纯粹理性批判英文版

ImmanuelKant'sCritiqueofPureReason

translatedbyNormanKempSmith

ImmanuelKant's

CritiqueofPureReason

Translatedby

NormanKempSmith

SometimeProfessorofLogicandMetaphysics

intheUniversityofEdinburgh

Aboutthisedition

Thee-textofthisbookwasoriginallypreparedby

Inviewofalltheseconsiderations,wearriveattheideaofaspecialsciencewhichcanbeentitledtheCritiqueofPureReason.

--thesearequestionsthatraisenogreaternorlessdifficultythanhowIcanbeanobjecttomyselfatall,and,moreparticularly,anobjectofintuitionandofinnerperceptions.Indeed,thatthisishowitmustbe,iseasilyshown--ifweadmitthatspaceismerelyapureformoftheappearancesofoutersense--bythefactthatwecannotobtainforourselvesarepresentationoftime,whichisnotanobjectofouterintuition,exceptundertheimageofaline,whichwedraw,andthatbythismodeofdepictingitalonecouldweknowthesinglenessofitsdimension;andsimilarlybythefactthatforallinnerperceptionswemustderivethedeterminationoflengthsoftimeorofpointsoftimefromthechangeswhichareexhibitedtousinouterthings,andthatthedeterminationsofinnersensehavethereforetobearrangedasappearancesintimeinpreciselythesamemannerinwhichwearrangethoseofoutersenseinspace.If,then,asregardsthelatter,weadmitthatweknowobjectsonlyinsofarasweareexternallyaffected,wemustalsorecognize,asregardsinnersense,thatbymeansofitweintuitourselvesonlyasweareinwardlyaffectedbyourselves;inotherwords,that,sofarasinnerintuitionisconcerned,weknowourownsubjectonlyasappearance,notasitisinitself.

Iwouldgladlyknowhowyoucandeterminethispossibilityofitsnot-being,ifyoudonotrepresentasuccessionintheseriesofappearancesandinitabeingwhichfollowsuponnot-being(orreverse-wise),thatis,achange.Fortosaythatthenot-beingofathingdoesnotcontradictitself,isalameappealtoalogicalcondition,which,thoughnecessarytotheconcept,isveryfarfrombeingsufficientforrealpossibility.Icanremoveinthoughteveryexistingsubstancewithoutcontradictingmyself,butIcannotinferfromthistheirobjectivecontingencyinexistence,thatis,thattheirnon-existenceispossible.Asregardstheconceptofcommunity,itiseasilyseenthatinasmuchasthepurecategoriesofsubstanceandcausalityadmitofnoexplanationdeterminantoftheobject,neitherisanysuchexplanationpossibleofreciprocalcausalityintherelationofsubstancestooneanother(commercium).Solongasthedefinitionofpossibility,existence,andnecessityissoughtsolelyinpureunderstanding,theycannotbeexplainedsavethroughanobvioustautology.Fortosubstitutethelogicalpossibilityoftheconcept(namely,thattheconceptdoesnotcontradictitself)forthetranscendentalpossibilityofthings(namely,thatanobjectcorrespondstotheconcept)candeceiveandleavesatisfiedonlythesimpleminded.

Buttheconceptofwhatthuspossessesallrealityisjusttheconceptofathinginitselfascompletelydetermined;andsinceinallpossible[pairsof]contradictorypredicatesonepredicate,namely,thatwhichbelongstobeingabsolutely,istobefoundinitsdetermination,theconceptofanensrealissimumistheconceptofanindividualbeing.Itisthereforeatranscendentalidealwhichservesasbasisforthecompletedeterminationthatnecessarilybelongstoallthatexists.Thisidealisthesupremeandcompletematerialconditionofthepossibilityofallthatexists--theconditiontowhichallthoughtofobjects,sofarastheircontentisconcerned,hastobetracedback.Itisalsotheonlytrueidealofwhichhumanreasoniscapable.Foronlyinthisonecaseisaconceptofathing--aconceptwhichisinitselfuniversal--completelydeterminedinandthroughitself,andknownastherepresentationofanindividual.

