评估和沟通竞争干预的好处-美国的说明（2023 年 6 月）

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

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UnclassifiedEnglish-Or.English

10June2023

DIRECTORATEFORFINANCIALANDENTERPRISEAFFAIRSCOMPETITIONCOMMITTEE

WorkingPartyNo.2onCompetitionandRegulation

AssessingandCommunicatingtheBenefitsofCompetitionInterventions-NotebytheUnitedStates

12June2023

ThisdocumentreproducesawrittencontributionfromtheUnitedStatessubmittedforItem6ofthe75thmeetingofWorkingParty2on12June2023.

Moredocumentsrelatedtothisdiscussioncanbefoundat

/competition/assessing-and-communicating-the-benefits-of-competition

-interventions.htm

FedericaMAIORANO

Email:Federica.MAIORANO@

JT03521630

Thisdocument,aswellasanydataandmapincludedherein,arewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothedelimitationofinternationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.

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UnitedStates

1.Introduction

1.TheAntitrustDivisionoftheU.S.DepartmentofJustice(“Division”)andtheFederalTradeCommission(“FTC”)(collectively,the“Agencies”)offerthisjointsubmissioninresponsetotheWorkingParty2’sconsiderationoftheassessmentandcommunicationofthebenefitsofcompetitioninterventions.Inthispaper,theAgenciesacknowledgetheimportanceofregularlyevaluatingtheeffectsoftheirenforcementandpolicyinitiatives.SuchevaluationprovidesavaluableauditoftheAgencies’effortsandprogressagainsttheirgoalsandpromotesvaluabletransparencyandaccountabilitynecessarytomaintainthetrustoftheAmericanpublic.

2.TheAgenciesbelievethatcommunicatingthebenefitsoftheircompetitioninterventionstoCongressionalleaders,otherU.S.federalagencies,states,companies,andthegeneralpublicisvitalandhelpsencouragecompetitionmorebroadly.PromotingthesebenefitscanensurethattheAgencies’fundinglevelsareadequatetomeetthedemandsoftheirstatutoryobligations.TheAgencies’publicizationoftheirenforcementactivitiesandclearmessagingaboutprevailinglegalstandardsinguidancedocumentsalsoensurethatmarketparticipantsaresufficientlydeterredfromviolatingtheantitrustlaws.Finally,communicatingtheAgencies’effortstoprotectcompetitionaidsinpreservingthecredibilityoftheAgencies—bothassuringtheAmericanpublicthattheirbudgetsarebeingwellspentandconveyingtomarketparticipantswhomaycometotheAgencieswithcomplaintsofunlawfulbehaviorthattheircomplaintswillbetakenseriously.CommunicatingthebenefitsofcompetitioninterventionsallowstheAgenciestocontinuetoeffectivelypromotemarketcompetition.

2.AssessmentofBenefits

3.TheAgencies’enforcementandpolicyinterventionsareguidedbytheirmission:toenforcethefederalantitrustlaws,whichhelpensureeconomicopportunitybypromotingfreeandfaircompetition.

4.IthaslongbeenrecognizedunderU.S.antitrustlawthattherearemanybenefits—bothquantitativeandqualitative—thatresultfromcompetition.AstheSupremeCourthasacknowledged:

TheShermanActreflectsalegislativejudgmentthatultimatelycompetitionwillproducenotonlylowerprices,butalsobettergoodsandservices.‘Theheartofournationaleconomicpolicylonghasbeenfaithinthevalueofcompetition.’…Theassumptionthatcompetitionisthebestmethodofallocatingresourcesinafreemarketrecognizesthatallelementsofabargain—quality,service,safety,anddurability—andnotjusttheimmediatecost,arefavorablyaffectedbythefreeopportunitytoselectamongalternativeoffers.1

1NationalSocietyofProfessionalEngineers.v.U.S.,435U.S.679,695(1978)(citingStandardOilCo.v.FTC,340U.S.231,248(1951));seealsoNat’lCollegiateAthleticAss’nv.Bd.ofRegentsofUniv.ofOkla.,468U.S.85,104n.27(1984)(quotingN.Pac.Ry.Co.v.U.S.,356U.S.1,4–5

(1958))(TheShermanAct“restsonthepremisethattheunrestrainedinteractionofcompetitive

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5.ConsistentwithU.S.antitrustlaw,theAgenciesassessbothquantitativeand

qualitativebenefitswithintheirevaluationsoftheirinterventions.

