,TilburgUniversity,UniversityofWisconsinMadison,ErasmusUniversityRotterdam,IEBusinessSchool,CentralBankofIreland,aswellasattheBoE5thWorkshoponHouseholdFinanceandHousingforcomments,andZhixunChenforexcellentresearchassistance.Theviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheauthorsonly,andnotnecessarilythoseoftheBankforInternationalSettlements.

1

1Introduction

Fordecades,expandinghomeownershiphasbeenaprominentgoalofpublicpolicyintheUSandothercountries.Homeownershipallowsfamiliestobuildwealthandpro-videsfinancialsecurity(

GoodmanandMayer,

2018;

Sodinietal.,

2023

),inparticularfortraditionallydisadvantagedgroups(

Herbertetal.,

2014;

WainerandZabel,

2020

).Home-ownersexhibithighersavingsrates(

Dietal.,

2007;

TurnerandLuea,

2009

)andbenefitfromahigherinternalrateofreturnandthefavorabletaxtreatmentofhousingcomparedtoalternativeinvestments.Moreover,housingwealthcanstimulateentrepreneurshipandinvestmentbyeasingcollateralconstraints(

CorradinandPopov,

2015;

Schmalzetal.,

2017

;

Bahajetal.,

2020

).

Theacutehousingshortageandrapidriseinhouseprices,however,threatentheobjectiveofexpandinghomeownership

.1

Surgingconstructioncosts,amongotherfactors,haveledtoasteadilywideninghousingsupplydeficit.Recentestimatesputitatastaggeringfourmillionunits(

FreddieMac,

2021

).Meanwhile,thecostofatypicalAmericanhomesubstantiallyincreasedinthelastdecades,loweringhousingaffordability.

Oneproposedsolutiontothehousingshortagearemanufacturedhomes.Manufac-turedhomes,alsocalledmobilehomes,areprefabricated,permanentresidencesthatarefactory-builtandtheninstalledonalot.Theirsalespriceisoftentimeslessthanhalfofwhatasimilarlysizedon-sitehomewouldcost,largelyreflectingsubstantiallycheaperconstructioncosts.Policymakershenceplacehighhopesinmanufacturedhomestoeasesupplyconstraintsinthehousingmarket

.2

Manufacturedhomescurrentlyhouseabout17millionAmericans,makingthemthelargestsourceofunsubsidizedaffordablehousing

.3

Themarketformanufacturedhomeloansisalsosizable:between2018and2022,lendersoriginatedalmostonemillionman-ufacturedhomemortgagesforatotalofabout$150billion,predominatelytoborrowerswithlowersocio-economicstatus.Themarketformanufacturedhomeloansisthuscom-parableinsizetootherimportantloanmarkets,suchasthemarketforpaydayloanswithanannualvolumeof$30billion

.4

Andyet,despiteitsimportanceandsize,the

1See

WallStreetJournal:TheNextHousingCrisis:AHistoricShortageofNewHomes;

TheNew

YorkTimes:TheHousingShortageIsn’tJustaCoastalCrisisAnymore

;or

FinancialTimes:Housing

shortagerisksbreakingtheAmericandream.

2See

CouncilofEconomicAdvisers,2021

and

FannieMae’s“DutytoServeUnderservedMarkets

Plan”.

3Numbertakenfrom

Jensen

(2024

),basedonCensusdata.Industrypublicationsestimateanumberofmanufacturedhomeresidentsinexcessof20million(seee.g.,

here

).

4Themarketforpaydayloanshasattractedsignificantattentionintheeconomicsliterature,see

Stegman

(2007

);

Agarwaletal.

(2009

);

Melzer

(2011

);

CarrellandZinman

(2014

);

DiMaggioetal.

(2020

),and

Allcottetal.

(2022

),amongothers.Forestimatesonthesizeofthepaydayloanmarket,see

here

and

here.

2

marketstructureandlendingconditionsformanufacturedhomeloanshavereceivedlit-tleattentionfromacademicresearchers,incontrasttothemortgagemarketforsite-builthomes.