Thelogicaldeterminationofaconceptbyreasonisbaseduponadisjunctivesyllogism,inwhichthemajorpremisscontainsalogicaldivision(thedivisionofthesphereofauniversalconcept),theminorpremisslimitingthisspheretoacertainpart,andtheconclusiondeterminingtheconceptbymeansofthispart.Theuniversalconceptofarealityingeneralcannotbedividedapriori,becausewithoutexperiencewedonotknowanydeterminatekindsofrealitywhichwouldbecontainedunderthatgenus.Thetranscendentalmajorpremisswhichispresupposedinthecompletedeterminationofallthingsisthereforenootherthantherepresentationofthesumofallreality;itisnotmerelyaconceptwhich,asregardsitstranscendentalcontent,comprehendsallpredicatesunderitself;italsocontainsthemwithinitself;andthecompletedeterminationofanyandeverythingrestsonthelimitationofthistotalreality,inasmuchaspartofitisascribedtothething,andtherestisexcluded--aprocedurewhichisinagreementwiththe'either-or'ofthedisjunctivemajorpremissandwiththedeterminationoftheobject,intheminorpremiss,throughoneofthemembersofthedivision.Accordingly,reason,inemployingthetranscendentalidealasthatbyreferencetowhichitdeterminesallpossiblethings,isproceedinginamanneranalogouswithitsprocedureindisjunctivesyllogisms--this,indeed,istheprincipleuponwhichIhavebasedthesystematicdivisionofalltranscendentalideas,asparallelwith,andcorrespondingto,thethreekindsofsyllogism.

Itisobviousthatreason,inachievingitspurpose,that,namely,ofrepresentingthenecessarycompletedeterminationofthings,doesnotpresupposetheexistenceofabeingthatcorrespondstothisideal,butonlytheideaofsuchabeing,andthisonlyforthepurposeofderivingfromanunconditionedtotalityofcompletedeterminationtheconditionedtotality,thatis,thetotalityofthelimited.Theidealis,therefore,thearchetype(prototypon)ofallthings,whichoneandall,asimperfectcopies(ectypa),derivefromitthematerialoftheirpossibility,andwhileapproximatingtoitinvaryingdegrees,yetalwaysfallveryfarshortofactuallyattainingit.

Allpossibilityofthings(thatis,ofthesynthesisofthemanifold,inrespectofitscontent)mustthereforeberegardedasderivative,withonlyoneexception,namely,thepossibilityofthatwhichincludesinitselfallreality.Thislatterpossibilitymustberegardedasoriginal.Forallnegations(whicharetheonlypredicatesthroughwhichanythingcanbedistinguishedfromtheensrealissimum)aremerelylimitationsofagreater,andultimatelyofthehighest,reality;andtheythereforepresupposethisreality,andare,asregardstheircontent,derivedfromit.Allmanifoldnessofthingsisonlyacorrespondinglyvariedmodeoflimitingtheconceptofthehighestrealitywhichformstheircommonsubstratum,justasallfiguresareonlypossibleassomanydifferentmodesoflimitinginfinitespace.Theobjectoftheidealofreason,anobjectwhichispresenttousonlyinandthroughreason,isthereforeentitledtheprimordialbeing(ensoriginarium).Asithasnothingaboveit,itisalsoentitledthehighestbeing(enssummum);andaseverythingthatisconditionedissubjecttoit,thebeingofallbeings(ensentium).Thesetermsarenot,however,tobetakenassignifyingtheobjectiverelationofanactualobjecttootherthings,butofanideatoconcepts.Weareleftentirelywithoutknowledgeastotheexistenceofabeingofsuchoutstandingpre-eminence.

Wecannotsaythataprimordialbeingconsistsofanumberofderivativebeings,forsincethelatterpresupposetheformertheycannotthemselvesconstituteit.Theideaoftheprimordialbeingmustthereforebethoughtassimple.

Consequently,thederivationofallotherpossibilityfromthisprimordialbeingcannot,strictlyspeaking,beregardedasalimitationofitssupremereality,and,asitwere,adivisionofit.Forinthatcasetheprimordialbeingwouldbetreatedasamereaggregateofderivativebeings;andthis,aswehavejustshown,isimpossible,althoughinourfirstroughstatementswehaveusedsuchlanguage.Onthecontrary,thesupremerealitymustconditionthepossibilityofallthingsastheirground,notastheirsum;andthemanifoldnessofthingsmustthereforerest,notonthelimitationoftheprimordialbeingitself,butonallthatfollowsfromit,includingthereinalloursensibility,andallrealityinthe[fieldof]appearance--existencesofakindwhichcannot,asingredients,belongtotheideaofthesupremebeing.