2.1.QuantitativeBenefits

6.EachagencyprovidesanassessmentofcertainmeasurablebenefitsofitsinterventionsinitsannualCongressionalSubmissions.2Thesereportscontainmeasurablegoalsforeachagencyrelatedtotheirmissiontoenforcetheantitrustlawsandpromotecompetitivemarkets.TheyareproducedinaccordancewiththeOfficeofManagementandBudget’srequirementsandtypicallyreportoutcomesfromtheprioryear.3ThesesubmissionsprovideanoverviewoftheAgencies’enforcementandpolicyefforts,includingexamplesofmajorenforcementmattersandpolicyprioritiesinadditiontoeconomictrendsthatimpacttheirwork.ThesubmissionsalsoincludeasummaryoffilingfeesthattheAgenciesreceivealongwiththecriminalfinesthattheDivisioncollects.4

7.WithintheDivision’ssubmission,certainquantitativebenefitsarereportedseparatelyfortheDivision’scriminalandcivilenforcementefforts.Thesemetricsincludethepercentagesofcasesfavorablyresolved(“successrates”)andadollarvalueofsavingstoU.S.consumers(“consumersavings”)thatcanbetieddirectlytoenforcementactionsresolvedduringthefiscalyear.Forexample,in2020,theDivisionreportedthatthetotalconsumersavingsasaresultofitsenforcementactivitieswas$114millionforDivisioncriminalactivitiesand$598millionforDivisioncivilactivities.5OtherquantifiablebenefitsoftheDivision’senforcementactivitiesincludethedollarvolumeofcriminalfines($529millionin2020)thattheDivisionreceivedandthenumberofactiveinvestigations/grandjuriesoropenedpreliminaryinquiries.6Ifanything,theseestimatesofconsumersavingsareconservative.Forexample,economistThomasPhilipponcalculatesthat“areturntothelevelofcompetitionprevailingintheUnitedStatesinthelate1990swouldaddabout$1.44trilliontolaborincomeintheUnitedStates.”7TheWhiteHousehascitedPhilippon’sworkinnotingthathigherpricesandlowerwagescausedby

forceswillyieldthebestallocationofoureconomicresources,thelowestprices,thehighestqualityandthegreatestmaterialprogress…”).

2ThesesubmissionsareaccessibletothepublicviatheDivision’sandFTC’swebsites.SeeDEP’T.OFJUSTICE,ANTITRUSTDIV.,CongressionalSubmissionFY2022PerformanceBudget(2022),

/jmd/page/file/1398291/download

[hereinafterFY22ATRCongressionalSubmission];FED.TRADECOMM’N,AnnualPerformanceReportforFiscalYear2021andAnnualPerformancePlanforFiscalYears2022to2023(2022),

/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/21apr_22-23app.pdf

.

3SeeOFFICEOFMGMT.ANDBUDGET,CircularA-136(Revised),

/wp

-content/uploads/2022/06/2022-A-136.pdf.

4SeeFY22ATRCongressionalSubmission,supranote2at2(“InFY2020theDivisionwasappropriated$166.8million,buttookin$101.6millionincivilfilingfeesandobtained$529.4millionincriminalfines.Similarly,inFY2019theDivisionwasappropriated$165.0million,buttookin$129.4millionincivilfilingfeesandobtained$364.7millionincriminalfines.”).

5Id.at23–24.

6Id.at41.

7ThomasPhilippon,“Causes,Consequences,andPolicyResponsestoMarketConcentration,”at26(AspenEconomicStrategyGroup,Nov.212019),

/wp

-content/uploads/2019/12/Maintaining-the-Strength-of-American-Capialism-Causes-

Consequences-and-Policy-Responses-to-Market-Concentration.pdf.

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lackofcompetitioncostthemedianAmericanhousehold$5,000peryear.8ThesavingsfromtheDivision’sworkinfightinganti-competitivebidriggingarealsosignificant.OECDhasestimatedthateliminatingbidriggingandotherformsofcollusioninprocurementcouldsavethegovernment20percentofexpendedfunds—ormore.9

8.TheFTC’squantitativeassessmentofitsactivitiesiscontainedwithinitsStrategicPlan,organizedbytheagency’sgoalsandobjectives.ThemetricstrackconsumersavingsthroughmergerandnonmergeractionsthattheFTChastakentomaintaincompetition.In2021,theFTCreportedatotalof$1.64billioninsavingsforconsumersthroughmergeractionsand$1.13billioninsavingsthroughnonmergeractions.10