Thispaperprovidesnovelevidencethatthemarketformanufacturedhomeloansischaracterizedbysubstantialmarketconcentrationthatcontributestohighinterestrateswhencomparedtomortgagesonsite-builtproperties.Ourstudyusespublicapplication-leveldataonmanufacturedhomeloanscollectedundertheHomeMortgageDisclosureAct(HMDA).Wefirstprovideaseriesofstylizedfactsonthemanufacturedhomeloanmarket.Wethenshowthatmarketconcentrationisakeydriverofhigherinterestratesonmanufacturedhomeloans.Ourresultsalsohighlighttheroleofintegrated(“captive”)lendersasapotentialdriverofthelinkbetweenmarketconcentrationandinterestrates.

TheHMDAdataprovideawealthofinformationonlenders,applicants,andloanterms.Crucialtoouranalysis,since2018HMDAcontainsnewdatapointsspecifictomanufacturedhousing.First,HMDAprovidesinformationonwhetherthemanufacturedhomeissecuredbythehomeandtheland(amortgage)orthehomeandnottheland(achattelorpersonalpropertyloan).Second,itindicateswhetherthelandonwhichamanufacturedhousingunitislocatedisownedorrented.Thisdistinctionenablesustorestrictoursampletopropertieswheretheborrowerownstheland(two-thirdsofthesampleofmanufacturedhomeloansinHMDA)toensureaclosercomparisontothemarketformortgagesforsite-builthomes.Third,HMDAcontainsdetailedinformationonloaninterestratesandratespreads,whicharedefinedasthedifferencebetweenaloan’sinterestrate(intermsofannualpercentagerate,APR,whichincorporatesupfrontcosts)andtheaverageAPRonsimilar-maturitymortgageloansissuedtoprimeborrowersatthesametime(theAPOR).

Ourdatashowthat,comparedtosite-builtmortgages,manufacturedhomeloanshavesubstantiallyhigherinterestrates(5%vs3.6%)andratespreads(1.9percentagepoints(pp)vs0.5pp).Propertyvaluesandloanamountsarelower,loantermsshorter,andLTVratioshigher.Banks(i.e.,deposit-takinginstitutions)arelessimportantinthemanufacturedhomeloanmarketthaninthesite-builtmarket,andloansaremorelikelytoberetainedbythelenderratherthansoldinthesecondarymarket.Comparedtosite-builtmortgages,borrowersinthemanufacturedhomeloanmarkethavelowerincomesandaremorelikelytobewhite,under35orover62yearsold.

Wealsofindthattheloanmarketformanufacturedhomesischaracterizedbymuchhigherlocalmarketconcentrationthanthemarketforsite-builtmortgages.Intheaveragecounty,theHirschman-HerfindahlIndex(HHI),astandardmeasureofcompetitionusedintheliterature(e.g.,

ScharfsteinandSunderam,

2016;

BuchakandJørring,

2024

),is

3

morethanthreetimeslarger.EverythirdcountyhasanHHIthatexceeds0.25,i.e.,isclassifiedashighlyconcentrated,inthemanufacturedhomeloanmarket.Thiscomparestoonly2%ofhighlyconcentratedcountiesinthemarketforsite-builtloans.

Motivatedbythesefactsweinvestigatewhetherlocalmarketconcentrationisadriverofhigherratespreads.Wefindahighlysignificantpositiverelationshipbetweenlocalmarketconcentrationandratespreads.Inourpreferredspecification,a10bp(0.1)highercounty-levelHHIisassociatedwitha10bphigherratespread.Thisresultstandsinstarkcontrasttoanalysesforthesite-builtmortgagemarket,wherestudiestypicallyfindlittlerelationshipbetweenlocalconcentrationmeasuresandratespreads(

Hurstetal.,

2016;

Ameletal.

,

2018;

Bhuttaetal.,

2024;

BuchakandJørring,

2024;

Fusteretal.,

2024

)

.5

Aconcernwithidentifyingtheeffectsofmarketconcentrationonratespreadsisthathigherspreadscouldreflectdifferencesinborrowercharacteristics.Forexample,riskierborrowerscouldclusterinmoreconcentratedmarkets,leadingtoapositiverelationshipbetweenmarketconcentrationandspreads.Toaccountfordifferencesinborrowerchar-acteristics,ourregressionsincludeabatteryofloan-andborrower-levelcontrols,aswellasvariouscensustractcharacteristics.Furthermore,ourpreferredspecificationincludescountyfixedeffects,meaningthattime-invariantlocalcharacteristicsareabsorbedandtheeffectofinterestisidentifiedbasedonwithin-countychangesinmarketconcentrationovertime.

