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TimeforaMarketUpgrade?AReviewofWholesale
ElectricityMarketDesignsfortheFuture
ChiaraLoPrete,KarenPalmer,andMollyRobertson
Report24-09June2024
AbouttheAuthors
ChiaraLoPreteisAssociateProfessorofEnergyEconomicsintheJohnandWillie
LeoneFamilyDepartmentofEnergyandMineralEngineeringatThePennsylvania
StateUniversity.Herresearchcentersontheeconomicsofenergymarkets,with
afocusontheareasofcompetitionanddesignofelectricitymarkets,naturalgas
marketdesigntoenhancegridreliability,geopoliticsandenergysecurity,andthe
impactsofenvironmentalregulationsonelectricpowergeneration.Recentworkhas
centeredonthedevelopmentofmathematicalmodelsandapplicationofempirical
methodstostudyelectricitymarketstructuresforresourceadequacyandwindenergyintegration,interdependentnaturalgasandelectricpowersystems,theweaponizationofelectricitytrade,emissionleakageandcross-productmanipulation.
KarenPalmerisaseniorfellowatResourcesfortheFuture(RFF),directorofthe
ElectricPowerProgram,andanexpertontheeconomicsofenvironmental,climateandpublicutilityregulationoftheelectricpowersector.Herworkseekstoimprovethe
designofenvironmentalandtechnologyregulationsinthesectorandthedevelopmentofnewinstitutionstohelpguidetheongoingtransitionoftheelectricitysector.To
theseends,sheexploresclimatepolicydesign,analyzesefficientwaystopromote
useofrenewableandothercleansourcesofelectricity,andinvestigatesnewmarketdesigns,newapproachestoelectricitypricingandregulatoryreformstopavetheway
forlong-termdecarbonizationofelectricitysupplyandelectrificationoftheenergyeconomy.
MollyRobertsonisaseniorresearchassociateatRFFworkingontopicsrelated
totheelectricpowersector,includinggriddecarbonization,electrification,and
electricitymarketdesign.ShehasalsocontributedtoRFF’sgrowingworkonequitablecommunitytransitionandenvironmentaljustice.Sheholdsamaster’sinpublicpolicyfromtheUniversityofMichigan’sFordSchool.
Acknowledgements
KarenPalmerandMollyRobertsonwishtoacknowledgefundingfromtheRFFElectricPowerProgram.ChiaraLoPretewouldliketoacknowledgefundingfromtheNationalScienceFoundation(Grant1943992).WethankPeterCramton,StevenCorneli,NataliaFabra,EricGimon,MalcolmKeay,DavidNelson,BrendanPierpont,KathleenSpees,
LeighTesfatsion,andFrankWolakforhelpfulfeedback.WealsothankparticipantsintheElectricPowerInnovationinaCarbonFreeSociety(EPICS)Thrust3workshopforhelpfulcomments.
ResourcesfortheFuturei
AboutRFF
ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutionin
Washington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.RFFis
committedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.
TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.
SharingOurWork
OurworkisavailableforsharingandadaptationunderanAttribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives4.0International(CCBY-NC-ND4.0)license.Youcancopyandredistributeourmaterialinanymediumorformat;youmustgive
appropriatecredit,providealinktothelicense,andindicateifchangesweremade,andyoumaynotapplyadditionalrestrictions.Youmaydosoinanyreasonable
manner,butnotinanywaythatsuggeststhelicensorendorsesyouoryouruse.Youmaynotusethematerialforcommercialpurposes.Ifyouremix,transform,orbuilduponthematerial,youmaynotdistributethemodifiedmaterial.Formoreinformation,visit
/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
.
