未来能源研究所-获取关键矿物以实现车辆运输电动化的政策挑战（英）

PolicyChallengesfor

AccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport

BeiaSpiller,SangitaGayatriKannan,andMichaelToman

Report23-19

December2023

AbouttheAuthors

BeiaSpillerisafellowandthedirectorforResourcesfortheFuture’s(RFF)

TransportationProgram.PriortojoiningRFF,shewasLeadSeniorEconomistat

EnvironmentalDefenseFund(EDF),wheresheworkedforalmostadecade.SheisalsoaBoardmemberfortheAssociationofEnvironmentalandResourceEconomists.Spillerisanenergyeconomist,withexperienceworkingonelectricityandtransportation

issues.DuringhertimeatEDF,sheparticipatedinmanyelectricutilityproceedings

inNewYorkandCalifornia,withagoalofusheringinacleaner,moreefficientand

equitableenergysystem.Shealsohasmanyyearsofexperienceworkinginthe

transportationsector.Hermorerecenteffortshavefocusedaroundelectricvehiclesandenvironmentaljustice,exploringsomeofthemostpressingissuesaroundelectriccar,truckandbusadoption.Herpublicationsrangeacrosstheenergyspace,withalargefocusonidentifyingenvironmental,communityandhealthimpactsofrenewableenergyresourcesandenergypolicies.

SangitaGayatriKannanisaPhDstudentintheMineralandEnergyEconomics(MEE)programatColoradoSchoolofMines(CSM)andwasa2023RFFsummerintern.Sheresearchesthevariousaspectsofthecriticalmineralssupplychainandhasakeen

interestintheroleofcriticalmineralsintheenergytransitiontowardrenewableenergy.SheholdsamastersinMEEfromCSMandabachelorsinchemicalengineeringfrom

AnnaUniversity,India.

MichaelTomanreturnedtoRFFasaseniorfellowin2021afterstintsattheWorldBankDevelopmentResearchGroup,RANDCorporation,andtheInter-American

DevelopmentBank.MikeservedasaSeniorStaffEconomistattheWhiteHouse

CouncilofEconomicAdvisersfrom1994–1996.Hiscurrentresearchinterests

includereductionofagriculturalgreenhousegasemissions,criticalmineralsfor

decarbonization,marketsforemissionreductioncredits,andclimatechange

policiesindevelopingcountries.MikehasaBAfromIndianaUniversity,aMScin

appliedmathematicsfromBrownUniversity,andMAandPhDdegreesineconomicsfromtheUniversityofRochester.

ResourcesfortheFuturei

AboutRFF

ResourcesfortheFuture(RFF)isanindependent,nonprofitresearchinstitutionin

Washington,DC.Itsmissionistoimproveenvironmental,energy,andnaturalresourcedecisionsthroughimpartialeconomicresearchandpolicyengagement.RFFis

committedtobeingthemostwidelytrustedsourceofresearchinsightsandpolicysolutionsleadingtoahealthyenvironmentandathrivingeconomy.

TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.

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PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransportii

Contents

1.Introduction1

2.TheGeographicDistributionofCriticalMineralProductionandReserves2

2.1.GlobalSupplyPatternsfortheCriticalMineralsUsedinEVBatteries2

2.2.DistributionofCriticalMineralReserves6

2.3.ChallengesofIncreasingMineralSuppliesintheUnitedStates8

3.USCriticalMineralPoliciesandTheirLimitations9

3.1.FederalSupportforNewCriticalMineralTechnologies9

3.2.CooperationandLeadershipinInternationalPartnerships10

3.3.TheInflationReductionAct11

3.4.PermittingReform13

4.Conclusions15

Appendix:ConcentrationIndicatorsforCriticalMineralSupplyChains17

References19

ResourcesfortheFutureiii

1.Introduction

TransitionbytheUnitedStatestoadecarbonizedeconomybythemiddleofthecenturymustincludetransportation,whichtodayaccountsforalittlelessthan30percentofUSgreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsandoverone-thirdoftotalCO2emissions(EPA2023;EIA2023).Amongtheoptionsfordecarbonizingground

transportation,currentpolicyemphasizesincreasedelectricvehicleusealong

withdecarbonizingthepowergridandfurtheradvancesinelectricvehicle(EV)

technology,especiallyforEVbatteries.