Tofurtherassessthecausalityofthelinkbetweenconcentrationandratespreads,weuseaBartik-styleinstrumentalvariablestrategy.Wefirstpredictthenumberoforiginationsofeachlenderineachcountyfortheyears2019–2022basedonthelender’sinitialoriginationsin2018inacountyandthenationalgrowthrateinthelender’soriginations.Wethenusethesepredictedoriginationnumberstore-constructtheHHI.Theresultinginstrumentthususesonlyvariationinmarketsharescomingfromlenders’initiallocalfootprintalongsidetheirnationwidegrowthinlateryears.Whileinitialoriginationscouldcorrelatewithunobservedlocalfactors,countyfixedeffectsabsorbthis.Two-stageleastsquares(2SLS)regressionsconfirmourbaselineresult:highermarketconcentrationleadstosignificantlyhigherratespreads.Weperformalargenumberofadditionalteststoensuretherobustnessofthisfinding

.6

5Weverifyforoursampleperiod,2018to2022,thatthereisnopositiverelationshipbetweentheHHIandratespreadsinthesite-builtmortgagemarketonceborrowercharacteristicsarecontrolledfor.Infact,usingthesameregressionspecificationasforthemanufacturedhomeloans,theestimatedrelationshipbetweenlocalmarketconcentrationandratespreadsissometimesnegative,althoughinourinstrumentalvariablespecification,thereisnosignificantrelationship.

6Forinstance,weshowthatourresultsarerobusttousingalternativemeasuresofmarketconcentra-tion;restrictingthesampletopurchaseloansonly;removingchattelloansfromthesample;restrictingthesampleperiodtopre-COVIDyears;andtoaddinglender×yearfixedeffectsorloanamount×propertyvaluefixedeffectstotheregression.

4

Toprovideadditionalevidenceonthenexusbetweenmarketconcentrationandratespreads,weexploittheHomeOwnershipandEquityProtectionAct(HOEPA)thresholdforratespreads.HOEPAseekstoensurethatborrowerswhotakeouthigh-costloans,definedashavingaratespreadexceeding6.5pp,haveaclearunderstandingoftheterms.High-costmortgagesarethereforesubjecttoadditionalconsumerprotections,suchasspecialdisclosuresandrestrictionsonloanfeatures.Moreover,theycomewithvariousrestrictionsandrequirethelendertoprovidetransparencytotheborroweraboutallcostsentailed.Theserequirementsimplysignificantlyhigheradministrativeandcompliancecostsforthelender,andmakelendersreluctanttooriginateloanswithspreadsabovethethreshold(

Benzarti,

2024

).

First,wefindapositiveandhighlysignificanteffectoftheHHIontheprobabilityofaloanhavingaratespreadinthebunchingregion([6,6.5pp]).A10bpincreaseintheHHIwithincountyincreasestheprobabilityofaloanhavingaratespreadinthebunchingregionby0.15pp,relativetoanunconditionalmeanof4%.Thisbunchingsuggestsmarketpower.Inaperfectlycompetitivemarket,athresholdabovewhichoriginationcostsdiscontinuouslyincreasewouldleadtoa“missingmass”ofobservationsrightabovethethreshold,butnobunching.Inthepresenceofmarketpower,however,lenderscanchargeamarkupsothattheratespreadexceedstheloancost.LenderscanthusdecidetogiveupsomeoftheirrentstoavoidpayingthehighercostsassociatedwithHOEPA.Theresultingbunchingbelowthethresholdisthenindicativeofmarketpower(

Bachas

etal.

,

2021

;

Coxetal.,

2023

).

