此为英文文档nber -Are Software Automation and Teleworkers Substitutes - Preliminary Evidence from Japan

NBERWORKINGPAPERSERIES

ARESOFTWAREAUTOMATIONANDTELEWORKERSSUBSTITUTES?PRELIMINARYEVIDENCEFROMJAPAN

RichardBaldwin

ToshihiroOkubo

WorkingPaper31627

/papers/w31627

NATIONALBUREAUOFECONOMICRESEARCH

1050MassachusettsAvenue

Cambridge,MA02138

August2023

WethankDavidGreenaway,RichardKneller,andJonathanDingelforconstructivecommentsandsuggestions.WealsothankNIRA(ReikoKanda,AtsushiInoue,andKozueSekijima),andKoheiAndoforsurveypreparation,datacleaning,datapreparationandexcellentassistance.FinancialsupportfromJSPS(23H00821,19H01487),KeioUniversity(ResearchProjectforNextGeneration),andNIRAisgratefullyacknowledgedbyToshihiroOkubo.TheviewsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheNationalBureauof

EconomicResearch.

NBERworkingpapersarecirculatedfordiscussionandcommentpurposes.Theyhavenotbeenpeer-reviewedorbeensubjecttothereviewbytheNBERBoardofDirectorsthataccompaniesofficialNBERpublications.

©2023byRichardBaldwinandToshihiroOkubo.Allrightsreserved.Shortsectionsoftext,nottoexceedtwoparagraphs,maybequotedwithoutexplicitpermissionprovidedthatfullcredit,including©notice,isgiventothesource.

AreSoftwareAutomationandTeleworkersSubstitutes?PreliminaryEvidencefromJapanRichardBaldwinandToshihiroOkubo

NBERWorkingPaperNo.31627

August2023

JELNo.F6

ABSTRACT

Digitaltechnologyisreshapingworkplacesbyenablingspatialseparationofoffices,knownastelework,orremoteintelligence(RI),andbyfacilitatingautomationofservicesectortasksviaartificialintelligence(AI).ThispaperisafirstattempttoempiricallyinvestigatewhetherAIandRIarecomplementsorsubstitutesintheservicesector.Itusesaworker-levelpanelofsurveyscollectedfromaround10,000workersfrompre-COVID-19pandemictolate2022,wefindpreliminaryevidencethatsuggeststhatAIandRIarecomplementsratherthansubstitutes.TheevidencecomesfirstfromthepositivecorrelationofinvestmentsinAI-promotingandRI-promotingsoftwareatthefirmandworkerlevel,andsecondfromthepositivecorrelationofworkers'expectationsregardingteleworkandsoftwareautomation.Theevidenceisfarfromdefinitivebutsuggeststhatthecomplement-substitutionquestionisafruitfullineforfutureresearch.

RichardBaldwin

GraduateInstitute,Geneva

GenevaChem.Eugène-Rigot2

1202Genève

Switzerland

andCEPR

andalsoNBER

rbaldwin@

ToshihiroOkubo

KeioUniversity

2-15-45MitaMinato-ku

TokyoJapan

okubo@econ.keio.ac.jp

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1Introduction

Digitaltechnologyisreshapingworkplacesinwaysthatwereunimaginablejustafewyearsago.Thisishappeningintwodistinctways.First,digitechisunbundlingofficesinthesensethatsomeservicetasksthatweretraditionallyperformedbyworkerssittingphysicallyclosetoeachothercannowbeundertakenatadistance.Second,digitechisallowingmanymoreservicesectortaskstobeautomatedbysoftware.