TimeforaMarketUpgrade?AReviewofWholesaleElectricityMarketDesignsfortheFutureii
Abstract
Existingwholesaleelectricitymarketdesignsarepoorlysuitedtoaddresschallengesassociatedwiththeevolvingresourcemix.Forexample,recentscarcityeventsin
theUnitedStatesshowthatreliabilitychallengesinrenewable-andgas-dominated
electricpowersystemsarisenotfromthelackofgenerationcapacitytoservepeak
customerdemand,butfromthelackofavailablecapacitytoprovidetherequisite
energyattimesofneed.Wereview11proposedelectricitymarketdesignsforthe
cleanenergytransitionandcomparethembasedon10criteria.Enhancingreliabilityinelectricpowersystemswithasignificantamountofvariablerenewableenergyrequiresincentivizingresourceflexibility,bothininvestmentandinoperation.Electricity
marketstructuresshouldallowresourcesneededforreliabilitytoearnadequate
revenuestorecovertheirvariableandfixedcosts.Goodmarketdesignsalsoenable
low-costfinancingtosupportinvestmentsincapital-intensiveresourcesthatare
instrumentalinmeetingdecarbonizationobjectives.Anadditionalpropertyofwell-
designedmarketsispromotingshort-runefficiencybyreducingincentivestoexercisemarketpowerandsupportingefficientrenewablecurtailmentoutcomes.Besides
achievingreliability,long-runefficiency,andshort-runefficiency,someproposalsin
ourreviewseektoachieveenergyaffordabilityobjectivesandintegrationwithclean
energygoals.Ourevaluationhighlightsseveralopenquestionsanddirectionsfor
futureresearch:thedeterminationofmandatorypurchaseobligationsofload-servingentitiesandassociatedenforcementmechanisms;theinterplaybetweenlong-term
hedgingrequirementsandincentivesfordemandparticipationinrealtime;andthe
compatibilitybetweenlong-termcontractdesignandefficientoperationsinshort-termenergymarkets.
ResourcesfortheFutureiii
Contents
1.Introduction1
2.TraditionalApproachestoResourceAdequacyandRevenueSufficiency5
2.1.ScarcityPricing5
2.2.CapacityRemunerationMechanisms6
2.2.1.CapacityPayments6
2.2.2.CapacityRequirements6
2.2.3.CapacityMarkets7
2.2.4.ReliabilityOptions7
2.2.5.StrategicReserves8
2.2.6.IncentivizingCapacityPerformance9
3.EvolvingMarketApproachestoSupportReliability,Flexibility,andPrice
Certainty10
3.1.FlexibleCapacityRequirements10
3.2.SeasonalForwardCapacityMarkets11
3.3.BasicGenerationService12
4.ProposedApproachestoMeettheChallengesoftheCleanEnergyTransition14
4.1.AnIntegratedCleanCapacityMarket14
4.2.StandardizedFixed-PriceForwardContracts16
4.3.AForwardEnergyMarketwithFlowTrading18
4.4.ATwo-PartMarketforEnergy21
4.5.AMarketforLong-TermEnergyContracts22
4.6.Long-TermContractsBasedontheAttributesofGenerationTechnologies24
4.7.Market-BasedIntegratedResourcePlanning26
4.8.AnOrganizedLong-TermMarket28
4.9.DualShort-TermMarketDesigns29
4.10.SwingContracts32
5.Discussion36
6.Conclusions41
References43
TimeforaMarketUpgrade?AReviewofWholesaleElectricityMarketDesignsfortheFutureiv
1.Introduction
Independentsystemoperators(ISOs),regionaltransmissionorganizations(RTOs),
andelectricutilitiesservingasbalancingauthoritiesmustensuretherearesufficient
resourcestomeettheelectricitydemandofend-usecustomersatalltimes,accountingforscheduledandreasonablyexpectedunscheduledoutagesofsystemelementsandsubjecttostandardindustrytargetsforlossofload,suchasthe“onedayintenyear”lossofloadexpectation1Thisconceptisreferredtoasresourceadequacy(NARUC,
2023;NERC,2013).