If,infollowingupthisideaofours,weproceedtohypostatiseit,weshallbeabletodeterminetheprimordialbeingthroughthemereconceptofthehighestreality,asabeingthatisone,simple,all-sufficient,eternal,etc.Inshort,weshallbeabletodetermineit,initsunconditionedcompleteness,throughallpredicaments.TheconceptofsuchabeingistheconceptofGod,takeninthetranscendentalsense;andtheidealofpurereason,asabovedefined,isthustheobjectofatranscendentaltheology.

Inanysuchuseofthetranscendentalideaweshould,however,beoversteppingthelimitsofitspurposeandvalidity.Forreason,inemployingitasabasisforthecompletedeterminationofthings,hasuseditonlyastheconceptofallreality,withoutrequiringthatallthisrealitybeobjectivelygivenandbeitselfathing.Suchathingisamerefictioninwhichwecombineandrealizethemanifoldofourideainanideal,asanindividualbeing.Butwehavenorighttodothis,noreventoassumethepossibilityofsuchanhypothesis.Nordoanyoftheconsequenceswhichflowfromsuchanidealhaveanybearinguponthecompletedeterminationofthings,orexerciseinthatregardtheleastinfluence;anditissolelyasaidingintheirdeterminationthattheideahasbeenshowntobenecessary.

Butmerelytodescribetheprocedureofourreasonanditsdialecticdoesnotsuffice;wemustalsoendeavourtodiscoverthesourcesofthisdialectic,thatwemaybeabletoexplain,asaphenomenonoftheunderstanding,theillusiontowhichithasgivenrise.Fortheideal,ofwhichwearespeaking,isbasedonanatural,notonamerelyarbitraryidea.Thequestiontoberaisedisthereforethis:howdoesithappenthatreasonregardsallpossibilityofthingsasderivedfromonesinglefundamentalpossibility,namely,thatofthehighestreality,andthereuponpresupposesthistobecontainedinanindividualprimordialbeing?

TheanswerisobviousfromthediscussionsintheTranscendentalAnalytic.Thepossibilityoftheobjectsofthesensesisarelationoftheseobjectstoourthought,inwhichsomething(namely,theempiricalform)canbethoughtapriori,whilethatwhichconstitutesthematter,realityinthe[fieldof]appearance(thatwhichcorrespondstosensation),mustbegiven,sinceotherwiseitcouldnotevenbethought,noritspossibilityrepresented.Nowanobjectofthesensescanbecompletelydeterminedonlywhenitiscomparedwithallthepredicatesthatarepossibleinthe[fieldof]appearance,andbymeansofthemisrepresentedeitheraffirmativelyornegatively.Butsincethatwhichconstitutesthethingitself,namely,therealinthe[fieldof]appearance,mustbegiven--otherwisethethingcouldnotbeconceivedatall--andsincethat)whereintherealofallappearancesisgivenisexperience,consideredassingleandall-embracing,thematerialforthepossibilityofallobjectsofthesensesmustbepresupposedasgiveninonewhole;anditisuponthelimitationofthiswholethatallpossibilityofempiricalobjects,theirdistinctionfromeachotherandtheircompletedetermination,canalonebebased.Nootherobjects,besidesthoseofthesenses,can,asamatteroffact,begiventous,andnowheresaveinthecontextofapossibleexperience;andconsequentlynothingisanobjectforus,unlessitpresupposesthesumofallempiricalrealityastheconditionofitspossibility.Nowowingtoanaturalillusionweregardthisprinciple,whichappliesonlytothosethingswhicharegivenasobjectsofoursenses,asbeingaprinciplewhichmustbevalidofthingsingeneral.Accordingly,omittingthislimitation,wetreattheempiricalprincipleofourconceptsofthepossibilityofthings,viewedasappearances,asbeingatranscendentalprincipleofthepossibilityofthingsingeneral.

Ifwethereuponproceedtohypostatisethisideaofthesumofallreality,thatisbecausewesubstitutedialecticallyforthedistributiveunityoftheempiricalemploymentoftheunderstanding,thecollectiveunityofexperienceasawhole;andthenthinkingthiswhole[realm]ofappearanceasonesinglethingthatcontainsallempiricalrealityinitself;andthenagain,inturn,bymeansoftheabove-mentionedtranscendentalsubreption,substitutingforittheconceptofathingwhichstandsatthesourceofthepossibilityofallthings,andsuppliestherealconditionsfortheircompletedetermination.

