2024年世贸组织电子商务协议中的国家安全问题报告 The national security question at the heart of the WTO e-commerce deal

hinrichfoundationNOVEMBER2024

advancingsustainableglobaltrade

Thenationalsecurityquestion

attheheartoftheWTOe-commercedeal

BYKEITHM.ROCKWELL

SENIORRESEARCHFELLOW,HINRICHFOUNDATION

2

Contents

INTRODUCTION

3

PUTTINGTHE‘T’BACKINTHEWTO

4

AHISTORYOFDEADLOCKS

7

THE“MOSTFAVOUREDNATION”BROUGHTINTOQUESTION

8

HOWTOSECUREE-COMMERCERULES?

10

GOINGTHEIROWNWAY

13

THEUSNATIONALSECURITYCONUNDRUM

14

E-COMMERCEANDNATIONALSECURITY

16

WHEREDOWEGOFROMHERE?

18

RESEARCHERBIO:KEITHM.ROCKWELL

20

ENDNOTES

21

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3

Introduction

Article34,almostthelastofthe

agreement’s38clauses,isveiled

innear-impenetrablelegaleseasa

provisionfor“Non-applicationofthisAgreementbetweenParticularParties.”

Anunusualclauseappearsneartheendofthe25textforadraftWorldTradeOrganizationagreementonelectroniccommerce.

Article34,almostthelastoftheagreement’s38clauses,isveiledinnear-impenetrablelegaleseasaprovisionfor“Non-applicationofthisAgreementbetweenParticularParties.”

ItisinfactattheveryheartofthedealandmayholdthekeytomakingtheWTOamoreeffectiveorganization.

TheclauseaskshardquestionsabouthowandwhytheWTO,whichwassetuptosalvethepainfullessonsleftbytheSecondWorldWar,hasfounditincreasinglydifficulttoreachagreementasitgrowseverlarger.

Article34proposesremovingsomeoftheshacklesthathaveboundnegotiatorsandimpededeffortstomodernizetheWTOandmakeitmorerelevant.

Article34oftheWTO’sdraftagreementone-commerceholdsthekeytomakingtheorganizationmoreeffective.ItaskshardquestionsabouthowandwhytheWTOhasstruggledsomightilyfordecades.

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4

Puttingthe‘T’backintheWTO

ThestateofplayattheWTOis

changing.Onebigchangeisthat

memberswithambitionstomodernizeandreformtheorganizationaredoingsoinplurilateralfashion.

AlmostfromtheinceptionoftheWTO,e-commercehasbeenontheorganization’sagenda.It’salonghistoryandithasnotbeenpretty.

Formorethan25years,theorganization’smembershavebeenunabletoagree

evenonbasicdefinitions.Effortstocreatee-commerceruleshavesputtered

formanyreasons.Foremostamongthemaretheobstaclesstrewnacrossthe

negotiatingpathbysomeoftheorganization’smostimportantmembersincludingIndia,SouthAfrica,andtheUnitedStates.

Itisnosmallironythatanorganizationsetuptofacilitateglobalcommerce

hasbeenunabletoagreeformorethanaquarter-centuryonrulesforthemost

modernandessentialformoftrade.Thefutureoftradeisdigital.Onlinesales

alreadyaccountforaboutaquarterofglobalretail,worthsomeUS$7trillion.Morethanhalfofonlineshopperssaytheyshopinternationallyaswellasdomestically.

ButthestateofplayattheWTOischanging.Onebigchangeisthatmemberswithambitionstomodernizeandreformtheorganizationaredoingsoinplurilateral

fashion.Thismeansthatonlythosemembersseriousaboutthetopicsathand

participateintheprocess.Thosethatdonotaren’tobligedtotakeonnew

obligationsand,inmostcases,wouldbefree-ridersbenefitfromtradeliberalizingbenefitsagreedbytheothers.

AttheBuenosAiresMinisterialConferencein2017,71membersagreedtojoinexploratorytalksonane-commercedeal.1

TheninJanuary2019,76membersannouncedthestartofe-commerce

negotiations,anupgradefromtheexploratorystageintheWTO’srule-making

process.Shornoftheunwieldymultilateralprocess,plurilateralnegotiations

movedbrisklytowardagreements.IndiaandSouthAfricacontinuedtryingvariouslegalchicanerytoderailthediscussions.