Teleworkisonenameforthefirstimpactofdigitaltechnologyandthekeypointisthatdigitaltechnologyismakingremoteworkincreasinglyeasy.Ofcourse,teleworkingisnotanewphenomenonandfirstappearedinthe1970s(Nilles,1975;Aguileraetal.2016).Therewerealwayssomeworkerswhoworkedremotely–‘roadwarriors’wasonenameforserviceworkerswhoroutinelyparticipatedinofficeworkwhiletravellingvialaptops,emails,andmobilephones(Bloometal.2018).SincetheCovid-19restrictionsrequiredorencouragedworkerstoworkfromhome,thissortofteleworkhasbecomefarmorecommon(Kahn,2020).Thekeytechnicalinnovationsincludeimprovedcollaborativesoftwaresuites,videoconferencingapps,andsecure,cloud-baseddocumentsharingandediting.Todatemuchoftheteleworkisdonebydomesticworkers,butthetrendtowardsusingforeignremoteworkersiswellunderway–aphenomenonthatcanbecalledtelemigration.

Thesecondmajorimpactofdigitaltechnologyonworkpatternsconcernsautomationofmanytasksrelatedtoservicejobs.TherecentbreakthroughsingenerativeAI,suchasChatGPT,aretransformingmanyofficeandprofessionaljobs.ButevenbeforeChatGPT,softwaresuchasRoboticProcessAutomation(RPA),chatbots,andautomatictranslationappswereautomatingmanytaskstraditionallyperformedbyofficeworkersandprofessionals.Collectively,suchsoftwaremightbecalledsoftwarerobots,orwhite-collarrobots(todistinguishthesefromthemorefamiliarindustrialrobots).

Thekeyinnovationherewastherapidadvanceofmachinelearning.Before2017(theyearFortuneMagazinecalledtheyearofAI),computerscouldonlyperformtaskstheautomatedhumanthinkingoftheanalytic,conscioustype–whatDanielKahnemancalls‘thinkingslow’(Kahneman,2011).Thereasonwasduetothenatureofcomputerprogramming.Writingcoderequiresthecodertounderstandthementalprocessthatisbeingtaughttothecomputer.Computerscouldnotdointuitive,unconsciousthinking–likerecognizingfacesinphotos,ortranslatinglanguages–sincehumansdidnotunderstandhowhumansthinkintuitively(westilldonot).Anewwayofwritingcomputerprogramsrelaxedthisconstraint.AformofAI,calledmachinelearning,alloweddatascientiststoestimateverylargeandverycomplexstatisticalmodelsthatmimichumanunconsciousthinking–orwhatKahneman(2011)calls‘thinkingfast’.Since2017,computersareasgoodorbetterthanhumansinsomeinstinctual,unconsciousmentaltasks—thingslikerecognizingspeech,readinghandwriting,andidentifyingobjectsinphotos.Therateofadvanceinthisfieldisastounding.

Themergerofthesetwoemergenttrends–globalisationandrobotisationofservicesectortasks–hasbeencollectivelyreferredtoasthe"GloboticsUpheaval"(Baldwin,2019).In2022,thepossibilityofdigitaltechnologydisruptingworkplacesanddisplacingjobsisnolongeraconjecture.Moreover,ineconomieswherejobsarethefoundationofeconomicprosperityandsocialstanding,thedisruptivenatureofcompetitionfromdistantteleworkersandnearbyservicetaskautomationsoftwareisareal

concern.

Thedualnatureofthedigitechimpactonthefutureofworkpromptsanimportantquestionabouttherelationshipbetweenservicesectorautomationandoffshoring:aretheycomplementsorsubstitutes?IsAIappliedinofficesasubstituteforremoteintelligence(RI)employedinoffices?Ortoputitmoredirectly,willteleworkingmakeitmorelikelythatyouremployerwillautomatepartorallofyourjob?Oneexamplewheretheyareclearlysubstitutableisinthedomainofcallcenterswhereautomationisreplacingremoteworkers.Callcenters,anintegralpartofmanyservice-sectorbusinesses,oftendeliveressentialsupportservicesusingworkerslocatedinlowercostplaceswithinthesamecountryoreveninothercountries.Inrecentyears,however,manyofthejobsinthesecallcentersarereplacingworkerswithchatbots,whicharejustAI-driveautomationsoftware.Anexample