9.TheAgenciescontinuetoquantifyconsumersavingsinamannerconsistentwithmanyofthesameprinciplesdescribedintheOECD’s2014Report.11Inlinewiththisreport,theseregularassessmentsarebaseduponapplicablemethodologiesusingcase-specificdatawhereavailable.12AsdescribedintheOECD2014Report,theconsumersavingsestimateoftendoesnotaccountfordynamiceffects—thoughgreatercompetitionproducesincreasesininnovationandproductivity,thesebenefitsaredifficulttomeasure.TheAgencies’estimatestypicallydonotaccountforthesesavingsunlesstheyareincludedincase-specificestimatesderivedfromthetargets’ownordinarycoursedocuments.TheAgencies’estimatesalsohavenottakenintoaccountlaboreffectsorthedeterrenteffectofinterventiongivenchallengeswithquantifyingtheseeffects.Lackofquantificationofthiseffectbynomeansdiminishesthevastimportanceofthiseffectanditsabilitytoincentivizefirmstoobeythecompetitionlaws.

10.TheAgenciesalsopublishanannualfiscal-yearreportonpre-mergernotificationactivitypursuanttotheHart-Scott-RodinoAntitrustImprovementsActof1976(“HSRAct”).13TheAgencies’AnnualHSRReportprovidesadetailedstatisticalanalysisofpre-mergernotificationactivityreportedundertheHSRAct,includingthenumberoftransactions,filingsreceived,SecondRequestsissued,andearlyterminationrequests.14

8FactSheet:ExecutiveOrderonPromotingCompetitionintheAmericanEconomy,July9,2021,

/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/09/fact-sheet-executive

-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

9“Fightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement”OrganizationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment.ViewedonSeptember16,2021./competition/bidrigging.

10FED.TRADECOMM’N,AnnualPerformanceReportforFiscalYear2021andAnnualPerformancePlanforFiscalYears2022to2023(2022),

/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/21apr_

22-23app.pdf.

11SeeORG.FORECON.COOPERATION&DEVELOPMENT(OECD),GuideforHelpingCompetitionAuthoritiesAssesstheExpectedImpactoftheirActivities(Apr.2014),

/daf/competition/Guide-competition-impact-assessmentEN.pdf

(Annex1detailingUSDOJ’sassumptionsusedincartelcases,mergercases,andabuseofdominance/monopolizationcases).

12ReferencetheFTC’s“DataQualityAppendix”submittedtoCongressaspartoftheagency’sperformancereports.ItexplainstheFTC’svariousmethodologies(including,whereapplicable,case-specificdatavs.proxymeasures).

13FED.TRADECOMM’N,AnnualReportstoCongressPursuanttotheHart-Scott-RodinoAntitrustImprovementsActof1976,

/policy/reports/annual-competition-reports

.

14See,e.g.,FED.TRADECOMM’N&U.S.DEP’TOFJUSTICE,HartScott-RodinoAnnualReport,FiscalYear2021at2(2022),

/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/p110014fy2021hsrannualreport.pdf

(reportingthat

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Thereportalsoshowsthepercentageincreaseordecreaseintransactionsrelativetopreviousfiscalyears,aswellasthenumberofenforcementchallenges,finalconsentorders,abandonmentsorrestructurings,andinitiatedadministrativeorfederalcourtlitigation.Finally,thereportsummarizesrecentdevelopmentswithinthepre-mergernotificationprogramandprovidesnarrativesummariesofmergerenforcementchallengesinitiatedbyeachagency.

11.Since1984,theFTC’sBureauofEconomics(“BE”)hasundertakenandpublishedtheresultsofmergerretrospectivesforarangeofconsummatedmergersspanningmorethanthreedecades.15ThegoalsoftheFTC’smergerretrospectivesare“tounderstandwhethertheagency’sthresholdforbringinganenforcementactioninamergercasehasbeentoopermissive,thusallowingtoomanypotentiallyharmfulmergers,”and“toassesstheperformanceoftoolsthatagencyeconomistsusetopredicttheeffectsofproposedmergersprospectively.”16BEiscurrentlypursuingseveralstudiestoinformtheFTC’senforcementandpolicyefforts.17

2.2.Qualitativebenefits

12.QualitativebenefitsfromcompetitionenforcementeffortsaresimilarlyemphasizedwithintheAgencies’CongressionalSubmissionsandcanincludehigherqualityofproductsandservices,increasedinnovation,greaterresiliency,andgreatereconomicdynamism.Thoughitisoftendifficulttoquantifytheeffectsofthesebenefits,theyarenolessimportanttotheAgencies’enforcementefforts.