OvertheoppositionfromIndiaandSouthAfrica,thee-commerceproponents

pressedonbutsoonencounteredanothermajorbombshell–fromanunexpectedsource.InOctober2023,theUnitedStates–longthemostvocalproponentofanambitiouse-commerceagreement–suddenlychangedcourseanddecidedthatitdidnotwantcross-borderdataflows,datalocalization,ortransferofsourcecodetobetakenupattheWTO.TheseissueshadalreadyprovenfiercelycontentiousasBeijingandWashingtonhaveprofoundlydifferentideasonhowthesequestionsshouldbeaddressed.

Defendingthevolteface,USTradeRepresentativeKatherineTaisaidthat

Washingtondidnotwantaninternationalagreementtohinderitsdomesticeffortsregulatingdigitalactivity.YetnoseriouslegislativeeffortsonsuchregulationwereunderwayintheUSandnothinghasemergedsince.

Abouthalftheinstitution’smembershavecometotermsonthee-commercepact,pushingbackahandfulofopponents.

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PUTTINGTHE‘W’–ANDTHE‘T’–BACKINTHEWTO

Anewpushtobreakthedeadlock

one-commercewouldrelegate

MFN,meaningitwouldbenefitonlythosecountriesthatparticipatein

thenegotiationswhileexcluding

opponentsfromenjoyinganybenefitsthathavebeennegotiated.

AttheheartoftheWTO’sfailuresliemanyoftheorganization’slongest-held

canons:decision-makingbyconsensusandnon-discriminationinapplyingtherules.ThetraditionoftakingmajordecisionsbyconsensusstemsfromthedesireofallWTOmemberstoprotecttheirrightsbyensuringthatnewrulesarenotforceduponthem.AgreedrulesareappliedtootherWTOmembersonanon-discriminatorybasisknownasthe“most-favoured-nation”(MFN)treatment.

Anewpushtobreakthedeadlockone-commercewouldrelegateMFN,meaningitwouldbenefitonlythosecountriesthatparticipateinthenegotiationswhileexcludingopponentsfromenjoyinganybenefitsthathavebeennegotiated.

Finalizationofthee-commercedraftagreementwillnotcomethisyear,

participantsinthetalkssay.Buttheyintendtorestartseriousworkbynext

summer,hopingthatthenewUSadministrationwouldhavesettledinbythenandanewUSTradeRepresentativeappointedandconfirmedsothattheUnitedStatescanproperlyrejointhenegotiations.Theagreedtextalreadyhas82WTOmembersonboard,afirmfoundationforregulatingdigitaltradeglobally.Theagreement

doesnotgoasfarassomeofitsarchitectshadhoped,butthenfewmultilateraldealseverdo.Thestructureofthisagreementismeanttocreatea“living”pact

thatallowsnewissuestobeintroducedandnewcountriestojoin.Theopen

natureofsuchastructurewould,forinstance,allowforthereintroductionintothenegotiatingagendaofvitallyimportantissueslikeregulatingcross-borderdata

flows,datalocalization,andtheforcedtransferofsourcecode.

Gettingtherewilltestinstitutionallyentrenchedmethodsofincorporating

agreementsintotheWTO’slegalframework.Theplurilateralnegotiationshave

alsotouchedonthepoliticallysensitivequestionofessentialnationalsecurity.

Thisissueisextremelydelicate,notleastfortheUnitedStates,butithasbecomecentraltoanyseriousdiscussiononreformingtheorganizationandparticularlythe

Formorethan25years,effortstocreateglobale-commerceruleshavesputteredformanyreasons.Foremostamongthemaretheobstaclesstrewnacrossthenegotiatingpathbyimportantmembers.

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PUTTINGTHE‘W’–ANDTHE‘T’–BACKINTHEWTO

Theroadtothee-commerce

agreementoffersatemplateonhowtheWTOmightaddressitsfuturebyfixingthewayitmakesdecisions.MostoftheWTO’sfailurescomedownto

aminorityofmembersthatuseMFNtoblockattemptstogovernmoderntrade.

WTO’sdisputesettlementsystem,onceseenastheorganization’scrownjewelbutnowrenderedinoperablebyWashington.