Toachieveresourceadequacy,bothtraditionallyregulatedandcompetitivewholesaleelectricitymarketshaveadoptedframeworkstoaddresstwowell-knownproblems:
themissingmoneyproblemandthemissingmarketproblem(Newbery,2016;Wolak,
2022).Themissingmoneyproblemarisesbecauserevenuesfromtheenergyand
ancillaryservicesmarketsarenotsufficienttoencourageadequateinvestmentin
newgenerationcapacity(CramtonandOckenfels,2012).Forexample,duringscarcityconditions,short-termenergypricesareunlikelytorisetopoliticallyunpalatablelevelsreflectingtheestimatedamountthatcustomerswouldbewillingtopaytoavoida
powerdisruption(RoquesandFinon,2017).Ontheotherhand,themissingmarket
problemresultsfromtheretailers’incentivetodelaytheirelectricitypurchasesto
theshort-termenergymarket.Thisarisesfortworeasons.First,pricecapsinthe
short-termenergymarketlimitthecostoffailingtoprocureadequateenergytomeetexpecteddemandbeforedelivery.Second,duringscarcityconditions,retailersare
randomlycurtailedregardlessoftheamountofenergyprocuredintheforwardmarket,creatinganincentivetounder-procureexpectedneedsintheforwardmarket(Wolak,2022).Thegapbetweenmaturitiesoflong-termcontracts(thatgenerallydonotextend
1InApril1996,theFederalEnergyRegulatoryAgency(FERC)issuedOrders888and889,whereitintroducedtheconceptofanISOto“operatethetransmissionsystemsofpublicutilitiesinamannerthatisindependentofanybusinessinterestinsalesorpurchasesofelectricpowerbythoseutilities”andtofacilitatenondiscriminatoryaccesstotheelectrictransmissiongrid.FERCOrder2000,issuedinDecember1999,encouragedtransmission-owningpublicutilitiestovoluntarilyformandparticipateinanRTOandestablishedasetof12technicalrequirementstoobtainRTOstatus.WhilesomedifferencesexistbetweenISOsandRTOs(forexample,ISOsareformedatthedirectionorrecommendationoftheFERCanddonotpetitiontheFERCforapprovalandthusmaynotmeettherequirementsneededtoholdthedesignationofRTO),theirbasicfunctionsarethesameandincludeoperatingtheelectricgridwithinadefinedregion,ensuringnondiscriminatoryaccess
totransmission,optimallydispatchinggenerationassetstokeepdemandandsupply
inbalance,administeringtheregion’swholesaleelectricitymarkets,andensuringgridreliability.Intherestofthepaper,wewilluseRTOstorefertobothtypesoforganizations.
TimeforaMarketUpgrade?AReviewofWholesaleElectricityMarketDesignsfortheFuture
1
beyondafewyears;Keppleretal.,2022)andtimeframesforinvestingingenerationcapacityincreasesthecostofcapitalanddistortstheenergymixtowardlesscapital-intensiveandlessriskygenerationtechnologies(NeuhoffandDeVries,2004).2
Resourceadequacyframeworksattempttoaddresstheseproblemsinvariousways.
Verticallyintegratedutilitiesoperatingintraditionallyregulatedmarketsadopta
centralizedprocurementframework.Indecentralizedprocurementregionslikethe
CaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator(CAISO)andSouthwestPowerPool(SPP),
load-servingentities(LSEs)haveanobligationtoindividuallyprocurethecapacity
theyneedtomeettheircustomers’demand.Obligationsaresubjecttoguidance
andstandardssetbyacentralauthority,butthereisnocentralbiddingprocess.The
ElectricReliabilityCouncilofTexas(ERCOT)reformeditsenergymarketsothatpeakpricesbetterreflectthescarcityofcapacity,whileotherregionslikeISONewEngland(ISO-NE),theMidcontinentIndependentSystemOperator(MISO),theNewYork
IndependentSystemOperator(NYISO),andPJMcreatedmechanismsthatprovide
additionalremunerationforcapacityontopofenergysalesthroughcentralizedforwardcapacitymarkets.
Despitemanydifferencesamongtheseapproaches,alltraditionalresourceadequacymechanismsfocusonprocuringsufficientgenerationcapacitytoservepeak
demandplusareservemargin.3Whilesuchapproacheshavebeensuccessfulat
maintainingresourceadequacyinthermalgeneration–dominatedsystemsunder
mostcontingencies,theyarepoorlysuitedtoaddresschallengesassociatedwiththe
evolvingresourcemix.Forexample,evidencefromrecentscarcityeventsintheUnitedStatesshowsthatreliabilitychallengesinrenewable-andgas-dominatedelectricpowersystemsarisenotfromthelackofgenerationcapacitytoservepeakcustomerdemand,butfromthelackofavailablecapacitytoprovidetherequisiteenergyattimesofneed.Inotherwords,supplyshortfallsareathigherriskofoccurringbecauseofinadequateenergytoservedemandduringnetdemandpeaks,ratherthanbecauseofinadequategenerationcapacitytosatisfysystemdemandpeaks(NERC,2020;ESIG,2021).
