Devinit-英国在充满挑战的全球背景下的援助趋势（英）

June2023UKaidtrendsinachallengingglobal

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0ContentsIntroduction2Keyfindings4OveralltrendsinUK

ODA

6ODAgrowthamongG7providersfrom2012onwards6ODAgrowthamongG7providersfrom2012onwards7BreakdownofUK

aidfrom2012to20228Trendsin

FCDObilateralaidbyregion9UK’sspendingonin-donor

refugeecostsincontext

11TheUK

hasthehighestper

capitain-donorrefugeecostsinEurope13Unpacking‘non-allocable’aid

15Overallcompositionin202115Implicationsforregionalfocus

17Conclusion21Notes22UKaidtrendsin

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1IntroductionInthisbriefing,we

setoutrecenttrendsintheUK’sofficialdevelopmentassistance(ODA).TheUKisthefifthlargestdonorand

historicallyhasfocuseditsODAonwhereitismostneeded.However,

since2020the

UKaid

budget

hasbeensubjectto

severalroundsofcuts,despiteglobalneed

in

low-andmiddle-incomecountriesincreasing

duetotheCovid-19pandemic

and

thefalloutfromtheRussianinvasionofUkraine.

Thespeedandseverityofthesecuts1

havedamagedrelationships

with

several

keypartnersandimpactedtheUK’sabilityto

deliveron

someof

itsdevelopmentobjectives,suchaspromotingfoodsecurity.2

TheForeignCommonwealthandDevelopmentOffice(FCDO)inparticularhasseensharpcutstoitsbilateralprogrammes:asidefrom

totalUKaidexpenditurefalling,an

increasingamount

of

ithasbeenabsorbedbyrisingin-donorrefugeecosts;spentthroughotherdepartments;orcountedas

vaccinedonations

(thatmanyhavearguedshouldnotbeincludedinODA3

atall).Furthermore,aidcutsweredisproportionatelyconcentratedin

Africa,theregionwitharguablythegreatestneed.In2022,

thistrendsawpartialreversals.Grossnationalincome(GNI)

increasedsubstantiallyincurrentterms(by

9.8%,4

partlydueto

inflation)

leadingto

an

increaseintheaidbudget.

Further

tothis,AndrewMitchell

–anMP

whowasprominentindefendingtheUK’saidbudget

–wasappointedasMinister

ofStateforDevelopmentandAfrica,andsuccessfullypushedforanadditional£2.5billioninaid5

tobespentbetween2022and2023.Consequently,

UK

ODAincreasedby

11.8%incurrentterms.However,this

increasewasnot

enoughtokeeppacewiththe

increasein

in-donorrefugeecostsresultingfromUkrainiansfleeingto

theUKfollowingRussia’sinvasion

in2022.Furthermore,

theglobalcontextremainschallenging.Asidefromtheimpactonin-donorrefugeecosts,theinvasionhasalsohadasignificantimpactonfoodsecurity

duetothecollapsein

foodexportsfrombothRussiaandUkraine,twoofthelargestexportersinseveralimportantcommodities.Additionally,theimpactsofthe

Covid-19pandemicwerestillfeltinmanycountries

in

2022,thenumberof

countries

in

debtdistressincreased,andtheimpactofclimatechangebecameevermore

apparent,especially

incountries

likePakistan.6What’smore,the

falloutfromtheinvasionofUkraineledtoadeteriorationin

theUK’sfiscalposition,

asthegovernmentprovidedhouseholdswithlargeenergysubsidiestohelpthemcopewiththesubsequently

higherenergypricescaused

inpartbytheconflict.Thisislikelytoimpacthow

soontheUK

returnstospending0.7%ofitsGNIonODA,whichisdeterminedbytwofiscalrulesagreedbythegovernmentin2021.