Wemayindeedbeallowedtopostulatetheexistenceofanall-sufficientbeing,asthecauseofallpossibleeffects,withaviewtolighteningthetaskofreasoninitssearchfortheunityofthegroundsofexplanation.Butinpresumingsofarastosaythatsuchabeingnecessarilyexists,wearenolongergivingmodestexpressiontoanadmissiblehypothesis,butareconfidentlylayingclaimtoapodeicticcertainty.Fortheknowledgeofwhatweprofesstoknowasabsolutelynecessarymustitselfcarrywithitabsolutenecessity.

Thewholeproblemofthetranscendentalidealamountstothis:either,givenabsolutenecessity,tofindaconceptwhichpossessesit,or,giventheconceptofsomething,tofindthatsomethingtobeabsolutelynecessary.Ifeithertaskbepossible,somusttheother;forreasonrecognizesthatonlyasabsolutelynecessarywhichfollowsofnecessityfromitsconcept.Butbothtasksarequitebeyondourutmosteffortstosatisfyourunderstandinginthismatter;andequallyunavailingareallattemptstoinduceittoacquiesceinitsincapacity.

Unconditionednecessity,whichwesoindispensablyrequireasthelastbearerofallthings,isforhumanreasontheveritableabyss.Eternityitself,inallitsterriblesublimity,asdepictedbyaHaller,isfarfrommakingthesameoverwhelmingimpressiononthemind;foritonlymeasuresthedurationofthings,itdoesnotsupportthem.Wecannotputaside,andyetalsocannotendurethethought,thatabeing,whichwerepresenttoourselvesassupremeamongstallpossiblebeings,should,asitwere,saytoitself:'Iamfrometernitytoeternity,andoutsidemethereisnothingsavewhatisthroughmywill,butwhencethenamI?'Allsupportherefailsus;andthegreatestperfection,nolessthantheleastperfection,isunsubstantialandbaselessforthemerelyspeculativereason,whichmakesnottheleastefforttoretaineithertheoneortheother,andfeelsindeednolossinallowingthemtovanishentirely.

Manyforcesinnature,whichmanifesttheirexistencethroughcertaineffects,remainforusinscrutable;forwecannottrackthemsufficientlyfarbyobservation.Also,thetranscendentalobjectlyingatthebasisofappearances(andwithitthereasonwhyoursensibilityissubjecttocertainsupremeconditionsratherthantoothers)isandremainsforusinscrutable.Thethingitselfisindeedgiven,butwecanhavenoinsightintoitsnature.Butitisquiteotherwisewithanidealofpurereason;itcanneverbesaidtobeinscrutable.Forsinceitisnotrequiredtogiveanycredentialsofitsrealitysaveonlytheneedonthepartofreasontocompleteallsyntheticunitybymeansofit;andsince,therefore,itisinnowisegivenasthinkableobject,itcannotbeinscrutableinthemannerinwhichanobjectis.Onthecontraryitmust,asamereidea,finditsplaceanditssolutioninthenatureofreason,andmustthereforeallowofinvestigation.Foritisoftheveryessenceofreasonthatweshouldbeabletogiveanaccountofallourconcepts,opinions,andassertions,eitheruponobjectiveor,inthecaseofmereillusion,uponsubjectivegrounds.

DISCOVERYANDEXPLANATION

oftheDialecticalIllusioninallTranscendentalProofsoftheExistenceofaNecessaryBeing

Boththeaboveproofsweretranscendental,thatis,wereattemptedindependentlyofempiricalprinciples.Foralthoughthecosmologicalproofpresupposesanexperienceingeneral,itisnotbasedonanyparticularpropertyofthisexperiencebutonpureprinciplesofreason,asappliedtoanexistencegiventhroughempiricalconsciousnessingeneral.Further,itsoonabandonsthisguidanceandreliesonpureconceptsalone.What,then,inthesetranscendentalproofsisthecauseofthedialecticalbutnaturalillusionwhichconnectstheconceptsofnecessityandsupremereality,andwhichrealizesandhypostatiseswhatcanbeanideaonly?Whyareweconstrainedtoassumethatsomeoneamongexistingthingsisinitselfnecessary,andyetatthesametimetoshrinkbackfromtheexistenceofsuchabeingasfromanabyss?Andhowarewetosecurethatreasonmaycometoanagreementwithitselfinthismatter,andthatfromthewaveringconditionofadiffidentapproval,everagainwithdrawn,itmayarriveatsettledinsight?