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presentedintheMITTechnologyReview(Hao,2020)relateshowthelocalgovernmentinOtsegoCountyNewYorkusedIBM’s‘WatsonAssistantforCitizens’torespondtothesurgeinroutinequestionsaboutCovid-19whilecuttingstaffbyhalf.Duringthepandemic,IBMsawatwo-fifthsboostintheuseofitsWatsonAssistant.TheemergenceofverycapablechatbotshasledtoareductionofhumansemployedincallcentersinthePhilippinesandIndia.Asusualitisnotafullsubstitution,sincehumansstillliketotalktohumans,andchatbotsdonothavetheanswertoeveryquestionbutaschatbotsadvance,thenumberofhumansneededwillfall.

Anothertypeofworker-substitutingautomationiscalled‘RoboticProcessAutomation’(RPA).AsJasonKingdon,whochairsanRPAcompany,BluePrism,describesthem:“Theymimicahuman.Theydoexactlywhatahumandoes.Ifyouwatchoneofthesethingsworking.…youseeittyping.Screenspop-up,youseeitcuttingandpasting.”RPAsaredesignedtoworkasanautomatedofficeworkerwhichiswhyBluePrismcallsthesoftwarerobots.ThecommercialinterestinRPAliesinthewayitcanreducethenumberofworkersinback-officeprocesses.RPAsarealsomoreconsistentthanworkersandtheycreateadigitalrecordoftheiractivity.RPAsneedhumanbackupfordifficultcases,butthenumberofworkersisreduced.Asmanyofthese‘assemblyline’informationprocessingjobswereshiftedtoteleworkduringthepandemic,RPAcanbethoughtofasbeingasubstituteofRI.

Onthecomplementside,oneobviousautomationsoftwarethatbooststheuseofremoteworkersisautomatictranslation.Withthewidespreadadoptionofmachinetranslationtechnology,remoteworkhasbecomeincreasinglyaccessibletonon-Englishspeakingworkers.Formanyservicetasks,allthatisneededisaccesstotheinternetconnection,alaptop,andtherequisiteskills.WithsoftwarelikeGoogleTranslate,DeepLTranslator,orBingMicrosoftTranslator,workerslivingincountrieswhere$5anhouraffordsamiddle-classlivingcanpotentiallybeworkmateswithofficeworkersinwealthiernations.HereAIisacomplementtoRIsincetheAIismakingtheRIeasiertodoforworkerswithoutlanguageskills.Inessence,theAImakesiteasierforforeignbasedfreelancersandremoteworkerstodelivercontentinEnglishevenwhentheyarenotnativespeakers.

LiteratureReview

TheliteratureontheimpactofComputers/Robots/ICT/AIonlaborhasbeengrowinginthelastdecades(Acemoglu,2007;Autoretal.2013;AcemogluandRestrepo,2018).ThetheoreticalworkhasfocusedontheimpactoftechnologicaladvancessuchasICTandrobotsonemploymentandwages.Autoretal.(2003),forinstance,modelledunskilledworkersasperformingmostlyroutinetasks,andskilledworkersasperformingmostlynon-routinetasks.Theimpactofautomationonthetwotypesoflabordependsuponwhetherthetechnologyissubstitutablefororcomplementarytothetwotypesoftasks.Assumingautomationisasubstituteforroutinetasksbutacomplementtonon-routinetasks,automationraisesthegapbetweenjobopportunitiesandwagesforunskilledversusskilledlabor.ThisaccountsforpolarizationintheUSlabormarket.Goosetal.(2007,2009,2014)foundthatunskilledlaborshiftedfromreplaceablejobsbyautomationtonon-replaceablebutlow-incomejobsintechnologicalchangeinEurope.Beyondthis,asshowninBrynjolfssonandMcAfee(2014)andFord

(2016),automationisdeeplyspreadoverthelabormarketinmanydimensions.FreyandOsborne

(2013)predictedaroundhalfofoccupationswillbedisruptedbyautomationinthefuture.