Whilelastyear,fiscalprojectionsfromtheOfficefor

BudgetResponsibilitymadeareturnto

0.7%

in2023/4seemlikely,theTreasuryisnow

not

expectingthisuntil

after2027/28atleast.7Thisbriefingprovides

anupdateon

theanalysispresentedin

DevelopmentInitiatives’2022publication,‘UK

aid:

Trends

in

the

quality

and

quantity

of

UK

ODA’.ItdiscussestrendsinUK

ODAin

thecontextofrecentevents,evaluatingtheimpactof

in-donorrefugeecosts,situatingtheUKamongotherdonors,andattemptingto

providegreaterUKaidtrendsin

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2clarityonwhereUK

aidisactuallyspentbyunbundlingtheincreasingshareofODA

thatcannot

beallocatedbyregion.Aboutthe

datain

thisbriefingThisbriefinguses

datafromthe

OrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment’sDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(OECDDAC)8

whichprovidescompleteand

verifiedODAdata,andthusanimportantanddetailedpictureof

the

aidlandscapeover

time.Preliminarytop-leveldatafordonorODAhasbeenmadeavailablefor2022followingtheOECDDAC

April2022datarelease.9

FullydisaggregatedOECDDACdatais,however,

publishedatleast

ayear

inarrears,meaningthatthelatestdetailedaiddatais

availableonlyupto2021.TheOECDDACdatafor

theUK

presentedinthispaper

isin

GBP,constant2021prices.Wheredataiscomparedwithother

DACdonors,values

areshowninUSD.Thisdatais

supplementedby

preliminarydatapublishedbythe

UK

governmenton

StatisticsonInternationalDevelopment

(SID)10whichincludesseveraladditionalaggregatesnot

availablein

theOECDDAC

preliminaryrelease.Wherepossible,thisanalysisusesnet

disbursementswhichallowsforconsistentcomparisonsoverthelastdecade.However,

thelatest

dataonUKSID

only

presentsgrant-equivalentdatafrom2018

onwardsandthereforeanalysisfromSIDgenerallyusesnetdisbursementupuntil2017andgrantequivalent

thereafter.

Thedifferenceisgenerallysmallfor

theUK

asitprovidesverylittleaidintheformofloans.

WherewerefertoForeign,CommonwealthandDevelopmentOffice(FCDO)data

before2021,thisindicatescombineddatafor

theForeign&CommonwealthOffice(FCO)andDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment

(DFID)priortotheirSeptember2020merger.Lastyear’sbriefingonUKaid

includedanalysisof

thelatestdatafromtheInternationalAid

TransparencyInitiative(IATI).However,

whileinpreviousyearsFCDO

hasregularlyupdatedIATI

data,allowingfornear

real-timeinsightinto

aidflowsfromtheUK’s

largestaid-spendingdepartment,thishas

not

beenthecasesinceDecember2022.Consequently,IATI

dataforFCDOiscurrentlynotcompleteenoughto

warrantanalysis.FCDOhaveinformedusthatthisis

theresultofmergingdatasystemspreviouslyhostedseparatelybyDFIDandFCO.UKaidtrendsin

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3KeyfindingsTheUK

remainedthefifthlargestdonor

involumetermsin

2022MultiplecountriessawlargeincreasesinODA

between2021–2022,withtotal

DAC

ODAincreasingby

15%

overthis

period,largelydrivenby

in-donorrefugeecosts

(IDRC).ButalthoughtheUK

hasfallenfrombeingthesecondlargestdonorin

volumetermsin

2014tobeingthefifthlargestin

2022,thereisstillacleargapbetweenthe

top

fiveandtherestoftheDAC.Whenin-donorrefugeecostsareexcluded,theUKwastheonlyG7countrytospendlessin2022thanin2012Trendsin

UKaidareout

ofstepwiththe

restoftheG7.

