2024 年非洲经济发展报告（英）-180正式版

UNITEDNATIONSCONFERENCEONTRADEANDDEVELOPMENT2024EconomicdevelopmentinAfricareportUnlockingAfrica'stradepotentialBoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksGeneva,2025©2025,UnitedNationsAllrightsreservedworldwideRequeststoreproduceexcerptsortophotocopyshouldbeaddressedtotheCopyrightClearanceCenteratcopyright.com.Allotherqueriesonrightsandlicences,includingsubsidiaryrights,shouldbeaddressedto:UnitedNationsPublications405East42ndStreetNewYork,NewYork10017UnitedStatesofAmericaEmail:publications@Website:ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofmaterialonanymapinthisworkdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheUnitedNationsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.Thispublicationhasbeeneditedexternally.UnitedNationspublicationissuedbytheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopmentUNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2024UNCTAD/ALDC/AFRICA/2024ISBN:978-92-1-003413-5eISBN:978-92-1-107032-3ISSN:1990-5114eISSN:1990-5122SalesNo.E.25.II.D.5EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksAcknowledgementsEconomicDevelopmentinAfrica2024:UnlockingAfrica’sTradePotential–BoostingRegionalMarketsandReducingRisksoftheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)waspreparedbyHabibaBenBarka(teamleader),ChristineAwiti,GraceGondweandAnjaSlany,undertheoverallsupervisionofPaulAkiwumi,DirectoroftheDivisionforAfrica,LeastDevelopedCountriesandSpecialProgrammes,andJuniorDavis,HeadofthePolicyAnalysisandResearchBranch.ResearchsupportwasprovidedbySvenJaggiandLinShi.AdministrativesupportwasprovidedbyEvelynBenítezandElenaStroganova.UNCTADgratefullyacknowledgesthesubstantivecontributionsofAbbiM.Kedir,UniversityofSheffield,UnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIreland,andWimNaudé,Rheinisch-WestfälischeTechnischeHochschule,AachenUniversity,Germany.Ahybridmeetingwasheldon11June2024toconductapeerreviewofthereport.Itbroughttogetherspecialistsinthefieldsoftradeandinvestments,politicaleconomy,regionalintegration,enterprisedevelopment,financialmarketsandriskmanagement.Thefollowingexpertstookpartinthemeeting:Jean-PaulAdam,OfficeoftheSpecialAdviseronAfricatotheSecretary-GeneraloftheUnitedNations;MonaFaridBadran,CairoUniversity,Egypt;DanielCash,UnitedNationsUniversityCentreforPolicyResearch;KarimElAynaoui,HinhDinh,KarimElAynaoui,SaloiElYamani,FatimaEzzahraMengoubandIsabelleTsakok,PolicyCentrefortheNewSouth,Morocco;NaseemJaved,ExpothonWorldwide;SergiiMeleshchuk,InternationalMonetaryFund;JeremiahNyambinya,EuropeanUniversityInstitute,Italy;NkechiS.Owoo,UniversityofGhana,Ghana;SanjayPatnaik,BrookingsInstitution,UnitedStatesofAmerica;VincentRouget,ControlRisks;MustaphaSadniJallab,WorldTradeOrganization;SampawendeJulesA.Tapsoba,AfricanExport–ImportBank;FionaTregenna,UniversityofJohannesburg,SouthAfrica;andKomiTsowou,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme.ThefollowingUNCTADcolleaguesprovidedhelpfulinputsandcommentsduringvariousreviewprocesses:LisaBorgatti,TheresaCarpenter,MussieDelelegn,HamedElKady,ElizabethGachuiri,KeithLockwood,LudovicaPoponcini,MesutSaygili,StefanieWestandAnidaYupari.ThereportwaseditedbyLucyDeleze.CoverdesignanddesktoppublishingwereundertakenbytheUNCTADCommunicationandExternalRelationsSection.iiiEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksTableofcontentsAcknowledgementsiiiForewordixAbbreviationsxiNotexiiChapterIThedynamicsofshockexposureandvulnerabilityacrosscountriesinAfrica1Introduction3NavigatingthroughuncertaintiesandriskperceptionsinAfrica4ExposuretoshocksinAfrica13Vulnerabilitytoshocks24Priorityareasforbuildingbulwarksagainstrisk36Conclusion38ChapterIIMonitoringeconomicvulnerabilitieswhentradingandinvestingacrossAfrica41Introduction43Tradepatternsduringasystem-widecrisis45Macroeconomicdriversofeconomicvulnerability51Economicvulnerabilityintimesofglobalshocks63Conclusion70ChapterIIIMaximizingtraderesilienceandregionalmarketbenefitsinAfrica71Introduction73Regionalvalueaddedtradenetworks:Ameanstoreducepotentialrisksfromglobalshocks74Resilienceinconnectivity:Thepotentialofregionalintegration87Conclusion103ivEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksChapterIVBuildingresilienceinAfricanbusinessesandcross-bordertransactions105Introduction107Firm-relatedrisksandopportunities107Valueandresiliencethroughtheenergy,infrastructureandtradenexus120InsightsfromSouthAfrica:Dynamicsofrisksandcapabilitiesforexportingfirms124Maximizingthebenefitsofcross-bordertransactionsinAfricathroughfinancialhedgingandenterpriseriskmanagement129Conclusion135ChapterVConclusionsandrecommendedpolicyactions137Introduction139Considerationsforpolicyguidance141Enhancingmacroeconomicstabilitytolowereconomicvulnerabilitytoshocks141Optimizingregionalmarketopportunitiestoreducetrade-relatedrisks144Strengtheninginstitutionalandorganizationalsettingstomitigateriskstocross-bordertransactions148References155Databases166vEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksBoxesBoxI.1Methodology11UNCTADsovereigndebtlifecycle:InsightsfromGhana57Exchangerates:ThecaseofSouthAfrica64Ethiopia:Anopportunityincrisis68Valueaddedtradenetworkmeasures78Methodology:Infrastructure–industrialoutput88Opportunitiesinintra-Africaninvestmentandrelatedinstruments114Creatingopportunitiesthroughforeignexchangehedgingpractices119BoxII.1BoxII.2BoxII.3BoxIII.1BoxIII.2BoxIV.1BoxIV.2BoxIV.3Random-effectsprobitestimatesoftheexportstatusoffirmsinSouthAfrica126BoxIV.4BoxIV.5Derivatives131InsightsfromVietNam:Reapingthebenefitsofprivatecapitalflows..133FiguresFigureI.1FigureI.2FigureI.3FigureI.4FigureI.5FigureI.6FigureI.7FigureI.8FigureI.9Theworlduncertaintyindex:Africaandglobalaverages,1990–20245Interconnectingexposureandvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks9Exposuretopoliticalshocks,bycountry15Exposuretoeconomicshocks,bycountry17Exposuretodemographicshocks,bycountry19Exposuretoenergyshocks,bycountry21Exposuretotechnologyshocks,bycountry23Exposuretoclimateshocks,bycountry25Economicvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry28FigureI.10Governancevulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry30FigureI.11Connectivityvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry32FigureI.12Socialvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry34FigureI.13Energyvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry35FigureI.14Climatechangevulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry37FigureII.1HistoricalviewofshockstotheeconomyofAfrica:Averagegrossdomesticproductgrowth44FigureII.2TopAfricanmerchandiseexports,2019–202146FigureII.3LeadingAfricanmerchandiseimports,2019–202148FigureII.4Moreexportproductsassociatedwithdiversification49viEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksFigureII.5Countriesthatconvergedtowardtheworldpattern,Exports:1995–202350FigureII.6DisruptionofinvestmentscausedbyshockstotheeconomyinAfrica:Averagegrossfixedcapitalformationgrowthrate51FigureII.7State-ownedinvestors,byleadingAfricancountries52FigureII.8Weightedaveragegrowthingrossdomesticproduct,bycommodityexportgroup53FigureII.9Averagefiscalbalancedeviations,2010–201955FigureII.10Overviewoffiscalbalancedeviationperformance,bycountry,2010–201956FigureII.11Inflation-moderatedgrowthingrossdomesticproductformineral-,metal-andfuel-dependentexporters61FigureII.12Impactofglobalshocksonpricesandeconomiesofagriculture-dependentexportingcountriesinAfrica,2000–202462FigureII.13Priceeffectsonnon-commodity-dependentexporteconomies63FigureII.14Parallelmovementbetweenfuelpricesandgrowthingrossdomesticproductforfuel-dependentexporters,2000–202466