Second,wefocusontheintroductionofHOEPAinJanuary2014andestimatedifference-in-differences(DiD)regressions.WefindthattheintroductionofHOEPAsignificantlyreducedratespreadsinmoreconcentratedmarkets.Moreover,thepositiveeffectofmarketconcentrationonbunchingbelowthethresholdonlyemergedaftertheintroductionofHOEPA,whiletherewasnobunchingandnocorrelationbetweenmarketconcentrationandbunchingpriorto2014.Consistentwithour2SLSregressions,theseresultssuggestthattherelationshipbetweenratespreadsandmarketconcentrationisnotdrivenbyborrowers’unobservablecreditrisk.

Wetheninvestigateanimportantcontributortoconcentrationinthemanufacturedhomeloanmarket,namelythepresenceofintegratedlenders,whoaccountforover20%ofloansinoursample.Weshowthattheratespreadstheychargeareabout1.8pphigherthanthoseofnonintegratedlenders,controllingforalltheborrowerobservablesaswellascountyandyearfixedeffects.Thesehigherratesaretheoppositeofwhatonemightexpectifintegratedlendershaveinformationaladvantages(e.g.,becausetheyknowthequalityofcollateralbetterthanotherlenders);instead,theysuggestthatintegratedlendersmaybeexploitingtheirmarketpoweroverborrowersatthepoint-of-saleofthe

5

home

.7

Analternativeexplanationforthehigherratespreadsofintegratedlendersisthattheyarepartofabundlingstrategy:cash-constrainedbuyersmaybewillingtopayahigherinterestrateinreturnforalowerpriceontheirmanufacturedhome.Wetestthisintwoways,butdonotfindsupportforthepredictionsfrombundling.First,ratespreadsatintegratedlendersarenotdifferentiallyhigherforborrowerswithlowincome(relativetothetypicalpurchasepriceforamanufacturedhomeintheirarea),whoshouldbenefitmostfromsuchbundling.Second,weexplainthatbundlingwouldpredictthatafterHOEPAwasintroduced,loanamountsandapplicationdenialratesatintegratedlendersshouldincrease,butwedonotfindevidenceforthesepredictionsinthedata.Wealsostudydifferencesinlenders’financingcostsasanalternativeexplanationforthehigherrateschargedbyintegratedlenders(whoretainalmostalltheirloansonbalancesheet),butfindlittlesupportingevidence.Finally,wedemonstratethatintegratedlendersaremorelikelytooriginateloansasexpensivechattelloans(ratherthanmortgagescollateralizedbytheland)inmoreconcentratedmarkets,suggestiveofsteering.

Despitetheimportanceofthemarketformanufacturedhomeloansforlower-incomehouseholds,therehasbeenessentiallynoacademicresearchonit

.8

Wesystematicallyinvestigatetheeffectsanddriversoflenderconcentrationinthemarketformanufacturedhomeloans,andtherebymakethreemaincontributionstotheliteratureandpolicydebate.

First,ourfindingscastdoubtonmanufacturedhomesasastraightforwardsolutiontoAmerica’shousingcrisis.AnaivelookattheUShousingmarketmightsuggestthatwhilehousepricesarehigh,themortgagemarketishighlycompetitiveandquiteeffi-cient.Cheaperhousingoptionsshouldthusalleviatesupplyconstraintsandprovideanaffordablealternativetotheownershipofsite-builthomes.However,ourresultssuggestthatthecheaperpriceofmanufacturedhomesmaybepartlyoutweighedbyhigherfi-nancingcoststhatreflectfrictionsintheloanmarketforthesehomes.Policyinitiativesthatpromotemanufacturedhousingshouldthusalsoconsiderthelackofcompetition,

7Ontheotherhand,wedofindthatnonintegratedlenderschargehigherspreadsontheirloanswhenthelocalmarketshareofintegratedlendersishigher,consistentwithconcernsaboutadverseselection

(Stroebel,

2016

).

8Atleastsincetheyear2000,wecouldnotfindanyarticlesonmanufacturedhousinginthetop-3financeandtop-5economicsjournals.Themainexistingstudiesofthemanufacturedhomeloanmarketareprovidedbythe

CFPB

(2014,

2021

),focusingondescriptivestatistics.