Theaverage(unweighted)increaseinODA

between2012–2022amongG7countrieswas74%

(whenexcludingin-donorrefugeecosts),whereastheUK

recordedadecreaseof

17%.SupportforUkrainemeant

thatFCDO

aidto

EuropeincreasedsharplyFCDObilateralaid

toEuropeincreasedfrom

£61millionto£296million

between

2021and2022inconstantterms,a381%

increase.Consequently,Europe’sshare

ofregionallyallocableaid

increasedfrom2%to12%.By

contrast,AfricaandAsiarecordeddeclinesof

23%

and16%respectively.UKin-donorrefugeecosts

(IDRC)reachedanew

peakin

2022,up

234%on

2021andnearly600%

on2019IDRCpeakedat£3.5billioninconstant2021prices,morethanwasspent

in

alltheyearspriorto2021combined.Whilethiswaspartly

duetoan

increaseinrefugees

resultingfromthewar

intheUkraine,therewerepre-existingissueswiththecostsofhostingasylum-seekersintemporaryaccommodationthatcontributedto

thisincrease.TheUK

has

byfarthehighestpercapitain-donorrefugeecostsinEurope,despitecomparatively

modestcostsoflivingWe

estimatethattheUK’s

percapita

in-donorrefugeecostswere

roughly

£19,600in2022,around47%

higherthan

inIrelandwhichhas

thenext

highestIDRCinEurope.FranceandItalybothhavecomparablestandardsofliving

tothoseoftheUK(asmeasuredbyGDP

percapita)but

eachhadpercapita

costs

oflessthanonethird

ofthoseintheUK.Non-region-allocableaidnowaccountsfornearlyhalfofFCDObilateralODAThepercentageof

FCDO’s

bilateralaidwhichcouldnotbe

allocatedto

specificregionsincreasedfrom29%

in

2012(DFIDandFCOcombined)to45%in2022.This

is

aconsiderablyhigher

increasethantheDACdonor

average.UKaidtrendsin

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4TheincreaseinFCDO’snon-allocableaid

waslargely

down

toincreased

contributionstoBritishInternationalInvestmentand

theCOVID-19VaccinesGlobalAccess(COVAX)initiativeThiswasdriveninpartbythe

way

inwhichcontributionstotheUK’sdevelopmentfinanceinstitutionarerecorded,whichdiffersfrommanyother

countries.Furthermore,theUKsignificantlyincreasedaidforspecific

purposefunds

duringtheCovid-19pandemic

(viathedonationof

vaccinesto

COVAX,forexample).UKaidtrendsin

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5Overalltrendsin

UK

ODAODAgrowthamongG7providersfrom2012onwardsTheUnitedKingdomrecordedthelargestfall

inODAbetween2021and

2022when

in-donorrefugeecostsareremoved.Figure1:TotalODA

(net

disbursements)byDACcountryexcludingin-donorrefugeecosts,US$billionsconstant2021prices,

changefrom2021–2022US$billions01020304050UnitedStatesGermanyJapanFranceUnitedKingdomCanadaNetherlandsSwedenincreasefrom2021decreasefrom2021ItalyNorwaySpainSwitzerlandKoreaAustraliaBelgiumDenmarkAustriaFinlandIrelandPolandLuxembourgNewZealandPortugalHungaryCzechiaGreeceSlovakRepublicSloveniaLithuaniaIcelandSource:DIanalysis

of

OECDDACTable1.Notes:Datarefersto

constantUS$billions,net

disbursements.UKaidtrendsin

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6•TotalglobalODA

increasedbyUS$28.4billion(15%)in2022andnearlyeveryDAC

memberrecordedanincrease(apart

from

Australia,Greece,HungaryandNewZealand).Thiswas

largelydueto

theprovisionof

humanitarianassistancetoUkraineandtheincreasein

in-donorrefugeecostsresultingfromlargenumbersofUkrainiansfleeingthewar.