Turningtoremoteintelligence(RI),therearealreadysomestudiesonremoteworkbeforethepandemicinworker-levelanalysisoflaboreconomics.Remoteworkhasseveraladvantagessuchasimprovingwork-lifebalance(Dutcher,2012;CoenenandKok,2014;Kazekami,2020)andproductivities(Bartiketal.2020).WiththespreadofCovid-19,studiesontheimpactofteleworkingoneconomiesincreased(Adams-Prassl,etal.2022;2023;Alipouretal.2021;2023;Bonacinietal.,2021;KawaguchiandMotegi,2021;Morikawa,2022;Mongeyetal.2021;Okubo,2022;Okuboetal.2021).DingelandNeiman(2021)suggestedthattherearesomespecificoccupationssuitableforremotework.TheirderivedremoteworkableindexbyoccupationbasedonO*NETinformationfoundthat37%ofjobsintheUnitedStatescanbeperformedentirelyathome.

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Asfarasweknow,nostudieshaveinvestigatedthenexusofautomationbyAIandremoteworkbyRIintheirlong-runaspects.OurpaperisaimedatinvestigatingthesubstitutabilityofAIandRItolaboratoccupationallevelandprovidingevidencefromJapaneseworker-levelsurveys.Furthermore,thesurveyweuseisuniqueinthatitdirectlyaskedworkersabouttheiruseandtheircompany’suseofAIandRIaswellastheirexpectationsconcerningtheimpactofAIandRIontheirownjobsinthefuture,andwhethertheyseeAIandRIassubstitutesorcomplementstotheirjobs.Inaddition,thesurveygathersextensiveinformationontheworkers’basiccharacteristics,thetaskstheirjobinvolves,andinformationontheirfirm.

Planofpaper

ThispaperinvestigatesthesubstitutabilityofAIandRIattheoccupationallevelinthecontextofJapanusingauniquepanelofsurveyscollectedfromabout10,000workerswithastartdatethatwasjustbeforetheCovid-19shockandcontinueduntillate2022.

Theinvestigationstartsbyexaminingthetechnicalteleworkabilityandautomatabilityofoccupationsasafirststeptolookingattheactualco-movementofteleworkandsoftwareautomation.Thisisbasedonexanteevaluationoftheoccupationdescriptions.ThemostfamousoftheseisDingelandNeiman(2020)whichexaminesthejobdescriptionsontheUS’sO*NET.AsimilarexercisehasbeendoneusingJapan’sO*NETbyKotera(2021).Whenitcomestoautomatability,welookatthefamousFrey-OsbourneindexofautomatabilitytogaugehowautomatabilityofvariousoccupationsinUS.Equivalently,FreyandOsbourne(2015)calculatedtheindexofautomatabilityforcaseofJapanincollaborationwithNRI(NomuraResearchInstitute).

Tosummarizethetechnicalfeasibilityforvariousoccupations,weintroducethe"Globoticsquadrantdiagram,"whichmapsoccupationsintoatwo-dimensionalchartbasedontheirautomatabilityandteleworkability.ThescatterchartisusedtoillustratedataforboththeUnitedStatesandJapan.Thecentralargumentisthatwhilesomeoccupationsarebothautomatableandteleworkable,manyothersaresuitedtoonlyoneorneither,asdeterminedbystandardmeasuressuchastheDingel-NeimanindexforteleworkandtheFreyandOsborneindexforautomatability.

ThesubsequentsectionofthepaperexaminestheimpactoftheCOVID-19pandemicinJapanontherelationshipbetweenAIandRIusingdatafromthesurvey,whichwasconductedbyToshihiroOkubo(KeioUniversity)andNIRA(NipponInstituteforResearchAdvancement).Whilethesurveyprovidesdetailedinformationonthenumberofworkerswhoswitchedtoteleworking,itlacksdataonthenumberofworkerswhowerereplacedbywhite-collarrobots.Thus,adirecttestofthesubstitution-versus-complementarityquestioncannotbeassessed.However,thesurveydoesprovideinformationonfirms'useofsoftwarethatfacilitatesteleworkandautomationofofficetasks,respectively.