CurrentEVbatterydesignsusesignificantquantitiesofso-calledcriticalminerals,

specificallylithium,cobalt,manganese,nickel,andgraphite.Radicallyincreasing

globalproductionandpurchasesofEVswiththesebatterydesignswillleadto

order-of-magnitudeincreasesindemandfortheseminerals(IEA2022).However,

asdiscussedinSection2,criticalmineralstendtobefoundmainlyinahandful

ofcountriesoutsidetheUnitedStates.Moreover,thecapacityforprocessing

extractedmineralsintoformssuitableforuseinmanufacturingEVbatteriesishighlyconcentratedinonecountry,China.

Thus,therearesubstantialconcernsaboutperceivedriskstofutureaffordabilityandreliabilityofthesuppliesofthesemineralsbecauseofthegeographicconcentrationofthesupplychainsandtheeconomicandpoliticalpowerthatdominantmineral

supplierscouldwield.Anotherconcernisaboutmineralpricevolatility,including

largepriceshocksofuncertainduration,whichwouldcomplicateplanningand

managementforbothbatteryandvehiclemanufacturers.Moreover,criticalmineralsuppliescanbeincreasedanddiversifiedonlyafterlengthyperiodsforexplorationanddevelopmentofnewmineralreserves,aswellasconstructionofnewprocessingfacilities.Inshort,theresponseofcriticalmineralsuppliestohigherpricesgenerallyishighlyinelastic,atleastuntilenoughtimehaselapsedformineralextractionandprocessingcapacitytoexpand.AsnotedinSection3.4,intheUnitedStatesthat

intervaloftenismanyyears.

ThispaperexploresthesechallengesingreaterdetailandhighlightsimplicationsforUSpolicytowardcriticalminerals.Section2reviewskeygeographiccharacteristicsofcriticalmineralsanduncertaintiesregardingexpandingtheirsupplieswithintheUnitedStates.Section3examinescriticalmineralpoliciesintheUnitedStatesandtheirlimitations.Thefinalsectionidentifiessomeprioritiesfordevelopingcritical

mineralpolicyandfillingknowledgegaps.

PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport1

Figure1a.GeographicDistributionofCriticalMineralExtractionforEVBatteries,2021

Figure1b.SharesofCriticalMineralExtractionbyCountry,2021

Sources:EstimatesbasedonUSGS(2023);NMIC(n.d.);Idoineetal.(2023);ReichlandSchatz(2023).

PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport3

Figure2a.GeographicDistributionofCriticalMineralProcessingforEVBatteries,2021

Figure2b.SharesofCriticalMineralProcessingbyCountry,2021

Sources:EstimatesbasedonUSGS(2023);NMIC(n.d.);Idoineetal.(2023);ReichlandSchatz(2023).

Note:Naturalgraphitedataarenotavailablefortheprocessingstage.

ResourcesfortheFuture4

Itisimportanttonotethatexceptfornaturalgraphite,Chinadoesnothavehighsharesforextractionofthesecriticalminerals.However,Chinahasmadesignificantcapital

investmentsincriticalmineralextractioncompaniesinothercountries,bothexistingfacilitiesandthosethatareexpectedtobeginproductionsoon.LiptonandSearcey(2022)reportthat,asof2020,Chinese-backedcompaniesownedorhadafinancialstakein15of19cobalt-producingminesintheDRC.Table1listssomeexamplesofChinese-ownedlithiumandcobaltfacilities.