WhenaidrelatingtoUkraineis

excluded,globalODAfell

by

US$4.9billion(3%).••Formanycountries,in-donorrefugeecostsdominatedaid

spendingin2022.Poland,CzechiaandIrelandeachspent

morethanhalfoftheirODA

onthiscategoryin2022.TheUK’sODAlargelyfollowedthe

sametrend.However,the

countryrecordedthelargest

absoluteincreasein

in-donorrefugeecosts

involumeterms.Italsorecordedthegreatest

fallin

ODAoutofalltheDACcountries(around20%)whenthesecostsareomitted.ODAgrowthamongG7providersfrom2012

onwardsWhenin-donorrefugeecostsareexcluded,theUKwastheonlyG7countrytospendlessonODAin

2022thanin

2012.Figure2:

Percentage

changeinODA(netdisbursements)excludingin-donorrefugeecosts,2012–2022160Japan140GermanyItaly12010080%60CanadaFrance40UnitedStates200UnitedKingdom-20-402012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022Source:DIanalysis

of

OECDDAC

Table1.Notes:Datarefersto

constantUS$billions,net

disbursements.UKaidtrendsin

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7•Inconstant2021US

dollars,aid

fromthe

UKincreasedby54%

between2012and2019,andby

50%whenin-donorrefugeecostsareexcluded.

However,between2019and2022,UK

aidfell

by25%or

45%whenin-donorrefugeecostsareexcluded.

In2020,therewasadecreasecausedbythedeclinein

GNIfollowingactionstakentocontroltheCovid-19pandemic(theUKchosenotto

goabovethelegallymandatedtarget

of0.7%ofGNI).In

2021,

furthercutswerecausedbyadecisiontoreducethetargetto0.5%.••TheUK

wasthe

onlycountry

intheG7toseeadeclinein

ODA(excluding

in-donorrefugeecosts)in

realtermsbetween2012and2022,recordinga17%

falloverthisperiod.TheUS

recordedthesmallestincrease

(28%,

45percentagepointshigher

thantheUK’s

change).

Germany,ItalyandJapaneachrecordedincreasesofover100%overthesameperiod.Consequently,theUK

fellfrombeingthesecondlargestdonor

in

2012(behindonlythe

US)tothefifthlargestin

2022

(havingbeenovertakenby

France,GermanyandJapan).This

istrue

whetherornotin-donorrefugeecostsareincluded.Breakdownof

UKaidfrom2012to

2022Figure3:UK

aidtrendschart,2012–2022,constant2021GBPbillionilateralCovid-19activitiesDebt

reliefBilateralhumanitarianassistanceBilateraldevelopmentODA6In-donorrefugeecosts4MultilateralODA202012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022Source:DIanalysis

of

OECDDAC

Table1and

UKStatistics

onInternationalDevelopment.Notes:Datarefersto

constant

GBP

billions,

netdisbursements.•UKODA

spendingwasstablebetween

2013and2020at

0.7%

ofGNI,but

theUKgovernmentvotedto

temporarilyreducetheODA

budgetto

0.5%

in2021,UKaidtrendsin

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8resultingin

asubstantialfallinODAbetween2020

and

2021.In2022,the

UKincreased

theamountto0.51%of

GNI,inanticipationofthesubstantialincreasein

in-donorrefugeecosts

(whichareeligibletobe

countedasODA).However,whiletheincrease

in

both

GNIand

thesharespenton

ODAledtoanincreaseof£0.33billionintotalnetaiddisbursements

(inconstant2021prices),in-donorrefugeecostsincreasedby

£2.5billionin

2022,meaningremainingaidfellby£2.1billion.•In-donorrefugeecosts

increasedmorethanthreefoldrelativeto

2021,

when

theystoodat£1.1billion,

thepreviousrecordhigh.Thelargeincreasewaspartiallyattributabletothe

RussianinvasionofUkraine

whichledtorecord

numbersofrefugeesin

manyEuropeancountries.But

it

isalsoattributableto

ongoingissueswithprovidingaccommodation

forasylum-seekersin

theUK.