13.ProtectingandpromotingincentivesforinnovationisakeybenefitoftheAgencies’enforcementefforts,particularlyinvolvingacquisitionsofnascentorpotentialcompetitors.18TheFTCsoughttopreventthe“dampening[of]futureinnovation”whenit

theFTCandtheDivisioncollectivelybrought32mergerenforcementchallengesinfiscalyear2021).

15ForarecentlistofretrospectivesconductedbyBE,seeFED.TRADECOMM’N,ListofFTCBureauofEconomicsRetrospectiveStudies,

/system/files/attachments/press

-releases/ftc-announces-agenda-14th-session-its-hearings-competition-consumer-protection-21st-

century/list_of_be_retrospective_studies.pdf.

16FED.TRADECOMM’N,OverviewoftheMergerRetrospectiveProgramintheBureauofEconomics(2022),

/policy/studies/merger-retrospective

-program/overview#end1.

17TheFTCiscurrentlyconductingtworetrospectivestudiesusingitsauthorityunderSection6(b)oftheFTCAct,15U.S.C.§46(b).Thefirstrelatestomergersinvolvinghealthcaresystemsthatwereallowedtoproceedunderstateregulatoryauthoritydespiteantitrustconcerns.ThesecondstudyconsidershowphysicianpracticemergersimpacthealthoutcomesofMedicarepatientsandtheextenttowhichthateffectdependsonthelevelofmarketconcentration.

18Forexample,theDivisionheraldeditssuitagainstVisaforitsacquisitionofnascentcompetitorPlaid—andthecompanies’subsequentabandonmentofthedeal—aspromotingcompetitionbyallowingforinnovationinthefintechspace.SeeDEP’TOFJUSTICE,VisaandPlaidAbandonMergerAfterAntitrustDivision’sSuittoBlock(Jan.12,2021),

/opa/pr/visa-and

-plaid-abandon-merger-after-antitrust-division-s-suit-block(“‘InavictoryforAmericanconsumersandsmallbusinesses,Visahasabandoneditseffortstoacquireaninnovativeandnascentcompetitor...NowthatVisahasabandoneditsanticompetitivemerger,PlaidandotherfuturefintechinnovatorsarefreetodeveloppotentialalternativestoVisa’sonlinedebitservices.Withmorecompetition,consumerscanexpectlowerpricesandbetterservices.’”).Similarly,theFTCnotedthatitsorderrequiringIlluminatodivestcancerdetectiontestmakerGrailwouldpromoteinnovation—andsavelives.FED.TRADECOMM’N,FTCOrdersIlluminatoDivestCancerDetection

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suedtoblockMetafromacquiringWithinUnlimitedanditsvirtualrealitydedicatedfitnessappSupernaturalin2022.19Althoughthecourtdidnotenjointhemerger,itsdecisionreinforcedthelegalgroundsforstoppingmergersthateliminateapotentialcompetitor.20Inaddition,DivisionAssistantAttorneyGeneral(“AAG”)JonathanKanterhashighlightedtheneedfor“competitionforcreativeideas,”whichpromptedtheDivision’scaseagainstthemergerbetweenbookpublishersPenguin-RandomHouseandSimon&Schuster.21ProtectinginnovationisalsooneofthecitedreasonsfortheAgencies’ongoingefforttomodernizethefederalmergerguidelines.22

14.TheAgenciesrecognizethatevenwhenthereisnoclearpriceeffectoftheirinterventions,competitiontendstoincreaseproductquality.Theneedtoenforcetheantitrustlawstopreservethebenefitsofqualityundercompetitiveforcesisparticularlyacuteinthehealthcareindustry,wheremergersbetweenrivalhospitalsoftenresultinlowerqualityofcare.23

15.TheAgenciesalsoregularlyhighlightqualitativebenefitstopromotingcompetitioninlabormarkets,includingincreasedworkermobility.TheFTC’srecentproposaltoadoptarulebanningcertainnon-competerestrictionsonworkersemphasizedthepotentialadverseeffectsofreducedlabormobilityoncompetition.24Similarly,theDivision’s

TestMakerGRAILtoProtectCompetitioninLife-SavingTechnologyMarket(Apr.3,2023),

/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/04/ftc-orders-illumina-divest-cancer

-

detection-test-maker-grail-protect-competition-life-saving(“Ultimately,theOpinionholdsthatlettingcompetitionspurthroughinnovationamongMCEDtestproviderswoulddomoretosavelivesthanallowingamonopolisttoverticallyintegrateandcapturethemarket.”).