Table1.ExamplesofChinese-ownedLithiumandCobalt-miningFacilitiesoutsideChina

Criticalmineral

Facility/company

Location

PercentownershipbyChinesefirm

Lithium

TalisonLithium

Australia

TianqiLithiumEnergyAustralia(ajoint

venturebetweenIGO,Australia,andTianqiLithium,China),51%

SociedadQuímicay

Minera

Chile

TianqiLithium,22.16%

MountMarion

Australia

GanfengLithium,50%

Pilbaramine

Australia

GanfengLithium,6.16%

SonoraLithiumProject

Mexico

MineraSonoraBoraxS.A.deC.V.(awhollyownedsubsidiaryofGanfengLithium),100%

MarianaLithiumProject

Argentina

GanfengLithium,100%

Cauchari-Olaroz

Argentina

GanfengLithium,46.67%

Cobalt

TenkeFungurumeMining

Democratic

RepublicofCongo

CMOCGroup,80%

Sources:SQM(2022);TianqiLithium(2023);GanfengLithium(n.d.);TangandChen(2023).

PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport5

Figure2showsthatcriticalmineralprocessingalsoishighlyconcentrated,withChinaprovidingabout60–75percentofallprocessedcobalt,lithium,andmanganese.ChinaandIndonesiatogetherprovidealmost60percentoftheprocessingcapacityfor

nickel.3FollowingIndonesia’sexportbanonnickelore,Chinesecompaniesinvested$14.2billionoverthelastdecadefortheconstructionofindustrialparksthatincludenickelsmeltersintwoIndonesianislandswithsomeofthelargestknownnickel

reservesintheworld(HoandListiyorini2022).

Intheappendix,weprovidenumericalindicatorsofthelevelsofconcentrationinbothstages(extractionandprocessing).Overall,thesestatisticsdemonstratethatthe

UnitedStatescontributeslittletoglobalextractionofthesecriticalmineralsandishighlyreliantonimportsofprocessedminerals.

2.2.DistributionofCriticalMineralReserves

Statisticsonmineralreservescanprovideanindicationofthesupplypotential

fromalreadyidentifiedsourcesonceextractionandprocessingcapacitieshave

expanded.4Figure3showsthatreservesofthecriticalmineralsforEVbatteriesarelessconcentratedthancurrentproduction,suggestingthepotentialfordiversifyingsourcesofsupply.However,asseeninTable2,theshareofreservesinthetopthreecountriesexceeds55percent.Theshareofreservesinfragileandconflict-affectedcountriesvariesamongthecriticalminerals.

Figure3a.GeographicDistributionofCriticalMineralReservesforEVBatteries,2023

3ThisissignificantinlightofChina’ssubstantialinvolvementasaninvestorinIndonesia’snickelsector(Tritto2023).

4USGSalsoprovidesrougherestimatesofmineralresourcesthatindicatetheirlong-termphysicalavailability.

ResourcesfortheFuture6

Figure3b.SharesofReservesofCriticalMineralsforEVBatteriesbyCountry,2023

Source:EstimatesbasedonUSGS(2023).

Table2alsoshowsthattheUnitedStateshasasmallshareofreservesforthese

minerals.Evenifextractionfromthosereservesweretogreatlyincrease,theUnitedStateswillhavetocooperatewithothercountriestodiversifyitssupplies.ThiswillremainthecaseevenifUSreservescanbeincreasedthroughexploration,unlesstheincreaseisoutsize.

Moreover,evenifsourcesofextractedmineralsweretodiversify,investmentin

mineral-processingcapacityinothercountrieswouldbenecessarytoincrease

diversificationofprocessedmineraloutputsforuseinEVbatteries.However,

diversifyingprocessingcapacityiscomplicatedandwilltaketime.China’sdominanceincriticalmineralprocessingistheresultofalonger-termindustrialpolicythat

allocatedcapitalinvestmenttocriticalmineralsnotwithstandingasomewhat

modestrateofreturn.Withthisinvestment,Chinahasoptimizedseveralprocessingtechnologiesthroughlearningbydoing,andthecountryhasaccumulatedsignificant

humancapitalintheindustrywithlowerlaborcostsrelativetodevelopedeconomies.5

5Lessstringentenvironmentalregulationsmayalsobeafactor;inthecaseofrareearthelements,forexample,Hurst(2010)foundthatlaxenvironmentalregulationinChina’srareearthextractionhashelpedkeeppricesdown.

PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport7

Table2.SharesofReservesofCriticalMineralsforEVBatteries

Criticalmineral

ShareofreservesintheUnitedStates(%)

Shareofreservesintopthreecountries(%)

Shareofreservesin

fragileandconflict-

affectedcountriesa

Cobalt

0.8

73

52.7

Graphite(natural)

Negligible

67

21.7

Lithium

3.8

70

1.2

Manganese

0

69

12.0

Nickel

0.4

57

7.3

Sources:EstimatesbasedonreservesdatafromUSGS(2023),andWorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WGI)fromKaufmannandKraay(2021).

aInthisanalysis,fragileandconflict-affectedcountriesarethoselistedinWorldBank(2023)andthosethathaveanaverage

scoreof<–0.5inWorldBank’sWGI(KaufmannandKraay2021),includingpoliticalstability,governmenteffectiveness,regulatoryquality,ruleoflaw,andcontrolofcorruption.WGIindicatorsareonascaleof–2.5to2.5andcover229countries.

2.3.ChallengesofIncreasingMineralSuppliesintheUnitedStates

ThoughtheUnitedStateshasasmallshareofknownreserves,explorationcouldleadtotheirexpansioninthefuture.ThereisalsoconcernaboutthetimeittakestoidentifytechnicallyandeconomicallyviablenewreservesandincreaseextractionintheUnitedStates,wheretheprocesssometimescanexceedadecade.Manystakeholdersclaimthatthisextendedtimelineisduetopermittingdelays,includingthetimeneededfor

preparationandapprovalofanEnvironmentalImpactStatement(EIS)orEnvironmentalAssessment(EA)tocomplywiththeNationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct(NEPA).

Theprocesstodevelopandinitiateoperationofaproducingmineinvolvesseveral

permittingsteps.Thecompanyfirstneedstoexplorelandtodiscoverandidentify

locationsthathavepotentialreservestobeextracted.Todothis,itmustfileaplanofoperationwiththerelevantagency,suchastheDepartmentoftheInterior’sBureauofLandManagement(BLM)ortheDepartmentofAgriculture’sForestService(USFS).Duringtheexplorationphase,theagencyconductsanEAasrequiredtocomply

withNEPA,whichgenerallytakesarelativelyshorttime(aboutoneyear)becauseofthelimitedlanddisturbanceofexplorationactivities.However,thecompanymust

ResourcesfortheFuture8

alsoundergopermittingatthestateandlocallevelsduringthisphase.Importantly,explorationisaniterativeprocessinwhichmostiterationsareunsuccessful,causingthecompanytohavetoresubmitanewplanofoperation,thusnecessitatingmoreapprovalsatthelocalandfederallevels(andpotentiallyanewEA,dependingontheextentoftheexploration).Oncethecompanyissuccessfulinitsexplorationphase,itsubmitsaplanofoperationsforbuildingtheminetoaleadpermittingagency

(BLMorUSFS).ThisprocessisthenusuallysubjecttoanEIS,consistentwithNEPArequirements.

Thecompanymustacquirepermitsfromvariousagencies,dependingonthelocationandimpactofthemine.MiningprojectsonUSfederallandsmustobtainatotalof30ormorepermitsfromfederal,state,andlocalbodies(SNLMetals&Mining2016).Forexample,thecompanywillneedpermitsfromtheUSEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyrelatedtowaterandairpollution,andifthemineiswithinendangeredspecieshabitatorwillaffectUSwaters,itwillalsoneedpermitsfromtheUSFishandWildlifeServiceortheUSArmyCorpsofEngineers,respectively.

3.USCriticalMineralPoliciesandTheirLimitations

ThediscussioninSection2showedthat(a)theUnitedStatesrealisticallycannot

avoiddependingonsomeothercountriesforfuturecriticalmineralsupplies;(b)

futureextractionofcriticalmineralsforEVbatteriescanbemorediversifiedthan

currentextraction;(c)diversificationofcriticalmineralprocessing,whichisnow

highlyconcentrated,isneeded,andthatposesseveralchallenges;and(d)possibilitiesforexpandingdomesticproductionquicklyarelimited,giventhesmallshareofUS

reserves.Inthissection,wediscussdifferentpoliciesthattheUnitedStateshas

implementedorisexploringtoincreaseanddiversifycriticalmineralsupplies.