Thereissomethingverystrangeinthefact,thatonceweassumesomethingtoexistwecannotavoidinferringthatsomethingexistsnecessarily.Thecosmologicalargumentrestsonthisquitenatural(althoughnotthereforecertain)inference.Ontheotherhand,ifItaketheconceptofanything,nomatterwhat,Ifindthattheexistenceofthisthingcanneverberepresentedbymeasabsolutelynecessary,andthat,whateveritmaybethatexists,nothingpreventsmefromthinkingitsnon-existence.ThuswhileImayindeedbeobligedtoassumesomethingnecessaryasaconditionoftheexistentingeneral,Icannotthinkanyparticularthingasinitselfnecessary.Inotherwords,Icannevercompletetheregresstotheconditionsofexistencesavebyassuminganecessarybeingandyetamneverinapositiontobeginwithsuchabeing.

IfIamconstrainedtothinksomethingnecessaryasaconditionofexistingthings,butamunabletothinkanyparticularthingasinitselfnecessary,itinevitablyfollowsthatnecessityandcontingencydonotconcernthethingsthemselves;otherwisetherewouldbeacontradiction.Consequently,neitherofthesetwoprinciplescanbeobjective.Theymay,however,beregardedassubjectiveprinciplesofreason.Theonecallsuponustoseeksomethingnecessaryasaconditionofallthatisgivenasexistent,thatis,tostopnowhereuntilwehavearrivedatanexplanationwhichiscompleteapriori;theotherforbidsusevertohopeforthiscompletion,thatis,forbidsustotreatanythingempiricalasunconditionedandtoexemptourselvestherebyfromthetoilofitsfurtherderivation.Viewedinthismanner,thetwoprinciples,asmerelyheuristicandregulative,andasconcerningonlytheformalinterestofreason,canverywellstandsidebyside.Theoneprescribesthatwearetophilosophizeaboutnatureasiftherewereanecessaryfirstgroundforallthatbelongstoexistence--solely,however,forthepurposeofbringingsystematicunityintoourknowledge,byalwayspursuingsuchanidea,asanimaginedultimateground.Theotherwarnsusnottoregardanydeterminationwhatsoeverofexistingthingsassuchanultimateground,thatis,asabsolutelynecessary,buttokeepthewayalwaysopenforfurtherderivation,andsototreateachandeverydeterminationasalwaysconditionedbysomethingelse.Butifeverythingwhichisperceivedinthingsmustnecessarilybetreatedbyusasconditioned,nothingthatallowsofbeingempiricallygivencanberegardedasabsolutelynecessary.

Since,therefore,theabsolutelynecessaryisonlyintendedtoserveasaprincipleforobtainingthegreatestpossibleunityamongappearances,asbeingtheirultimateground;andsince--inasmuchasthesecondrulecommandsusalwaystoregardallempiricalcausesofunityasthemselvesderived--wecanneverreachthisunitywithintheworld,itfollowsthatwemustregardtheabsolutelynecessaryasbeingoutsidetheworld.

Whilethephilosophersofantiquityregardallforminnatureascontingent,theyfollowthejudgmentofthecommonmanintheirviewofmatterasoriginalandnecessary.Butif,insteadofregardingmatterrelatively,assubstratumofappearances,theyhadconsidereditinitself,andasregardsitsexistence,theideaofabsolutenecessitywouldatoncehavedisappeared.Forthereisnothingwhichabsolutelybindsreasontoacceptsuchanexistence;onthecontraryitcanalwaysannihilateitinthought,withoutcontradiction;absolutenecessityisanecessitythatistobefoundinthoughtalone.Thisbeliefmustthereforehavebeenduetoacertainregulativeprinciple.Infactextensionandimpenetrability(whichbetweenthemmakeuptheconceptofmatter)constitutethesupremeempiricalprincipleoftheunityofappearances;andthisprinciple,sofarasitisempiricallyunconditioned,hasthecharacterofaregulativeprinciple.Nevertheless,sinceeverydeterminationofthematterwhichconstituteswhatisrealinappearances,includingimpenetrability,isaneffect(action)whichmusthaveitscauseandwhichisthereforealwaysderivativeincharacter,matterisnotcompatiblewiththeideaofanecessarybeingasaprincipleofallderivedunity.(Foritsrealproperties,beingderivative,areoneandallonlyconditionallynecessary,andsoallowofbeingremoved-wherewiththewholeexistenceofmatterwouldberemoved.)Ifthiswerenotthecase,weshouldhavereachedtheultimategroundofunitybyempiricalmeans--whichisforbiddenbythesecondregulativeprinciple.Itthereforefollowsthatmatter,andingeneralwhateverbelongstotheworld,isnotcompatiblewiththeideaofanecessaryoriginalbeing,evenwhenthelatterisregardedsimplyasaprincipleofthegreatestempiricalunity.Thatbeingorprinciplemustbesetoutsidetheworld,leavingusfreetoderivetheappearancesoftheworldandtheirexistencefromotherappearances,withunfailingconfidence,justasiftherewerenonecessarybeing,whileyetwearealsofreetostriveunceasinglytowardsthecompletenessofthatderivation,justasifsuchabeingwerepresupposedasanultimateground.