Roughestimatessuggestthateven

ifcostsforUkrainianrefugees

wereomitted,in-donorrefugeecostscouldstillhaveamountedtoaround£1.8billion

(see

Box

1).Multilateralaidfellfrom£4.7billionin2021to

£3.1billionin2022,its

lowest

levelsince2009(inconstant2021prices).Thisrepresenteda33%

fall,comparedtothefall

inbilateralaid(excludingIDRC)of20%.••AsashareoftotalODA,multilateralODAfellto

26%,itslowestsharesince

2005whentheUK’sbilateralaidwasboostedbysubstantialdebt

reliefoperations.However,thiswaslargelyaresultofin-donorrefugeecosts.Withoutthese,multilateralODAwouldrepresent36%oftotalODA.•Humanitarianaidincreasedfrom£0.7to£1.0billionin

constantpricesbetween2021and2022.This

waspartlyduetoUkraine,whichreceived

£148millioninhumanitarianaidfromtheUK(US$191millionincurrentprices).Whileincomplete,datafromthe

UN’sFinancialTrackingService11

suggeststhathumanitarianaidtoAfghanistanalsoincreasedsubstantially.••Bilateralaid

forCovid-19activitiescontinuedto

decline,from£0.6billionin2021to£0.3billionin

2022.Preliminarydatafor2022suggeststhatthe

shareof

total

ODA

spentthroughFCDOcontinuedto

decline.In2022,60%

ofODA

wasspentthroughFCDOcomparedwith72%in2021.However,2022

wasanunusualyeargiventheelevatedin-donorrefugeecosts.Whenin-donorrefugeecostsareexcludedforbothyears,FCDO’sshareincreasedfrom79%to84%

ofthetotal.TrendsinFCDObilateralaidbyregionFCDOistheUK’sprimary

aid-spendingdepartment,andthepreliminary

statistics

oninternational

development

providemoredetailonFCDO’sspendingthantheUK

asawhole.Asin

previousyears,AfricawastheregiontoreceivethehighestshareofFCDO’sregion-allocable

bilateralaid.However,thegapbetweenAfricaandAsiahasnarrowedsubstantially.Bothareovershadowedbythe

significantrisein

non-allocableaidwhichnowaccountsfor

45%of

FCDO’sbilateralaid.Mostof

thisaidreaches

recipientcountries,

but

indirectly.UKaidtrendsin

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9Figure4:Trendsinbilateralaidbyregion:percentageofFCDObilateralaidreceivedby

regionseach

year,GBPbillions50Non-allocable44%4545%40353029%%25Africa24%2015105AsiaEuropeAmericasPacific02012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022Source:DIanalysis

of

UKStatistics

onInternationalDevelopment.Notes:Datarefersto

constant2021GBP

billions,

net

disbursementsuntil2017andgrant-equivalenttermsthereafter.•45%of

FCDO’sbilateralisnotallocablebyregion.Thiscategoryincludesnumeroustypesofspending,suchascontributionstoBritishInternationalInvestment(BII

–the

UK’s

developmentfinanceinstitution),

corecontributionstoNGOs,andcontributionsgiven

tomultilateralorganisationsforspecificpurposes(‘multi-bi’aid).Whilesuchprogrammescanbeuseful,

the

risein

non-allocableaid(from29%in2012to45%in

2022)

obscurestheultimatebeneficiariesofUKaid.

Wediscussthedrivers

ofthistrend

in

the

section

below.••Therisein

non-allocableaidis

notspecifictotheUK

–theshareofDAC

bilateralODAwhichis

non

allocable

rosefrom25%

in

2012to

32%in

2021

–buttheFCDOincreasehasbeenmore

extreme.AsapercentageofFCDO’s

totalbilateralaid,aidto

Africadeclinedfrom30%in2021

to24%

in

2022.Thiscontinuesthesteadydeclinesince

2017whenAfrica’sshareofFCDO’sbilateralaidwas40%.••While

2022dataisnotyetavailablefortheUKasawhole,in2021Africareceivedthe

smallestshareof

theUK’sbilateralaidsincethe1970s.Asashareofregion-allocableaid,aidtoAfricadeclinedfrom

52%

in

2021to44%in2022.Thisfollows

adeclinein

2021fromashareof

55%in2020.