19FED.TRADECOMM’N,FTCSeekstoBlockVirtualRealityGiantMeta’sAcquisitionofPopular

AppCreatorWithin(Jul.27,2022),

/news-events/news/press-

releases/2022/07/ftc-seeks-block-virtual-reality-giant-metas-acquisition-popular-app-creator-

within.

20FTCv.MetaPlatformsInc.,No.5:22-cv-04325(N.D.Cal.2023)(slipop.).

21DEP’TOFJUSTICE,ANTITRUSTDIV.,AssistantAttorneyGeneralJonathanKanteroftheAntitrustDivisionDeliversRemarksatHowardLawSchool(Jan.12,2023),

/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-jonathan-kanter-antitrust-division

-delivers-remarks-howard-law.

22DEP’TOFJUSTICE,ANTITRUSTDIV.,JusticeDepartmentandFederalTradeCommissionSeektoStrengthenEnforcementAgainstIllegalMergers(Jan.18,2022),

/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-trade-commission-seek-strengthen

-enforcement-against-illegal(“‘Illegalmergerscaninflictahostofharms,fromhigherpricesandlowerwagestodiminishedopportunity,reducedinnovationandlessresiliency’”)(emphasisadded).

23FED.TRADECOMM’N,FTCPolicyPerspectivesonCertificatesofPublicAdvantageat12(Aug.15,2022),

/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/COPA_Policy_Paper.pdf

(“theweightoftheempiricalevidenceindicatesthat‘[i]nthelongrun,hospitalmergersshieldedwithCOPAsoftenleadtohigherpricesandreducedqualityfromunconstrainedmarketpower.’”).

24Non-CompeteClauseRule,88Fed.Reg.3482,3537(Jan.19,2023)(“Whenworkerssubjecttononcompeteclausesareblockedfromswitchingtojobsinwhichtheywouldbebetterpaidandmoreproductive,unconstrainedworkersinthatmarketaresimultaneouslydeniedtheopportunitytoreplacethem.Thiscollectivedeclineinjobmobilitymeansfewerjoboffersandanoveralldropinwages,asfirmshavelessincentivetocompeteforworkersbyofferinghigherpay,betterbenefits,greatersayoverscheduling,ormorefavorableconditions.”).

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commentinsupportoftheFTC’srulemakingnotedthepotentialfortheagreementstorestrictworkermobility,dampeningcompetitioninlabormarkets.25

16.TheAgenciesalsomonitorandinappropriatesettingsreporttheoverallbenefitsthatderivefromacompetitiveeconomy—ortheharmsthatexistwhenmarketsbecomelesscompetitiveorlessresilientandmorefragile.Forexample,theAgenciesacknowledgemany,butnotall,empiricalstudieshavefoundincreasinglevelsofconcentrationintheU.S.economy.26Thisconcentrationcouldresultinhigherpricesforconsumersandlowerwagesforworkers.Forexample,theshareofnationalincomegoingtoworkershasfallensharplysince2000,sotheshareofincomegoingtoworkerstodayisnow6to8percentagepointsbelowthesharein1980.Onepotentialexplanationforthisdeclineisdecreasedcompetition.27

3.CommunicatingtheBenefitsofCompetitionandtheU.S.Agencies’EnforcementandPolicyEfforts

17.TheAgenciesseektoreachthebroadestaudienceinraisingawarenessoftheirenforcementandpolicyefforts.TheyviewengagingwithadiversityofviewsandstakeholdersasimperativetotheefficacyoftheAgencies’enforcementandpolicyefforts.28Todoso,agencypersonnelroutinelyparticipateinpubliceventswherethey

25DEP’TOFJUSTICE,ANTITRUSTDIV.,CommentontheAntitrustDivisionoftheUnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice,FTCDocketNo.2023-007(Apr.19,2023),

/atr/page/file/1580551/download

.

26See,e.g.¸CouncilofEconomicAdvisersIssueBrief,BenefitsofCompetitionandIndicatorsofMarketPowerat5(Apr.2016),

/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414

_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf(notingchangeinrevenueshareearnedbythe50largestfirmsineachsector);DavidAutoretal.,TheFalloftheLaborShareandtheRiseofSuperstarFirms,135Q.J.ECON.645

(2020)(findingthatthetop4firmsinthetopsectorsoftheeconomybecamesteadilyandsignificantlymoreconcentrated);ThomasPhilippon,Causes,Consequences,andPolicyResponsestoMarketConcentrationinASPENECONOMICSTRATEGYGROUP,MAINTAININGTHESTRENGTHOFAMERICANCAPITALISM(2019)(reviewingliteratureonconcentrationintheU.S.economy).DominicSmithandSergioOcampo,TheEvolutionofUSRetailConcentration,WP,findincreasesinretailconcentrationatboththelocalandnationallevelovertime.However,LanierBenkardetal.,ConcentrationinProductMarkets,WP,finddecreasesinconcentrationovertimeformanyconsumerpackagedgoodmarkets.