Mostofthetext’sprovisions,formallyagreedon26Julythisyear,arebest

endeavors,meaningtheyarenotlegallybindingonmembersbutareguidelinesforregulatingdigitaltrade.ThisisnotunusualintheWTO.TheTradeFacilitationAgreement(TFA)andServicesDomesticRegulationJointInitiativewereof

thesamemold.Evenwithoutlegalbinding,thereisstillgreatvalueinaWTO

e-commerceagreementthatobligesgovernmentstomakepublictheirregulationsforelectronicpaymentsandpaperlesstrading,offersonlineconsumerprotections,mandateslegalframeworkstoprotecttheprivacyofpersonaldata,andcommitsgovernmentstoestablishalegalframeworkforelectronictransactions.

Morethanthis,theroadtothee-commerceagreementoffersatemplateonhowtheWTOmightaddressitsfuturebyfixingthewayitmakesdecisions.MostoftheWTO’sfailurescomedowntoaminorityofmembersincludingIndiaandSouth

AfricathatuseMFN,theWTO’spracticeofequaltreatment,toblockattemptstogovernmoderntrade.

Theplaybook,ifadoptedinfutureWTOnegotiations,wouldcreatethemeansfortheplurilateralapproachtolegalizeaWTOagreementwithoutneedingaconsensusof166members.ItwouldrestorewindinthesailsofaWTOheld

hostagebymembersthathaveuseditsnon-discriminationidealsagainsttheinstitutionitself.

AttheheartoftheWTO’sfailuresliemanyofitslongest-heldcanons,includingnon-discriminationinapplyingtherules.Anewpushtobreakthedeadlockone-commercewouldrelegateMFN.

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Ahistoryofdeadlocks

IndianandSouthAfricanopposition

tothee-commercedealremainsfirmlyentrenchedandtheyvowtoblockanyattemptstoincorporatetheagreementintotheWTO’slegalarchitecture.

Butwithsomuchatstake,thedeal’sproponentsarenotpreparedtolettheagreementlanguish.

BecausethisisabouttheWTO,thisisastoryoffrustration,delays,setbacks,anddiplomaticbrinksmanship.

Theworld’stradeministersfirstagreedin1998totakeupe-commerce.Butthe

processwascumbersomeandseeminglydesignedtostall.FourWTOcouncils

andcommitteeswereassignedoversightoftheissuewithaspecialcommitteeoftheGeneralCouncil,theorganization’sleadingbodyinGenevaactingonbehalfoftheMinisterialConference,chargedwithcoordinationandoversightof“cross-cutting”issues.Gradually,thiscoordinatinggroupbegantoconnectthedotsandtheoutlinesofacoherentapproachtoe-commercegovernanceslowlyemerged.ButtheseeffortscareenedintoaditchinOctober2016whenSouthAfricaraisedobjections.

Unbowedbytwodecadesoffailures,thee-commercepact’skeyproponentsinGeneva–ledbytheambassadorsofAustralia,Japan,andSingaporeasitsco-convenors–successfullydeliveredon26Julyane-commerceagreementsupportedby82membersincludingtheEuropeanUnionandChina.

TheUnitedStatesisnotamongthem,thoughitwasamongthe91membersthatsignedontonegotiatingthee-commercedealinJune2024.Those91economiesaccountedformorethan90%ofglobaltrade.Thefinalfateofthedealwon’tberesolvedatleastuntilthedusthassettledfromtheUSelections.

EvenwithoutUSparticipation,muchinthisagreementisalreadywithoutglobalprecedent.ParticipantspointoutthatChinahasmadecommitmentsBeijinghasnevermadebefore,includingonprotectionofdataprivacy,accesstogovernmentdata,andrespectfortherightsofindigenouspersons.Theagreementwouldalsomakepermanent,withafive-yearperiodbeforereview,aprovisiondatingbacktothe1998MinisterialConferenceinwhichgovernmentsagreednottoapplydutiestoe-commercetransmissions.Themoratoriumiscrucialespeciallytosmalland

mediumexporters.Citingtheirneedsfor“policyspace”andaccesstoadditionalcustomsrevenue,India,SouthAfrica,Indonesia,andTurkeysoughtforyearsto

strikethismoratoriumfromtheWTOrulebook.Theysucceededatthisyear’s

MinisterialConferenceinAbuDhabiwhereministersagreedtoletthemoratoriumexpirenextyear.