Thelargefallin

2022is

mainly

attributabletoanincreaseinaidto

Ukraine.UKaidtrendsin

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10••Europeneveraccountedformorethan

3%ofFCDO’s

bilateralaid,until2022whenit

increasedto

7%,from

1%in

2021.

Althoughwe

do

notyethaveacountrybreakdownof

bilateralspendingin2022,

this

islikelyaccountedforbytheincreasein

aid

toUkraine.

Aid

toUkrainein

2022wasestimatedtobeat

£307millioninconstant2021prices

(fromthewholeoftheUKgovernment),whichisroughly50%

morethantotalaidtoEuropefromtheUKin2021.Together,AfricaandAsiaaccountedfor93%ofregion-allocableaidin

2021,and81%of

aidin2022.Whilethesuddenfall

in2022isthe

resultof

increased

aidtoUkraine,theshareofaidaccountedforbythe

twolargestregionshasdeclinedinrecentyears,asaidtotheAmericashas

increased,albeitfromalowbaseline.In2012,theAmericas

accountedfor2%of

FCDO’sregionalbilateralaid.By

2021,thishaddoubledto

4%,andin

2022itincreasedto6%

despitethe

suddenincreasein

aid

toUkraine.•Theshareofregionalaidspentin

AsiabyFCDOhasbeenrelativelystatic.In2022,Asiareceived37%ofFCDO’sbilateralaid,the

sameshareas

in2010.Whileit

accountedfor41%in2021,this

wasstillslightlybelowits

peak

in2019,despitetheUK’stalkofanIndo-Pacifictiltinforeignpolicy.12UK’sspendingonin-donorrefugeecostsincontextThenarrativearoundaidspendingin

2022

wasdominatedbythe

reactionto

Russia’sinvasionof

Ukraine.Thisledto

large

increasesin

in-donorrefugee(IDRC)costs

bynearlyall

DACcountries.FortheDACasawhole,IDRCnow

accountsfor14%

oftotalODA.Thisisarecordhigh:

previously,thehighestshareofDACODA

thatwasspentonIDRCwas

11%

attheheightofthe

‘refugeecrisis’in

Europein2016followingthecivilwarin

Syria.However,

inthecaseoftheUK,this

isnot

thewholestory.As

wehave

documentedelsewhere,the

UK

sawsharpincreases

inIDRCbefore2022owingto

thecostsofaccommodatingasylum-seekersintemporaryaccommodation.UKaidtrendsin

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11Figure5:In-donorrefugeecosts,

US$billions,constant2021pricesUS$billions01234567UnitedStatesUnitedKingdomGermanyPolandFranceItalyIrelandSwitzerlandNetherlandsSpainCanadaCzechiaDenmarkNorwayFinlandSwedenAustriaBelgiumJapanLithuaniaGreeceSloveniaPortugalNewZealandKoreaIcelandSlovakRepublicHungaryLuxembourgAustraliaSource:DIanalysis

of

OECDDAC

Table1.Notes:Dataisinconstant2021US$billions,

netdisbursements.•Inabsoluteterms,theUKspentthesecondlargestamountonin-donorrefugeecostsoutof

allDACmembers,spendingUS$4.84billioninconstant2021prices(£3.5billioninconstant2021prices).ItovertookGermany

(whichspentUS$4.78billion)despiteGermanyhavingapproximatelysix

timesmorerefugeesthantheUK.13

TheonlycountrytospendmorewastheUS

whichspent

US$6.22billion.TheUK

spent29%ofitsODA

onIDRC

in2022.This

wasthefourthlargestproportion,

behindIreland(51%),Poland

(65%)

andCzechia(65%).••Australiaand

Luxembourg

bothchoosenotto

countIDRCin

theirODAfigures.Severalothercountries(inparticular,the

Netherlands

andSweden)

areUKaidtrendsin

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12consideringcappingtheamountofODA

thatcan

spentonthiscategory.ThisinstarkcontrasttotheUK,wheretheDevelopmentMinisterAndrewMitchellhasreiteratedseveraltimesthatalleligiblecostswouldbecounted.14•TheUK

has

not

alwaystakenthisapproach.Before2010,theUKdidnotrecordanyIDRCdespiteincurringcoststhatwouldhavebeeneligible.