FigureII.15Trade-in-servicesexportersadverselyaffectedduringthepandemic:Average2019–202167FigureII.16Ethiopia:Effectsofweather-relatedshocksonanagriculturalcommodityexporter69FigureIII.1Principalglobalpartnersinthevalueaddedtradenetwork,202276FigureIII.2Intra-Africanvalueaddednetworkmetrics79FigureIII.3Intra-Africanvalueaddedtradenetwork:Manufacturingsector,selectedyears83FigureIII.4CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfricavalueaddedtradenetwork:Manufacturingsector,202286FigureIII.5TheevolutionofconnectivityinAfrica,2005–202287FigureIII.6Transportandinformationandcommunicationstechnologyinfrastructurecompositeindices,202292FigureIII.7CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica:Impulseresponsefunction95FigureIII.8Averagenon-tarifftradecostsamongandbetweenregionaltradingblocsinAfrica97FigureIII.9Averagetradefacilitationperformance,2017and202299FigureIII.10Logisticsperformance,bycountry,2012–2022102FigureIV.1Resiliencetoshocksinselectedcountries108FigureIV.2BilateralinvestmenttreatiesandtreatieswithinvestmentprovisionssignedbycountriesinAfrica113FigureIV.3BusinessenvironmentobstaclesfacedbyAfricanfirms,2023117FigureIV.4Accesstoelectricity,bycountry,2022122FigureIV.5MainobstaclesfacedbySouthAfricanfirms,selectedyears125viiEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksTablesTableI.1TableI.2TableI.3TableIII.1Componentsoftheexposuretoshocksframework,13Componentsofthevulnerabilitytoshocksmeasure26Majorareasofvulnerabilitytopolycrisisshocks,bycountry39Outdegreeandindegreecentralitiesinthemanufacturing,serviceandprimarysectors,2012and202280TableV.1Strategicstepsandkeyactionsforinstitutionalizingenterpriserisk-managementpracticesinAfrica153viiiEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksForewordTheworldisinpolycrisis,andAfricaisonthefrontlineofexposure.Thesameglobalshockhasverydifferentimpactsdependingonthelocation.Resilienceisthedifferencebetweentheshockandtheimpact;howtobuildresilienceinAfricaisthefocusofthisreport.Recentcriseshavehitthecontinentdisproportionately.Buildingresiliencewillallowthecontinenttoreapthemanyopportunitiesofferedbyitsfuture.Thoughexposurevariesbycountry,Africaneconomiesarepersistentlyexposedtoarangeofexternalshocksduetocommodity-dependency,highlevelsofdebtandlimitedtechnologicalinfrastructureandconnectivity.AbouthalfofallAfricancountriesreliedonoil,gasormineralsforover60percentoftheirexportearningsin2023.Globaltraderoutedisruptionshaveexposedthemtosignificantlyhighershippingandtradecosts.In2024,Africanshippingrateswere115percentabovepre-COVID-19(coronavirusdisease)pandemiclevelsanddoublethe2023averagecosts.Atthesametime,officialdevelopmentassistancetoAfricadeclinedby4.1percentin2022,whileAfrica’saverageborrowingcostincreasedto11.6percent,8.5percentagepointshigherthantherisk-freerateofthebenchmarkoftheUnitedStates.Thisyear’sEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024:UnlockingAfrica’sTradePotential–BoostingRegionalMarketsandReducingRiskspresentssomeimportanttoolsinthiscontext.ThisincludesacomprehensiveframeworktohelpAfricancountriesanalysethenatureoftheirownexposuretoshocks,withaparticularfocusontradeandinvestment.Wealsoprovideanevidence-basedanalysisthathighlightshowregionaltradecanincreasethecontinent’sresilience.Therearefivetakeawaysfromthisreport.First,theargumentthateconomicdiversificationservesasastrongbufferagainsteconomicshocksremainsrelevant.ThisisparticularlytrueforAfricaneconomiesthatdependonalimitednumberoftradepartners.Africahasfivemaintradingpartnersaccountingforover50percentofallitsimportsandexports.Second,despitesixdecadesofgrowthingrossexports,Africa’sintegrationintohighvalueaddedsegmentsofglobalsupplychainsremainslow.Only16of54Africancountriessourcemorethan0.5percentoftheirintermediateinputsfromwithinthecontinent.BetterinfrastructureandleveragingtheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeAreacanimproveregionalmarketparticipationanddrivepositiveoutcomes.ixEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksThird,improvingtheoperationalenvironmentisvitalforAfricanbusinesses,particularlymicroenterprisesandsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises.Lessthan50percentofthepopulationhasreliableelectricityaccess,whichraisescostsandlimitsvaluechainintegration.Relianceonfossilfuels,over50percentoftheenergysupply,heightensrisksamidglobalenergytransitions.RecentgrowthinrenewableenergyinvestmentinAfrica(estimatedat$15billionin2023)remaindirelylowcomparedtoglobalrenewableenergyinvestment,atabout2.3percentofthetotal.Fourth,polycrisiscreateseconomicuncertaintyanddiscouragestradeandinvestment,thushamperinglong-termdevelopmentprospects.In2023,flowsofforeigndirectinvestmenttoAfricadeclinedby3percent,toatotalstockof$53billion.Deeperregionalintegrationcanhelpreversethetrend.Lastyear,between13and20percentofinternationalprojectsfinancedinAfricawerefundedbyAfricaninvestorsthemselves.Finally,thereportprovidessomekeypolicyrecommendationstoAfricanGovernments.Thisincludesenhancingthelegalandregulatoryenvironment,leveragingrobustriskmanagementtools,regionalcooperationandstrategicinvestmentsininfrastructureandtechnologytoensuresmoothtradeandimprovedconnectivity.IhopethatthiseditionoftheEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReportwillserveasavaluabletoolforpolicymakersandinspireurgentactionintheseurgenttimes.RebecaGrynspanSecretary-GeneralofUNCTADxEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksAbbreviationsCOVID-19

coronavirusdiseaseGDPgrossdomesticproductICTinformationandcommunicationstechnologyOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopmentsmallandmedium-sizedenterpriseOECDSMEUNCTADUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopmentxiEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksNoteDollarsareUnitedStatesdollars.Useofadashbetweenyears(forexample,2000–2005)signifiesthefullperiodinvolved,includingtheinitialandfinalyears.Alllinkswereaccessedon19September2024.xiiEconomicdevelopmentinAfricareport2024ChapterIThedynamicsofshockexposureandvulnerabilityacrosscountriesinAfricaEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksIntroductionTheissueof“globalpolycrisis,”or“thecausalentanglementofcrisesinmultipleglobalsystemsinwaysthatsignificantlydegradehumanity’sprospects”(Lawrenceetal.,2024),hasrecentlyresurfacedandintensifiedtheheateddebateoverthepotentialtoleverageeconomicandtradeopportunitiesfortransformationinAfrica.AccordingtoColumbiaUniversityhistorianAdamTooze,inapolycrisis“theshocksaredisparate,buttheyinteractsothatthewholeisevenmoreoverwhelmingthanthesumoftheparts”(Lähde,2023).Apolycrisisisasituationinwhichmultiplecrises,suchasclimatechange,biodiversityloss,economicinstabilityandsocialinequality,interact,creatingacomplexandoftenunpredictablescenarioofinterrelatedcrises,predicamentsandviciouscycles.Thesecrisesarecriticalinvestmentstowardsustainabledevelopmentamidtighteningcreditconditionsandrisingexternalfinancingcosts(UnitedNations,2023a).Thetighteningofborrowingconditionsandstrainedgovernmentliquidity,coupledwiththecomplexityofinflationarydynamics,includinghikesinenergyandfoodcommoditypricesandassociateddemandandsupply-sidecrises,occuratatimewheneconomiesandregionsarefarmoreinterconnectedandsynchronizedthaneverbefore.Thisbringstheadditionalriskofspilloverortheaccelerationofcrisisevents,especiallyinthecurrentinterlinkedarchitectureofeconomic,financialandsocietalsystemsatthegloballevel,whichcanfacilitateoramplifythephenomenonofstresses(shocksorimpactsofcrisisevents)withsystemsaffectingeachotherorcreatingstressesindifferentsystems.Forinstance,globalenergypriceshocksstressglobaltransportationandfoodsystems,creatinginflationarypressuresandhighinterestrates.Theresultingstressesintherealeconomyandglobalbankingsystemcouldincreasecapitalcosts,impactingproductivityandreturns.WhilepolicymakersandregulatorsattempttocontainorApolycrisisisasituationinwhichmultiplecrises,interact,creatingacomplexandoftenunpredictablescenarioofinterrelatedcrisesinterconnectedsothatthecombinedimpactisgreaterthanthesumoftheirindividualeffects.Further,theconcepthighlightsthesystemicnatureofglobalchallengesandthedifficultyinaddressingtheminisolation.Today’sglobalpolycrisis,whichisgeneratedbyshocksandcrisesoccurringatdifferentlevels(local,national,regionalandinternational)anddisruptsvariousdomainsandsystems(health,financial,economic,politicalandenvironmental),isnotnew.Someofthepastglobalcrisesincludetheoilshocksofthelate1970s,whichcreatedglobalenergyshortagesandcontributedtostagflationinmanyeconomies.Anotherexampleofapastglobalcrisisisthe2008–2009globalfinancialandeconomiccrisis,whichintersectedwithoilsupplyconstraintsandfoodpricevolatilityandfurtherstressedfinancial,production,supplyandoperatingsystems(Lawrenceetal.,2024).reversepressuresfromvolatilityinfoodandenergyprices,lowerwagesandincome,anddecliningsavingsandinvestment,theslowdownofeconomicactivitiesduetothisentanglementofstresseswouldhaveexposedalreadyvulnerablebusinessesandpeople.Thiscancreatesocialtensionsandproducesystemicrisk.Thecentralityoftheinterconnectivityoftoday’sglobalsystemsinfuelling,acceleratingoramplifyingcrisiseventsisalsoevidentthroughthecomplexityofgeopoliticalstressesandtheiraccompanyingdistressandspilloverintoothersystems.ThewarinUkraineshowshowgeopoliticalstressescangeneratestressesindifferentsystems,forexample,globalenergy,foodandfinancesystems.However,thecurrentglobalpolycrisisisunprecedentedinsomeways.Forinstance,thehealth,socialandeconomiceffectsofthecoronavirusdisease(COVID-19)pandemiclingerstillandchallengetheabilityofmanydevelopingcountriestomake3EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksTheUnitedNationsGlobalCrisisResponseGrouponFood,EnergyandFinanceThereportfocusesontheoptimizationofregionalmarketbenefitstostrengthenmarketresiliencetospecificshocksandvulnerabilitiesandexploresthediversetraderisksinAfricastemmingfromahostofeconomic,political,environmental,energy,technologicalandlogisticalchallenges.Thereportunderscorestheimportanceofrobustriskmanagement,regionalcooperationandstrategicinvestmentsininfrastructureandtechnology.Italsohighlightsbestpracticesacrossthecontinent,showinghowcountriesandbusinesseshaveeffectivelyaddressedthesechallengestounlocknewopportunities.Byprovidingadetailedanalysisofthetradeenvironment,potentialrisksandde-riskingstrategies,thisreportaimstoequipstakeholderswiththeinsightsneededforinformeddecision-making.Ultimately,itseekstofostersustainableeconomicgrowthandsharedprosperityinAfricabyleveragingthecontinent’suniquestrengthstomaximizeregionalmarketbenefits.TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea,launchedin2021,marksacrucialsteptowardseconomicintegrationinAfrica.Withitsyouthfulpopulation,abundantresourcesandgrowingpoliticalstability,Africaoffersvasttradeopportunities.However,realizingtheseopportunitiesrequiresnavigatingacomplexlandscapeofrisksandchallenges.reported,duringtheearlymonthsofthewarinUkraine,thedevastatingimpactofconflictonalreadytightglobalfood,energyandfinancialmarkets(UNCTAD,2022a).Whentwocountries,namelytheRussianFederationandUkraine,thatprovideabout30percentoftheworld’swheatandbarley,25percentofitsmaizeandover50percentofitssunfloweroilareinconflict,andoneofthemistheworld’stopnaturalgasexporterandsecond-largestoilexporter,theimpactsonspecificcommoditypricesbecomesignificant,withfoodpricesincreasingbyabout34percent,crudeoilpricessurgingbyabout60percentandgasandfertilizerpricesmorethandoubling(UnitedNations