IndianandSouthAfricanoppositiontothee-commercedealremainsfirmly

entrenchedandtheyvowtoblockanyattemptstoincorporatetheagreement

intotheWTO’slegalarchitecture.Butwithsomuchatstake,thedeal’sproponentsarenotpreparedtolettheagreementlanguish.Theysaytheyarereadytoexploreunprecedentedchannelstodeliveranaccord.

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The“mostfavourednation”broughtintoquestion

China,atfirstaquiescentmemberonthesidelinesofWTOproceedings,

soontookastuteadvantageofeveryambiguityinthesystem.ManyWTOmembersbegantoharbortheviewthatWTOrules,astheyhadbeen

written,offerednorecoursetoChina’stradingpractices.

NoWTOprovisionismorehallowedthanArticle1oftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,the“most-favoured-nation”clause.MFNisacommitmentby

GATTandlaterWTOmembersnottodiscriminateagainstanyothermember.Thelegallydenselanguagestatesthat“anyadvantage,favour,privilegeorimmunitygrantedbyanycontractingpartytoanyproductoriginatinginordestinedfor

anyothercountryshallbeaccordedimmediatelyandunconditionallytothe

likeproductoriginatinginordestinedfortheterritoriesofallothercontractingparties.”2

Thereisareasonthisprovisionisthefirstarticleoftheglobaltradecharter

thatnowunderpinstheWTO.Manyhistoriansandeconomistsbelievethat

discriminatorytradepracticesinthe1920sand1930ssparkedtit-for-tatretaliationandescalatedthetensionsthatledtotheSecondWorldWar.

TheidealismofMFNwasembracedbymembersofthepostwartradingorderfordecades.Itwaseasieratfirst.GATThadjust23nationswhenitwassignedin1947.Asthenumberofmembersgrew,consensusbecameeverhardertoreach.BythetimetheWTOgotto166members,thevalueofMFNisbeingquestionedasneverbefore.

China’s2001entryintotheWTO,encouragedandfacilitatedbytheUS,was

pivotal.China’sinclusionsignificantlyboostedglobaltradebutatthesame

timeintroducedanenormous,oftenopaque,andhighlystate-controlledexportjuggernautthatmadeitdifficulttobringdisputesagainstBeijing.China,atfirst

aquiescentmemberonthesidelinesofWTOproceedings,soontookastute

advantageofeveryambiguityinthesystem.ManyWTOmembersbegantoharbortheviewthatWTOrules,astheyhadbeenwritten,offerednorecoursetoChina’stradingpractices.

ConcernsoverChinamagnifiedWashington’srisingskepticismwiththeWTOanditscornerstoneprovision,MFN.ThisdissatisfactionboiledoverwithDonaldTrump’sunilateralapplicationoftariffsonmorethan$380billionofChinese

importsintheclearest-everabrogationoftheUScommitmenttoMFN.

Thispositioncreptintothee-commercenegotiationsalmostimmediately.

TheAmericansrightfromthestartsuggestedsottovocethattheywere

uncomfortableextendingMFNtreatmenttoChinainanyeventuale-commercedeal,thosefamiliarwiththenegotiationssay.Whentheissuesofcross-borderdataflows,forcedtransferofsourcecode,anddatalocalizationwereonthe

agenda,Washington’sfearswereparticularlypronounced.TheUSbelieves,andmanyothersconcur,thatChinaappliesamongtheworld’sharshestrestrictionsontheflowofdata,thatithasandwouldcompelcompaniestorevealtheir

algorithms,andthatBeijinginsiststhat“importantdata”–adeliberatelyvagueterminChina’scybersecuritylaw–bestoredonserversinChina.

FortheUS,theabilitytowithholdMFNfromChinaisessential.OthermembersarereluctanttosingleoutChina,whetherforfearofantagonizingtheworld’ssecond-

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THE“MOSTFAVOUREDNATION”BROUGHTINTOQUESTION

Fewparticipantsinthee-commercepactwanttoextendthesebenefitstocountrieswhichthemselveshavenotagreedtoofferthesametreatmenttoothertradingpartners.

largesteconomyorsimplybecausetheybelieveChinahasarightfulplaceinthee-commercediscourse.WhateveronemakesofBeijing’sheavyhand,ithasnot

stoppedmanycountriesfrompartneringwithChinaonothertradedeals,includingintheWTO’splurilateralInvestmentFacilitationforDevelopmentAgreement

agreedby128membersatFebruary’sMC13.