Between2010and2012(whenAndrewMitchellwasalsoDevelopmentMinister),theUKcountedaverysmallshareofcosts.At

that

time,the

UK

recordedroughly

£780perpersonin

IDRC,

comparedtoaround£20,000in

2022.TheUKhasthehighestpercapitain-donorrefugeecostsinEuropeFigure6:

Estimated

IDRCpercapitaagainstGDPpercapita3000025000UK20000150001000050000020000400006000080000100000120000GDPpercapita

(constant2017PPP)Source:DIanalysis

of

OECDDAC

Table1,

WorldBankDevelopment

Indicators,

UNCHRpopulationstatistics,andUNHCRUkrainerefugeesituationdataportalstatistics

pastdatahosted

by

the

ONE

Campaign.Notes:Estimatesoftotalnumbersof

refugeesbycountry

areacombinationoftotalasylumapplicationsfor2022(excluding

Ukraine)

andthenumberof

refugees

recordedineachcountrybyUNHCRattheend

of

2022.Thisisanapproximationascostsarecountedforoneyearfromthedateofarefugee’s

arrival,

andso

somecostsofrefugeesarriving

in2022willbecountedin2023.

However,

UNHCRpopulationstatistics

areannual.•WhilecountriesrecordvastlydifferentamountsofIDRC,thepopulationofrefugeesalsodiffersconsiderablyacrosscountries,and

soamorereasonablewayofmakingcross-countrycomparisonsistoexaminecostspercapita.UKaidtrendsin

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13However,this

isdifficultbecauserefugeenumbersarenot

harmonisedwithODAfigures.ForEuropeancountries,weestimatetherefugeepopulationeligibletoreceiveODA

basedon

the

numberofasylumapplicationswithinayear

addedtothenumberofUkrainians

in

saidcountryaccordingtothe

UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees

(UNHCR).Forthefollowinganalysis

on

IDRCpercapita,it

shouldbebornein

mindthatthisis

onlyanapproximation.TheUK

hadthehighestper

capitaIDRC

amongEuropeancountries,spendingroughlyUS$24,000perrefugee/asylumseeker.

Thisis47%higherthanIrelandwhichspendsthe

secondlargestamountperrefugee(US$16,000percapita).Percapitacostsacrosscountriesarecloselycorrelatedwithaveragecostsoflivinginthosecountries.

Incountries

withahighercostofliving,providingthesamebundleofservicesto

refugeesismoreexpensivethanin

countrieswithlowercostsofliving,andsopercapitaIDRCwill

generally

behigher.Weapproximatecostof

livingbycountry

with

GDPpercapita.The

correlationbetweenGDPpercapitaandestimatedIDRC

percapitais

0.85(whenexcludingtheUK

whichisaclearoutlier).•••••AtUS$45,000,theUK’sGDPpercapitaisroughlyequaltothe

median

ofEuropeanDACmembers.TheUK’spercapitaIDRCfarexceeds

thoseof

othercountries

withasimilarGDP

percapita.For

example,

France

alsohasaGDPpercapitaofUS$45,000,but

haspercapitaIDRCofaroundUS$7,000,lessthanathirdofthatintheUK.Asexploredinthis

blog

by

Development

Initiatives,UK

costshavespiralledbecauseofthecostof

hostingasylumseekersintemporaryaccommodation

–primarilycommercialhotels.This

beganasapublichealthmeasureduringtheCovid-19pandemic

whentherewererestrictionsonbeinginpublic.Butthe

useofhotels

haspersisteddespiteconcernsfromrefugee-focusedNGOs.Giventheasylumapplicationnumberspublishe