Asfollowsfromtheseconsiderations,theidealofthesupremebeingisnothingbutaregulativeprincipleofreason,whichdirectsustolookuponallconnectionintheworldasifitoriginatedfromanall-sufficientnecessarycause.Wecanbaseupontheidealtheruleofasystematicand,inaccordancewithuniversallaws,necessaryunityintheexplanationofthatconnection;buttheidealisnotanassertionofanexistencenecessaryinitself.Atthesametimewecannotavoidthetranscendentalsubreption,bywhichthisformalprincipleisrepresentedasconstitutive,andbywhichthisunityishypostatised.Weproceedherejustaswedointhecaseofspace.Spaceisonlyaprincipleofsensibility,butsinceitistheprimarysourceandconditionofallshapes,whichareonlysomanylimitationsofitself,itistakenassomethingabsolutelynecessary,existinginitsownright,andasanobjectgivenaprioriinitself.Inthesameway,sincethesystematicunityofnaturecannotbeprescribedasaprinciplefortheempiricalemploymentofourreason,exceptinsofaraswepresupposetheideaofanensrealissimumasthesupremecause,itisquitenaturalthatthislatterideashouldberepresentedasanactualobject,which,initscharacterofsupremecondition,isalsonecessary--thuschangingaregulativeintoaconstitutiveprinciple.Thatsuchasubstitutionhasbeenmadebecomesevident,whenweconsiderthissupremebeing,whichrelativelytotheworldisabsolutely(unconditionally)necessary,asathinginandbyitself.Forwearethenunabletoconceivewhatcanbemeantbyitsnecessity.Theconceptofnecessityisonlytobefoundinourreason,asaformalconditionofthought;itdoesnotallowofbeinghypostatisedasamaterialconditionofexistence.

CHAPTERIII

Section6

THEIMPOSSIBILITYOFTHEPHYSICO-THEOLOGICALPROOF

If,then,neithertheconceptofthingsingeneralnortheexperienceofanyexistenceingeneralcansupplywhatisrequired,itremainsonlytotrywhetheradeterminateexperience,theexperienceofthethingsofthepresentworld,andtheconstitutionandorderofthese,doesnotprovidethebasisofaproofwhichmayhelpustoattaintoanassuredconvictionofasupremebeing.Suchproofweproposetoentitlethephysico-theological.Shouldthisattemptalsofail,itmustfollowthatnosatisfactoryproofoftheexistenceofabeingcorrespondingtoourtranscendentalideacanbepossiblebypurespeculativereason.

Inviewofwhathasalreadybeensaid,itisevidentthatwecancountuponaquiteeasyandconclusiveanswertothisenquiry.Forhowcananyexperienceeverbeadequatetoanidea?Thepeculiarnatureofthelatterconsistsjustinthefactthatnoexperiencecaneverbeequaltoit.Thetranscendentalideaofanecessaryandall-sufficientoriginalbeingissooverwhelminglygreat,sohighaboveeverythingempirical,thelatterbeingalwaysconditioned,thatitleavesusataloss,partlybecausewecanneverfindinexperiencematerialsufficienttosatisfysuchaconcept,andpartlybecauseitisalwaysinthesphereoftheconditionedthatwecarryoutoursearch,seekingthereevervainlyfortheunconditioned--nolawofanyempiricalsynthesisgivingusanexampleofanysuchunconditionedorprovidingtheleastguidanceinitspursuit.

Ifthesupremebeingshoulditselfstandinthischainofconditions,itwouldbeamemberoftheseries,andlikethelowermemberswhichitprecedes,wouldcallforfurtherenquiryastothestillhighergroundfromwhichitfollows.If,ontheotherhand,weproposetoseparateitfromthechain,andtoconceiveitasapurelyintelligiblebeing,existingapartfromtheseriesofnaturalcauses,bywhatbridgecanreasoncontrivetopassovertoit?Foralllawsgoverningthetransitionfromeffectstocauses,allsynthesisandextensionofourknowledge,refertonothingbutpossibleexperience,andthereforesolelytoobjectsofthesensible