Butifthee-commerceparticipantsarereluctanttosingleoutChina,theyharboraverydifferentviewwhenitcomestoIndiaandSouthAfrica.

Thereasonliesinthedesireofsignatoriestothee-commercejointstatement

agreementtoretainandindeedmakepermanentamoratoriumontheapplicationofdutiestodigitaltransmissions.Thelanguageinthee-commerceplurilateral

textisclear:“NoPartyshallimposecustomsdutiesonelectronictransmissionsbetweenapersonofonePartyandapersonofanotherParty.”3

Fewparticipantsinthee-commercepactwanttoextendthesebenefitsto

countrieswhichthemselveshavenotagreedtoofferthesametreatmenttoothertradingpartners.

“It’saboutthemoratorium,”saidoneparticipantinthee-commercetalks.“YouwouldhavefreeridersifitwasMFN.”

Andsothereappearedapeculiarclauseinthedrafttextofthee-commerce

negotiations.Specifically,Article34statesthattheagreement“shallnotapplyasbetweenanytwoPartieswhereeitherParty,atthetimeeitherPartyacceptsoraccedestothisAgreement,doesnotconsenttosuchapplication.”4

WhatitmeansinplainEnglishis:“WearenotgoingtogoMFN,”another

participantinthetalkssaid.“Noneofthememberswantto.Peoplewillchallengeandgripe,butwhatcantheydo?”

TheinclusionofthisarticleisdifferentfromwhatiscontainedinotherWTO

agreements.ArticleXXXVoftheGATTissimilar,butGATTXXXVwasdesignedtoaccordwithexistingGATTmembersthepowertowithholdMFNfromnewentrants.TheexemptionfromMFNcouldalsobeappliediftheoldandnewmembershadyettoengageintariffnegotiations.5

TheWTO’splurilateralInvestmentFacilitationforDevelopmentAgreementhasno

suchprovisionandwouldbeappliedtoallWTOMembersonanMFNbasis.6Howdidthisprovisioncometobeinserted?

SeveralofficialsinvolvedinthenegotiationssaiditwasatthebehestoftheUnitedStates.ThisiscrediblegiventhelongstandingUSdesiretohaveane-commerce

dealwhichitcouldwithholdfromChina.USofficialsfranklyacknowledgethattheyliketheprovision.Butsodomanyothersandthereislittleinterestinremovingitamongnegotiators.

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Howtosecure

e-commercerules?

GiventheiraversiontoanMFNagreement,theproblemforthee-commercesignatoriesishowtoinsertthisagreementintotheWTO’slegalframework.

Oneideawasthatthosewhosupporttheagreementcouldsimplyinclude

theprovisionsintheirindividualservicesschedulesundertheWTO’sGeneralAgreementonTradeinServices(GATS).In1997,twoyearsaftertheWTOwas

setup,membersagreedtoplurilateralcommitmentsintelecommunications

andfinancialservicesandmanyservicesexpertssuggestthiswouldbealegallyfeasibleroutefore-commerceaswell.

Becausemembershavegreatcontrolovertheadaptationoftheirschedules,itwouldbefarmoredifficultforthelikesofIndiaorSouthAfricatoobstructthee-commerceprovisionsweretheytobeinsertedintoservicesschedules.SouthAfricahasevenstatedthatitwouldnotobjecttosuchaprocess.

SignatoriestotheServicesDomesticRegulation,adoptedin2021,tookthisroute.Theagreement’sguidelinesanddisciplineswereincorporatedintotheservicesschedulesof59WTOmembers.7

Indiacontinuestoobjecttotheratificationofservicesschedulesfor11membersseekingtojointheServicesDomesticRegulationdeal.Inthiscase,India’s

obstructionismultimatelyfailed.UnderWTOrules,objectionstoschedule

amendmentsmustberesolvedwithin45days,afterwhichthecertificationoftheamendedschedulesisautomatic.8

GiventheiraversiontoanMFNagreement,theproblemforthee-commercesignatoriesishowtoinsertthisagreementintotheWTO’slegalframework.

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HOWTOSECUREE-COMMERCERULES?

Itispossibletohavea“closed”

plurilateralWTOagreementinwhichthebenefitsareextendedonlyto

signatories.Currently,thereareonlytwosuch“Annex4”agreements,so-

calledbecausetheyarelistedinAnnex4ofthe1994MarrakeshAgreement

establishingtheWTO.