Usinginformationonfirms’usageofpro-RIandpro-AIsoftware(asreportedbytheworkers),andtheexogeneityoftheCOVID-19shock,thepaperexamineswhetherfirms'investmentsinAI-promotingsoftwareandRI-promotingsoftwarewerepositivelyornegativelycorrelated.Giventhattheriseinteleworkwasdirectlyinducedbythepandemic,whiletheadoptionofautomationsoftwarewasnot,apositivecorrelationwouldsuggestthatAIandRIarecomplements,whileanegativecorrelationwouldsuggestsubstitution.Inshort,westudywhethercompaniesthatusedmoreteleworkinvestedinmoreorlessservice-tasksoftwareautomation,likeRPA.

Thefinalsubstantivesectionturnstoanotherindirectproxyforsubstitutionandcomplementarybehavior.Thesurveyincludesquestionstoworkersabouttheirexpectationsaboutfutureuseofteleworkandsoftwareautomation.ThisevidencestrandprovidesadditionalinsightintotherelationshipbetweenRIandAI.

Whiletheevidencepresentedinthispaperisnotconclusive,whatisclearisthatonthewholeteleworkandautomationdonotseemtobesubstitutes.Weshowthatteleworkandautomationaretechnicallypossibleformanyoccupations,butthereisnoclearevidencethatautomationwasless

5

usedinoccupationswhereteleworkrosethemost.WetakethisaspreliminaryevidencethatinthecontextoftheCovid-19shock,AIandRIareeitherindependentorcomplementsnotsubstitutes.

2TeleworkabilityandautomatabilityintheUSandJapan:The

globoticsquadrantdiagram

Thingscanbesubstitutable,complementary,orindependent.Theideaofsubstitutabilitymeanstwothingscanbereplacedbyoneanother;complementaritymeanstwothingsareusedtogether.Itisalsopossiblethatthetwothingsareindependentandhavenothingtodowitheachother.Thesedefinitionsareimportantwhenwethinkaboutofficeautomationandteleworkbecausenotalljobscanbeautomatedandnotallcanbedoneviatelework.

Thepossibilitythatautomationandremoteworkaresubstitutesorcomplementsarisesforoccupationswherebothautomationandteleworkarefeasible.Incontemplatingtheirimpact,wemustfirstdeterminewhichoccupationsarecapableofbeingautomatedandperformedremotely.Toclassifyoccupationsbasedonthissuitability,weintroducethe“globoticsquadrant”diagram.Itallowsustoassesstheteleworkabilityandautomatabilityofeachoccupation,thusdeterminingthepotentialforautomationtosubstituteforremoteworkandviceversa.

2.1Whichservicejobsareoffshoreandautomatable?

Sincetheonsetofthepandemicin2019,economistshavemadeseveralattemptstoclassifyoccupationsintoteleworkableandnon-teleworkablecategories.ThemostfamouswasbyDingleandNeiman(2020)fortheUS,whilstthebest-knowneffortwasbyFreyandOsborne(2013).ThesearethemeasuresweuseinthefirstinstancewhenlookingattheUS.

Weplotoccupationsinaquadrantdiagram,whatwecalltheGloboticsQuadrant(Figure1)

3

.Thehorizontalandverticallinesaredrawnatthemeanvalueforalloccupations,sooccupationstotheleftoftheverticallinearelessthanaverageautomatableandthosebelowthehorizontallinearelessthanaverageteleworkable.WhiletheoriginalFrey-OsborneandDingle-NeimanestimatesweredoneattheBLSoccupationlevel,itwouldbetooclutteredtopresentallinasinglediagram,sowehaveaggregatedtheBLSoccupationsintoJapan’s38occupations(NIRAclassification)weightedbyoccupationallaborforceinJapan(PopulationCensus)(SeeAppendixTable).WefirstfocusonlyonUSdata.BelowwecontrasttheseresultswithsimilarmeasuresforJapan.

3OriginalideaandbasicconceptofthediagramonpolicyperspectivewerefirstlyproposedbyOkubo(2022c).