,2022a).Asthesefoodandenergypressuresinteractedwithongoingstressesinglobalsupplychainsandfinancialmarkets,manyeconomieswereaffectedbyinflationarypressures,heightenedmarketvolatilityandtighteningmonetaryconditions.OptimizationofregionalmarketstrengthensmarketresiliencetospecificshocksandvulnerabilitiesThisyear’sEconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport:UnlockingAfrica'sTradePotential:BoostingRegionalMarketsandReducingRisksexaminesoptimalstrategiesforcountriesinAfricaandtheprivatesectortomitigatetraderisksassociatedwiththeuncertaintiescreatedbythisglobalpolycrisis.NavigatingthroughuncertaintiesandriskperceptionsinAfricaWhennavigatingtheseglobalcrisesanduncertainties,Governments,companiesandindividualsarerequiredtointernalizethembydeployingtoolstotrackandassesstheirpotentialimpact,adjusttothenewwaysinwhichtheydisruptsystems,adoptmoreflexibilityandmitigatetheiradverseeffectsbyhavingcontingencyplansinplaceandbeingabletoactfasterandreducetheriskofmistakes(Bloometal.,2022).Bloom(2023)maintainsthatuncertaintiesaffectdecision-makingandtransactions,forexamplepeople’sdecisionstopurchaserealestate;companies’strategicchoicesaboutbuildingnewfactories,investingincapitalequipmentandhiringworkers;orGovernments’policychoicesconcerningpublicexpenditureandrevenues(forinstance,taxpolicies).Theseuncertaintiesareperceivedtobehigherinfrequencyandintensityinemergingmarketsandlow-incomecountriesthaninadvancedcountries(Ahiretal.,2022).4EconomicDevelopmentinAfricaReport2024UnlockingAfrica'stradepotential:BoostingregionalmarketsandreducingrisksUsingtheworlduncertaintyindex1asshocks(Ahiretal.,2022).FigureꢀI.1showstheworlduncertaintyindexfrom1990to2023.Duringrecentepisodesofglobalcrises,suchasthe2014–2016oilpriceshockandthe2019–2020COVID-19pandemic,Africawassubjecttohigherlevelsofuncertaineconomicandpoliticalsituations,althoughthetrendfollowedtheglobalaverageintermsofspikeanddip.ThesynchronizationoftheindicesforAfricaandtheworldaverageduringthoseperiodscanbepartlyexplainedbythefactthatcountriesinAfricaweremoreconnectedtotherestoftheworld.DuringrecentepisodesofglobalcrisesAfricawasaproxytocapturethelevelsofglobaluncertaintyrelatedtoeconomicandpoliticaleventsindicatesthatthelevelsofuncertaintyhaveincreasedsignificantlysince2012andspikedsharplyasaresponsetoorduringglobalepisodesofshocksorcrises(figureꢀI.1).ThehigherlevelsofuncertaintyfortheaverageofcountriesinAfrica,comparedtotheglobalaverage,canbeexplainedbythecompoundedeffectsofdomesticpoliticalshockssuchascoupsd’étatandconflicts,oraggravatedbytheirvulnerabilitytonaturaldisastersandtheirlowcapacitytomanageexternalsubjecttohigherlevelsofuncertaineconomicandpoliticalsituationsFigureI.1Theworlduncertaintyindex:Africaandglobalaverages,1990–2024(Index)Tradetensions,UnitedStatesofAmericarecessionandattacksintheUnitedStateson11September2001includingChinaandtheUnitedStates,and“Brexit”FinancialcreditcrunchGulfWarGeopoliticaltensionsandcollapseofSiliconValleyBank,SignatureBankandCreditSuisseUnitedStates80ꢀ00070ꢀ00060ꢀ00050ꢀ00040ꢀ00030ꢀ00020ꢀ00010ꢀ0000SovereigndebtcrisisinEuropepresidentialelectionsIraqwarandCOVID-19pandemicoutbreakofsevereacuterespiratorysyndromeUnitedStatesꢁscalcliffandsovereigndebtcrisisinEuropeFederalReserveSystemtighteningandpoliticalriskinGreeceandUkraineWarinUkraine“Brexit”AfricaWorld199019921994199619982000200220042006200820102012201420162018202020222024Source:UNCTAD,basedondatafromtheworlduncertaintyindex,2024.Note:TimeseriesofworlduncertaintyindexaveragesforAfricaandtherestoftheworldfromthefirstquarterof1990tothefirstquarterof2024.Actualdatafromthefirstquarterof1990tothefirstquarterof2024,comparingtheaverageindexvalueforAfricawiththeglobalaverage.1TheworlduncertaintyindexwaslaunchedbytheInternationalMonetaryFundin2020tomeasureandcomparequarterlythelevelofuncertaintyacros