27See,e.g.,GeneM.GrossmanandEzraOberfield,TheElusiveExplanationfortheDecliningLaborShare,

AnnualReviewofEconomics202214:1,93-124.

28See,e.g.,DEP’TOFJUSTICE,ANTITRUSTDIV.,AssistantAttorneyGeneralJonathanKanterDeliversRemarksonModernizingMergerGuidelines(Jan.18,2022),

/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-jonathan-kanter-delivers-remarks

-

modernizing-merger-guidelines(highlightingtheneedtoconsultwitha“diversegroupofstakeholders”including“consumers,workers,innovators,andothersontheground”whenrevisingtheMergerGuidelines);seealsoFED.TRADECOMM’N,RemarksofChairLinaM.KhanRegardingtheRequestforInformationonMergerEnforcement(Jan.18,2022),

/system/files/documents/public

_statements/1599783/statement_of_chair_lina_m_khan_regarding_the_request_for_information_on_merger_enforcement_final.pdf(“Iwantto...encouragethosebeyondtheantitrustcommunity...tosharefeedbackandevidence.Thequalityofourreviewandanysubsequentrevisionstotheguidelineswilldependonrobustpublicparticipation,andweareespeciallyeagertohearfromabroadsetofmarketparticipants.”).

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presenttheAgencies’enforcementandpolicyeffortstoawidevarietyofaudiencesandthroughavarietyofmediums,includinginterviewsandeditorialsingeneralnewsoutlets.29Inaddition,theAgenciespromotethebenefitsofcompetitionthroughtheirpolicycommunications,includinginteragencycoordination,amicusbriefsinlitigationmatters,andstatementsofinterestinongoinglitigation.

18.TheAAGoftheAntitrustDivision,ChairoftheFTC,FTCCommissioners,andagencyseniorleadershipperiodicallyprovidetestimonybeforeCongresswheretheAgencies’antitrusteffortsarediscussedaswellasavarietyofothercompetitiontopicsofinteresttolawmakers.30ThistestimonyisfrequentlycoveredintheU.S.pressandisanimportantcommunicationtooltoensurethattheAgencies’enforcementeffortsarefullyappreciatedbyCongressasitlookstowardsappropriationsandotherlegislativeefforts.31

19.DuringCongressionaltestimony,theAAGandFTCChairtypicallyhighlightsomeofthequantifiablebenefitscoveredintheAgencies’mostrecentCongressionalSubmission,includingthenumberofactivecasesbeforetheAgenciesandthenumberofnotifiabletransactionsreceived.TheAAGandFTCChairalsotypicallyincludestatisticsonmonetaryremediesobtainedbytheAgenciesinanefforttodemonstratethatthebenefitstoconsumersfromtheAgencies’workfaroutweightheAgencies’costs.32Forexample,duringtheAgencies’mostrecentoversighthearing,AAGKanterhighlightedtheeffortsoftheDivision’sProcurementCollusionStrikeForce(“PCSF”)bynotingthedollarvalueofthecontractsinvolvedinPSCF’srecentenforcementefforts.33Similarly,FTCChairKhan

29See,e.g.,InterviewwithLinaM.Khan,CNBC(Jan.6,2023),

/2023/01/06/first-on-cnbc-cnbc-transcript-ftc-chair-lina-khan-speaks-with-

cnbcs-andrew-ross-sorkin-on-squawk-box-today.html;

LinaM.Khan,WeMustRegulateA.I.

Here’sHow,NEWYORKTIMES(May3,2023),

/2023/05/03/opinion/ai

-lina-khan-ftc-technology.html.

30EachagencyhastestifiedbeforeCongressonavarietyofissues.SeeDEP’TOFJUSTICE,ANTITRUST

DIV.,CongressionalTestimonybyAntitrustDivision,

/atr/congressional-

testimony;

FED.TRADECOMM’N,Testimony,

/legal

-

library/browse/testimony?search=&sort_by=search_api_relevance.

31Se