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Figure1:TheUSgloboticsquadrant:occupationsbyautomatabilityandteleworkability

Source:Authors’elaborationofdatafromDingel-Neiman(telework),andFrey-Osbourne(automatability).Note:Eachpointrepresentsanoccupation;x-axisshowstheautomatabilityscore(from0to1),andy-axisisteleworkableScore(0to1).OccupationsgroupedintoJapan’sNIRA38aggregates.

Toreadthediagram,keepinmindthefactthatoccupationsintheNortheastquadrantareexposedtoaboveaverageoffshorability(takingteleworkabilityasaroughindicatorofoffshorability)andtoaboveaverageautomation.ThoseintheSouthwestareexposedtobelowaverageteleworkabilityandautomatability.Intheothertwoquadrants,theoccupationshaveaboveaverageexposuretoteleworkabilityorautomatabilitybutbelowaverageexposuretotheother.ThelabelsinthediagramshowthenumberofUSworkerswithoccupationsineachofthequadrants.

Thekeytakeawaysaresimple.First,occupationsarespreadacrossallfourquadrants,sotheimpactofadvancingdigitaltechnologywillvarygreatlybyoccupation.TherecanbenouniversalanswertothequestionofwhetherAIandRIarecomplementsorsubstitutes.Forparticularoccupations,AIandRIcanbesubstitutesorcomplements,butnotasageneralstatementaboutalloccupations.

Second,thereareabout12millionworkersintheoccupationsfoundintheNortheastquadrant,whichisabout10%ofoccupationsclassified(Table1).ThesearejobswhereAIandRIarebothrelevantandthuspotentiallycomplementsorsubstitutestoeachother.Theoccupationsinthequadrantaregeneralclerical,outdoorservice,andofficeapplianceworkers.

Thereareabout21millionworkersinoccupationsintheNorthwestquadrant(Table1).Thesejobsaredifficulttoautomatebuteasilyundertakeninremoteplaces.Theoccupationsareaccountancyclerks,productionrelatedclerical,agriculturalforestryandfisheryengineers,foodanddrinkcookingstaffandservingcustomers,transportationandmachineoperation,agricultureforestryandfishery,manufacturingprocess,carryingcleaningpackagingandrelated,sales,constructionandmining,familylifesupportandcareservice.

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Table1:USoccupationsandjobs(millions)inUSgloboticsquadrants

Quadrant

Jobs

Quadrant

Jobs

Northwesttotal

20.7

Northeasttotal

11.7

Accountancyclerks

2.5

Generalclerical

1

Production-relatedclerical

0

Outdoorservice

1.4

Agriculture,forestry,andfisheryengineers

0.6

Officeapplianceoperators

4.6

Foodanddrinkcooking,staffservingcustomers

6.6

Transportandpostclerical

0.9

Transportandmachineoperation

1.7

Salesclerks

1.8

Agriculture,forestryandfishery

0.8

Managerofresidentialfacilitiesandbuildings

1.4

Manufacturingprocess

1.6

Financeandinsuranceprofessionals

0.6

Carrying,cleaning,packaging,andrelated

5.4

Sales

0.1

Constructionandmining

0.2

FamilyLifeSupportandCareService

1.1

Source:Authors’elaborationofdatafromDingel-Neiman(telework),andFrey-Osbourne(automatability).Note:Eachpointrepresentsanoccupation;x-axisshowstheautomatabilityscore(from0to1),andy-axisisteleworkableScore(0to1).

OccupationsintheSouthwestcornerarebothdifficulttoautomateanddifficulttoundertakefromaremotelocationsotheissueofsubstitutabilityandcomplementaritydoesnotreallyarise.Manyoftheseareinfactlistedashavingzeroteleworkability,sotheissueofsubstitutesversuscomplementsdoesnotarise.