Highpenetrationofrenewableenergysourcesalsoexacerbatesthelong-standing
missingmoneyproblembecauseincreasedentryofvariableenergyresources(VERs)withnear-zeromarginalcostsdecreasestheamountofthermalgenerationcleared
fromthemerit-orderstackandinduceslowercapacityfactorsforthermalgenerators.Inaddition,energypricestendtobelower(onaverage)andmorevolatileasaresultofincreasingVERparticipation(Mallapragadaetal.,2023).Between2014and2020,
2Long-termcontractsaretradedonorganizedexchangeslikeIntercontinentalExchange(ICE,2024),butliquidityisconcentratedinshorterperiods,withonlysmallamounts
tradedmorethan2or3yearsout.Contractsformorethan5yearsarerareandusuallytradedoverthecounter.Asapointofreference,constructiontimesrangefrom2yearsforanaturalgascombinedcycleplantto3-4yearsforacoalplantto10yearsfora
nuclearplant,andagenerationunit’slifetimemaybe20ormoreyearsafterthefinalinvestmentdecision.
3Insomecases,capacitycommitmentshavesignificantlyexceededthetargetreservemargins,resultinginchronicover-procurementandnegativecostimpactsforthe
consumers(Wilsonetal.,2020).
ResourcesfortheFuture2
generationresourcesinsomeregionsoftheUnitedStateshaveobserveddiminishingenergymarketearningsandagreatercontributionofcapacitymarketrevenuestotherecoveryofinvestmentcosts(Figure1).4Thistrendisproblematicbecausecapacity
marketsdonotprovidethenecessaryincentivestoinvestinanadequateamountandmixofflexiblegenerationtomeetevolvingsystemneeds(PJMInterconnection,2017b).Additionally,pricevolatilitycreatesgreaterrevenueuncertaintyforvariableresources,whichinturnraisesfinancingcostsforcapital-intensivegeneratorssuchasrenewables(PierpontandNelson,2017).
Figure1.ComponentsofPJMPrice
Source:AuthorelaborationondatafromMonitoringAnalytics(2023a,2023c,2024).
Someresearchersandanalystsarguethatdeepdecarbonizationofelectricitysystemswillrequireashiftawayfromthetextbookelectricitymarketdesigninwhichlong-terminvestmentdecisionsaredrivenbyshort-termenergyprices.Forexample,Roques
andFinon(2017)suggestanevolutionofmarketdesigntowardahybridregimewhere“competitionforthemarket”vialong-termcontractstosupportinvestmentwould
befollowedby“competitioninthemarket”forshort-termdispatchandbalancing
operationsasatpresent.AnexampleofhybridmarketscombinesmandatesforLSEstoenterintolong-termbilateralpowerpurchaseagreements(PPAs)withrenewablepowergeneratorsandstorage(whichareoftenmediatedthroughcompetitive
procurementprograms;Joskow,2022)anddispatchofthenewgenerationcapacityinshort-runenergymarkets.Keppleretal.(2022)furtherelaborateonthemotivationforhybridmarkets.
4Theincreaseinenergymarketearningsobservedin2021and2022waslargelydrivenbytheupwardtrendinnaturalgasprices(EIA,2024).