JohnsonandTodd

(2017)

focusspecificallyonconcentrationinmanufacturedhomeloanstoAmericanIndianandAlaskaNativeborrowers.Afterpublishingourinitialdraft,webecameawareofadissertationchapter(notavailableonline)by

Banga

(2022

)thatdocumentssomeofthesamefactsaswedoandalsostudiestheHOEPAintroductionin2014.Herpaperdoesnotstudydifferentpotentialdriversofthepricepremiumchargedbyintegratedlenders(includingbundlingandsteering),anddoesnotcomparetheloanmarketformanufacturedhomestothatforsite-builthomes.

6

andinparticulartheroleofintegratedlenders,inthemortgagemarketformanufacturedhomes

.9

Second,ourresultssuggestthatconsumerprotectionregulationintheformofHOEPAcanbenefitmanymanufacturedhomebuyers.Duetohighmarketconcentrationandlenders’marketpower,withoutHOEPAmanufacturedhomeloanswouldhaveevenhigherratesonaverage.SincewefindlittletonoeffectoftheintroductionofHOEPAonloanoriginations,ourresultssuggestthatloweringtheHOEPAthresholdfurthercouldreducethecostoffinancingmanufacturedhomeswithoutmateriallyaffectingthesupplyofloans.Thesefindingscontributetotheliteratureinvestigatingtheeffectsofrulesaimedatpreventingpredatorylendingon(mortgage)credit(

Bondetal.,

2009;

Agarwaletal.,

2014

;

DiMaggioandKermani,

2017;

DiMaggioetal.,

2019;

Benzarti,

2024

).

Third,ourevidencefromthemarketformanufacturedhomeloansalsocomplementsexistinginsightsfromothercreditmarkets.Inparticular,ourresultscontributetothelong-standingdebateonmarketpowerandloanpricingintheUSmortgagemarket.Moststudieshavefailedtoestablishareliablelinkbetweenmarketconcentrationandloanratesformortgages(

Hurstetal.,

2016;

Bhuttaetal.,

2024;

BuchakandJørring,

2024;

Fusteretal.

,

2024

)

.10

Rather,theUSmortgagemarketisgenerallyconsideredashighlycompetitive(

Ameletal.,

2018

)and“nationalinscope”(

FederalReserveSystem,

2008

).Oursettinghelpsinidentifyingtheeffectofconcentrationonratespreads.Anditshowsthatasegmentofthemortgagemarketthatisparticularlyimportantforlow-incomeborrowersischaracterizedbylowcompetitionandhighspreads,evenifthemortgagemarketasawholeisdeemedcompetitive.Inaddition,wecomplementstudiesthathaveconsideredtheroleofintegrated(orcaptive)lendersforcreditsupplyandotheroutcomes(e.g.,

Benmelechetal.,

2016;

Stroebel,

2016;

MurfinandPratt,

2019;

Benetton

etal.

,

2023

;

Hankinsetal.,

2023

).

Therestofthepaperproceedsasfollows.Section

2

providesbackgroundonmanu-facturedhousingandHOEPA.Italsoexplainsourdataandmainvariables.Section

3

reportstheresultsforconcentration,ratespreadsandbunching,aswellasresultsfrominstrumentalvariableanddifference-in-differencesanalyses.Section

4

examinestheroleofintegratedlenders.Section

5

concludes.

9Recentworkby

Jensen

(2024

)exploresanotherdimensionofmarketpower,specificallyintheprovisionofinventoryfinancingfrommanufacturerstoretailers.Shearguesthathighpriceschargedforthisfinancinglowerthequantityofhomesshipped,exemplifyingacaseof“verticalforeclosure.”

10Although

BuchakandJørring

(2024

)findnorelationshipbetweeninterestratesandmarketcon-centration,theydocumentapositiverelationshipbetweennon-interestfeesandconcentration.

Bhutta

etal.

(2024

)findthatthedispersionofratesishigherinlocationswithlowerconcentration,consistentwithstrongercompetitionbenefittingprimarilysophisticatedborrowers.

7

2Institutionalbackgroundanddata

Thefirstpartofthissectionprovidesinstitutionalbackgroundonmanufacturedhousing.ThesecondpartdiscussestheHomeOwnershipandEquityProtectionAct,whichseekstoensurethatborrowerswhotakeouthigh-costloanshaveaclearunderstandingoftheterms.Thefinalpartintroducesthedatathatunderlieouranalysis,explainstheconstructionofourmainvariables,andprovidessummarystatistics.