Third,thereisnoclearcorrelationbetweenteleworkabilityandautomatability.Forinstance,wedonotseemostprofessionsintheNortheastandSouthwestquadrantsaswouldbethecaseifautomationandteleworkabilitywerepositivelycorrelatedacrossprofessions.Thisstressestheneedfornuancewhenthinkingabouttheimpactofdigitaltechnologyonthefutureofwork.

Fourth,thelackofaclearpositiveornegativecorrelationissuggestiveofalackofeconomy-widesubstitutabilityorcomplementarity.Ifalltheoccupationshadlinedupinapositivelyslopedline,wecouldsaythatinareduced-formsense,teleworkandautomatabilitytendedtobedonetogether.Whenyouseealotofteleworkability,youseealotofautomatability.Bycontrast,aclearnegativecorrelationwouldhavesuggestedareduced-formsubstitutability.Occupationstendedtobeeitherautomatableandnotveryteleworkable,orviceversa.

2.2JapanesequadrantcontrastwithUS

ThescoresinFigure1arebasedonananalysisofthetasksinvolvedinthevariousoccupationsanalyzedintheUS.AsimilaranalysishasbeendoneforJapan.Specifically,weusetheteleworkabilityindexofKotera(2020)basedonrecalculatingDingelNeiman’sremoteworkindexbyusingtheJapan’sO*NET.WealsousetheautomatabilityindexbyFreyandOsbourne(2015,NRIreport),recalculatedastheJapanesecase.

8

Teleworkability

22

2223

10

24

26

29

32

3529

8

0.00

0.00

23

1.00

27

8

35

28

Automatiability

1.00

US

JP

0.50

10

30

28

0.50

32

24

273737

30

26

Overall,Japaneseoccupationsarejudgedasbothlessteleworkableandlessautomatable.Onthescale

ofzerotoone,theUSaverageautomatablescoreis0.51whileitis0.32inJapan.Forteleworkability,theaveragesare0.47and0.41.

Figure2:AutomatabilityandTeleworkable,officeandwalkingserviceoccupations:USvsJapan

Teleworkability

1.00

25

25

1

19

12

19

6

2

12

11

20

20

US

JP

1

11

6

2

0.50

0.00

0.000.501.00

Automatiability

#OfficeWorkOccupations#WalkingServiceOccupations

1Administrativeandmanagerialworkers8Publichealthnurses,midwives,andnurses

2Researchers10Professionalsocialwelfareworkers

6Dataprocessingandcommunicationengineers22Salesclerks

12Financeandinsuranceprofessionals23Outdoorserviceworkers

19Generalclericalworkers24Transportandpostclericalworkers

20Accountancyclerks26Salesworkers

25Officeapplianceoperators27WorkersinFamilyLifeSupportandCareService

28Occupationalhealthandhygieneserviceworkers

29Foodanddrinkcooking,staffservingcustomers

30Managerofresidentialfacilitiesandbuildings

32Securityworkers

35Transportandmachineoperationworkers

37Carrying,cleaning,packaging,andrelatedworkers

Source:Authors’elaborationofdatafromDingel-Neiman(telework),andFrey-Osbourne(automatability).Note:Eachpointrepresentsanoccupation;x-axisshowstheautomatabilityscore(from0to1),andy-axisisteleworkableScore(0to1).

Figures2and3compareUSandJapaneseteleworkabilityandautomatabilityscoresbydistinguishingoccupationsbythreebroadcategoriesofserviceoccupations:officeworkers,professionalserviceworkers,andwalkingserviceworkers(seelistunderthefigures).

Figure2(leftpanel),showsthecomparisonforofficeworkers,itindicatesthattheresultsfortheUSandJapanarenotverydifferentwhenitcomestooffice-basedoccupations.AllbuttwooftheoccupationsareinthesamequadrantforboththeUSandJapanesecase.Moreover,thereisnotapervasivedifferenceineitherdimension.Forexample,threeoftheeightoccupationsarereportedasmoreteleworkableinJapan,andfouraremoreautomatable,buttwoarebothmoreautomatableandteleworkable,andthreehavelowerscoresinJapanonbothdimensions.Bycontra