TimeforaMarketUpgrade?AReviewofWholesaleElectricityMarketDesignsfortheFuture3
Thispaperpresentsareviewofelectricitymarketdesignstosupporttheclean
energytransition.Meetingsystemreliabilitychallengesassociatedwithincreasing
levelsofrenewablegenerationrequiresincentivizingresourceflexibility,bothin
investmentandinoperation.Electricitymarketstructuresshouldbedesignedto
allowresourcesneededforreliabilitytoearnsufficientrevenuestorecovertheirfixedandvariablecosts.Goodmarketdesignsshouldalsoenablelow-costfinancingto
supportinvestmentsincapital-intensiveresourcesthatareinstrumentalinmeetingdecarbonizationobjectives.Anadditionalpropertyofwell-designedmarketsis
promotingshort-runefficiencybyreducingincentivestoexercisemarketpowerandsupportingefficientrenewablecurtailmentoutcomes.Besidesreliability,long-run
efficiency,andshort-runefficiency,electricitymarketsmayseektoachieveequity
objectives(e.g.,lowercostsofrenewablegenerationmustbepassedthroughtoretailcustomers)andinsomecasesmaybeintegratedwithcleanenergygoals.
Ourworkbuildsonthreerecentreviewsofelectricitymarketdesign.Bhagwat,
DeVries,etal.(2016)surveyUScapacitymarketexpertswiththepurposeof
drawinglessonsfortheEUandconcludethatUScapacitymarketshaveachievedreliabilitygoalsinaneconomicallyinefficientmannerbecausetheytendtoleadtoexcessgenerationcapacity.Asaresult,consumershavenotbenefitedfromtheimplementationofcapacitymarketsintermsofloweroverallcosts.Bublitzetal.
(2019)discusscapacityremunerationmechanismsfromacrosstheglobeandreviewexperienceswiththem.Theynotethat“astheadequatedesigndependsonavarietyoffactorssuchastheexistingcapacitymixanddemandcharacteristics,nogeneral
advantageousnessofsingle(capacityremuneration)mechanismscouldbedeterminedsofar.…Nevertheless,itcanbeconcludedthatmarket-basedmechanisms,e.g.,a
forwardcapacitymarket,areusuallyadvantageouscomparedtointerventionist
mechanismssuchascapacitypayments”(2019,1074).Duggan(2020)reviewsthe
literaturethatevaluatestherelativeperformanceofvariouscapacitymechanisms,
includingthe“energy-only”marketapproach.HediscussesrecentdevelopmentsindifferentRTOmarkets,whichheconcludescollectivelyindicatethatexperimentationoncapacityremunerationforresourceadequacysupportisanongoingprocess.Wecontributetothisliteraturebybroadeningthefocustoincludeproposedelectricitymarketdesigns,andbyprovidingacomprehensivereviewandcomparisonoftheseoptionsbasedonkeymetrics.
Therestofthepaperproceedsasfollows.Thenextsectionreviewstraditional
approachestoensureresourceadequacyandrevenuesufficiency,includingscarcitypricingandarangeofcapacitymechanisms.Section3discussesevolvingUSmarketapproachestosupportreliability,incentivizeflexibility,andprovideforwardprice
certaintytomeetloadrequirementsofeligiblecustomers.Thepaperthenturnsin
Section4toadiscussionof11proposeddesignsthatofferpotentialsolutionsto
thechallengesfacedbyelectricitymarketsintheUnitedStatesandabroad.We
comparethedesignsbasedontheirpotentialabilitytosupportthedevelopmentofreliablemixesofgenerationresources,promoteefficientlong-andshort-runresourceallocation,andhelpachieveenergyaffordabilityanddecarbonizationobjectives.
Section5highlightsopenquestionsanddirectionsforfutureresearch.Section6providesconcludingremarks.