2.1Manufacturedhousing

Manufacturedhomesareprefabricated,permanentresidencesthatarefactory-builtandtheninstalledonalot

.11

Onceplaced,manufacturedhomesaretypicallynotmovedfromtheiroriginalsite(

CFPB,

2021

).Unlikeforsite-builthomes,thehomebuyerdoesnotnecessarilyownthelandonwhichthehomeislocated.Ifthehomebuyerdoesnotowntheland,financingisusuallydonethroughso-calledchattelloans,whichmakeuparound40%ofthemanufacturedhomeloanmarket.Amonghomebuyersthatdonotowntheland,afurtherdistinctionismadebetweenthosethatpayrentforthelandhostingthehome(around50%ofallchattelloans)andthosethatdonot

.12

Accordingtothe2019AmericanCommunitySurvey,therewere6.8millionmanu-facturedhomesintheUS,housingover17millionAmericans.Almost6%ofallowner-occupiedhousingunitsaremanufacturedhomes.Thesamedatarevealsignificantvari-ationintheshareofmanufacturedhomesoutofallhousingunitsacrossregions.Intheaveragecounty(censustract)11.9%(5.7%)ofallhousingunitsaremanufacturedhomes,withastandarddeviationof9.5%(10.4%)

.13

ManufacturedhomesareanimportantsourceofaffordablehousingintheUSandmorecommoninlower-incomeareas(

KaulandPang,

2022a,

b

).Forexample,amongcountiesinthebottomquartileofthemedianhouseholdincomedistribution,theshareofmanufacturedhomesaverages19.9%,whileforthoseinthetopquartiletheshareaverages6.6%.Consistentwiththesepatterns,

Figure1

,panel(a)showsthattheshareofmanufacturedhomesishigherinruralareasaswellasintheSouthandSouthwest.

11Tobeprecise,manufacturedhomesarefactory-builthousingconstructedafterJune1976inaccor-dancewiththeUSDepartmentofHousingandUrbanDevelopment’sManufacturedHomeConstructionandSafetyStandardscode.

12See

here

forasummaryonhowmanufacturedhomeloansdifferfromsite-builtmortgageloansandwhatrightstenants/ownershave.Animportantdifferencebetweenchattelloansandtraditionalmortgageloansisthatinthecaseofchattellending,thepropertyremainsintheownershipofthelenderuntilfullypaidoff.

13Countiesaremoreunequallysizedthancensustracts,andthemanufacturedhomesharetendstobehigherinrural,lesspopulatedcounties.

8

Theirprevalenceamonglower-incomehouseholdspartlyreflectscheaperconstructioncosts,whichleadstoasubstantiallylowersalesprice.Datafromthe2019ManufacturedHousingSurveyshowsthatmanufacturedhomeshaveanaveragesalespriceof$81,900,foranaverageof1,448squarefeet.Incontrast,forsite-builthomestheaveragesalespriceis$383,900,withanaverageof2,518squarefeet.Inamoresystematicanalysis,

Herbert

etal.

(2023

)showthatthecostofamanufacturedhomerangesfrom35%to75%tothatofacomparablesite-builthome,evenwhenincludingfinishedlotcosts.Moreover,pricesformanufacturedhomesmoveintandemwithoverallhouseprices;andappreciationratesofmanufacturedhomesonownedlandaresimilartothoseforsite-builthomes(

Goodman

andPang

,

2024

).

Themarketformanufacturedhomeloansislarge.AccordingtoHMDAdata,whichwediscussinmoredetailbelow,lendersoriginatedalmost1,000,000suchloansforatotalamountofabout$150billionbetween2018and2022.Forcomparison,thepaydayloanmarket—whichhasgarneredconsiderableattentioninacademicresearch—seesannualoriginationsofroughly$30billion,asnotedearlier.

Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatobtainingaffordablefinancingformanufacturedhomesischallenging(

KaulandPang,

2022b

).Thiscouldresultfromthewaymanu-facturedhomesaresoldand