3.1.FederalSupportforNewCriticalMineralTechnologies

TheUSgovernmenthasincreasedR&Dsupportfornovelcriticalmineralsupply

technologies,consistentwiththewidelyacceptedviewthatknowledgegainedfrom

R&Disapublicgood.Forexample,theInfrastructureInvestmentandJobsAct,passedinNovember2021,appropriates$7.9billionforbatterymanufacturing,recycling,andcriticalmineralsupplies.6Thisincludesthe$3billionBatteryMaterialsProcessing

GrantProgramforthesupport,construction,andimprovementofbatterymaterial

6Thisincludesthe$3billionBatteryMaterialsProcessingGrantProgramforthesupport,construction,andimprovementofbatterymaterialprocessingdemonstrationprojectsandfacilities.Italsoincludesa$3billiongrantprogramforthesupport,construction,andimprovementofbatterycomponentmanufacturingandrecyclingdemonstrationprojectsandfacilities.

PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport9

processingdemonstrationprojectsandfacilities.Italsoincludesa$3billiongrant

programforthesupport,construction,andimprovementofbatterycomponent

manufacturingandrecyclingdemonstrationprojectsandfacilities.7

ApresidentialdeterminationwasissuedinMarch2022permittingtheuseofDPATitleIIIauthoritiestostrengthentheUSindustrialbaseforlarge-capacitybatteries,makingDPAfundingavailableforcriticalmineralsneededinEVbatteries.However,itremainsunclearwhethersupportsimilartoDPATitleIIIawardswillbesufficienttobringonlineandhelpsustainsignificantdomesticproductionofcriticalminerals,especiallyif

marketconditionsbecomechallengingbecauseofmeasuresenactedbyincumbentplayers.Forexample,JervoisMining’scobaltprojectinIdahohadbeenexpectedtobeginproductionearlierin2023.However,thecompanyannouncedsuspensionof

operations,citinglowcobaltmarketpricesandUSinflationarypressures(Stevenson2023).Despitesuspensionofoperations,inJune2023,JervoisMiningUSAreceiveda$15millionDPATitleIIIawardtoenablethecompanytoundertakemineralresourcedrillingtoexpandthecurrentlyknowncobaltresourcebase.

3.2.CooperationandLeadershipinInternationalPartnerships

GiventhesmallshareofreservesintheUnitedStates,internationalcooperation

needstobeafundamentalpartofpolicystrategyforincreasinganddiversifying

criticalmineralsupplies.AnexampleofsuchcooperationisthePartnershipforGlobalInfrastructureandInvestment(PGII)initiative,launchedattheG7summitinJune2022.Theinitiativeaimstomobilize$600billionby2027forinfrastructureinvestmentsin

developingcountries.8ThePGIIhasfourpriorityareas,oneofwhichisclimateand

energysecurity.Thisincludesdevelopingcleanenergysupplychains,whichinvolves“responsibleminingofmetalsandcriticalminerals”and“investinginnewglobal

refining,processing,andbatterymanufacturingsites”(WhiteHouse2022).

7TheDOE’sLPOhasmadeseveralinvestmentsorcommitmentsthatincludea$102

millionloanfortheexpansionofagraphite-basedanodematerialmanufacturing

facilityinLouisiana;aconditionalloancommitmentof$2billionfortheconstruction

andexpansionofabatterymaterialscampusinMcCarran,Nevada;andaconditional

loancommitmentof$9.2billionfortheconstructionofthreemanufacturingplantsin

TennesseeandKentuckytoproducebatteriesforFordMotorCompany’sfutureEVs.AnexampleofDODfundingistheefforttosupportcobaltproductionfromJervoisMiningUSA’sprojectinIdaho.

8ThroughthePGII,theUnitedStateshasfacilitatedastrategicpartnershipbetweenTechMet,supportedbyaUSInternationalDevelopmentFinanceCorporationequityinvestment,andLifezoneMetals,whichhasannouncedanagreementwiththe

TanzaniangovernmenttoopenamultimetalprocessingfacilityfornickelandothercriticalmineralsminedinTanzania.