ResourcesfortheFuture4
2.TraditionalApproachestoResource
AdequacyandRevenueSufficiency
2.1.ScarcityPricing
AllRTOsintheUnitedStatesusesomeformofscarcitypricingtoincentivize
availabilityduringtimesofneed(Mehrtashetal.,2023).Scarcitypricingallowsenergyorancillaryservicespricestoriseabovetheaveragevariablecostofalloperating
plantswhenthesystemiscapacity-constrained.Insuchinstances,unitsearnashort-runprofit,knownasscarcityrent.Asufficientnumberofscarcityhourswouldincreasethecumulativescarcityrentsearnedbyoperatingunits,andfirmswouldinvestin
newcapacityaslongastheexpectedcumulativescarcityrentsexceededthecosts
ofbuildingnewcapacity(Bublitzetal.,2019).However,theexistenceofpricecaps
andlackofshort-termprice-responsivedemandposepracticalchallengesinthe
implementationofscarcitypricinginreal-worldelectricitymarkets.Toaddressthese
challenges,marketshaveamendedtheirpricingmechanismstogeneratehighprices
whenoperatingreservesarescarce.Forexample,inERCOT,theonlygridoperatorin
theUnitedStatesthatreliesonan“energy-only”market,pricesforbothenergyand
ancillaryservicesriseabovetheofferpricesofgenerationunitswhenreservemarginsarelow.Pricesintimesofscarcityarebasedonanoperatingreservedemandcurvethatreflectsthesystemoperator’sdemandforreserves(Hogan,2005).5Thismechanism
providesincentivesfortheperformanceofgenerationcapacityundermostoperatingconditions(PotomacEconomics,2021),althoughaftertheFebruary2021outagesinTexas,criticsarguedthattheenergy-onlyparadigmfailstoensureadequatelevelsofinstalledcapacityandmaintainreliabilityunderstressconditions(Borreson,2022).6
Aspartoftheredesignofthestate’senergy-onlymarketinthewakeofWinterStormUri,inJanuary2023thePublicUtilityCommissionofTexas(PUCT)endorsedthe
performancecreditmechanism(PCM)toincentivizegeneratorstobeavailableduringtimesofhighdemand.Thenewmarketmechanismawardscreditstogeneratorsattheendofacomplianceperiod,basedontheiravailabilityattimesofgridstress.Utilitieshaveanobligationtopurchasecreditsbasedontheirshareofsystemloadduringhighreliabilityriskhours.InFebruary2024,ERCOTfiledamemorandumlayingoutoptionsfordesignparametersandaproposedevaluationmethodologytoselectthefinal
parameters(PUCT,2024).ThePUCTisexpectedtoadoptrulesregardingPCMinthefirsthalfof2025.
5ERCOTdoesnotcurrentlyco-optimizeprovisionofenergyandoperatingreservesinrealtime,althoughco-optimizationisexpectedtobeimplementedby2025(Mehrtashetal.,2023).Asaresult,thereservepriceisdeterminedexpostandaddedtothereal-time
energypricetoprovideadditionalrevenuestorecoverfixedandvariablecosts.
6Itisunclearwhetheranyalternativemarketstructureswouldhaveprovidedbetter
incentivesforpowersupplierstoweatherizeagainsttheextremecold-weatherconditionsobservedinTexas,relativetoan“energy-only”market(Busbyetal.,2021;Palmerand
Cleary,2021).
TimeforaMarketUpgrade?AReviewofWholesaleElectricityMarketDesignsfortheFuture
5
2.2.CapacityRemunerationMechanisms
Inadditiontoscarcitypricing,resourceadequacyconcernsmayalsobeaddressedthroughcapacityremunerationmechanismswherebygenerationunitsearnrevenuestreamsforcapacityinadditiontorevenuesearnedthroughthesaleofenergyandancillaryservices.Awiderangeofoptionsincludescapacitypayments,capacity
requirements,capacitymarkets,reliabilityoptions,andstrategicreserves.
2.2.1.CapacityPayments
Capacitypaymentsawardgeneratorsanadministrativelydeterminedpriceforcapacitymadeavailabletothesystem.ThesemechanismshavebeeninplaceforyearsinSpain,Italy,Greece,Chile,Colombia,Peru,andSouthKorea,andtheymaybefixedorvariable,aswellastargeted(i.e.,paidexclusivelytonewgenerationcapacity)ormarket-wide
(i.e.,paidtobothnewandexistinggenerationcapacity).Absentacompetitiveprocess,themajorchallengeistheidentificationofthecorrectleveloftheper-unitcapacity
payment.Capacitypaymentsarethereforelikelytobetheleastefficienttypeofcapacitymechanism(EuropeanCommission,2016).
2.2.2.CapacityRequirements
InsomeregionsoftheUnitedStates(CAISOandSPP),capacityrequirementsmandatethatLSEsprocureanadministrativelydeterminedquantityofcapacityfromgenera
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