IndiacontinuedtoraiseobjectionsandsoughtarbitrationfromtheWTOto

stymieAustralia’sscheduleamendment.ButIndiafailedagainsincetheWTO’s

arbitrationproceduresaredesignedtocompensateamemberwhoserightshavebeendiminished,whichisn’tthecaseforIndiainAustralia’sapplication.Indianowbenefitsasafree-riderfromstreamlinedservicesectorproceduresimplementedby70WTOMembersparticipatingintheDomesticRegulationinServices

agreement.

Noteveryoneagreesthate-commercecommitmentswouldslotsmoothlyintoWTOmembers’servicesschedules.Butthisisnotthereasonproponentsof

thee-commercedealrejectedthisapproachtolegalization.Therealproblemforthe82signatoriesisthatusingthisroutewouldextendthebenefitsofthee-commerceagreementtoallWTOMembersunderMFN,keyparticipantssay.

Itispossibletohavea“closed”plurilateralWTOagreementinwhichthebenefitsareextendedonlytosignatories,i.e.,withoutMFNtreatment.Currently,there

areonlytwosuch“Annex4”agreements,so-calledbecausetheyarelistedin

Annex4ofthe1994MarrakeshAgreementestablishingtheWTO.TheseAnnex4agreementsongovernmentprocurementandcivilaircraftwerestruckinthedaysoftheGATTandgrandfatheredintotheWTO.TwootherAnnex4deals,ondairyandbovinemeat,expiredin1997andhavebeendeletedfromtheannex.9

Annex4wouldbeafarmoredifficultpathfore-commerce.IfNewDelhiandPretoriaopposeagreementsliketheInvestmentFacilitationforDevelopmentAgreementfromwhichtheywouldderiveMFNbenefitsevenwithout

participating,whywouldtheyapproveanAnnex4dealfromwhichtheyareexcluded?

ThetravailsoftheInvestmentFacilitationforDevelopmentAgreementare

instructiveinthisregard.The128membersthatsoughttoimplementthe

investmentfacilitationdealviaAnnex4havebeenblockedfourtimesthisyearbyIndia,SouthAfrica,andTurkey.10

IndiastandsoutasaconsistentnaysayertoalmostanyWTOtradedeal.Atthe

firstWTOMinisterialConference,heldinSingaporein1996,tradeministersagreedthattradeandinvestmentwouldbediscussedaspartofthepackageknown

asthe“Singaporeissues,”whichalsoincludedcompetitionpolicy,transparency

ingovernmentprocurement,andtradefacilitation.WhileIndiawarilyagreedin

Singaporetodiscusstheseissues,itfiercelyobjectedtoeveryattempttoupgradethediscussionstonegotiations.Theseobjectionsforcedproponentsin2004to

dropinvestmentaltogetherfromtheWTOagenda.Transparencyingovernmentprocurementandcompetitionpolicywerealsojettisonedwhileministersagreedtocommencenegotiationsontradefacilitation.

WhenArgentinatriedtoreintroduceadiscussiononinvestmentata2016WTO

GeneralCouncilmeeting,Indiapreventedthemeetingfromtakingplaceby

blockingtheadoptionofthemeeting’sagenda,normallyaperfunctoryprocedure.TheArgentineambassadortotheWTO,MarceloCima,wasfurious.India’sactionspurredhimtoleadthepushfortheinclusionofinvestmentfacilitationasone

oftheplurilateralinitiativesthenlaunchedatthe2017MinisterialConferenceinBuenosAires.

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HOWTOSECUREE-COMMERCERULES?

TheadvantageofgainingapprovalforanAnnex4agreementisthatitwouldclearthewayforplurilateralmemberstoactivelyusetheWTO’sinfrastructure.ItwouldgivelegalbackingtoenableproponentstoestablishaWTO

e-commercecommitteeanduseitsSecretariatservicestooverseetheagreement.

India’spositiononinvestmentisparticularlyillogical.Investmentprovisionsalreadyexistinservices(Mode3CommercialPresenceinanotherMember’sterritory)andintheTrade-RelatedInvestmentMeasuresagreement.11Moreover,theInvestmentFacilitationdeal,liketheTradeFacilitationAgreementandthee-commercetext,ismostlyaboutbestendeavors,ratherthanstrictrules.Theinvestmentdeal

containsasophisticatedapproachtotechnicalassistanceandcapacitybuildingandisspeci