ResourcesfortheFuture10

TheMineralsSecurityPartnership(MSP),launchedinJune2022,isanother

internationalprogramthatseekstodiversifyglobalcriticalmineralsupplies.9Itworks

withhostgovernmentsandindustrytoprovidetargetedtechnical,political,andfinancialsupporttomining,processing,andrecyclingprojectsthatmaintainhighenvironmental,social,andgovernance(ESG)standards(DOS2023).Theprojectsdonothavetobe

locatedwithintheMSPcountriestoreceivethissupport.TheMSPpartnergovernmentsandtheirinstitutionsmaychoosetoprovidesupportforprojectsproposedbyprivate

companies.TheMSPadvocatesforhighESGstandardsrecognizedinternationally

inageneralsense,buttheenforcementofESGstandardsislefttothediscretionof

theindividualparticipatingcountries.“InternationallyrecognizedESGstandards”is

looselydefinedandcouldraisesubjectivedisagreementsamongtheMSPparticipatingcountries,goingforward.

3.3.TheInflationReductionAct

TheInflationReductionAct(IRA)usestaxbreaksandtraderestrictionstoinfluence

thedirectionofcriticalmineralexpansion.Theseincludetaxbreaksfordomestic

criticalmineralsunderthecleanproductionprovisionsoftheact(IRASection13501)

andindirectinducementsbyconditioningthesizeofEVtaxbreaksonwhetherthe

criticalmineralscomefromtheUnitedStatesorcountrieswithwhichithasafree

tradeagreement(FTA;IRASection13401).UndertheCleanVehicleTaxCredit(30D)

inSection13401,a$3,750creditisavailableforEVsthatmeetcertainmanufacturer’s

suggestedretailprice(MSRP)limitsiftheapplicablepercentageofthevalueofthe

criticalmineralscontainedinthebatterywasextractedorprocessedintheUnited

StatesoracountrywithwhichithasanFTAorwasrecycledinNorthAmerica.An

extra$3,750creditisprovidediftheapplicablepercentageofthevalueofthebatterycomponentswasmanufacturedorassembledinNorthAmerica.Theapplicable

percentagestartsat40percentin2023andincreasesgraduallyto80percentin

2027andbeyond.Tobeeligibleforthetaxbreak,startingin2024,qualifyingvehicles’batteriesalsocannotcontainanycomponentsmanufacturedorassembledbyaforeignentityofconcern(China,Russia,Iran,orNorthKorea),andstartingin2025,cannot

containanycriticalmineralsextracted,processed,orrecycledbyanyoftheseentities.

AsshowninTable3,onlyafractionoftotalextractionandprocessingcomesfromtheUnitedStatesandFTAcountries.Givenhowlongittakestodevelopnewmines(discussedinSection2.3),itwilllikelybedifficultforautomakerstofindsufficientcriticalmineralssothattheirvehicleswillbeeligibleforthetaxcredits.

Moreover,theIRAimplicitlycreatesincentivesforautomanufacturerstodeveloplargerbatteriesthroughitsAdvancedManufacturingProductionTaxCredit,whichprovidesbatterymanufacturersataxcreditof$35perkilowatt-hour(kWh)ofbatterycell

capacityandsignificantlymorecreditsbasedonkWhcapacityofthebatterymodules.Theproductionoflargerbatterieswillinturnincreasedemandforcriticalminerals.

9Morecountrieshavesincebeenadded.AsofSeptember2023,MSPpartnersincludeAustralia,Canada,Finland,France,Germany,India,Italy,Japan,Norway,theRepublicofKorea,Sweden,theUnitedKingdom,theUnitedStates,andtheEuropeanUnion(representedbytheEuropeanCommission).

PolicyChallengesforAccessingCriticalMineralstoElectrifyVehicleTransport11

Table3.SharesofGlobalProductionandReservesfromCountriesEligibleforIRATaxCredits

Criticalmineral

Shareof